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Mr. Straw: All I would say to my hon. Friend is that we have to accept the media as they are. It is no part of the duty of Governments in a democracy to interfere. However, I think it is the sentiment of the whole House, and certainly the sentiment in much of Iraq, that although the BBC should pursue particular agendas if it thinks that they are consistent with its charter, it should also ensure that there is a more balanced and comprehensive reporting of the reality on the ground in Iraq, which in respect of the rebuilding of Iraq is better news than it was.
Mr. Andrew Mackay (Bracknell): In his statement, the Foreign Secretary listed a number of countries, from Ukraine to New Zealand, which are apparently sending troops to Iraq. Significantly, he did not mention the numbers, which I suspect are very small. Is it not inevitable that we will soon need more troops from other countries because otherwise we will face overstretch? Is it correct that the French are blocking that in NATO?
Mr. Straw: On the right hon. Gentleman's last point, a number of other countries have expressed reservations within NATO. The discussions will continue. As for the numbers, I am happy to write to him and put them before the House. In some cases, the number is small. For example, Lithuania had no armed forces before it was turned into an independent country following the collapse of the old Soviet empire, so its contribution is necessarily going to be small. In other cases, such as Poland, the contribution will be substantial.
I note that the number of British service personnel has reduced from 45,000 at its peak to around 11,000 in the whole theatre—some are in the Gulf rather than in Iraq itself. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence and the Chief of the Defence Staff keep overall troop levels under careful review. I have received no representations from them that at this level, or levels around which the number might fluctuate, the services will be subject to overstretch.
Tony Lloyd (Manchester, Central): Does my right hon. Friend recognise that if Iraq's oil is to be used for
the purpose of reconstruction, that decision—certainly the mortgaging of the oil future and oil revenues—can only be taken by those who really represent the Iraqi people? To do otherwise would simply lead to the suspicion that the decision to invade, at least on America's part, was based on oil and not for the reasons of which the US Administration are trying to persuade us. Will my right hon. Friend confirm that the British Government will not be party to a mortgaging of Iraqi oil unless that is agreed to by proper representatives of the Iraqi people?
Mr. Straw: Let me satisfy my hon. Friend. Resolution 1483 lays down clearly the conditions under which all revenues, in particular oil revenues, can be used, and have to be used, for the benefit of the people of Iraq. The war was never about oil. Everyone knows that. In the initial stages, the financial responsibility rests on the coalition provisional authority, because it has to rest somewhere. As quickly as possible, it will move to the governing council. In any event, there are clear and substantial monitoring arrangements, supervised by a monitoring board established by 1483. There is also the ever-present figure of Vieira de Mello, the UN Secretary-General's special representative, who is required to make regular reports to the Security Council to ensure that 1483 is complied with.
Mr. Alex Salmond (Banff and Buchan): If, as the Foreign Secretary now claims, the decision to go to war was not based on intelligence information, why did the Government keep providing it in the form of dossiers to the House and the UN before we made decisions? If the Prime Minister of Australia is prepared to apologise and the head of the CIA is prepared to take the rap for believing British intelligence, why does the Foreign Secretary stick doggedly to his story about the reality of the uranium imports from Niger to Iraq? If that story of the falsified and forged documents has caused so much embarrassment to the Government, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, what inquiries have been made to find out who falsified and forged those documents?
Mr. Straw: My point—it is a point that I have made often enough and is well illustrated by analysis of all the speeches made in our debates, especially since Christmas—is that the intelligence assessments that were provided formed part of the background, but they were not the heart of the argument and never were. They simply were not. The argument moved on.
The issue last September and October was whether the UN would be used to give what amounted to a final opportunity to Iraq. Everyone was pleased when we negotiated resolution 1441. Iraq was given a final opportunity and, as I explained, it failed to fulfil the clear undertakings required under 1441. The issue before the House in March, in shorthand, was whether containment was going to work, notwithstanding Iraq's defiance, or whether we had to give it a further very final ultimatum and, if necessary, take military action. I invite the hon. Gentleman to look at what was said and the nature of the argument, not to rewrite history following one reference on the "Today" programme on 29 May. That was simply not part of the argument. No one in the House, for example, mentioned 45 minutes once during the debate on 18 March.
On the hon. Gentleman's second point, the issue of who forged the documents is a subject of an inquiry, in particular by the International Atomic Energy Agency, to which the documents were submitted. We did not know that they were forged. We had no information about that until mid-February and no confirmation of that until the IAEA gave its report to the Security Council on 7 March. On the overall issue of assessments, I have explained—I gave this information in memorandum to the FAC, and the ISC will inquire further—that the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee stands by the assessments that he and his staff, not Ministers, made.
Andrew Mackinlay (Thurrock): Will the Secretary of State put in the Library of the House in the next 24 hours the dates on which the security and intelligence services learned that the Niger documents were forged and the date on which Ministers were advised that they were forged?
Mr. Straw: I will do my best to comply, if not in 24 hours, then as quickly as possible.
Hugh Robertson (Faversham and Mid-Kent): The Foreign Secretary will be aware that military operations thrive on a simple clear aim. Given that we have 11,000 servicemen and women deployed, what is that aim?
Mr. Straw: The aim is to secure Iraq, to rid Iraq of the remains of the Saddam regime and to assist the Iraqi people, now through the governing council, to create conditions in which they are responsible for their internal security. I think all the forces are aware of that and they are meeting that challenge with their customary professionalism and very high standards.
Mr. Neil Gerrard (Walthamstow): The Foreign Secretary has said again that it was not intelligence that led to the decision to go to war, but breaches of UN resolutions, although the rest of the Security Council did not feel able to support anything after 1441. Is it not the case that those of us who were sceptical and who opposed the case for war were told time and again that Iraq still had weapons of mass destruction, was still developing weapons of mass destruction and was ready to use them? If that did not come from intelligence sources, where did it come from?
Mr. Straw: Most of it came from documents that I placed before the House which were entirely open. No one can read the last report of UNSCOM made just after its delegation was thrown out of Iraq at the end of 1998 or the 173 pages of unanswered disarmament questions submitted to the Security Council after it had finished its meeting on 7 March without being absolutely clear about the capabilities of Iraq and its wilful failure to resolve the issues. If Iraq had nothing to fear, it would have dealt with those questions. It failed to do so. Of course the intelligence assessment informed the debate, but let us be clear that the issue before the House was whether the policy of containment had been laid out or whether we had reached a moment at which, in our judgment, it was right to take military action to enforce the will of the UN. The House voted in favour of that by a margin of 263.
Mr. David Ruffley (Bury St. Edmunds): I hope that the Foreign Secretary will accept that the success of
Iraqi reconstruction will, to some degree, be affected by the trial of Guantanamo bay detainees captured in Afghanistan. In that context, do the British Government believe that President Bush is acting wholly within and in accordance with international law and US law in setting up military commissions to try those detainees?
Mr. Straw: I am not entirely sure what is the direct connection, but intensive discussions on the issue continue with the American Administration. That is the current position, and as soon as there is anything to tell the House, the House will be told.
David Winnick (Walsall, North): Let us be fair to the BBC concerning at least one of its media outlets. Did my right hon. Friend see last night's "Newsnight" that broadcast films made by the Saddam regime which showed savage beatings, torture and places of execution? Does he not agree that there is a responsibility on every Member of this House who opposed the war to tell us how one of the most terrifying and brutal dictatorships could have been destroyed without the action taken at the time?
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