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Malcolm Bruce: The hon. Lady is making a fundamental point. Is not one of the problems with those who have become so opposed to the European Union that they are effectively advocating withdrawal that they have lost sight completely of the added value that working together brings, whether in dealing with asylum seekers or with the environment? She is right to say that we must find out where the value is added, and where retaining our independence is added value. If one cannot approach the debate in that fashion, one cannot realistically take part in it.

Ms Stuart: Indeed. It could be argued that this area, rather than being one in which the Convention has failed or missed the trick, was not part of our mandate. We did not look at policy itself. Therefore, whatever the constitutional implications of the document that comes out at the end of the intergovernmental conference, if anyone were to ask how the life of a citizen has changed at this point, the answer would be that it had not done so at all, because all the policies are carrying on as they were. It could be argued that the exercise should have been approached as if one were a chief executive of EU plc, asking which areas of competency work well, which things we should not do, and where we need new institutions. We did not approach it in that way, however.

Mr. Bercow: I want to challenge the hon. Lady's premise that it does not really matter which Executive, domestic or European, implements policy, but merely that there should be a chance to scrutinise it. I put it to her that there is an essential difference, on which my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (Mr. Redwood) touched in his intervention, which is that we should have the chance subsequently to change policy. There is a difference between this country choosing to

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legislate on social, cultural, environmental or economic matters, with the chance of change, and European institutions having the opportunity to do so, thereby removing from British parliamentarians the opportunity to secure change at a later date. That is the difference.

Ms Stuart: The point that I was trying to make was that the job of parliamentarians is scrutiny of the Executive. The Westminster Parliament's job is to scrutinise our Government and the European Parliament's job is to scrutinise the Commission. We need to learn to work much more closely with our MEPs so that we take the strategic approach that best represents our country.

It is not true that we shall lose the ability to implement nationally; we need to be much more clever about ensuring that we do at European level what is best done collectively.

Mr. Hendrick : Does my hon. Friend find it curious that 10 nations are clamouring to join the EU and have recently held referendums on that, yet the Opposition are doing their best to make out that the EU is a waste of time? They have gone as far as they could without saying that we should withdraw, even though we know that that is their real agenda.

Ms Stuart: Yes.

Michael Fabricant: That was a difficult one.

Ms Stuart: It was a valid intervention. It is curious that part of this country seems to have forgotten that EU membership has been in our collective interest and has served us well for the past 30 years. We should have a constructive and open debate about how we can continue to make it work with a Union of 25.

Mr. Ancram: I have been listening carefully to what the hon. Lady has been saying about the role of parliamentarians. On two occasions, she said that the job of Parliament is to scrutinise the Executive, but is it not also to authorise the Executive? The Executive take their power from the parliamentarians who are elected by the people. It is thus not quite right for her to criticise me for saying that power flows from national Parliaments. I repeat that they must be the fount of power, because their sovereignty stems from the people.

Ms Stuart: The right hon. Gentleman is right. However, the distinctions that I have been trying to draw for the past 15 months relate to how the sovereignty and authority that come from the nation state, through its rightfully elected Government—from Westminster in our case—are represented in the Council of Ministers. I do not want to turn national Parliaments into European institutions; that is not Westminster's job. National parliamentarians are at one remove from Europe. I was delighted to hear the Foreign Secretary say that he wanted to strengthen the early warning mechanism. It has already been strengthened in one way by giving a right of referral to the courts, but I should prefer there to be a red card saying "No".

The challenge is to Parliaments. An interparliamentary body—COSAC—already exists, almost unknown except by the small group of people

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who attend it. Over the 10 past years, COSAC has been unable to arrive at a common view. That is why the Convention document poses a huge challenge to national Parliaments.

I want to make a few comments about where I would draw the line, because that is how I shall judge the outcome of the IGC and whether the integrity of member states will be protected so as to ensure that the EU is not more than a union of states. I am not hung up about whether things are described as having a Community basis. Having spent the first 18 years of my life in a federal state, I realise that sometimes "federal" can mean decentralised.

In key institutional elements, the minority must not be overruled by the majority, so treaty ratification must be carried out by all member states. Similarly, the voluntary withdrawal clause in the document is a statement of the fact that a member may withdraw. If a constitution sets out that one can join a body, there must, logically, be provision for withdrawal. That is where we should focus our minds.

Opposition Members keep saying that we are going down a one-way street or that we are in a prison from which we cannot escape. I challenge them to make their case and to spell out the practical consequences of their view. They should not merely engage in scaremongering, but should really think things through. At some stage, I should like them to make the case that it would be in the United Kingdom's interest—

Sir Teddy Taylor : I am sorry to interrupt the hon. Lady, but, under article 57, there is no right for member states simply to withdraw if they want to. It is all spelt out on page 44, which says that they can discuss proposals with the Commission, but the proposals must be approved by a majority of the Council, then by the European Parliament. So the idea that that measure gives anyone the right to walk out of the European Union is, sadly, not true. It would be much better to have a voluntary organisation from which people could withdraw. Article 57 does not provide that right at all.

Ms Stuart: I can assure the hon. Gentleman that it does. It must be recognised that there is a Union interest if a member were to withdraw. Let us think through the political consequences if France, for example, decided to withdraw. There is a proper process. There is a time limit by which the European Council would have to take note of such a decision, but the political reality is that, for the first time, we have created a proper legal basis for that process. By the way, withdrawal was also possible before then; one country has withdrawn.

Sir Teddy Taylor: Greenland.

Ms Stuart: That was done under the Vienna convention, and it is much more proper, in my view, for the constitution to spell out a political process.

On the efficiency of the Union, the document proposes a smaller, much more effective Commission, and I had hoped that even Opposition Members would welcome that. I wish that the European Parliament would ask for the right to censor individual commissioners, as that would be the proper way to hold them to account. It gives a clearer delineation of responsibilities and a clearer way to take decisions.

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I do not for the life of me understand why the Opposition oppose the President of the European Council. There is something ambiguous about the language—I would have preferred to use the phrase "Chair of the European Council"—but if ever a new institutional structure strengthened the representation of the member states it is that very function. The Commission is elected for five years and has a permanent composition. The European Council is elected for five years and has a permanent composition.

The third part of the institutional triangle, which has to have equal sides, will be the 25 representatives, and they will have general elections, so the membership will change. However, the presidency changes every six months and, from my experience of three presidencies and chairing the group of national parliamentarians, I do not think that the rotating presidency is a terribly good idea. Even in those 15 months, we experienced three different lots of people in the chair. So the proposed process will be hugely strengthening.

Denzil Davies (Llanelli): Does my hon. Friend agree that the rotating presidency merely demonstrated that the Council of Ministers was not a central institution of the EU, like the Parliament, the European Courts and the Commission? That is why there was a rotating presidency. If we move away from that, we shall turn the Council of Ministers from an institution that represented member states into a kind of semi-centralised institution of the EU. That is the difference.


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