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Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: My hon. Friend is right. It was openly conceded on the continent among politicians at the Convention that that is the case. If we are to have a European state with its own currency, we need centralised economic management, including the management of taxes. The draft already contains

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provision for the erosion of the unanimity principle on taxation. That is one of the Government's red lines, but they will have to fight on many fronts. They need to take all the stuff about majority voting out before they start, and I know from bitter experience that international negotiation is not a one-way street. The bargaining process in the European Union is usually that one representative agrees to do something that is bad for his country, if the other also agrees to do something that is bad for his country. Everybody has to give way on something. The idea that we will be able to take everything within the red lines out, without having to accept anything in return, is fantastically innocent and naive.

Substantial areas of policy that must at present be decided under the unanimity process will be transferred to qualified majority voting. Giscard d'Estaing, the president of the Convention, last week mentioned 50 such areas. I have been able to count only just over 30, but I defer to his superior knowledge. The Foreign Secretary was asked early in the debate what the new areas of competence were, and I can add the example of energy, which has come from nowhere. There is presently no treaty base for EU legislation or action on energy policy in the existing treaties, but it now appears in the draft constitution. The power given will be to ensure the security of energy supply. I know from my earlier work as a junior Energy Minister that the Commission has been itching to gain some measure of control over North sea oil and gas, as a strategic reservoir in times of oil embargo or international disruption. That will give the Commission the ability to do that by majority voting. Clearly, that could override our own concerns.

Ms Stuart: The right hon. Gentleman has mentioned the debate about the move to QMV. The 50 areas identified by Giscard d'Estaing include matters such as court appointments. However, we must be clear that energy has been a shared competence, which the Commission adopted on the basis of article 308. As I understand it, the UK would prefer to put the matter on a proper footing in a treaty, rather then relying on that rather extensive article.

Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: I hate to disagree with the hon. Lady—whom I sometimes think of as my hon. Friend. We used to march together, on occasions, in our attempts to defend the interests of this House. However, on this matter I must disagree with her. I would rather have energy dealt with under the existing flexibility clause, as unanimity at least gives us a veto. Once it is moved to its own treaty base, matters to do with energy will be dealt with by QMV. Britain's unique interest in energy could be overridden, so I do not agree with the hon. Lady on that matter.

My point is that whole new legal bases were put into the draft constitution at quite a late stage. A bigger example is that of criminal justice and policing. The draft constitution contains powers to harmonise criminal laws and procedures by majority voting.

This House debated those sensitive matters very recently. Our ability to control and hold accountable magistrates, judges and the police, and our sense of ownership of our criminal justice system, are vital. Those matters lie at the heart of our work in this place,

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as does the concept of the nation state. We are dealing with the coercive power of the state over its citizens. A state can imprison people, and giving up that power in favour of some more remote jurisdiction is very dangerous. It certainly contradicts the instruction in the Laeken mandate to design a Union that is closer to its citizens.

How is a close Union created by taking decision making away from the citizen and from this House, and passing it upwards to a more remote tier of Government? I asked that question persistently in the Convention, and I was never given an answer.

I think that I can assert without any doubt that the structure and essence of the draft constitution are now fixed and that the constitution will reduce the power of this House. We have been offered some crumbs in the form of a subsidiarity check. The Foreign Secretary said in a speech yesterday that the new mechanism would make sure that the Union

"respects the principle of subsidiarity."

I am afraid that it will do no such thing. The mechanism involved is only a request.

The Foreign Secretary went on to say that he was sure that the Commission would "get the message". I am afraid that that is all that it will get. If the Commission gets such a request from one third of member state Parliaments, the draft protocol provides that the Commission "shall review its proposal", after which it

"may decide to maintain, amend or withdraw its proposal."

Well, thanks very much, but we can do that already. We can send the Commission a message asking it to review a proposal, and it can say no. That situation is going to persist, and there will be no additional power for this House. Against that, we are losing massive powers as a result of the loss of the national veto in so many areas. Also, the whole area of criminal justice and policing is being moved out of the third pillar, where it was corralled precisely to protect its intergovernmental nature. It is now being put into the main treaty structure, with majority voting.

