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3.57 pm
Mr. Paul Keetch (Hereford): The House has just heard a very moving speech from the hon. Member for North Thanet (Mr. Gale), and I hope that the Minister was listening in particular to the earlier remarks about press coverage of certain aspects of the war. The hon. Gentleman's remarks were very important, and I hope that the Ministry of Defence's review of the involvement in Iraq will deal with the press issue as well.
It is of course right to begin by congratulating the British armed forces on their continuing professionalism and hard work in difficult circumstances, which I witnessed myself on a trip to Basra and southern Iraq with the Minister of State and the hon. Member for North Essex (Mr. Jenkin). The decision to go to war in Iraq split this nation and, indeed, this Parliament, but the whole country has rightly been united in praise for the work of the armed forces, and I repeat that praise now. We should also praise their families because they also suffer who wait at home. Indeed, some 37 have had to accept paying the final price; we are fortunate that the number was not much greater.
The war in Iraq has had many implications for our armed forces and for our country as a whole. The lessons for the MOD are many—from equipment to logistics, from inoculations to pay. On visiting our forces in Iraq, I discovered that they were rightly proud of the job that they had done and were in good spirits, but there were several issues that they asked me to raise, and I hope that the Under-Secretary will respond to them in his reply.
The Father of the House mentioned logistic supplies, with which there were some considerable problems. I was told of a container that went missing for eight weeks. It was to be collected the day after I left—after peace had actually been won. Mention has been made of parcels sent from relatives to the troops, but the troops also like to send parcels back. They have to pay for
doing so—I do not know why. I have also been told that flights arranged from Germany for families to visit troops were arbitrarily cut from two per soldier to one. Can the Minister confirm whether that is true? There were other problems—more serious, in some respects—such as small arms ammunition shortages, which were rife at the beginning of the campaign. Air Marshall Brian Burridge referred to the problem with boots at the Defence Committee yesterday, and we also heard that the desert camouflage arrived too late.Troops were concerned about other aspects of the war, particularly what they saw first hand of the looting. For example, every desk and computer was looted from Basra university, and the troops wanted to know why there were no plans in place to deploy them to help the situation. Amazingly, they were told that they had to protect various Ministry buildings and the land registry, but there were no plans to protect hospitals or universities.
Some positive things resulted. The reconstruction effort has been first class. The phone calls and the operational welfare package were well received, as were the e-blueys. Some of the equipment worked well: Challenger 2 was exceptional, Storm Shadow was very good and Raptor excellent. As one of the most vehement critics of the SA80 rifle, may I put on record my acknowledgement of the fact that it at last appears to be working correctly. I congratulate the Ministry of Defence on that: it has taken time, but it has finally got it right. The purchase of the Minimi light machine gun has also been welcomed by all the forces.
Our forces over there, like people here, were also asking questions about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. They want to know whether there were intelligence failures, whether reports were exaggerated, why they were not told of a tactical threat and why they crossed the line in some cases with no training in how to put on their nuclear, biological and chemical equipment. They, too, had doubts about the reality of the threat. We owe it to the people who put their lives on the line to establish whether the threat was indeed real.
The issue stemming from the recent conflict in Iraq that will probably have the greatest direct impact on our armed forces is that of overstretch. The hon. Member for Mid-Norfolk (Mr. Simpson) rightly referred to what the retiring Chief of the Defence Staff said about the "serious pain" that would be inflicted if we were to undertake such an operation again. We recall that in February 2002 the Secretary of State told the House:
- "We are using available resources to their maximum capability."—[Official Report, 11 February 2002; Vol. 380, c. 4.]
Can the Minister tell us how many troops will be needed in Iraq for how long, and how many reservists will be sent out again? We know that it is a difficult judgment, but our forces need to be given some idea—will it be six months, 12 months, five years, or what? I think that they should be told. We also know that reservists are being relied on to a significant extent, and
there is anxiety about that. Without assistance from other nations to take the strain in peacekeeping, such a deployment for the British Army alone is unsustainable.The strategic defence review projected that a brigade level force could be sustained in theatre indefinitely. Given that the current force in Iraq is considerably larger than anything the SDR envisaged, there must be either a size or a time limit to our deployment. The risk of unsustainability is even greater because pressures on reservists might encourage many to leave. With 48 per cent. of the reserve air forces reserves committed to operations and the Territorial Army undermanned in all but three units, are there any signs that the recent overstretch is affecting recruitment and retention in the reserves? I am told that there are.
Have estimates been made of expected outflow rates of regulars after the war in Iraq? That could also prove a problem. We have all heard reports from regulars and reservists that explain why some now want to leave the armed forces. Many reservists were not fully briefed about compensation packages before going to Iraq, and many who applied for hardship allowances have not yet received their payments. In some cases, payments of standard awards have been delayed. SI No. 309, the regulation governing compensation, was introduced in 1997 and is clearly outdated. Are there any plans to update it?
It is not only the financial arrangements that have been less than satisfactory. The vaccination programme that many of our reservists were asked to take has made some of them sick. There have been many reports of reservists receiving cocktails of inoculations in a short space of time, even including anthrax. That practice, which seems to have been followed regularly, is in stark contrast to MOD policy, as expressed in the House by the Secretary of State. Two reservists fell so ill after their inoculations that they could not even make it to the Gulf.
I hope that the Minister will confirm what instructions were given by the MOD about the administration of vaccines. Are five vaccinations in one day too many? What are we doing to ensure that reservists are monitored for any problems that they may have with Gulf war sickness—whether we believe it exists or not? We should not forget those people from Gulf war one who are still battling so hard to make their points known.
Mr. Paul Tyler (North Cornwall): As my hon. Friend knows, I take a close interest in questions relating to Gulf war one and the veterans. Does he accept that while we all welcome the fact that the MOD has been much more proactive with an assessment of possible illness from vaccination and other factors after recent hostilities, that is in itself a recognition that it was inadequately covered after the 1991 conflict?
Mr. Keetch: My hon. Friend has been one of the leaders in the House on that issue. I noticed that the Minister appeared to suggest that it was not a problem to have five vaccinations in one day. If that is the case, I would like to know why the Secretary of State for Defence said:
- "it is not sensible to inflict on our forces a large number of inoculations simultaneously".—[Official Report, 20 January 2003; Vol. 398, c. 37.]
Mr. Keetch: I am sorry that the Minister takes a cavalier attitude to the issue. Perhaps he could explain that to Mr. Tony Barker, a 46-year-old who has been a TA soldier for 26 years.
Dr. Moonie: There was nothing cavalier about pointing out that it is normal clinical practice—as a doctor, I am well aware of that—to give cocktails of vaccinations, and it does no harm at all.
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