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Mr. Prisk: Will the Secretary of State give way?
Mr. Hoon: I have given way a great number of times and I recognise that a considerable number of right hon. and hon. Members wish to speak in the debate.
We can draw on the armed forces in response to any emergency, national or regional, that goes beyond the normal capacity of the emergency services. We did so in
the foot and mouth outbreak, and we did so during the firefighters dispute. But there was a penalty. The personnel involved—some 19,000 at the peak—had to be withdrawn from their primary military duties. Training and preparations for Iraq were disrupted. Some ships were unable to go to sea.An extra burden was placed on the individuals concerned. Even though the strikes themselves were not continuous, personnel involved in providing the cover remained on standby to deploy. That meant that they could not take planned leave and, in some cases, post-operational tour leave had to be cancelled. Because we could not predict how long the dispute would continue, training and other normal military activities could not be planned while the possibility of further strikes remained. Nor could the commitment have been maintained indefinitely. At the outset, we recognised that the effort necessary to provide emergency cover would impact upon other military operations and training activity. But the increasing level of military commitments during the early part of this year meant that in order to meet the demands of other operations—most notably Iraq—we had to progressively reduce the number of personnel engaged in the operation. Ultimately, it would have become impossible to maintain the same level of cover as had been provided during the early strikes.
The success of the operation is an excellent example of the flexibility and commitment that our armed forces bring to any operation they undertake, but it also serves to remind us of the limitations of working within what is essentially a finite resource.
We recognise explicitly in our planning that earmarking units for more than one contingency imposes limitations. When a contingency unfolds—whether it is an operation in Sierra Leone or a fire strike in the United Kingdom—any forces committed to that contingency become unavailable for other operations. This applies to the CCRFs and reserve units as it does to regular units. Simply put, no one can be in two places at the same time. It is not possible to act and still be able to meet every possible contingency. That is the core challenge of managing our commitments. It applies at home and overseas and is ultimately a matter of a decision on the priorities of particular circumstances of the moment. It cannot be any other way, principally because our human resources are not unlimited.
This works because of the hard-earned flexibility and commitment of our armed forces. That flexibility and commitment flow from the time and effort spent in the training of the highest quality of the men and women who make up our regular and reserve forces.
I am confident that we have put in place the capabilities and structures that will allow our armed forces to make an effective contribution to maintaining the defence and security of the United Kingdom, whether that is through responding to a terrorist incident here or conducting expeditionary operations overseas to prevent a threat materialising as an attack on our home territory.
2.7 pm
Mr. Bernard Jenkin (North Essex): This is not a good day for the House of Commons. The Secretary of State may have observed the letter of the procedures of the House, but he has abused the spirit of the House by effectively making a statement about a Committee report that was published this morning without advertising it in advance and without giving Members an opportunity to learn in advance that he would be making a statement. To debate a Committee report so soon after its publication is a most unusual procedure for the Government to pursue. It was also discourteous for the Foreign Secretary to make a statement about the contents of the report outside Downing street, instead of to this House.
At the outset, the Government have shown little respect to this House, certainly to those who might disagree with them on this question. This situation underlines how elaborately the spin operation has worked in relation to the publication of the report. It is now clear that there has been briefing from Whitehall officials on the contents of the Intelligence and Security Committee report in advance of its publication, precisely to enable the Secretary of State to manage this occasion. It remains to be seen whether the effect he feels he has created in this House is sustained in the media tomorrow and in the commentary that will undoubtedly follow. I believe that the right hon. Gentleman's attempt to brush aside the question of his conduct will in the end serve him ill.
What it would be most appropriate to concentrate on today, the second anniversary of the terrible attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on 11 September, are those terrible attacks, those who died on that terrible day and those who displayed such heroism. Here in this House of Commons, it would be appropriate to concentrate on the Government's defence policies and the responses to 11 September 2001 in the context of the title of today's debate, "Defence in the United Kingdom." The Government should remove anything that distracts us from that vital task.
We take this opportunity to pay tribute to the UK's overstretched armed forces and intelligence services for all that they have achieved since that terrible day. They have worked harder than ever. They have performed superbly, despite shortages of manpower and equipment, despite cancelled leave and unduly long separation from families and loved ones, and despite the risks and dangers that they face. Indeed, we have seen conspicuous acts of gallantry and bravery that are the hallmark of all three armed services. And there have been sacrifices. I join the Secretary of State in paying tribute to our armed forces on this occasion.
This should be an occasion on which to concentrate on the Secretary of State's policy failures: I would wish to explore the failure to provide a more coherent policy for the security of our homeland; the failure to appoint a single Minister responsible for homeland security—as we have appointed an Opposition spokesman to shadow that task; the failure to deal with the erosion in the numbers of the Territorial Army and the reserves; and the failure to create an effective and operational civil contingencies reaction force, which my hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Patrick Mercer) has just pointed out.
The Secretary of State has also failed to recruit effectively for all three of our armed services. How can he tell us that all is well, when the armed forces are more challenged and more overstretched than ever before and when he has cut the target size of the armed forces by 3,500 from April 2001 to 1 July 2003 so that he can claim that we are less under-recruited than before? Not only has the right hon. Gentleman failed to meet his recruitment targets: he has cut the target size of the Army. He has signally failed to fulfil the promise in the strategic defence review to increase the size of the Army to 108,500. The spending crisis in the Department is an open secret in Whitehall and among defence contractors. Other problems include the state of the accommodation. I visited Blandford camp last Friday and saw accommodation not fit for a student, with mould on the walls—[Interruption.] I saw bedsits not fit for students, where we expect 40-year-old senior NCOs to live for two years while on a training scheme at the Royal College of Signals.
Mr. Julian Brazier (Canterbury): Disgraceful.
Mr. Jenkin: It is an absolute disgrace. There should be nothing distracting us from that and other issues, yet we are being distracted. What is the point of conducting such a debate with a Secretary of State who is now so widely expected not to be in office for very much longer? How can the Secretary of State be capable of conducting his Department with regard to defence in the UK if he is so obviously being hung out to dry by his own Prime Minister? How is he meant to command the confidence and respect of the armed servicemen and women in his care, whose whole command philosophy is about taking control of and accepting responsibility for those answerable to them, when he never accepts responsibility for anything?
How can the British people or the armed forces have trust in the conduct of the Secretary of State's Department after he told the Hutton inquiry that he was not aware of key events taking place in his own Department? He was apparently not even aware of the discussions taking place at meetings at which his special adviser said he was present. That compounds his record in the Ministry of Defence.
The Secretary of State never takes responsibility for the shortcomings in kit and equipment for the armed forces. Whenever things go wrong in his Department, like the sudden need to send reinforcements to Iraq, he hides behind his military advice, as though he is simply a messenger for the chiefs of staff, yet he was ready to overrule his permanent secretary when his political reputation was on the line.
Mr. Malcolm Savidge (Aberdeen, North): Is not the hon. Gentleman being inconsistent in criticising the Secretary of State for referring to the report published today but now doing the same thing himself?
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