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Mr. Ancram: If we are to have confidence in what the Prime Minister or the Government tell us about intelligence information in the future, how and why the Prime Minister misled the House on this occasion must be cleared up. The Home Secretary has tried to intervene. I hope that he can clear things up.
Mr. Blunkett: In the spirit that you have asked us to take in our approach to the issue, Mr. Deputy Speaker, I put it to the right hon. Gentleman that it is an absolute disgrace to come here and accuse my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister of comprehensively duping and misleading the House on the matter. Such an allegation has not been made by other Conservative Front-Bench spokesmen. The leader of the Conservative party has accepted the evidence again and again, including that given to him under the Privy Council rules that apply so that he can receive comprehensive intelligence evidence. I ask the right hon. Gentleman to withdraw a scurrilous, unsubstantiated and disgraceful allegation against the Prime Minister.
Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. Before the right hon. Gentleman responds, I ask him to weigh his words carefully. To accuse any Member of the House of deliberately misleading it is a very serious matter.
Mr. Ancram: I accept that, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I carefully said that I was not going to say whether it was deliberate or not, because it does not matter. What is important is that the House is able to hear what the Prime Minister in particular says to it about intelligence and to have confidence in it. The Home Secretary has missed the point. It is not me who is saying that the
Prime Minister was wrong: it is Alastair Campbell in the evidence that he gave to the Select Committee and, indeed, the Committee, which reported that the document had not been cleared by the JIC and had not been checked with the relevant agencies.
Ann Taylor: I do not want to get embroiled in the discussions between Front-Bench spokesmen, but I ask the right hon. Gentleman to be careful not to misquote the Committee. He said that there was no intelligence in the February document. The Committee says that the document contained some intelligence-derived material, but it was not clearly attributed or highlighted among other material and was not checked. I hope that he will not attribute conclusions to the Committee that it has not reached.
Mr. Ancram: I hear what the right hon. Lady says. If she reads what I said, she will notice that I used my words carefully. I said that the dossier was not an intelligence document. That is carried by the report, which says that it was not cleared by the JIC prior to publication, nor was it checked with the agency providing the intelligence. I was careful in what I said because it is important. I am making an important point about the right of the House to rely on information given to it by senior Ministers as to what is intelligence and what is not.
Dr. Julian Lewis: I thank my right hon. Friend for giving way again and I shall endeavour not to try the patience of the House. In preparation for the debate, last night I looked at the uncorrected transcript of the evidence taken by the Foreign Affairs Committee on Thursday 19 June from Mr. Ibrahim al-Marashi, the author of the dissertation—the article—in the "Middle East Review of International Affairs", which was used in the second dossier. Something struck me which I had not heard before. My right hon. Friend may be interested to know that in response to question 701 on page 43 of the transcript, Mr. al-Marashi said:
- "If I could estimate, I would say that 90 per cent. of this intelligence dossier was taken from the three articles: by myself . . . and the two articles in Jane's Intelligence Review, virtually unchanged."
Mr. Ancram: Again, I am grateful to my hon. Friend, who underlines effectively the point that I have been trying to make.
Mr. Michael Portillo (Kensington and Chelsea): Does my right hon. Friend think that the Home Secretary is in danger of being off message? I read carefully what the Prime Minister said to the House on 3 February 2003 at column 25. He seems to enter no caveat about the document being a mixed document. He talks firmly about it being intelligence. The most likely conclusion to draw from that is that the Prime Minister at that time had no idea that it was a mixed document. He had been misled by those who passed it to him. Surely the Home Secretary would be on much firmer ground in saying that it has since been recognised that the document was
an appalling mess and that the Prime Minister was put in the position of misleading the House inadvertently on 3 February because he had not been told that.
Mr. Ancram: I am grateful to my right hon. Friend. That was one of the options that I hinted at—
Mr. Ancram: If the Minister reads what I said, he will see that I said it was either one thing or the other. It is up to the Prime Minister to explain which.
Let me make what I hope is a constructive suggestion. To prevent manipulation of intelligence material in the future, is there not a way of registering at publication whether a report is based on genuine intelligence material and has been cleared by the JIC? Perhaps the Committee will consider that. It would at least allow us to avoid the difficulty arising again.
Ann Taylor: I draw the right hon. Gentleman's attention to the end of paragraph 82, in which the Committee says:
- "We have been assured that systems have now been put in place to ensure that this cannot happen again, in that JIC Chairman endorses any material on behalf of the intelligence community prior to publication."
Mr. Ancram: I welcome that. I just hope that it will be done in such a way that those of us in the House who are not privy to intelligence material will know that it is being done, and can understand the difference between an intelligence report and what we got on 3 February, which we now know was a concoction from various different sources.
Today's world is much changed from the world of the cold war, with the certainties that the superpower balance and the doctrine of mutually assured destruction imposed on us. As 9/11 demonstrated so tragically, today's threats are unpredictable. Terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, rogue or failed states as well as economic collapse, poverty and disease all threaten regional stability and our own security. The strongest weapon against them is good intelligence. I shall not speak about domestic security and the threat from terrorism in domestic terms as I am sure that my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Mr. Letwin), the shadow Home Secretary, will wish to do so when he winds up on our behalf. However, intelligence is at the centre of this fight. Indeed, increasing emphasis is placed on the value of electronic intelligence. However, in some parts of the world, human intelligence is equally, if not more, important. We must ensure that our human network is effective and that there are sufficient resources on the ground in the most sensitive areas. I hope that we can be reassured of that in the light of the report.
