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Mr. Simon Thomas: What should be the deciding body on any withdrawal of military force from Iraq? Who should decide when the time is right—America, as head of the unified control that the right hon. Gentleman outlined, or the United Nations? The final arbiter of when military force withdraws is important for whether the Iraqis perceive the forces as occupying or bringing them peace and justice.
Mr. Ancram: We are talking about practical realities, and about the security of Iraq. Those who are best able to judge the security situation are those who are responsible for securing it in the first place—the armed forces, not the United Nations. It is therefore inevitable that the decision will be taken by the armed forces in consultation with the various participating nations, which is how the matter should be decided. I shall give another example shortly, which will show that that where we should direct our attention.
Mr. Salmond: The doctrine that decisions on withdrawal from—or, for that matter, entry into—a theatre of combat are made by the armed forces is extraordinary. Such decisions are political decisions made by whoever is authorising the armed forces. The right hon. Gentleman was asked whether withdrawal would be authorised by the American command—presumably, the President of the United States—or by the United Nations. If the unified command is reporting to the United Nations, surely it should be the United Nations that makes the decision.
Mr. Ancram: I do not know how much knowledge the hon. Gentleman has of military matters, but I would say to him that those in charge of security are best placed to decide when changes can be made to security operations. Those who have been responsible for providing the security in the first place should properly take the final decisions on whether the situation in Iraq is secure enough for withdrawal to take place. I shall return to the issue later, but a good example of the principle in operation is to be found in Afghanistan, where decisions on security are taken by the armed forces and the decisions on humanitarian and political questions are taken by the United Nations. That relationship is working well, and it is one that we should look at closely in relation to Iraq.
The formal United Nations involvement should not be military. The passing of the current draft resolution will create a mandate for the further involvement of other nations in the security of Iraq, which would be welcome. In particular, it could open the door to India's military involvement. Furthermore, I understand from conversations that I have had that some of the Gulf states might be able to provide Arab forces to help in this endeavour, which would be an important extension of the multinational nature of the force that is in place.
The endeavour should not be a UN peacekeeping force in the sense that we understand it at present, however. Kofi Annan has ruled out a blue helmet—or, indeed, a blue beret—operation for good reasons, not least because it will not be a traditional peacekeeping operation of the kind in which the United Nations is involved elsewhere. At the moment, it is a counter-insurgency mission, which is not, and should not be, the role of the United Nations. For that reason, I believe that the definition set out in the draft resolution text is the correct one.
In Afghanistan, the United Nations has a significant role to play on the political and humanitarian front, in co-ordination with NATO and the American forces on the security front. It achieves its purpose without seeking to exert control over the military operation. The military, for its part, welcomes the work of the UN, which allows it to concentrate on its security responsibilities. I saw this in action when I visited Afghanistan in July. I talked to the United States and United Kingdom military commanders there, and to Lakhdar Brahimi of the United Nations. There was a clear and important demarcation of responsibilities, which worked well. That was before NATO took over the command of ISAF, which I believe will help still further by creating greater continuity on the security side.
In Afghanistan, as in Iraq, one of the priorities is to move as swiftly as possible to a democratically elected indigenous Administration. The military coalition accepts its role in training local security forces to provide security across the country, without which a successful election would be unlikely to be held. The United Nations has the vital responsibility of helping to carry out sensitive work on voter registration and other legal technicalities, and advising on constitutional options. Afghanistan provides an example of how that relationship is working successfully on the ground, and it is just such a relationship that is envisaged in the United Nations draft resolution. It is a model that could usefully be adapted and adopted for Iraq.
If, however, the United Nations is to play a significant role in delivering a bright future for Iraq, two things are needed immediately: first, as far as possible its security must be assured; and, secondly, civilian reconstruction must be stepped up and the contracts to do so must be in place. After the tragic death of Sergio Vieira de Mello and other United Nations personnel, not least our own Fiona Watson, in the bombing of the United Nations building, the question of United Nations security is paramount. I heard what the Secretary of State said, and I do not wish to know about the private and secret discussions that took place. However, when I was in Baghdad, the United Nations was beginning to be aware of a threat and was considering discontinuing its flights into Baghdad airport, because there had been several incidents of missile lock-ons. It was beginning to see that there was a threat, and I still regret that, for the reasons the Foreign Secretary stated, it had kept itself outside the secure area on the east side of the river where the security provided by the security forces was not available.
Mr. Garnier: My right hon. Friend may not want to know what discussions the Foreign Secretary had with his counterparts, which are necessarily confidential, but
we are entitled to comment that the safety and overall security of United Nations' personnel can be achieved effectively and practically only with the assistance of United States' armed forces guarding its premises. That may be politically inconvenient and diplomatically uncomfortable, but if we are to avoid tragedies such as those that took place in August, as members of the United Nations we should swallow our pride and allow those who have the means to help to protect us.
