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Aircraft Carriers

Mr. Wray: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what delays have occurred so far in the aircraft carrier programme: what recent discussions his Department has held with BAE and Thales; and whether he expects the in-service date to be met. [118272]

Mr. Ingram: Work is progressing on the future aircraft carrier project consistent with our plan at the commencement of the CVF Assessment Phase, under which we expect to award the Demonstration and Manufacture (D and M) contract in spring 2004. MOD officials meet regularly with BAE Systems and Thales UK as part of the routine business of the Assessment Phase.

Our target in-service dates for the two new carriers remain 2012 and 2015. Estimates for their delivery will be developed progressively during the remainder of the

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Assessment Phase, taking account of the maturing carrier design. Expected in-service dates will be confirmed when we place the D and M contract.

Mr. Wray: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence which parts of the aircraft carriers being built under the future aircraft carrier project will be built in foreign shipyards; and if he will make a statement. [118273]

Mr. Ingram: In line with Government policy on building warships for the Royal Navy, the future aircraft carriers will be built in the United Kingdom. As my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence announced on 30 January 2003, our planning is proceeding under the assumption that the carriers will be built by a combination of four yards: BAE Systems Marine at Govan, Vosper Thornycroft at Portsmouth, Swan Hunter on Tyneside, and Babcock BES at Rosyth. However, the involvement of other UK yards has not been ruled out.

Armed Forces Funding

Mr. Jenkins: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether funding for the armed forces is determined by the planned number of servicemen; and what the impact on funding is of a shortfall in the number serving. [119237]

Mr. Ingram: Funding for Defence is decided as part of the biennial Spending Review process and takes into account all the factors relevant to the delivery of the Ministry of Defence's Public Service Agreement, including service manpower plans. Defence funding will next be reviewed as part of Spending Review 2004 when any changes in service manpower numbers and plans will be taken into account.

Cluster Munitions

Joan Ruddock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) what recent independent evidence has been gathered by his Department on failure rates of cluster munitions; [116812]

(2) what target his Department has set for a failure rate in cluster munitions. [116817]

Mr. Ingram [holding answer 5 June 2003]: Weapons containing cluster munitions are currently in service with the Army and Royal Air Force. The Army systems consist of Shell 155mm HE Extended Range Bomblet Shell (ERBS) and Multiple Launch Rocket System.

Acceptance tests for the latest purchase of Shell 155mm HE ERBS have confirmed a maximum failure rate of 2 per cent., which is consistent with the results of Director Royal Artillery tests of 1994. The target reliability rate for ERBS is not less than 95 per cent.

For the MLRS, US Government test reports, based on 15 years worth of data, indicate a failure rate of between 5 and 10 per cent., dependent on ground conditions and range. Although there is no target failure rate for the current MLRS system, its replacement (the future GMLRS Area Effects Munition (AEM)) due in service in 2007, has a target failure rate of less than 1 per cent. for bomblet sub-munitions.

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The RAF system consists of the BL755 cluster bomb, routine surveillance of a representative sample of weapons is carried out by the Design Authority (Insys Ltd.) on behalf of the Ministry of Defence. Recent statistics show an overall failure rate of 6 per cent. which is in line with expectations.

Departmental Agencies

Mr. Jenkin: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will state in cash terms the (a) provision and (b) outturn for each of his Department's agencies since financial year 1997–98. [117501]

Mr. Ingram: This information is not held centrally in the format requested and could be provided only at disproportionate cost.

However, Defence Agencies with an accounts direction from HM Treasury publish their own financial statements each year. Copies of these documents have been placed in the Library of the House.

Desert Combat Clothing

Mr. Jenkin: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what orders have been given to the Reserve Training and Mobilisation Centre at Chilwell for the withdrawal and then re-issue of desert combat clothing; and if he will make a statement. [119197]

Mr. Ingram: In accordance with Materiel Regulations for the Army, the Reserve Training and Mobilisation Centre at Chilwell withdraw from demobilised Reservists all additional kit above standard TA clothing scales, with the exception of next to skin items such as Socks and T-shirts. Desert Combat Clothing (DCC) is not part of standard TA clothing scales and is therefore withdrawn from Reservists. It is standard practice to return laundered kit (including DCC) to stock for re-issue.

Hovercraft

Mr. Wray: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) when hovercraft were last used in military operations by British forces and in what way; and if he will make a statement on hovercraft capability; [116240]

(2) what assessment has been made of the value of hovercraft to amphibious and other military operations; how many are in service with the armed forces; if there are plans to increase numbers; and if he will make a statement. [116239]

Mr. Ingram: Hovercraft were used during the recent operations in Iraq for tasks including reconnaissance and mine clearance. The advantages of hovercraft include speed, the ability to access a higher percentage of beaches than conventional craft, the ability to travel over small obstacles and in shallow water and a relatively high level of immunity from the threat of mines.

Currently, the Royal Marines (539ASRM) operate four Griffon 2000 TDX hovercraft. They have the capacity to lift 12 fully equipped troops or 2 x 1000kg pallets of stores and are capable of deployment in C130 Hercules aircraft. It is expected that the current fleet of hovercraft will be replaced in around 2007. There are no

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plans at present to increase overall numbers, although this will be kept under review, for example, in light of lessons learned from operations in Iraq.

