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Mr. Straw: I agree entirely with my hon. Friend. As I have said, those who supported containment—I understood and respected their view, but did not agree with it—have an equal responsibility to acknowledge the fact that their policy would have left Saddam Hussein in power. He would have been reinvigorated and re-empowered as the troops were pulled back from the Gulf, and over time he would have tried to secure by deception a clean bill of health from UNMOVIC. The reign of terror over his people would have become infinitely worse, as would his support for international rejectionist terrorists—not least those working in the occupied regions. That is one reason why I say with confidence that a consequence of the removal of Saddam Hussein has unquestionably been to help to create a more benign environment in which a peace process between the Israelis and the Palestinians is much more possible.
Mr. Keith Simpson (Mid-Norfolk): The Foreign Secretary has made it clear—twice, I think—in his statement and in reply to hon. Members that our reasons for taking military action were based very much on Saddam Hussein's defiance of the United Nations. As somebody who absolutely supported the Government's action, I must say that the debate was undoubtedly influenced by reports based on intelligence not only that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, but that there was a clear and present danger of his using them.
I do not know whether weapons of mass destruction will be found in Iraq—I see that we have slipped into using the term "programmes", which is more vague. None the less, I am genuinely concerned that, if we do not find weapons of mass destruction or there is continuing debate about intelligence, should the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues face a clear and present danger in a year or two and ask the House for a
decision on immediate military action, the House will say, "Sorry, but we've heard that before and we don't agree with you."
Mr. Straw: Of course I understand the interest in further evidence of the scale and extent of Saddam's programmes. Sometimes when I listen to these debates, I think that some of those who are now criticising the Government—not the hon. Gentleman—must be inhabiting a parallel universe in which, hey-presto, Saddam Hussein never had any nuclear capability, had never used chemical weapons against his own people or the Iranians and, despite evidence of concealment, had never denied that he had a biological weapons programme. He denied and denied that, and it was discovered only after his son-in-law had defected. Indeed, when the representatives of UNSCOM—the previous inspectors—went in, they discovered a much larger biological weapons programme than they had ever anticipated. This is not a matter of looking in the crystal; it was in the book.
Of course I understand and appreciate that some of the intelligence assessments formed a background to the argument, but I invite the hon. Gentleman and all other hon. Members to look at the terms of the motion passed by the House by a majority of 263 votes on 18 March. That was about the failure of Saddam Hussein to comply with the terms of resolution 1441.
Glenda Jackson (Hampstead and Highgate): But surely my right hon. Friend cannot be unaware that the unwillingness, certainly of my constituents, to accept the rosy picture that he and other Ministers are painting of post-conflict Iraq is based on their total disbelief of the Government's reasons for us going to war in the first place. It is not possible for the Foreign Secretary to stand at that Dispatch Box and argue on the grounds of resolution 1441, which was based on the premise that Saddam Hussein still had weapons of mass destruction—a situation which the Prime Minister found still to be the case. Indeed, he discounted as absurd the thesis that those weapons had been unilaterally destroyed before the war began. Until the basic questions of precisely what was intelligence and how contemporaneous it was are answered, my constituents will remain exceedingly concerned about why British troops were sent to war.
Mr. Straw: I do not accept that. I say to my hon. Friend—
Glenda Jackson: Not me, my constituents.
Mr. Straw: I say to my hon. Friend, and through her to her constituents, that the judgment that Saddam Hussein had proliferated weapons of mass destruction, had long-range missiles and had defied the Security Council over 13 years was not just ours or that of the United States. It was the judgment of France, of Russia, of China and of the 10 elected members of the Security Council—also of Syria.
Glenda Jackson: Well, where are they?
Mr. Straw: A good deal of what was stated in the 24 September dossier in respect, for example, of the
concealment of missile systems has already been confirmed to be wholly accurate and proved. If my hon. Friend had had her way, we would never have discovered the 500-plus missile engines. [Interruption.] They were there. The Iraqi survey group is now conducting its work. [Interruption.]Let me deal with the way in which Saddam concealed his weapons. Recently, CNN reported that an Iraqi scientist, Mahaddi Ubaydi, who I am told was head of the centrifuge uranium enrichment programme, had volunteered information to the United States about centrifuge parts and documents concealed in his garden—[Interruption.] Yes, the documents related—[Interruption.]
Mr. Speaker: Order. Allow the Foreign Secretary to answer.
Mr. Straw: I ask my hon. Friend to think about what she is saying. The documents related to 1991. She knows that it was possible to build nuclear weapons in 1991. The bigger question is why an Iraqi scientist was concealing those documents and centrifuge parts under a rose bush in his garden. He told CNN that he was ordered to hide them so as to be able to rebuild the bomb programme at some time in the future, which is exactly what we said.
Moreover, David Kay, a former United Nations arms inspector said:
- "It begins to tell us how huge our job is. Remember, this material was buried in a barrel behind his house in a rose garden. There's no way that that would have been discovered by normal international inspections. I couldn't have done it. My successors couldn't have done it."
Mr. Andrew Mitchell (Sutton Coldfield): The Foreign Secretary was clearly right in his statement to underline the growing importance of the United Nations, the international community and particularly the pivotal role of Mr. Vieira de Mello. Following the announcement earlier this week, is the right hon. Gentleman yet in a position to tell the House which countries will be sending members of the team of experts that will pave the way for elections in Iraq?
Mr. Straw: No, I am not, but if I have more information when I get back to the office, I will write to the hon. Gentleman.
Mr. Speaker: Order. The Foreign Secretary has agreed to continue with matters relating to the statement, but the questions must be brief and there should be only one supplementary.
Mr. Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow): Could we return to the factual questions of my hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock (Andrew Mackinlay) about when the
Government first knew that the documents were forged? The hon. Member for Banff and Buchan (Mr. Salmond) asked who forged the documents, on whose behalf and why.
Mr. Straw: February this year is the answer to the first part of the question and, in answer to the second, we do not know, but we would like to.
Mr. Douglas Hogg (Sleaford and North Hykeham): What steps will be taken to ensure that the constitution drawn up by the unelected council is acceptable to the various peoples and regions in Iraq? The Foreign Secretary's statement was silent about the armed services—when and how will a reformed army, capable of supporting the civil power, be brought into being?
Mr. Straw: The governing council, which is necessarily unelected at the moment, but far more representative than anything under the Saddam regime, has the job not only of drafting the constitution but of consulting widely on it. Although I am merely speculating, it would have to be endorsed using some democratic method by the people of Iraq. That is a guarantee. Moreover, de Mello has a clear role in respect of that. As for the reform of the armed forces, the first stage has been to establish a reformed police service, and the next stage will be to establish a reformed security service, including an army.
Mike Gapes (Ilford, South): If there are to be elections in 2004, will the Foreign Secretary assure the House that UK political parties and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy will be involved in the preparations to assist the process of building pluralistic democracy in Iraq?
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