Mr. Ancram: I agree in principle with my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier), but there was another dimension: the United Nations was in its old building, which was on the east side of the river. That was not part of the secured area in Baghdad. That was its decision. It was not so much that it required American assistance in protecting its premises. I would have preferred it if its premises had been within the secure area, because that would have lessened the likelihood of what happened. It is easy to be wise after the event, but I drove past the United Nations building and, having in my time in Northern Ireland learned that terrorists look for soft, rather than hard, targets, I wondered whether the United Nations was not presenting itself as a soft target and therefore a temptation to terrorists.
Mr. Garnier: I do not want to labour the point, because it is not central to the debate, but surely there is not much difference between siting premises in an insecure area, and having them within a secure area but refusing to accept the protection of security forces.
Mr. Ancram: Ideally—I hope this will happen now—there should be a United Nations presence, but within the secured area, where it can take advantage of the fact that it will be a harder target than in the unsecured area. The United Nations must be brought to understand that if it is to succeed in Iraq, it must accept the security umbrella of what I hope will be reinforced coalition military protection.
United Nations security will also be enhanced by greater co-operation from the Iraqi people themselves. I say again that that is more likely to be forthcoming if the civilian programme of reconstruction, particularly of basic amenities, progresses apace. The question we must ask is, will it be forthcoming? After three days, I have not yet heard anything concrete from the Government to suggest that there is a clear, structured and timetabled plan for physical reconstruction. As it is five months since the war ended, that is simply not good enough.
I want to make it clear that I have nothing but praise for the performance of our troops, who have done much to improve the lives of people in Iraq, not least building a new hospital in Basra. However, our troops are not there to act as surrogate civilian contractors, and I was surprised to hear the Foreign Secretary on BBC radio yesterday apparently suggesting that they were. That would be a travesty of their role and of their responsibilities.
I repeat that the dearth of civilian contracts is not a complaint raised by me but one that was raised with me not only by Iraqis, but also by senior British military sources when I was there. It is difficult, in the absence of a clear and stated programme and schedule of work, to avoid the impression that the Government are confused
about how that programme will develop. We have been left asking whether there was a post-war plan, let alone what has been described as an exit strategy, but which I like to think of as a completion strategy.In June this year the erstwhile Secretary of State for International Development admitted that
- "the preparations for post-conflict were poor and we have got the chaos and suffering that we have got now".
The present Secretary of State, Lady Amos, admitted
- "we would all say there are things we did not get right with respect to the planning and administration"
On Monday, I asked the Foreign Secretary about reconstruction contracts. I now ask him again: how many civilian construction contracts were in place when I visited Iraq on 24 July? How many contracts are now in place? How many are in preparation, and how long is the period between project identification and the start of the work? Those are questions that were put to me, and we have still not had answers to them. I hope that we may have answers today.
A strong civilian programme of reconstruction will make an enormous contribution to stability on the streets, and will create a stronger environment within which the UN can play the important role that is increasingly open to it in Iraq. The same would be achieved by a demonstration by the Government that there is a strategy for reconstruction, for returning power to the Iraqi people as soon as possible, and—on completion of those tasks—for getting out. That would have a powerful effect on sceptical people in Iraq, and would also enhance stability on the ground.
Of course the most urgent problem at the moment is the rising wave of terrorism and insurgency. The priority must be to root that out and eliminate it. The Conservatives welcome the deployment of additional troops, although the pressure of overstretch in our armed forces cannot be ignored. We also welcome the programme of retraining and recommissioning Iraqi military and police forces. I believe that their role in combating both terrorism and lawlessness will be crucial. Similar training carried out in Afghanistan has given us some indications of how that can work effectively.
If reconstruction, political development and the satisfactory provision of humanitarian aid are to be achieved, a secure environment must be achieved and maintained. I have no doubt that the UN can play an effective and vital role in such an environment.
I believe that a new chapter is opening in Iraq. I believe that what we did in the war was right. What we must not do now is squander the peace for lack of political direction or will. There are positive signs, which must offer hope.
On Sunday President Bush demonstrated a clear determination to make reconstruction work, and I hope that the Government here will do the same. Through the work that he did in Baghdad, Sergio Vieira de Mello showed that the UN can perform a vital role. We owe it
to him, and to all the others who have died in the service of securing and building a better future for the people of Iraq, to get the peace right and to give them back their country, free of tyranny and free of the reign of fear. To do that, the Government must show more direction than they have hitherto, and simply get on with the job.
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