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Mr. Jenkin: It was the Secretary of State who raised the issue of the report. I shall not debate the 45-minute issue or discuss the breadth of the report, but the Secretary of State has brought his personal reputation to the fore in this debate and I simply point out what is at stake.
Mr. Christopher Chope (Christchurch): Will my hon. Friend deal with this issue? The Prime Minister told the
House on 4 June that he would produce all the evidence for the ISC, yet paragraphs 96 and 97 of the report make it clear that the Secretary of State deliberately and wilfully suppressed vital evidence that the Committee wanted.
Mr. Jenkin: I shall come to the question of whether the ISC can really fulfil the function the Prime Minister promised it would.
Now the Secretary of State disclaims any responsibility for the ISC's finding that he and his Department were "unhelpful and potentially misleading" in the evidence given in the recent inquiry. The report continues:
- "We are disturbed that after the first evidence session, which did not cover all the concerns raised by the DIS staff"—
- "the Defence Secretary decided against giving instructions for a letter to be written to us outlining the concerns."
The Secretary of State knows the real reason why he is being sustained in office on a life support machine. He knows that he will not survive beyond a few more weeks. He knows that he is to be the scapegoat, tethered to the stake until all the sins of this Government have been heaped upon him, before he is cast into the wilderness in a symbolic but insincere act of contrition. Is it really in the national interest for the Secretary of State to allow himself to be used in that way? Is it in the interests of the men and women of the armed services? Would it not help the right hon. Gentleman's reputation and integrity if he accepted ministerial responsibility for all the problems and mistakes for which he is ultimately responsible? Would it not be better for his own integrity, for the Government and for the general reputation of public life? Paradoxically, there is an example that he could follow: Alastair Campbell has resigned and so should the Secretary of State.
The Intelligence and Security Committee has had an extremely difficult task, but I fear that its report will only fuel the debate about the handling and presentation of intelligence material in the run-up to the war in Iraq. I could elaborate on the contradictions between the Committee's report and the earlier report by the Foreign Affairs Committee. Then there are the far more detailed and public testimonies given to the Hutton inquiry, which expose the weakness of the processes of both the Committees that have reported. That is not to cast any aspersion on the Committees' work or integrity, but no Committee of this House can carry out the kind of impartial and forensic cross-examination that we have seen in Lord Hutton's inquiry. No Committee of this House can reach impartial conclusions that are properly
insulated from the party political battle, in order to command the public confidence that is so necessary in this case.
Alan Howarth (Newport, East) rose—
Mr. Jenkin: I shall not give way.
The fundamental truth remains that the only way to establish the truth about these matters in a manner that will command public confidence, which is so necessary for the defence and security of our country, is for Lord Hutton to be given the wider remit for which we have always argued, or for a new independent judicial inquiry to be established for that purpose. In the meantime, the Secretary of State should insist that the Prime Minister accept his resignation, so that his Department can get back to the business that it should really be about—the defence of the UK.
The Secretary of State is discredited and, with all respect, he should go.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Sylvia Heal): Order. I remind the House that Mr. Speaker has imposed a 12-minute limit on speeches from the Back Benches. I call Mr. Bruce George.
2.21 pm
Mr. Bruce George (Walsall, South): Madam Deputy Speaker—
Mr. John Smith (Vale of Glamorgan): On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. Is it in order for the Opposition defence spokesman to open the debate for his party without making any reference to the subject on the Order Paper?
Madam Deputy Speaker: The content of the shadow Secretary of State's speech is his responsibility, not mine.
Mr. George : Madam Deputy Speaker, I hope that the clock began ticking off my 12 minutes 10 seconds ago, not when you actually called me.
I applaud the fact that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State came to the House and made, if not a statement, at least remarks about the Intelligence and Security Committee report. Had he not done so, the Opposition spokesman would have used plan B, turned over a page of his second-rate speech, which was like an impersonation of Sir John Gielgud—
Mr. Smith: That is too flattering. It was third rate.
Mr. George: The hon. Gentleman's speech was indeed third rate. Under plan B, he would have attacked my right hon. Friend for making no comments on the presentation by the ISC.
Secondly, the hon. Member for North Essex (Mr. Jenkin) spoke about overstretch. I am sorry to go on about this again, but the Opposition Front-Bench defence team is so overstretched that half of them have to double-hat as members of the Defence Committee. I find that appalling, and I shall be writing to the Liaison Committee and to my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House on the matter. It is very important for Opposition Front-Bench Members to decide whether they are able to function as a politically motivated group in one environment while adopting a more consensual approach in another. That dichotomy is something of which I am very critical.
Having used two of my 12 minutes on those matters, I turn to the subject of the debate. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has commented on what his Department has done by way of homeland security. My Committee has mirrored that process, and in our reports we have criticised the Government for doing the wrong things. We have produced four reports: "The Threat from Terrorism" in December 2001, "Defence and Security in the UK" in July 2002, and "A New Chapter to the Strategic Defence Review" in May 2003; our most recent report concerned the draft civil contingencies Bill, and it appeared in July 2003.
I am very proud to be Chairman of the Defence Committee. Our work goes beyond the terms of reference set for us. From what my right hon. Friend said, I took him to mean that this country's departmental structures are not reflected in reality. The Defence Committee has broken away from its terms of reference—with no complaints from anyone so far—to look at the roles of the Ministry of Defence, the Home Office, the civil contingencies secretariat, and a whole range of Departments. We have looked at how decisions are made, both horizontally and vertically. We have looked at regional and local government and civil contingency planning, as well as the roles of the NHS, the ambulance service and the private sector.
What is happening is patently obvious to everyone. As my right hon. Friend said, the Ministry of Defence and the armed forces are only part of the process of deterrence. The nation must realise that we must be engaged in what is called total defence. The term may not be exact, and indeed it is almost a contradiction in terms in a free society, but it involves the private sector and ordinary citizens as much as the armed forces. The armed forces' role is a narrow one, and the structure of the Select Committee system and of Government in general should reflect the changing world in which we live.
Terrorism does not fit neatly into any departmental structure. We must overcome departmentalism in the Committee system of the House of Commons as well as in central Government. If we do not, I fear that we will not be responding as effectively as we should.
In our report "Defence and Security in the UK"—the product of six months' work—we made a number of recommendations that did not go down a bundle with the Ministry of Defence or the Home Office. We touched on the question of whether there should be a director of homeland security for this country. We were not attacking the Home Secretary, but we thought that it might be better to have a senior Cabinet member who could devote all his time to the matter. At present, the
Home Secretary has to cover a vast range of subjects. I believe that the Committee remains of the opinion expressed in the report.My right hon. Friend commented on the report entitled "A New Chapter to the Strategic Defence Review" and the establishment of a civil contingency reaction force, which I very much welcome. That force may not necessarily be the first available in a crisis, as that responsibility might well go to our full-time armed forces, assuming that they are available for deployment. I have a few concerns about the new reaction force, one of them being that five days' training may not be sufficient, even though it may not be doing everything if a major crisis happens. I hope that that matter will be addressed properly, and that we can be reassured in that regard.
Some matters need to be explained more fully. It is disappointing that the Ministry of Defence has not thought more innovatively about home defence. Is that because of a potential turf war with the Home Office? I was a little irritated—
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