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Dr. Julian Lewis (New Forest, East): While we welcome this improved co-ordination among the intelligence agencies, can the Minister tell the House why the Government have been resisting our recommendation that such co-ordination should be carried on at ministerial level, too, and that the Government should appoint a dedicated Minister devoting his or her entire time to co-ordinating the various Ministries in precisely the same way that the agencies are now correctly being co-ordinated?
Mr. MacShane: I will return to the point of ministerial oversight later in my speech.
In response to some of the other recommendations from the ISC in respect of Bali, I am pleased to tell the House that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has made extensive improvements to its travel advice service. We have now put in place arrangements to guarantee that travel advice for every country is reviewed at least once a month, and that each new piece of advice is checked for clarity, consistency and accuracy before publication. The FCO has also taken steps to ensure that it can respond quickly to major attacks on our interests overseas. We have established three rapid deployment teams, which can be despatched to the scene of any incident within 24 hours. We used one of the teams recently in the aftermath of the terrorist bombing in Saudi Arabia. Each team is led by a senior diplomatic officer and will combine a mixture of skills, including consular experience. We continue to look hard at the structure of our response in London to see if that too can be further improved.
As well as Bali, the ISC's annual report includes a number of conclusions and recommendations for the future conduct of work by the intelligence agencies and the Security Service. The official response published by the Government on 19 June deals with each of those. I will not repeat all of that material in my remarks today,
but let me focus on just three of the most serious issues: first, Iraq; secondly, the role of Ministers in the management of intelligence services; and thirdly, ministerial involvement in counter-proliferation policy.First, on Iraq, I welcome the fact that the ISC will be conducting an inquiry into the role of intelligence in determining the Government's policy last year and in the run-up to military action. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has already announced that he will see the Committee, and my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary will give evidence on 16 July. The Committee will also hear evidence from the heads of the intelligence agencies and the chairman of the JIC. The Committee will have access to the key documents that underpinned the judgments reached in the dossier that the Government published on 24 September. We can expect them to pursue their investigation with the same degree of rigour and probity as was so evident during their inquiries into the Bali incident and the Mitrokhin archive.
The second issue that I would single out from the ISC's annual report is the role of Ministers in the management of the intelligence services. Over the past year, the Committee has conducted a full inquiry into the national intelligence machinery, examining who collects, analyses and assesses intelligence material. It is encouraging that the Committee did not identify any significant structural problems of gaps or duplication. The report, however, has noted that the ministerial committee on the intelligence services—the CSI—has not met and that Ministers should be more involved in longer-term strategic issues relating to the agencies.
I fully accept that the CSI has an important role to play in the setting of resources and priorities for the intelligence services, and that it should meet to consider that work. The fact that it has not yet done so does not mean that the agencies have been operating in a vacuum—far from it. The Prime Minister receives regular reports from the heads of the agencies, and both the Foreign Secretary and the Home Secretary are apprised of the agencies' work on a regular basis.
Mr. Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow): What does the Minister think induced Vice-Admiral Sir Louis Le Bailly, who was vice-chairman of the JIC from 1972 to 1975, to write in The Times yesterday:
- "It follows, if this vital tradition it to be maintained, that the JIC, which looks at all the facts often in all their bleakness and transmits them to those the electors have temporarily lent the power to govern, must never be used as a political instrument and must never be referred to as "the Government's JIC"?
Mr. MacShane: I believe he wrote that because some people have made allegations, but they have been dealt with by the Foreign Affairs Committee and much discussed in the House, and we now know those allegations to be false.
Simon Hughes (Southwark, North and Bermondsey): The Government have consistently resisted the argument that there ought to be specific ministerial oversight. The Committee, however, has recommended on several occasions that the existing CSI, chaired by the
Prime Minister, should meet. I think that I heard the Minister saying that he agreed with that. Does that mean that it is going to meet? Surely the answer to some of the suggestions is that the principal Cabinet officers responsible should conduct a regular review, that we should know that that happens, and that they should report to the Intelligence and Security Committee.
Mr. MacShane: The hon. Gentleman makes a good point. The Prime Minister accepts that recommendation, and the CSI will meet in due course. I stress, however, that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary, who is present, and my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, who is not here today, are the two senior Cabinet officers who should have charge of this. I am frankly against the notion of appointing a third Minister to be above or below them because it would be purely job creation for Ministers.
Simon Hughes: I hope that the Minister does not misunderstand me. Of course, the Foreign Secretary and Home Secretary perfectly properly take day-to-day responsibility for the two security services—one is accountable for domestic matters and one for foreign matters. My suggestion is not that new people should do things but that the Prime Minister and key Cabinet Ministers, including the Defence Secretary and the Deputy Prime Minister, should come together regularly to ensure that the operation is co-ordinated and brought together with the Prime Minister, as the principal Minister in Government, taking charge. Surely that is a good idea that should be implemented soon.
Mr. MacShane: It is an extremely good idea and, on behalf of the Prime Minister, I assure the hon. Gentleman that we accept the points that he makes.
Ministers on the CSI are consulted on the requirements placed on their agencies, and their role in the process is being reinforced under the revised system that is being introduced this year. Contrary to the concern expressed in the ISC report, all CSI members have received, and will continue to receive, all Joint Intelligence Committee papers.
The third issue that I identify from the ISC report is the conclusions on ministerial involvement in counter-proliferation policy. I cannot accept the Committee's central conclusion that Ministers are not adequately informed on counter-proliferation issues or that ministerial responsibilities are unclear. The Government's counter-proliferation policy, which was formulated by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, was set out clearly in response to a recent question asked by the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs. The policy has been approved by Ministers, and they are also consulted on any major issues of implementation as they arise.
The demarcation of departmental responsibilities is clear. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office leads bilateral and multilateral diplomatic activity. The Ministry of Defence leads on military operations and the Department of Trade and Industry covers national export controls. My right hon. Friends the Home Secretary and Foreign Secretary supervise the work of the agencies. That is not to say that counter-proliferation policy is compartmentalised in any way. On the contrary, it is an example of joined-up
government. Action against a proliferator, whether that is an individual, a country or a Government, usually involves close co-operation among Departments and agencies that is co-ordinated by the Cabinet Office. As the ISC report notes, the Committee has been briefed on enhancements to that machinery that were introduced last year.That brings me to an important final point. The threats facing the United Kingdom are formidable. The terrorist attacks in New York, Bali and Riyadh were thoroughly planned and executed. The North Korean nuclear and long-range missile programmes have been in development for well over a decade. Terrorists and proliferators use increasingly sophisticated means to work across national boundaries.
Dr. Julian Lewis: I am grateful to the Minister for allowing me to intervene again, but I remind him that he said that he would address the point that I raised earlier: if the threats are so serious, why have the Government not appointed a specific Minister to be devoted entirely to co-ordinating the measures necessary to meet such dangerous threats? The Opposition have done that, in shadow terms, by appointing my hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Patrick Mercer) to his post.
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