I pay tribute to the often dangerous, unsung and sometimes secret work that the members of the intelligence and security services carry out on our behalf and for our safety. I include special branch officers in that tribute because quite often the role that they play is
missed. I am glad that the Minister also paid tribute to the intelligence services. That is in strong contrast to the comments of some of his ministerial colleagues. Accusing the intelligence services of containing "rogue elements", as the Secretary of State for Health did recently in a moment of hysteria, is both unjust and damaging. I can find no justification for those words anywhere within the report or elsewhere. I hope that those on the Government Front Bench will today disown those silly words.I welcome the appointment of Sir David Omand as security and intelligence co-ordinator, and as accounting officer for the single intelligence account.
I shall respond briefly to some of the specific points that are made in the report, and first, gaps in intelligence. Last year's annual report stated that the reductions in collection areas were causing
- "intelligence gaps to develop which may mean over time unacceptable risks will arise in terms of safeguarding national security and in the prevention and detecting of serious organised crime."
- "GCHQ has reduced analysis effort in a number of possible trouble spots."
- "that the problem of collection gaps has worsened and therefore risks are being taken with national security."
- "with the focus on current crises, the Agencies' long-term capacity to provide warnings is being eroded. This situation needs to be addressed and managed by Ministers and the JIC."
Astonishingly, the CSI still has not met. The Minister told us that it will meet in due course. I do not know what he means by that. It is a term that normally stretches way into the future, and is a way of kicking balls into the long grass. I wonder how many other committees, after six and a half years of this Government, have not met. That is extraordinary, and we have had no real explanation for that. The Prime Minister and relevant Ministers have met only on short-term issues.
At paragraph 56, the Committee reports that
- "these crisis-driven and ad-hoc groupings do not provide Ministers with an active forum in which they can make collective decisions about longer-term intelligence requirements and priorities for secret intelligence across the full range of topics."
- "CSI Ministers are not sufficiently engaged in the setting of requirements and priorities for secret intelligence, nor do they all see the full capability of intelligence collection."
Do the Government agree with the Committee's conclusions in relation to weapons of mass destruction? Paragraph 78 states that:
- "However, world-wide, sanctions, even when effective, only slow proliferation."
On Iraq, I welcome recognition of the fact that intelligence—I quote from paragraph 80—
- "indicated that the Iraqis were continuing to produce WMD and their delivery means."
I am pleased that the Government listened to the Committee's earlier report regarding problems and shortcomings in the previous counter-terrorism and analysis system as exposed by the Bali bombing. I, too, hope that the establishment of the joint terrorism and analysis centre will address the points that have been raised. We welcome any steps that will lead to a more joined-up approach that will increase efficiency and, of course, public safety. I welcome the Foreign Secretary's constructive response to suggestions that I made about travel advice. I welcome also the incorporation of our ideas for links between British and other Government travel advice. As the Committee notes, the advice is now clearer and consistent.
The Committee also examined GCHQ and commented on the changes and modernisation programme that is underway there. The report raises concerns in paragraph 29
- "about the size of the planned write-off . . . that GCHQ is having to make in the next year for a developmental SIGINT system that has only partly delivered the intended capability."
I shall refer briefly to Guantanamo bay. I understand that it has been a matter of interest to the intelligence services since British prisoners were first taken there in January 2002. I understand why prisoners from the war in Afghanistan were taken to Guantanamo bay and the practical reasons for their rights being suspended in the public interest in order to obtain potentially vital information in the war on terrorism. However, as the months have passed with no charges being laid and apparently no due process, the British public have become increasingly uneasy about the situation. I understand why, and I believe that we must respond to this uneasiness.
A tenet of our law is that British citizens should not be held for an unduly long period without charge. In normal circumstances there are safeguards that protect the citizen, not least the principle of habeas corpus and the judicial scrutiny of Executive decisions to extend periods of detention. I yield to no one in my determination to see terrorism eradicated. Force is necessary and special rules must sometimes be accepted, but law must also have its place. The nine British citizens held in Guantanamo bay have been there for 17 months without charge or apparent due process. I believe that the time has come for the Government to act. They must now let the House know how they intend to proceed.
We are told that progress has been made. Will the Home Secretary, when he responds to the debate, or the Minister—I will give way if he wants to intervene now—
tell the House what has been agreed with our American colleagues? We have heard tell of tribunals. Will the Home Secretary or the Minister tell us how these tribunals will work? Has a date been set for the start of these tribunals? Has any agreement been reached on the handling of charges? What legal representation will the British detainees have? These are important questions. It seems that the Minister does not want to respond. I hope that the Home Secretary can take advice and respond to my questions when he winds up.I do not for a moment underestimate the complexities of the Guantanamo bay situation. However, we cannot pretend that it does not exist, or that if it does, it is not our business. The Government must face their responsibilities.
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