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3.25 pm
Mr. Malcolm Savidge (Aberdeen, North): As the Defence Secretary said, defence in the UK is interlinked with our international situation. As other hon. Members have said, it is appropriate that the debate is being held on the anniversary of 11 September. I identify myself with the sympathies extended to all those who are grieving at this time. It is appropriate for us to consider the perspective since 11 September.
Britain rightly said after 11 September that we were standing shoulder to shoulder with the United States. We believed that the attack was not just on the United States, but on civilisation itself. Although I believe that taking part in the war on terror was correct, we should also recognise the price that could be paid by increasing the risk of terrorism against the UK. Whether we believe that the war on Iraq was right or wrong, we should recognise that it has also probably increased the risk of terrorism against British citizens.
Immediately after the start of the war, influential people in the Bush Administration started arguing for further pre-emptive wars. Again, we should be under no illusions that if the United States engages in more military adventures, that will increase fear and hatred of it. From a time when the world was so closely behind the United States after 11 September, it is disturbing to see the extent to which the Pew survey and other surveys of international opinion have shown a sharp increase in hostility to the United States. There should be no doubt on our part that if the UK were to support further military adventures, that would massively increase the risks of terrorism against our people, whether from Islamic or other groups, whether from abroad or possibly even indigenous sources. The blood price of that military special relationship would be paid not just by our armed forces, but by our civilians at home or abroad. One thinks of the example of Bali, which was clearly an attack on Australian citizens.
I believed that over and above the work of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the report from the Intelligence and Security Committee and the work of Lord Hutton, it was in the national interest to have a wider independent inquiry. One reason is that it is important that we should analyse the basis on which we went to war to ascertain whether or not that should set precedents for the future. Should a pre-emptive war on the basis of intelligence, which in terms of the ISC report can be uncertain, or as Paul Wolfowitz said can be murky, set a precedent for the future, or should we decide that we should be far more cautious in future?
Since the war there has tended to be a change of emphasis. In Britain there has been an emphasis on human rights aspects. I give the highest credit to my hon. Friend the Member for Cynon Valley (Ann Clwyd) for the work that she has done over the years in emphasising the appalling atrocities of the Saddam regime over the decades.
War is a terribly dangerous precedent and we did not get the agreement of the international community, which was the way in which we should have been dealing with the matter. I fear that human rights was not the priority of the United States, and that there was far too much arbitrariness. We must work primarily to build up the International Criminal Court and in strengthening diplomatic and other pressures, with war being regarded only as a last resort, if we are to preserve a stable world under the rule of law.
I find the US neo-conservative concept of America as a self-appointed sheriff with a posse of the willing frighteningly near the idea of vigilantism and lynch law. To me that leads not only to arbitrariness but, as Nelson Mandela said, to the potential for international anarchy.
It is appropriate on 11 September for us to ask whether we are winning or losing the war on terror. I am glad that we have the report of the Oxford research group by Professor Paul Rogers, which was launched at the all-party parliamentary group on global security in this place last Tuesday. I shall briefly summarise some of his conclusions. First, while we have had significant successes militarily and in stopping the economic power of some of the terrorist organisations, and in thwarting some attempted attacks by means of intelligence, there have been significant failures such as Bali, Casablanca, Riyadh, Karachi and elsewhere, mostly in Asia and
Africa. Professor Rogers estimates that al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda-linked groups have probably killed about 350 people and injured perhaps 1,000. He points out that during the two years since 11 September they have achieved more than they were achieving in, say, the two years before it.Professor Rogers says that in Afghanistan, where we achieved military victory, we must recognise that it is only an area around Kabul that is under control. The area outside that is dangerously out of control. While the positive support that was being given by the Taliban to al-Qaeda is no longer there, it still creates a sort of anarchy where there are grave risks that terrorist groups can still thrive.
Professor Rogers says that there is a grave danger that the troops in Iraq may be a magnet for terrorism and that contrary to what President Bush said—that this is the centre of the war against terrorism—it may be a focus for terror and terrorists.
I shall add two personal observations. It is undeniable that Iraq has fractured the unity of the international coalition against terrorism. Perhaps more controversially, I believe that it has been a distraction from the campaign against terrorism. On the basis that stability at home is based on stability abroad, I shall summarise Professor Rogers's recommendations. He suggested that the UK and the international community should put far more effort into aiding and providing stability in Afghanistan. Secondly, he suggested that we should persuade our US allies to give far more control of the situation in Iraq to the UN. Thirdly, on the basis that we need to be tough on terrorism and tough on the causes of terrorism, we need to do much more about the global economic divide. We need to try to improve our efforts to introduce development to the poorest countries. In a sense, the Department for International Development has a role along with the Ministry of Defence in increasing the security of the United Kingdom. I pay tribute to the work that I believe the Government have done in taking a lead in some of these areas. All three of Professor Rogers's recommendations deserve serious consideration.