The draft protocol means that all the other institutions of Europe get more power, but not national Parliaments. The Council probably gets the least extra power; it has paid a heavy price for the symbol of having a full-time President to chair its quarterly meetings. The new president of Europe will not be a serving head of government, answerable to an electorate. That is specifically ruled out. The President of the Commission may take on the job, as that is allowed for in the draft, but I absolutely agree with the right hon. Member for Llanelli (Denzil Davies), that there would be a diminution in the concept that elected heads of Government or state should be in charge.

Many people are dismissive of the idea of the rotating presidency. I rather agree with it; it gives small countries in particular a feeling that they can occasionally have some real influence, and it brings the Union closer to citizens if the presidency is parked for a few months in individual capitals instead of always being run from Brussels. The proposals seem to go in the opposite direction to the constant injunction that we should bring the whole thing closer to the citizen.

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Finally, I turn to the common foreign and security policy. There will be majority voting—that is a red line, if one defined in an extraordinarily contorted phrase, which I shall read out for the benefit of anyone interested in Euro-speak—

"when adopting a decision on a Union action or position, on a proposal which the Minister puts forward to it following a specific request to him from the European Council made at its own initiative or that of the Minister".

I have read that several times, and I am still none the wiser; suffice it to say that there is provision for some majority voting on a common foreign and security policy. The British Government are against it, and I am glad of that at least.

Even if the Government manage to take out that red line, however, there will still be a European Foreign Minister who "shall" conduct the Union's common foreign and security policy. The text is littered with obligations for member states to conform to the policy concerned. The best, and clearest, is in article I-15:

"Member states shall actively and unreservedly support the Union's common foreign and security policy in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the acts adopted by the Union in this area."

It is sometimes said that something similar to that wording can be found in existing treaties. That is true, but they are treaties, and this is an enforceable constitution. We know that from looking at the new powers of the European Commission, which is given a new job:

"It shall ensure the application of the Constitution".

The European Court of Justice

"shall ensure respect for the law in the interpretation and application of the Constitution."

Finally, and perhaps clearest of all, the draft states that the constitution

"shall have primacy over the law of Member States."

It is all down in black and white; we do not have to speculate about it.

We had a debate earlier about the significance of the primacy clause, and it has been alleged in some quarters that it is already in the existing treaties. That is not true. The case law of the European Court of Justice has established over the years that Community law is superior to that of member states, but we are adding that unconditionally into an article in a constitution. I know that the British Government are concerned about that from comments made by the Leader of the House in plenary sessions of the Convention and from the amendments that he tabled there. The point is rightly of concern to the Government, but are they going to try to have it removed?

The significant point is not that Union law will have primacy, although one can argue about the merits of that. The point is that the constitution will have primacy, and that is a wholly new concept, because there is no constitution at present. When there is one, it will, in all respects, whether in passing law or in demanding solidarity or mutual obligation, have primacy over the laws of member states. That is a giant step forward. It is completely new, and it is absurd to call the process a tidying-up exercise.

We must have a national debate between the end of the Convention and the start of the intergovernmental conference. For that to take place, we need a White

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Paper from the Government. I agree with what the Liberal Democrat spokesman said on the subject earlier—it is very important that the Government now tell us what they can accept, what they cannot accept, and what they hope to achieve so that we can have a national debate. An even more fundamental precondition is that we are all honest about what is in the draft. If these changes are so good for this country, let the Government argue the case for them. It is intolerable that they should pretend that it is merely a matter of tidying up what we have already. These changes are of giant constitutional significance. If they have merits, let us hear what they are. I will argue the opposite, and we can have an honest debate.

Finally, and most importantly, after all that is done, this matter can be decided only by the people. I often disagree with Valéry Giscard d'Estaing—I have had many spats with him in the past 15 months—but right at the start he said something that was true. He said that treaties are for Governments but constitutions are for people.

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