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Mr. Paul Keetch (Hereford): The shadow Secretary of State has detailed some of the visits that he made after the war and the discussions that he had with our military commanders about the prospect of civil disintegration in Iraq. Did he, however, raise his concerns about such a prospect when he visited our troops before the conflict, both in theatre and outside, and when he had discussions with the Secretary of State at that time?

Mr. Jenkin: I did not think that front-line commanders preparing for a conflict would have to worry about what the Department for International Development and the Government back home should have been worrying about. They were more concerned about whether there were going to be enough chemical suits or whether the food was going to be delivered on time to their soldiers, and about some of the other problems that our overstretched logistics were presenting to them.

Mr. Keetch: I would like to press the hon. Gentleman on this point, because I am aware that he visited the Gulf before the war and that he had discussions with the Secretary of State at that time. The commanders certainly expressed to me their concerns about what might happen after the war. We probed that matter and, indeed, went to the United States and spoke to representatives of US Central Command about it. Did the Conservative shadow Secretary of State carry out the same exercise?

Mr. Jenkin: We had a whole debate in the House—in January, I think—on post-conflict planning. It was then that the Government gave us assurances that planning would be in place, and it is for them to explain why those plans have turned out to be so different.

Increased military capability is clearly necessary to deal with the increased terrorist threat and the continuing burden that so many civilian tasks place on our soldiers in Iraq. But this reinforcement underlines how the post-conflict plans have gone wrong. The Prime Minister assured the House on 3 February that he had to have a plan

"every bit as viable and well worked out as a military plan."—[Official Report, 3 February 2003; Vol. 399, c. 36.]

I questioned the Secretary of State for Defence on 3 April, during the conflict, as we became more concerned about the lack of preparation, but the only assurance that he would give about his "ambition" for post-conflict Iraq to be run by the Iraqi people was that it was just that: an ambition. There was no sign of a plan.

We now know from the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Ladywood (Clare Short) that there was no plan. What does the Secretary of State have to say about

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that? Why on earth was the right hon. Lady allowed to stay in her post month after month, when she was so clearly seeking to obstruct the Government's policy? This underlines how weak the Prime Minister has become in his own party and his own Government. Presumably the Defence Secretary had discussions with the right hon. Lady, then his counterpart at the Department for International Development, about post-conflict reconstruction. What on earth did they discuss? Was he aware that there was no plan, when he committed British forces to this operation? More importantly, is there a plan now?

Yesterday's written statement says that

"the full scale of the requirement"—

for reinforcements—

". . . has yet to be developed".

It goes on:

"The military capabilities needed will be identified as the detail of the plan's implementation takes shape."

Does this mean that there is still no fully formed plan? If we are committing further UK forces, what exactly are we committing them for? The Secretary of State's statement tells us that the requirement is

"driven by initiatives of the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Department for International Development (DFID) to accelerate reconstruction activities in Iraq".—[Official Report, 8 September 2003; Vol. 410, c. 2WS.]

That is a laudable aim. The Foreign Secretary told BBC Radio 4 this morning:

"The key task there is to make use of these troops to get the infrastructure back up and running."

Will the Secretary of State explain what is meant by that?

There is an urgent need for increased security, increased patrols, better protection of key points, convoys and installations, and better intelligence as well as a need to improve border security, disarm rebels, mediate between warring Iraqi factions and speed up the recruitment and training of the Iraqi military. Our soldiers are fighting a classic counter-insurgency war, for which their training and experience have well prepared them. Their priority must be to kill or capture the terrorists, but are we to believe the Government when they say that they are increasing the burden of essentially civilian tasks for our troops? The fact is that the reconstruction effort has been painfully slow, and rectifying that is a key priority in restoring Iraqi public confidence in the coalition provisional authority. Where are the civilian agencies and contractors that should be undertaking these tasks?

Will the Secretary of State tell us whether there is a clear plan? If there is, please will he publish a suitable summary of it for the House? Unless he can do so, in the light of the months that have already passed with so little reconstruction activity, why should we believe his assurances that any plan exists at all?

