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Mr. Ancram: I have asked the Foreign Secretary about that before, and he has had the honesty to admit that in 1983 he, and most other Front Benchers, stood on a manifesto promise to withdraw from Europe. That was their position, but it is not our position now and has never been our position.

We reject the motion. Its intention is clear—to support the creation of a European constitution that is a step change away from the treaty agreements on which the European Union is presently based. It is a constitution, and no amount of play on words by the Foreign Secretary can disguise that fact. I cannot understand why the Government fell in love with this constitution so suddenly. The Prime Minister told us in 2000 that a constitution was not necessary. In our view, it is still not necessary, and the Foreign Secretary has never explained why it is necessary.

Mr. Allen: It may surprise the right hon. Gentleman if I say that I am with him so far on his view that the document is a constitution, but the weakness of his case is that he proposes a referendum because his party is anti-European, rather than because it would be democratic. The anti-Europeanism came from his party before the call for a referendum, which flies in the face of those who feel that a referendum is a way to involve people more widely in the European project.

Mr. Ancram: The whole point of a referendum is to allow people to have a choice. That is what we want to

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do. If we had a referendum, we would campaign on the policy in which we believe and others would campaign on their policies, but the important thing is to have a referendum.

Sir Patrick Cormack: Will my right hon. Friend remind Labour Members that there are varying degrees of enthusiasm for the European Union on both sides of the House, just as there are varying degrees of enthusiasm for this constitution on both sides of the House? However, even Conservatives who have always stood steadfast behind the policy first enunciated by Sir Edward Heath believe, as do the Liberal Democrats, that this document should not be ratified until it has received the approval of the British people in a referendum.

Mr. Ancram: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for making that point, which is reflected in our amendment. I will develop the points that he has raised later in my speech.

The draft constitution represents a significant step change. It has been said:


Those are not my words, but those of Ana Palacio, the Spanish Foreign Minister in the New York Times on 15 June 2003. It has also been said that


Again, those are not my words, but those of Italian Convention representative, Lamberto Dini.

The draft constitution explicitly claims supremacy over national laws. In a clear move away from intergovernmentalism, it will set up a five-year presidency and get rid of the rotating presidencies that underline that intergovernmentalism. Against all the assurances given to the contrary, from the Prime Minister downwards, it will incorporate and give legal effect to the charter of fundamental rights. It will create a European Foreign Minister. It will dramatically extend qualified majority voting, thereby undermining and diminishing the ability of individual nations to determine their own futures. It will give the EU control of asylum and immigration. It will meddle in criminal trial procedures and increase EU powers over transport and energy policies. It will provide for further creeping integration, without recourse back to national parliaments. Economic co-ordination and a common foreign policy all hover in the wings. This is a constitution, and a fundamental constitution at that.

Sir Michael Spicer: My right hon. Friend has mentioned the increase in powers in the constitution. Can he think of reasons why the Government keep saying that the veto will stay on defence, foreign policy and taxation, whereas Mr. Prodi keeps saying that it will not?

Mr. Ancram: The question that I asked the Foreign Secretary earlier was valid. We keep being told that the

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Government have red lines. We need to know whether, if those red lines are crossed—and if the amendments proposed by the Leader of the House, which were not carried by the Convention, are not eventually agreed—they are prepared to veto the treaty? They do not get several vetoes: they get one, and they have to face up to that. If we had an answer to that question, it would provide the answer that my hon. Friend seeks.

The Convention will also give the EU a single legal personality. In the last debate, we were told that that would not add to what the EU can currently do, but that is not Romano Prodi's view. On 21 June, he said:


Obviously in his view the EU has not been able to play that role without it. He has underlined the significance of the changes that will be made.

The constitution is not a collection of insignificant changes designed to make an enlarged Europe more manageable. It sets out the attributes of the constitution of an independent state. It signals the end of the democratic rights of the currently sovereign nations to determine their own affairs and therefore of the people to direct their own destinies. And that is why we reject it.

Mr. George Osborne (Tatton): My right hon. Friend's point is amply demonstrated by the very first line of the draft constitution.

The Minister for Europe (Mr. MacShane): It is Greek.

Mr. Osborne: Indeed it is, and it is from Thucydides. It says:


It uses the word "constitution" and talks explicitly about "the greatest number"—meaning the extension of majority voting and the elimination of the national veto.

Mr. Ancram: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for reminding the House of that, and I congratulate him on his swift translation of ancient Greek, which might be beyond most of the rest of us.

The constitution could also affect our ability to determine our own security. The Foreign Secretary told the Foreign Affairs Committee last November that


Yet for all the references to the European security and defence policy, there is a glaring omission in the constitution, because it contains no guarantee of the primacy of NATO. We should remember that NATO is about guaranteeing national sovereignty, but this constitution is about eroding it.

Our criticism of the constitution goes further. The task set for the Convention in Laeken was clear—to bring Europe closer to its peoples. However, as the Austrian newspaper Die Presse stated:


That is the truth about the outcome of this Convention. Rather than certainty, we have—in so many areas—fudged ambiguity. Article I-3(3) says that the Union


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What on earth does that mean, unless it is an ill-defined invitation for Brussels to expand its powers?

The Foreign Secretary has boasted about national Parliaments' rights to vet European legislation yet, under the draft constitution, that vetting would allow the Commission still to ignore Parliaments' objections. How does that give power back to national Parliaments?

Article I-10.2 states:


Again, what on earth does that mean? On the face of it, the European Court of Justice will be endowed with enormous power. Article I-13 sets out shared competencies where the EU is to take the lead. Those open-ended provisions could allow a vast expansion of central EU power. Once again, that is centralisation, when we were told that the proposals were about returning powers to national Parliaments.

Article I-14 is extraordinary. It deals with the co-ordination of employment and economic policies. Again, it contains wide-ranging and loose imperative provisions that are unclear in meaning but could authorise sweeping powers for Brussels. One extraordinary provision relates to foreign affairs. Article III-196.(2b) states:


If other Conservative Members can work out what on earth that means, they are doing a better job than I am. For instance, does it mean that any proposal made by the European Minister for Foreign Affairs on his initiative could, in the end, be subject to QMV?


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