It has been suggested—I think correctly—that a particular threat on which we should concentrate is the risk of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction coming together. There is a real danger, obviously, of al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups that might be described as being of an unconditional, apocalyptic or absolutist nature seeing some value in killing vast numbers of people. In that context, I am concerned having read paragraphs 125 to 128 of the ISC report. That passage indicates that the JIC made the same judgment as the CIA—namely, that there was not a large probability of Iraq transferring WMD to terrorist organisations, but that such a risk would exist in the event of invasion. Personally, I always suspected that the US, the United Kingdom and Australia had overestimated Iraq's WMD capacity. I now think it possible, given present evidence, that its WMD capacity was either wholly or substantially destroyed, perhaps long before the war started. If the coalition Governments seriously believe that there are large
stocks of WMD in Iraq, they are being grossly negligent in not seeking to ensure that such material could not fall into terrorist hands or on to the black market.We should never forget that weapons of mass destruction give rise to more threats than terrorism alone. India and Pakistan have reminded us of the appalling threat of regional nuclear war, and we should never forget that if there were ever to be wider-scale international conflict or world war involving weapons of mass destruction, we would face a human catastrophe of unthinkable proportions. That is why it is crucial that we hold to the concept that war must be a last resort; and why the United Nations, for all its weaknesses, is our only hope of survival and must be strengthened and supported. It is why it is vital that the emphasis should be on non-proliferation and on international treaties and arms control agreements, not on the concept that is usually described as counter-proliferation—that is, pre-emptive war, military interdiction and so on. I am not suggesting that the two concepts are mutually exclusive, but non-proliferation must remain the absolute priority.
I am concerned that in UK Government circles counter-proliferation is being mentioned more often. I hope that that does not indicate a gradual change in policy comparable to the shift that I fear is taking place towards missile defence, which is part of the agenda of thinking that one can resolve problems primarily by military power and military technology. It is vital that we continue to believe in the importance of multilateral diplomacy as the basis of our human security. The influential neo-cons in the Bush Administration have been demanding further pre-emptive wars, although they have become slightly less vocal as problems in Iraq have increased. Given their relentless determination in pursuing their obsessions—
Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Alan Haselhurst): Order. The hon. Gentleman has had his time allocation.
3.37 pm
Mr. Peter Viggers (Gosport): In his opening speech, the Secretary of State made it clear that departmental responsibility for defence in the United Kingdom rests with the Home Office. I therefore very much regret that no Home Office Minister has visited the Chamber during the debate, especially as contributions have been thoughtful and in some cases authoritative. It would have been right for the Home Office to be represented.
Against what or whom are we defending ourselves? It is no longer the Soviet Union or the Warsaw pact. I have seen the Warsaw pact tanks in Russia and elsewhere—they are going nowhere. Russia and the other former members of the Soviet Union are under-resourced and pose no threat to us. The only threat lies in their stocks of nuclear weapons. I am delighted that the United States, in particular, has been taking action with the Russians to eliminate those stocks. I also observe that the United Kingdom has been active in supporting the Russian armed forces in demobilising their over-large units. There is a great deal of co-operation between Russia and the NATO countries, especially between Russia and the United States and the United Kingdom—that is extremely impressive.
In shaping up to defence in the United Kingdom, our major alliance is NATO. The political, parliamentary underpinning of NATO is provided by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, some of whose members are colleagues who sit in the House of Commons.
The Assembly has five committees. The Political Committee, which is the senior committee, has been dealing with the expansion of NATO, relations with Russia and Ukraine and transatlantic relations. I am proud to chair that committee. The second committee is the Defence and Security Committee, which deals with military strategy and procurement. The third is the Economic Committee, which covers economic co-operation and issues such as money laundering—especially relevant now because of terrorism. The fourth is the Science and Technology Committee, which deals, for example, with weapons of mass destruction, and specialist issues such as small arms and the threat that they pose around the world. The fifth is the Civilian Affairs Committee, which has recently been dealing with the exclave of Kaliningrad from Russia and reconstruction in Afghanistan and Iraq. There are ad hoc groups dealing with Russian relations, Ukrainian relations and Mediterranean relations.
