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15 Jul 2003 : Column 171W—continued
European Constitution
Mr. Rosindell: To ask the Prime Minister what assessment he has made of the effect of the proposed new EU constitution upon the representative role of Her Majesty The Queen. [125990]
The Prime Minister: Her Majesty The Queen's status and role as Head of State of the United Kingdom, including any representative functions, would be unaffected by any of the proposals in the draft Constitutional Treaty.
Government Reorganisation
Mr. Syms: To ask the Prime Minister what estimate he has made of (a) the costs arising from the recent Cabinet reshuffle and (b) the reorganisation costs of Government departments. [125042]
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The Prime Minister: I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave to the right hon. Member for Wokingham (Mr. Redwood) on 25 June 2003, Official Report, column 792W.
Iraq
Llew Smith: To ask the Prime Minister if he will seek permission from the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee to allow publication of the source for the statement at page 6 of the dossier on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, published in September 2002, that Iraq has sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa; and whether Her Majesty's Government provided the source material to the International Atomic Energy Agency. [123047]
The Prime Minister: It is not our practice to publish the source of intelligence reports. We asked the originators of our intelligence information to discuss the issue with the IAEA.
Adam Price: To ask the Prime Minister what discussions he has had on the use of oil revenues to fund reconstruction in Iraq in the manner outlined to the United Nations on 10 May. [125235]
The Prime Minister: UN Security Council resolution 1483, which the UK co-sponsored, stipulates that Iraqi oil revenues must be used for purposes benefiting the people of Iraq, including economic reconstruction. I have always made it clear in relevant discussions that Iraqi oil is owned by the Iraqi people and its revenues should be used for the good of the people, consistent with UN Security Council resolutions.
Adam Price: To ask the Prime Minister what recent discussions he has had regarding (a) extra funding and (b) international assistance for the Iraqi police force. [125248]
The Prime Minister: Government officials have discussed with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) how best the UK can contribute to the CPA's work to rebuild the Iraqi police service. The UK considers the restoration of the rule of law in Iraq to be a priority and will stay closely engaged with the CPA on issues of funding and assistance. In particular, the UK has deployed a senior police officer to Baghdad to assist with advising and training the new Iraq police service. In addition to this a further senior officer will deploy to Basra on 15 July to advise CPA (South). The CPA intends to hold a police contributor's conference shortly to garner support for a substantial international policing contribution and the UK is actively considering making a further commitment as part of this process.
Mrs. Mahon: To ask the Prime Minister if he will make a statement on Iraq's attempts to purchase uranium from Niger. [125650]
The Prime Minister: The September dossier stated that
- "there is intelligence that Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa".
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Glenda Jackson: To ask the Prime Minister if he will make a statement on (a) the reasons for defining the defection of Iraqi Lieutenant General Hussein Kamal as important in the Government's dossier, Weapons of Mass Destruction, of 24 September 2002 and (b) the value of the General's testimony to UN weapons inspectors that all proscribed weapons had been destroyed on his orders. [125936]
The Prime Minister: Lieutenant General Hussein Kamal defected in 1995. As the dossier makes clear, following his defection Iraq released over 2 million documents relating to its weapons of mass destruction programmes and acknowledged that it had pursued a biological programme that led to the deployment of actual weapons.
In his testimony to UN weapons inspectors, Kamal claimed that he had ordered the destruction of all biological, chemical and nuclear weapons and missiles. We know that Iraq did not do this and continued to be in breach of UN Security Council resolutions. Intelligence obtained by the British Government, reflected in the September dossier, has reported on the possession and production of chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles by Iraq. Equipment related to Iraq's nuclear programme dating back to 1991 has recently been recovered from the garden of a scientist in Iraq.
Glenda Jackson: To ask the Prime Minister what the deterioration rates are of the (a) VX nerve agent, (b) sarin and (c) botulinum toxin which he declared had been unaccounted for when UN weapons inspectors left Iraq in 1998, during his statement to the House of 18 March 2003, Official Report, column 76W. [125937]
The Prime Minister: The stability of the materials quoted depends very much on the initial purity and the precise storage conditions. Their usable lifetime as chemical or biological warfare agents, can range from a few months to tens of years. Even partially degraded material may still pose a significant hazard.
Dr. Julian Lewis: To ask the Prime Minister pursuant to his evidence to the Liaison Committee, 8 July, Question 186, (1) on what basis he calculated that (a) it was not true that 90 per cent. of the second dossier came from plagiarised material and (b) two of the three parts of the dossier were based on intelligence; [125968]
- (2) what proportions of the second Iraqi dossier were based upon the work of (a) Ibrahim al-Marishi in the Middle East Review of International Affairs of September 2002, (b) Sean Boyne in Jane's Intelligence Review of 1997, (c) Ken Gause in Jane's Intelligence Review of 2002, (d) Anthony Corderman in Key Targets on Iraq of February 1998 and (e) UK intelligence services. [125955]
The Prime Minister: I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave to the House on 10 February 2003, Official Report, column 583W.
The published memorandum from the Foreign Secretary and my Director of Communications and Strategy made clear that sections one and three were based on intelligence material and highlighted the relevant parts in section two that were based on intelligence material. The intelligence material was
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authorised by the relevant intelligence agency for use in the public in domain, in accordance with the procedures in place at the time.
Mr. Dalyell: To ask the Prime Minister when he was first informed that the reports relating to attempts by the Iraqi regime to obtain nuclear related materials from Niger were (a) of dubious basis and (b) possibly based on forgeries; and what recent discussions he has had with the US administration on the reports. [126037]
The Prime Minister: In February 2003, the IAEA received a number of documents related to Iraqi attempts to obtain uranium. On 7 March 2003, Dr. el-Baradei announced that the IAEA had concluded that these documents were not authentic.
I speak to President Bush regularly on many matters. It would not be appropriate to disclose the contents of those discussions.
Korea
Mrs. Mahon: To ask the Prime Minister what plans he has to visit the Republic of Korea. [123835]
The Prime Minister: I will visit Korea on Sunday 20 July where I will have my first meeting with President Roh in Seoul.
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Departmental Consultations
John Barrett: To ask the Minister of State, Department for International Development if he will list the consultation documents issued by the Department in each of the last four years; what the cost was of producing each of these; how many documents were issued in each consultation; and how many responses were received in each consultation. [124573]
Hilary Benn: The information requested is not collated on a central basis and could be provided only at disproportionate cost. However, a list of consultation exercises run by DFID is available at www.dfid.gov.uk.
Departmental Strategies
Mr. Wood: To ask the Minister of State, Department for International Development what measures are in place to ensure that account is taken of the concerns of aid agencies, human rights organisations and other non-governmental organisations in developing the Department's strategies. [124619]
Hilary Benn: DFID has significant involvement with a wide range of NGOs and other civil society organisations. This includes meeting, discussing and consulting widely with them, at both ministerial and official level.
Examples include: DFID's Information and Civil Society Department consult widely with the British Overseas NGOs for Development (BOND) network in relation to funding schemes, and have made improvements to funding procedures based on the views of BOND'S members; the International Financial Institutions Department holds regular official meetings with NGOs, particularly focusing on Poverty Reduction
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Strategy process; many of our Policy teams engage in wider dialogue with individual organisations on key policy and strategic areas; and a number of key NGOs made submissions to DFID White Papers and have responded to our Institutional Strategy Papers and Target Strategy Papers.
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