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9 Sept 2003 : Column 346W—continued
Defence Training
Mr. Tyrie: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) when the Defence Training Review Rationalisation Programme began; [127249]
- (2) what the earliest date is on which decisions on the Defence Training Review can result in the implementation of a major relocation of service police; [127236]
(3) when the first major relocation from the Defence Training Review Rationalisation programme will be completed. [127250]
Mr. Ingram: The intention to review defence education and individual training was announced by my right hon. and noble Friend Lord Robertson, the then Defence Secretary on 22 July 1999, Official Report, columns 614–15W, and the outcome of that review which included the recommendation for the rationalisation programme was announced by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence on 27 March 2001, Official Report, columns 547–48W.
The Ministry of Defence is currently engaging with industry to determine the most appropriate and cost effective locations for the Defence Training Establishments within the rationalisation programme. The earliest that any decisions on the locations of training units will be made is December 2004. It is anticipated that contracts with the successful bidders will be signed in 2005 and any relocations will take place after that date. Opportunities for early implementation will however be kept under review.
Destroyers
Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the average operating cost of (a) batch 3 type 22, (b) type 23 and (c) type 42 destroyers were in each of the last two years; and if he will make a statement. [127274]
Mr. Ingram: The actual cost of operating various types of frigates and destroyers will vary considerably from year to year, dependent on the tasking and maintenance undertaken during that period. Average annual operating costs, based on historic costs over the last two full financial years are given in the table. The
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figures include manpower, maintenance, fuel, stores and other costs (such as harbour dues), but exclude depreciation and cost of capital.
| Financial Year | ||
|---|---|---|
| 2001–02 | 2002–03 | |
| (a) Batch 3 Type 22 Frigate | 11.9 | 13.1 |
| (b) Type 23 Frigate | 10.3 | 10.3 |
| (c) Type 42 Destroyer | 13.0 | 13.5 |
HMS Bridport
Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what plans he has for HMS Bridport. [127275]
Mr. Ingram: HMS Bridport is being held in extended readiness at Faslane.
Hutton Inquiry
David Davis: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what criteria his Department used to decide which documents to disclose to the Hutton inquiry. [128603]
Mr. Hoon: We have disclosed all documents that appeared to be relevant to the inquiry's work. We have also supplied further material which the inquiry has requested.
Iraq
Llew Smith: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what (a) scientific and (b) medical evidence was used as the basis of the statements in paragraph 4.10 of his Department's report on first reflections on operations in Iraq, that there is no reliable scientific or medical evidence to suggest depleted uranium has previously been responsible for post-conflict incidences of ill-health. [126923]
Mr. Hoon: The Royal Society's independent expert Depleted Uranium Working Group recently completed an extensive review of the scientific work on potential health and environmental effects of depleted uranium (DU) munitions. The findings of the review are detailed in two reports entitled "The Health Hazards of Depleted Uranium Munitions" (2001, 2002). They support the Ministry of Defence's view that risks posed by DU to the health of soldiers on the battlefield are minimal except for a small number of extreme cases. The United States Government has carefully monitored the health of those US soldiers who were exposed in extreme circumstances when DU rounds accidentally hit their vehicles during the 1990–91 Gulf Conflict. Some seventeen of them have had DU shrapnel embedded in their bodies for the last twelve years. None of the groups shows signs of health problems attributable to DU. The offspring of the highly-exposed US veterans, amounting to some sixty children, are all healthy.
Some 53,000 British troops took part in the 1990–91 Gulf Conflict, and some 3,300 subsequently felt the need to attend the Gulf Veterans Medical Assessment Programme. The results of the first 3,000 patients to attend have been published: 75 per cent. were found to be well, no novel or unusual conditions were found and
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the most common condition was found to be post-traumatic stress disorder. No evidence of ill-health due to DU exposure was found.
The findings of United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) studies in Kosovo (2001), Serbia and Montenegro (2002) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (2003) note very low levels of DU contamination which do not present immediate radioactive or toxic risks for human health. UNEP's findings are consistent with MOD's view that any DU contamination will be limited and localised and that actions to reduce any potential intakes will only be necessary in some extreme cases.
Mr. Gray: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) how many (a) camp beds and (b) NBC suits and respirators were used during Telic 1; and what shortfalls there were; [127109]
- (2) how much body armour was issued during Telic 1; and what shortfall there was. [127108]
Mr. Ingram: I assume that Telic 1 relates to the period between initial deployment of troops to the Gulf region and the end of major hostilities. The quantities of camp beds, NBC suits, respirators and body armour deployed to theatre are detailed in the table. It is not possible to identify the quantities actually used during that time for which the information is not held centrally.
| Equipment type | Number issued |
|---|---|
| Camp beds | 25,280 |
| NBC suits | 218,000 |
| S10 respirators | 31,500 |
| Enhanced Combat Body Armour (ECBA) sets | 38,200 |
The S10 respirator, referred to in the table, is an item of personal issue to all Service personnel, to be retained at all times; the number shown deployed to theatre was to provide replacement stocks.
