| Previous Section | Index | Home Page |
4.17 pm
Mr. Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow): In the short years between his retirement and his death, I used to gossip with the late Sir Maurice Oldfield. He told me that in March 1974, he had gone, as C, to Jim Callaghan on his second day as Foreign Secretary. Jim Callaghan had said to him, "Tell me, Sir Maurice, what is the Security Intelligence Service for?" Sir Maurice Oldfield said that he replied, "My job, Secretary of State, is to bring you unwelcome news." Some months later, I checked with Jim Callaghan, and indeed it was a factual not apocryphal story. In a sense, it encapsulates the fact that the key to the success of the JIC system is the firm separation of analysis and policy. Indeed, that conclusion was drawn both by Noel Annan in his best book, "Changing Enemies", and by Harry Hinsley in his official account of intelligence during world war two.
If the Prime Minister is convinced, as all his predecessors have been since 1940, that the singular virtue of the British JIC system is the determination that held throughout the second world war and the cold war that its analytical product must always be kept separate from the policy implications to be drawn from it, does he not therefore accept that his signed preamble to the September 2002 dossier must be treated equally separately from the JIC analysis that made up the bulk of that document? If so, does the Prime Minister appreciate, and does he not wish the British public to appreciate, that it is possible for knowledgeable people inside Whitehall and beyond to place different weightings on aspects of the JIC analysis from the conclusions that he drew? Is it not possible, therefore, that concentrating on one journalist and one intelligence source fails to reflect the range of anxieties on the part of several intelligence professionals about the weightings and thrust of the Prime Minister's crucial preamble? I am confident that the Intelligence and Security Committee, under my right hon. Friend the Member for Dewsbury (Ann Taylor), will bring the necessary skill, scepticism and detachment that are always needed during the careful evidence-driven analysis of kaleidoscopic intelligence at a time of tension, anxiety and uncertainty.
Finally, because all hon. Members should have the opportunity to speak, Hans Blix says that he was getting the highest quality intelligence from Washington, yet his inspectors could find nothing of significance. Therefore, the coalition must have known that its intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction simply did not provide its Governments with justification for war. Indeed, that point is eloquently made in the letter to The Times yesterday that was written by Field Marshall Lord Bramall.
4.21 pm
Mr. James Arbuthnot (North-East Hampshire): The report speaks for itself. I must especially stress the point, which has been well made in a number of quarters, that we are well served by our intelligence agencies.
There is no need, and no time, for me to comment on every aspect of the report. However, on Iraq and weapons of mass destruction, the Intelligence and Security Committee recognises that it has a heavy responsibility. I am not controlled by the Government but neither are the rest of the members of the Committee. The Committee is excellently chaired by the right hon. Member for Dewsbury (Ann Taylor), who is no Government poodle.
On ministerial oversight, I was extremely pleased that the Minister for Europe said that the ministerial committee on the intelligence services would meet in due course. However, he gave us no indication that such meetings would be regular. The ministerial committee will be effective only if it meets regularly to build up the expertise and relationships needed for proper ministerial control.
The main point that I want to address is terrorism and the treatment of terrorists. We are told that we are at war and that the battle against terrorism is beginning to look long lasting—I think that that is right. The casualties have been dreadful but that should not make us flinch from the task. The Duke of Wellington once said:
- "Nothing except a battle lost can be half as melancholy as a battle won."
That is why I was pleased to hear what my right hon. Friend the shadow Foreign Secretary said about Guantanamo bay. Nearly two years after 11 September, our coalition partner, the United States, continues to hold people in legal limbo, with no end in sight, in a place, and a manner, that are subject to no nationally or internationally recognised law or process. What justifies that? The United States says that information from intelligence gathered from those at Guantanamo bay is an essential tool in the war against terrorism. But there is disagreement in the United States Administration about whether the intelligence product is nearing its useful end.
As a result of Guantanamo bay, the United States has been subjected to accusations of torture and inhumanity. I am sure that those accusations are unfair and untrue. Those who make them undermine their more valid arguments against Guantanamo bay. The United States tells us that the detainees are not prisoners of war and are not subject to the Geneva conventions. It bases that view on its theory that the detainees from Afghanistan are illegal combatants. Presumably, the same view would, or should, be taken about the Northern Alliance fighters. The difference appears to be that the Northern Alliance fought with us while the Taliban fought against us. That is an uncomfortable position to adopt.
The United States tells us that despite the fact that the Geneva conventions do not apply to the detainees, they are being treated in accordance with those conventions. But in one very important respect they are not. The conventions require that once someone is identified as a suspect in a crime, he has a right not to be questioned in the absence of a lawyer of his choice. No detainee has been allowed a lawyer of anyone's choice, and they have all been questioned. The United States has made it clear that it intends to use the confessions taken as evidence against the detainees in their trials. I do not believe that confessions taken in such circumstances should be admissible.
The Pentagon tells us that the procedures for trials by military commission, issued in March, will include the presumption of innocence. That is, of course, good to hear, but the day before it issued those procedures, President Bush, the man in charge of them, said:
- "Remember . . . the ones in Guantanamo Bay are killers."
Some people ask: what else is the United States to do with the detainees? It may well be true that some, if released, might immediately return to terrorism. How on earth can we expect the United States to put up with that? The answer is that of course we cannot. However, I am certain that the international community would be eager to use its many tribunals to try those detainees according to an internationally recognised process. The question then would be whether the United States would be prepared to accept the outcome.
Let us not forget that there will be prisoners as a result of the war in Iraq who will be motivated in precisely the same way as those detained from Afghanistan, yet the United States recognises them as prisoners of war. To treat the Taliban differently from the Iraqi Fedayeen is clearly wrong in principle. We were once accused of doing the same during the period of detention in Northern Ireland, but at least recognisable rules applied and those detained had access to advisers. More important, when we put a stop to detention, we increased our moral authority in a way that the United States could do now if it chose.
So far, the focus of the British Government has been on the British detainees. Perhaps that is understandable, but it misses the point. The real point is that the decision to treat the detainees differently is wrong in principle. By appearing to condone one law for the United States and another for everyone else, we are feeding resentment against the United States and hence against ourselves throughout the world.
I have three questions about the matter, which I should be grateful if the Home Secretary would answer when he replies. First, do the British Government accept
the United States view that the Geneva convention does not apply to the detainees of Guantanamo bay? Why are they keeping so quiet on so vital an issue? If any other country behaved like this, as the right hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife (Mr. Campbell) said, both the United Kingdom and the United States would be protesting vigorously.Secondly, on 17 June, the Foreign Office Minister with responsibilities for trade and investment stated:
- "The status of the detainees under international law depends on the facts of each individual case and is ultimately a matter for the US, as the detaining power."—[Official Report, 17 June 2003; Vol. 407, c. 142W.]
Thirdly, do the British Government believe that the intelligence product from Guantanamo bay is still valuable? If so, for what? Is it limited to the purpose of the prosecution of the detainees?
The United States is, and always has been, the world's greatest supporter of freedom. Time after time, it is the United States that comes to the rescue of individual countries and of the world. However, freedom rests on the observance of the rule of law, and the United States would win itself many friends by establishing beyond doubt that it was bringing the detainees within the scope of a process of law that was internationally recognised.
| Next Section
| Index | Home Page |