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Mr. Bernard Jenkin (North Essex): I am grateful to the Minister for his statement. Before responding, I would like to correct the record. I do not believe that the Leader of the House deliberately misled the House, but we never insisted on having an oral statement "tomorrow." We were always perfectly happy about an oral statement today, but we believe that it is important that we should always have an oral statement, as a matter of principle, in respect of any new deployment into any new theatre. I am sure that the whole House would agree.
Nobody could possibly object to the proposition that the Congo crisis is crying out for international intervention. That country that has been racked by tribal civil war and has been plundered for decades by neighbouring states for oil, gold and diamonds. We fully support intervention by the international community to stem the latest bloodshed. However, the conflict has claimed some 4 million lives since 1998 and the Minister has not explained what such a small intervention can truly achieve. What he did say is, "It is exactly how we envisage the EU's security and defence policy developing—as the practical expression of a common foreign and security policy." The deployment raises many questions about the assurances given to the House and to President Bush that NATO would always have first refusal over EU operations and would always be involved in the planning. Is this statement on the serious crisis in the Congo really the occasion to experiment with new and untried EU military structures and for the Minister to make political points about their highly controversial European security and defence policy? The crisis demands our best effort, because this small but complex operation may put at risk our servicemen's lives.
Given the Government's commitment to NATO and NATO's proven and tested abilities to plan and command operations of this sort, the Minister should explain why we did not press for NATO to lead the operation, just as NATO is leading peacekeeping in Kabul without any direct US military involvement.
A European security and defence policy operation is clearly more risky. The German former chief of NATO's military committee, General Klaus Naumann, has warned of the "casual approach of politicians", and that "soldiers risk dying" because of politicians' "ambitious decisions". Furthermore, a French military briefing paper obtained by The Guardian described the operation as
- "politically and militarily high risk; very sensitive and complex",
- "This is the most cynical military briefing I've read in my entire life. Everybody is just laughing at it."
In order to allay any concern, can the Minister set out the military mission for the operation? He seemed keener to talk about the ESDP, but said nothing about the military mission. What are the benchmarks for its success, and what are the key risks? Realistically, what impact can 1,400 soldiers have in a country the size of Europe? How can a mere 1,400 soldiers avoid being overwhelmed by the scale of the humanitarian crisis in Bunia? What humanitarian aid will be available to support military operations there? What are the provisions for reinforcement, if necessary, and what are the means of extracting the force in an emergency?
The French briefing paper is reported to confirm that the deployment will have negligible impact on the tribal conflict. Francois Grignon of the International Crisis Group has written:
- "This intervention is, on the face of it, totally insufficient to meet the needs of Ituri's pacification."
Mr. Ingram: I welcome the hon. Gentleman's initial comments about full support for the intervention, but the thrust of his comments was that it would have been better done under NATO than under ESDP. Of course, NATO could have become involved if it had wished, but it did not. The ESDP process was then triggered. That was always envisaged when the process was set up.
I take exception to the hon. Gentleman's comment that the very nature of the deployment would place additional risk on the lives of our personnel. There is not one shred of evidence for that and when the hon. Gentleman raises such scares, he has to recognise the possible impact on morale. It was a wholly unacceptable approach to adopt.
The potential humanitarian crisis and other threats that may exist—such as people pouring in to safer areas or outbreaks of major diseases and pestilence—have all formed part of the force planning that has been undertaken, in recognition of the fact that it will be a small deployment. The hon. Gentleman asked under what mandate we act and what approach we will take. I suggest that he reads the UN Security Council resolution, which states that the Security Council:
- "Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations . . . Authorizes the deployment until 1 September 2003 of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force in Bunia, in close co-ordination with MONUC,"—
- "in particular its contingent currently deployed in the town, to contribute to the stabilization of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, to ensure the protection of the airport, the internally displaced persons in the
- camps in Bunia and, if the situation requires it, to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, United Nations personnel and the humanitarian presence in the town . . . Stresses that this Interim Emergency Multinational Force is to be deployed on a strictly temporary basis to allow the Secretary-General to reinforce MONUC's presence in Bunia and in this regard, authorises the Secretary-General to deploy, within the overall authorised MONUC ceiling, a reinforced United Nations presence to Bunia, and requests him to do so by mid-August 2003."
I hope that I have answered the questions raised by the hon. Gentleman. He is clearly concerned because the ESDP is involved, but that does not diminish the quality of the personnel who will be put in place. They will do a thorough and professional job, as they always do, no matter which flag they are doing it under.
Mr. Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow): Albeit that the House is relatively empty, let us understand that this is a momentous statement. With trepidation and foreboding, I support the Government's actions. I was chosen by Mr. Speaker Weatherill as the leader of the Inter-Parliamentary Union delegation to Zaire in November 1990 and I just hope that Ministers understand the bitter tribal divisions in that place. We will be going into a morass, and it is not a place for a token force to achieve anything. The Minister says September and refers to strict dates. I hope he is right, but let us not mistake the momentous nature of what we are doing.
Mr. Ingram: Not for one moment do the Government, or any other country involved, underestimate the scale of the problem, which is long-running and will not be easily resolved. That is why I said in my opening statement that a military solution is unlikely. We have to move forward on a range of fronts. I am grateful for my hon. Friend's support. In one sense, the decision is indeed momentous, because it shows a clear commitment in Europe to take on difficult tasks that we have been requested by the UN to address. We understand wholly the deep, bitter tribal divisions that exist, and that could fragment even further. The scene is constantly shifting, with supporters moving from faction to faction. The UN has to understand that, and it does. It has to tackle it, and it is trying. We will give it support in what it is trying to achieve.
Mr. Paul Keetch (Hereford): I thank the Minster for advance warning of his announcement. We do not believe that today is the day to rehearse arguments about European integration. We welcome the positive response by the Government to the request for troops to be sent to the Congo, under EU authority. I am sure that it is with some discomfort that our armed forces face yet another commitment in the present circumstances, but the Minister is right to point out that the strategic defence review acknowledged that as a permanent member of the UN Security Council Britain has a responsibility to contribute to international peacekeeping missions.
The shadow of Rwanda will fall over this mission. There is a need for many more troops than those on their way to the Congo. According to a leaked French military document—as the hon. Member for North Essex (Mr. Jenkin) said—the force will not be able to disarm the militia or stop the war, merely protect civilians. While it is right that we should not know the exact rules of engagement, can the Minister assure the House that they are sufficiently robust to protect our troops in the field, and the civilians in their care?
What efforts are the Government making to convince other nations to contribute, both from within the EU and outside it? Will there be a reserve call-out associated with this deployment? Can we learn the lessons from Sierra Leone? Can we ensure that all personnel on their way to the region receive appropriate protection against diseases? Will the malaria prevention issued be the same as in Sierra Leone? As with Sierra Leone, we need to know what the exit strategy is—as the Father of the House said. The French have said they will commit only to 1 September, after which they will hand over command to the Bangladeshis. Do we leave with the French, or wait for the Bangladeshis?
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