Although sufficient quantities of the equipments were supplied to theatre, I am aware that local supply difficulties may have resulted in shortfalls in some areas. In particular, some redistribution of ECBA ceramic plates was required, with priority given to front-line combat units. Supply difficulties will be addressed as part of the on-going departmental review of the operation.
Joint Service Military Training
Mr. Tyrie: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what recent assessment he has made of the risks of joint service military training. [127248]
Mr. Ingram: The risks associated with the programme to create defence training establishments have been identified and are being appropriately managed and mitigated.
Mr. Tyrie: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the capital cost is of work required at RAF Halton in order to make it serviceable for joint service police training. [127237]
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Mr. Ingram: The initial estimate of the capital works required at the RAF Halton site to accommodate joint service police training is £90 million. This will provide modernised domestic accommodation, improved site infrastructure and a new joint police training facility.
Mr. Tyrie: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) what the capital cost is of work required at Chichester to provide joint police service training, excluding the MoD police; [127238]
- (2) if he will estimate the capital cost of initiating a pilot scheme of joint service police training; [127235]
(3) how long it would take to begin operations if a decision were taken to start a pilot of joint service police training; [127234]
(4) whether his Department has done a cost benefit analysis of Chichester as a location for a pilot scheme to extend joint service police training; [127233]
(5) if he will permit a consortium to bid for a pilot scheme incorporating more joint military police training before completion of the Defence Training Review Rationalisation Programme. [127232]
Mr. Ingram: In 1999 it was estimated that the capital works required at Chichester to provide joint police service training, excluding provision for the Ministry of Defence Police, would be £3.5 million. Subsequent study has shown that the site does not offer the opportunity for redevelopment and modernisation to accommodate the full requirement for joint police training, including the MOD Police.
No pilot scheme is planned for joint service police training.
Mr. Tyrie: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what initial estimate he has made of the total saving from moving the Royal Military Police from Chichester to the lowest cost site, assuming maintenance of the same overall level of training output. [127239]
Mr. Ingram: The initial estimate of the total savings from moving the Royal Military Police from Chichester to the lowest cost site is £695,000 per annum. In addition, a receipt from the disposal of the Chichester site will be realised. Over a 25 year period moving from the current service police, MOD Police and Guard Service training locations at Chichester, HMS Excellent, Wethersfield and Worthy Down to the benchmark site at RAF Halton is calculated to generate savings of at least £430 million.
Mr. Tyrie: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what priority he attaches to joint service military training in relation to other parts of the review of joint service activity. [127240]
Mr. Ingram: Joint service training plays an important role in underpinning joint operational capability. A high priority is placed on delivering joint training when it is appropriate.
Mr. Tyrie: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) whether the initiation of full joint service military police training needs to await the outcome of the Defence Training Review Rationalisation Programme; [127242]
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- (2) what joint service military police training is taking place; at what cost; and what proportion (a) by number of trainees and (b) by cost of all military police training, (i) excluding and (ii) including Ministry of Defence police, it represents. [127241]
Mr. Ingram: There are no plans to initiate joint Service military police training other than through the Defence Training Review rationalisation programme. However, the training at the Royal Military Police Training School (RMPTS) is open to all three Services and some common training has also been carried out with the MOD Police. In practice, personnel from the Royal Marines, Royal Navy and RAF have attended the following courses: Royal Military Police (RMP) Junior Non Commissioned Officers (JNCO), RMP Investigations, and RMP Scenes of Crime. Information for 2001–2002, which is the most recent year for which data are readily available, shows that students from the Royal Air Force, Royal Navy and Royal Marines make up 2.5 per cent. of the total student throughput and represented 2.4 per cent. of the total cost of RMPTS courses.
Mr. Tyrie: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether recent experience of joint service operations in Afghanistan, the Gulf, Sierra Leone and the Falklands have resulted in joint service military training being placed at a higher priority. [127243]
Mr. Ingram: We have always placed importance on joint service training. Training provided is reviewed in the light of lessons learned from all campaigns.
Mr. Tyrie: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many army military policemen have been deployed at short notice to support other service policemen to assist with incidents in operations overseas; and in how many cases. [127244]
Mr. Ingram: Since January 2003, 18 members of the Royal Military Police have supported deployed Military Police assets, at short notice, for seven incidents conducted in four overseas locations.
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