Mr. Wray: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what recent research has been undertaken in developing the hovercraft; and what finance was allocated to this research. [116241]

Mr. Ingram: No funding has recently been allocated to developing the hovercraft. The technology is well established and suitable craft are available as military off-the-shelf procurements or as modifications of commercial civilian designs.

Mr. Wray: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what representations have been made by (a) private developers and (b) British forces representatives about the military use of hovercraft; and what discussions have taken place with manufacturing companies in the United States and United Kingdom regarding the development of hovercraft. [116242]

Mr. Ingram: There have been a number of routine fact-finding visits and meetings involving Ministry of Defence personnel and representatives of industry to establish the military utility of Hovercraft. These have included representations by companies based in the United Kingdom and United States. Most recently the Griffon 8000TD Hovercraft, a larger version of the 2000 TDX hovercraft current used by Royal Marines, was demonstrated to UK Military staff on 15 May 2003.

Iraq

Sir Michael Spicer: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what his latest estimate is of the cost of the war in Iraq. [119005]

Mr. Ingram: The Ministry of Defence identifies the costs of Operations in terms of the net additional costs it has incurred. The costs, which the MOD would have incurred had the operation not been undertaken—expenditure on wages and salaries or on conducting training exercises for example—are deducted from the total costs of the operation.

Calculating all the costs of military action will take some time to determine since it will include the cost of ammunition, bombs and guided weapons consumed in excess of peacetime levels and the cost of equipment destroyed and damaged. These sums are likely to be significant. However excluding those costs, the latest estimate is that the net additional cost of Operations in Iraq for 2002–03 will not exceed £1 billion; the amount set aside at spring Supplementary Estimates 2002–03.

It is too early to estimate the costs in 2003–04.

Lynne Jones: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what discussions he has had with (a) the Secretary of State for International Development and (b) the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance regarding the restitution of the refuse collection system in Baghdad. [116258]

Mr. Hoon: I have had no specific discussions with either the Secretary of State for International Development, or the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), as ORHA is now termed, concerning the restitution of the refuse collection system in Baghdad.

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However, improving sanitation is among the Coalition's top priorities in the reconstruction of Iraq, and the CPA has recently facilitated the removal of almost a third of the 300,000 cubic metres of refuse that it is estimated remain uncollected in Baghdad.

Paul Flynn: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many cluster bombs were used by British forces during the recent campaign in Iraq; and what assessment he has made of the number of unexploded cluster bombs in Iraq. [116927]

Mr. Ingram: United Kingdom forces used some 66 RBL755 air-delivered cluster bombs, each containing 147 bomblets, for which recent statistics show an overall failure rate of 6 per cent. and some 2,098 artillery-delivered L20 extended range bomblet shells, each containing 49 bomblets, which have a proven maximum bomblet failure rate of 2 per cent. Further evaluation of the latter will be required to establish the exact rate on the ground. We do not have comparable assessments for the rates of unexploded cluster munitions not delivered by UK forces.

Mr. Gardiner: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether his Department has a programme for the removal of landmines in Iraq. [117038]

Mr. Ingram: Providing a safe, secure and risk free environment for the Iraqi people is a key aspect of restoration activity for the coalition. The United Kingdom itself has made a significant effort to educate the local population in its area of operations about the dangers of mines and unexploded ordnance, but the actual responsibility for developing a programme for the removal of landmines rests with the Iraq Mine Action Centre (IMAC) and not the UK military. The UK and the IMAC are in the process of marking and documenting around 400 unexploded ordnance sites. In addition to this, the UK has, with the support of UNICEF and the ICRC, developed a Theatre Mine Risk Education programme. A poster and leaflet campaign has been carried out, head teachers in Basrah have been briefed and military teams are delivering mine and unexploded ordnance awareness training to primary and secondary schools on a daily basis using material approved by the ICRC. In addition to this, local radio stations are informing the local population about unexploded ordnance and encouraging them not to tamper with anything that has either been marked as or may look like unexploded ordnance.

Norman Baker: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what his latest estimate is of the number of Iraqis who died in the recent conflict in that country, broken down by (a) military personnel and (b) civilians. [117369]

Mr. Ingram [holding answer 9 June 2003]: We make every effort to minimise any impact of the coalition's military action on the Iraqi population. We have no means of ascertaining the numbers of Iraqi military personnel or civilians killed during the conflict.

Mr. Jim Cunningham: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what efforts are being made to protect citizens in Iraq from (a) entering the areas where unexploded bomblets are and (b) tampering with them. [118196]

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Mr. Ingram [holding answer 11 June 2003]: A coalition-wide operation is currently underway to check and mark all suspected areas of mine and unexploded ordnance contamination. In addition to this, the United Kingdom has made a significant effort to educate the local population in its area of operations about the dangers of mines and unexploded ordnance. UK forces, in conjunction with the Iraqi Mine Action Centre (a part of the Office of the Coalition Provisional Authority), are in the process of marking and documenting around 400 unexploded ordnance sites in the UK area of operation in Southern Iraq. Radio broadcasts are being used to inform the population of marking practices and encouraging them not to tamper with the markers. A Theatre Mine Risk Education Programme has been developed with the support of UNICEF and the ICRC. A poster and leaflet campaign has been carried out, head teachers in Basrah have been briefed and military teams are delivering mine/UXO awareness training to Primary and Secondary schools on a daily basis using material approved by the ICRC.

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