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Mr. Cash: On the White Paper, will the right hon. and learned Gentleman explain why he is confining himself to the Government's objectives? If a referendum were to be based on proper information, would it not be much better to have a White Paper on the legal and constitutional implications of the treaty, which would be similar to the one published by the Labour Government in 1967? When we reach that point, the British people may have a proper debate.
Mr. Campbell: The hon. Gentleman is getting ahead of himself. The White Paper that I envisage, and which the Government have promised, will relate to the IGC. There might well be scope for a White Paper of the kind that he describes after the process has been completed and a set of proposals has been brought before the House of Commons. In those circumstances, the set of proposals will almost inevitably have to be put before the British people and, if so, a document such as that to which the hon. Gentleman referred and with which those of us who remember the 1975 referendum are familiar would be entirely appropriateindeed, I suspect that it would be obligatory.
Without endeavouring to be exhaustive, let me outline the type of issues that raise constitutional implications. First, the provisions for the charter of fundamental rights have such implications. They mirror provisions relating to the European convention on human rights and, indeed, supplement them. However, the United Kingdom was always a signatory to that convention. The Labour Government introduced legislation not to allow us to join the convention but to allow convention rights to be pursued and vindicated in our domestic courts so that a litigant need not have recourse to Strasbourg. Given that such a measure was part of the 1997 manifesto on which the Labour party was elected, the Government had a mandate to repatriate the right to seek redress under the convention to the United Kingdom's domestic courts. However, that measure is in a different category from the proposal for the charter of fundamental rights.
Secondly, I have several reservations about the passerelle clause, which has already been mentioned. However, whatever one thinks about it, it would allow the Union to determine by unanimity that it may move toward using majority voting for specific additional matters. It is difficult to argue that that would not have constitutional implications.
The third issue in my illustrative yet not exhaustive list is the proposal for a permanent presidency of the Council. Whatever view one takes of the merits of such a proposalthere are merits to argue in its favourit necessarily has constitutional implications. To that extent, I agree with the right hon. Member for Llanelli, not only for the reasons that he gave, but because it would reduce the influence that individual states have on the EU's agenda during the six-month presidency for which they are eligible.
The interesting question is whether any of the proposals taken singly would be enough to trigger a referendum. One could argue not, but we must consider
their cumulative effect, and that has persuaded me of the inevitability of a referendum. That would be consistent with decisions taken by my party in 1993, when we debated a new clause tabled by Bryan Gould in relation to the Maastricht treaty, and again in 1995, when on a Liberal Democrat Opposition day we introduced and passed a motion which said that a material change in the relationship between the UK and the EU should be ratified and endorsed by a referendum. I also pray in aid the fact that the Liberal Democrats, under the leadership of Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon, were the first to say that joining the single European currency raised issues of economic, political and constitutional significance which required a referendum.
Mr. Bercow: Given that whatever else might be said about the Government, they are not renowned for their respect for precedent or tradition. Notwithstanding the right hon. and learned Gentleman's attraction to the idea of a European constitution, does he agree that the Government are so opposed to a referendum because they are scared that they will lose it?
Mr. Campbell: It is dangerous to attribute base motives to individuals, parties or Governments. The Government should answer for themselves on that matter. Those of us who support the European idealI do not shrink from putting it in those termsshould have the confidence to argue it, not just in the Chamber, but in the country. The point made by the hon. Member for Nottingham, North (Mr. Allen) about the need to reconnect the individual voter with the EU is valid. There is no better way of effecting that reconnection than by arguing the merits of the case and inviting people to pass judgment on those merits by way of a vote.
Mr. Ian Davidson (Glasgow, Pollok): Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?
Mr. Campbell: No, I apologise, but I want to make progress.
We have to accept that the IGC will not in all likelihood produce final proposals that in all material respects coincide with the views of all hon. Members. But the process on which we are embarking has an IGC, a treaty and a process of ratification in the House. That treaty has to be signed by all 25 members. Any one of them will have the power of veto.
The Foreign Secretary and I are as one on the view that the veto has to be retained in foreign policy, defence and taxation. I took the opportunity to look again at article I-40.2. The apprehensions of the right hon. Member for Devizes (Mr. Ancram)he has apologised for his absence; he has another pressing obligationare not well founded. The second half of paragraph 2 contains three elements of the common defence policy. The first is that it
The reason why I am sympathetic to the Foreign Secretary and his views on foreign policy, defence and taxation is, as I have said before in the House, that I think that those are quintessentially the responsibility of a national Parliament such as our own. They are features of the constitutional settlement that we have recently arrived at in the United Kingdom. We have not given away those responsibilities to devolved Parliaments or Assemblies; they have been maintained here in this Parliament because we regard them as quintessentially ours.
The Foreign Secretary was right when he hinted at the fact that the existing system of treaties is complicated and opaque. The purpose of the constitution must surely be to set down and define the role and powers of institutions of the European Union. It is of course true that there could be enlargement without these provisions being enacted, but it would be a curious European Union which emerged as a result, and one that would be all the more likely to be subject to paralysis and sclerosis.
In spite of the rather powerful argument about other treaties made by the right hon. Member for Llanelli, there is a strong case to be made for an end to the endless tinkering with the EU's constitutional arrangements. It is little wonder that public incomprehension has been followed by public disinterest and a sense of disconnection. This process, once completed, must surely lead to a period of constitutional calm for the foreseeable future, if not for the 50 years rather grandly envisaged by Giscard d'Estaing; that would be in the interests of the EU, its member states and indeed its citizens. We cannot conduct the affairs of the EU as if we are engaged in a perpetual Maoist cultural revolution or, as the Foreign Secretary indicated, a culture of crisis characterised on some occasions by last minute compromise against a background of physical exhaustion and horse trading.
Subsidiarity and proportionality are particularly referred to in annexe 2 to the treaty. On the last occasion on which we debated these matters, I had an exchange with the hon. Member for Buckingham (Mr. Bercow). I am sure that he has read the annexe, but others who have not would be well advised to take some account of it. It sets out in letterI shall come to the question of spirit in a momenta comprehensive set of principles by which subsidiarity and proportionality are to be advanced. It says that decisions are to be
I have another proposition. Why should there not be an independent official with the responsibility to audit all existing and proposed legislation to see whether it conforms to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality? Such an official should have the right to initiate action for breaches of the principles before the Court, as set out in annexe 2. That would go a long way towards helping to restore the connection between the citizens of the EU and the EU itself.
Whatever the objectives or motives of others in seeking a referendum, I have no doubt that it is in the United Kingdom's best interest to be at the heart of Europe, which is why I support UK membership of the single currency. I believe in the value of a common foreign and security policy based on the principle of consensus. I am seeking a referendum on the proposals for a constitution because I wish them to have both the political and constitutional endorsement of the British people. I am wholly opposed to any question of UK withdrawal or associate status. I am confident about making the case for continued membership, and I do not understand why the Government do not share that confidence.
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