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Jeremy Corbyn (Islington, North) rose—
Mr. Roy Beggs (East Antrim) rose—
Mr. Straw: I shall give way first to my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn).
Jeremy Corbyn: Will my right hon. Friend explain why the Iraqi assistance fund is under the control not of the UN, but of Britain and the US? The fund has access to all the Iraqi foreign reserves frozen during the Saddam regime. It is busy handing out contracts for reconstruction, mainly to American companies, and it also has access to all the oil revenues that are coming in. Is my right hon. Friend surprised that there is growing opposition in Iraq to the US presence there?
Mr. Straw: I suggest that my hon. Friend read the terms of the resolution. It is true that operational paragraph 12 establishes the fund, to be held by the central bank of Iraq and subject to the directions of the coalition provisional authority, for the time being. However, the fund is to be audited by independent public accountants approved by an independent monitoring and advisory board. That board includes representatives of the UN Secretary-General, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and certain regional bodies. Moreover, the money can be used only for the benefit of the people of Iraq. That, too, will be audited.
It is therefore simply wrong of my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North to suggest that there is any possibility that the funds could somehow be siphoned off for the benefit of the members of the coalition. The coalition has power over the funds because of its obligations as the occupying power.
One of the things that I insisted should be included in the initial draft of the resolution—and there was some reticence about this—was an acknowledgement that we were the occupying power, as defined under the fourth Geneva convention and the Hague regulations. That acknowledgement imposed very significant obligations, and it was not a role that the UN wanted at that stage, especially given the controversial history of the occupation.
Mr. Beggs: I have no doubt that the concealed evidence will, in time, be exposed. However, intelligence gathering in Iraq remains up to date. The disabled
special Olympics team there has been identified. We have had commitments in the House that resources will be available to enable that team to participate in the games. Can the Foreign Secretary give me an assurance—
Madam Deputy Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman's intervention is going rather wide of the motion.
Mr. Straw: I have discussed that matter with my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence. There are difficulties about pursuing the hon. Gentleman's suggestion, but I will take it up again with my right hon. Friend, and I will write to the hon. Gentleman.
Dr. Tonge: Will the Foreign Secretary explain under which international law an occupying power can be responsible for humanitarian aid and reconstruction of the occupied country?
Mr. Straw: The fourth Geneva convention and the protocol, and the Hague regulations. A good abstract exists of both those sets of international instruments, and I shall make a copy available to the hon. Lady.
My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister set out in detail, both at Prime Minister's questions and in his statement about the G8 summit, the arrangements that the coalition forces are making to step up their efforts to investigate sites, documentation and individuals concerned with Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programmes. There is no need for me to repeat what he said.
The motion focuses, as the right hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife (Mr. Campbell) said, on the claim that weapons of mass destruction were capable of being used at 45 minutes' notice. It further recalls the Government's contention that those weapons posed
- "an imminent danger to the United Kingdom and its forces".
Mr. John Bercow (Buckingham) rose—
Mr. Straw: I will give way later, but I want to make some progress.
Let me make it clear why Ministers and the Joint Intelligence Committee regarded the information in our dossier as reliable, including the claim—far more carefully worded in the dossier than in newspaper rewordings of it—that Saddam's military planning allowed for some of the weapons of mass destruction to be readied within 45 minutes of an order to use them. That seems to me to be an unremarkable claim, since most materiel can be made available within 45 minutes
of an order to use it; indeed, the order to use it is often not given until it is known that the materiel is available for use.
Mr. Michael Portillo (Kensington and Chelsea): When the Prime Minister made the decision to include the 45-minute point in the foreword, did any security official remonstrate with him to say that that point, reliant as it was on a single source of information, did not bear sufficient weight to be included over the Prime Minister's signature?
Mr. Straw: I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his question. Let me deal with the provenance of the dossier. The 45 days—[Hon. Members: "Forty-five minutes."] I am sorry.
Mr. Patrick McLoughlin (West Derbyshire): The truth is coming out now.
Mr. Straw: The intelligence on 45 minutes came, as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said, from an established and reliable source, not a defector, who has been reporting to us secretly for some years. The intelligence became available at the end of August. It was discussed by the Joint Intelligence Committee in the first week of September. It was included straight away in classified JIC documents. The fact that it had already been included in JIC assessments before its appearance in the public dossier puts in perspective the wilder accusations in the media.
Let me deal with the point made by the right hon. Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Mr. Portillo)—
Mr. Crispin Blunt (Reigate) rose—
Mr. Straw: No, I shall deal first with the point made by the right hon. Member for Kensington and Chelsea, and I will then give way to the hon. Member for Buckingham (Mr. Bercow).
A dossier was prepared. It was in draft, and it was discussed in the normal way. Then it went back to the head of the JIC and his colleagues for final approval. I saw the draft; I cannot remember exactly what comments I made on it, but they will be among the evidence given to the Intelligence and Security Committee. A draft of the foreword was then prepared. That, too, was subject to discussion with and agreement from the head of the JIC to ensure, plainly, that what was in the foreword was entirely consistent with what was in the body of the document.
Mr. Portillo: I am awfully sorry, but I do not think that the right hon. Gentleman has answered my point. Of course it is axiomatic that what was in the foreword was consistent with the body of the report. What I asked was whether, when the reference was moved from the body of the report to the foreword, to stand above the Prime Minister's signature and be given the extra emphasis of having the Prime Minister's signature below it, intelligence officers made any representation to the Prime Minister, or any other Minister, that, given
the provenance of the information, it did not bear sufficient weight to stand above the Prime Minister's signature.
Mr. Straw: I do not accept what the right hon. Gentleman is saying. If he has a copy—[Hon. Members: "Answer."] The right hon. Member for Kensington and Chelsea is saying that he does not believe that the point about 45 minutes deserved the prominence that the Prime Minister gave it in the report.
Mr. Portillo: I am awfully sorry, but perhaps I am not speaking loudly enough. I am asking the Foreign Secretary a question. When the Prime Minister submitted a draft of the foreword, including the 45-minute point within it, did any intelligence officers remonstrate with the Prime Minister, or any other Minister, to say that they did not believe it should stand in the foreword because it was based on only a single source? If the answer is no, we can all move on.
Mr. Straw: The answer is no, and we can all move on.
Mr. Bercow: Given that the Prime Minister displayed such admirable statesmanship in the run-up to and conduct of the war against Saddam Hussein, and given that the people responsible for weapons detection are different from those responsible for national reconstruction in Iraq, why is it only now, as we learned at Prime Minister's Questions, that a new body is being established to intensify the search for weapons of mass destruction? In broad terms, within what time scale can we expect that work to be completed and reported?
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