Mr. George Foulkes (Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley): Did not the shadow Secretary of State sit through the Foreign Secretary's statement yesterday, in which he went through plan after plan? [Interruption.] He did. He said, for example, that all 240 hospitals in Iraq are operating. That is probably better than France,

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considering the way things are at the moment. The Foreign Secretary outlined detailed plans yesterday. It is the shadow Secretary of State who seems to be in denial.

Mr. Jenkin: It might be the root of the problem that the Foreign Secretary's idea of detail is very different from ours. A few sketched aspirations do not constitute a strategic plan. There is a case for the Government publishing a proper document that includes details of how they plan to move forward and that sets out the military tasks rather than the civilian tasks that they expect our armed forces to undertake. I can tell the right hon. Member for Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley (Mr. Foulkes) that there are people in the armed forces who are very worried about the lack of a strategic plan and about what the Government are taking on in Iraq without such a plan.

Harry Cohen (Leyton and Wanstead): Does the hon. Gentleman favour DFID employees and non-governmental organisations operating in Iraq when the security situation is not safe? If not, why is he criticising DFID?

Mr. Jenkin: I favour our military forces concentrating on the security tasks, so that those people can enter Iraq safely and carry out their tasks. That means that DFID will have to co-operate actively with the British armed forces and that the NGOs will have to work closely with our armed forces on the ground. That is the only way to improve the situation, rather than dumping on our soldiers all the jobs that they cannot do.

Mr. Salmond: We are witnessing the collapse of the pro-war coalition. Did it never occur to the hon. Gentleman, or to any Conservative Front Bencher, that given that the Government deceived the country over the reasons for going to war, they might well also have deceived us over the after-war preparations?

Mr. Jenkin: I am not here to play politics in this debate. I am here to hold the Government to account for their failure to plan properly for post-conflict Iraq. I am therefore asking the Secretary of State to publish a plan, perhaps in co-operation with his counterpart at DFID.

The Government have clearly been involved in promoting good will between the United States and our other allies in the United Nations. We certainly support a greater role for the United Nations if it will bring other nations in to support the coalition's effort to improve security, provided that there remains a coherent single military command, which, naturally, would be American. Will the Secretary of State spell out exactly what increased role for the UN he envisages, and how it will affect the conduct of military operations in Iraq?

The US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, has stated that the latest draft resolution contains

"invitations, direction, and other ways of inserting the UN in the development of a new Iraqi government".

If this is still not enough to appease French anti-US sentiment, what consideration has been given to a lead role for NATO? NATO is successfully leading the peacekeeping force in Kabul, and it has the experience

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and expertise to lead multi-national military operations in war-torn countries. There is great confidence and expectation at NATO headquarters that it should play a role. NATO has already been assisting the Polish armed forces in Iraq; moreover, it could decide to lead peacekeeping forces on the basis of a decision involving 18 rather than 19 in order to exclude any French obstructionism.

The prerequisite for avoiding what the Foreign Secretary's memorandum described as strategic failure in Iraq is the restoration of personal security, along with a tangible start on the rebuilding of Iraq. If we fail to achieve that soon, it will be difficult for genuine political reforms to take hold, and the political liberation from Saddam Hussein will be in danger of becoming the kind of foreign occupation that the Iraqi people resent and for which we have no ambition.

Iraq is already a magnet for terrorists who want to have a go at United States or United Kingdom soldiers. The horrific attack on the United Nations confirms that they want to destroy anything associated with the values of democracy and freedom. We cannot let them win.

There is every reason to be optimistic about the future of Iraq, provided that there is coherent planning and determined implementation. That holds out the prospect not just of democracy and prosperity for the Iraqi people for the first time, but, with all eyes in the middle east focused on Iraq, of a transformation of security throughout the region. The Government must convince the British people that those prizes are worth the money, the sweat and even the lives of the hard-pressed men and women of our armed forces. They have our admiration and good wishes as they face the challenges ahead.

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