My only regret about the NATO Parliamentary Assembly is that its work is not well known. Its debates and reports are seriously authoritative. Four former Prime Ministers, numerous Foreign Ministers, Defence Ministers and ambassadors sit on the Political Committee. I am sorry that that work is not better known and I hope to do more to promote awareness of the Assembly and the reading of its reports and debates.
We must consider the future of NATO. It was created to make sure that the United States, which came late into the first and second world wars, would be totally committed to Europe. The United States currently spends approximately twice as much as the rest of NATO put together on defence, but its military capacity is around 10 times more effective than that of the rest of the NATO forces put together. That massive power is in the hands of an insular country, where only 7 per cent. of the population have passports. Indeed, many Senators and Congressmen boast of having no passport because they do not feel the need or the wish to travel overseas and see any part of the world other than United States. That insularity means that it is crucial to stay close to the United States.
I worry about European Union defence planning. Yesterday, I was at a meeting of the European Parliament with Javier Solana, the high representative of the European Union. He stressed that the EU has and must have autonomous powers. Yes, provided that European powers are focused within NATO. However, the fact that four NATO nations wish to set up a planning cell or unit outside supreme headquarters allied powers Europe is symbolic of the divorce between NATO and the European Union. It shows the drift away from NATO of some EU members. Despite their friendly language, we must remember that some continental NATO members believe that perhaps it has run its course, that the European Union needs to flex its muscles now and that we can say goodbye to NATO. For the reasons that I outlined, that would be an enormous mistake.
We are considering defence against what? The answer is "the unexpected." How does one prepare against the unexpected? It is rather like the conundrum, "How do hedgehogs make love?" The answer should be the same—"very carefully." How careful are our preparations for the unexpected? I examined American preparations and discovered that America has a homeland security advisory system, by which it sets great store. It determines the security risk, from low, categorised as green, through guarded, categorised as blue, elevated, categorised as yellow, high, designated orange, to severe, which is red. Those security states are widely advertised throughout the United States and all citizens are encouraged to learn what the states mean and what they should do. The lowest states involves:
- "Ensuring personnel receive proper training on the Homeland Security Advisory System and specific preplanned department or agency Protective Measures".
I thought that it would be a good idea for us to have a homeland security warning system comparable to that of the United States, so I telephoned the Ministry of Defence and the Home Office to ask whether they could please let me have the official guidance on security alert systems. I can scarcely believe their response. I was told that the information was classified and that I could not be given it. Indeed, I was told in a rather sheepish way, "We do not want to alarm people unnecessarily." That was the reason given for not publicising the systems. So we have not even started. I urge Ministers to look again at the public advisory systems relating to security.
I suspect that the unexpected will happen, and we should plan accordingly. The section of the strategic defence review called "A New Chapter" looks at asymmetrical threats, and a well-considered section entitled "Network-centric capability" urges that we should have precision in intelligence command and control, and strike capability. I agree that our forces should be trained and equipped to a high level of technology and efficiency, because the unexpected will occur.
High technology brings its own problems. The Secretary of State pointed out quite correctly that, if an aircraft hits a power station, it does not matter whether it is a result of terrorist action or not; the response must be the same, and it must involve a considerable amount of structured, organised planning. Nowadays, however, the higher level of technology has brought its own problems. Air traffic control is so sophisticated that if one aircraft is delayed, it will delay others and cause congestion. If we lose our electricity supply, we lose traffic lights, water pumps, air conditioning, refrigeration, lifts, computers and trains. Aircraft and cars have become more reliable, but that means that road planning has now become so clever that it takes only a minor irritation on a road to cause massive congestion. Instead of having 1,000 snarl-ups from 1,000 broken-down cars, we are now more likely to have one great big snarl-up involving 1,000 efficient cars.
I welcome the introduction of reaction forces in the "New Chapter", and the 6,000 to 7,000 structured, trained and disciplined reserves, but I would urge that we go further in encouraging our reserves. The Labour Government cut the Territorial Army from 59,000 to 41,200. With the number of regulars pushing 100,000, that gives a ratio of about four reserves to 10 regulars. In the United States, the numbers of regulars and reservists are roughly equal. In Australia, there are two and a half regular brigades and five and a half reserve brigades. In France, there are roughly the same number of reservists as regulars, and Germany, Russia and China all have the capacity to expand their forces with reserves.
In preparing for the unexpected, we therefore need access to trained personnel who need not necessarily be regulars. I would urge that we should have the scope to have among our reserves specialists in linguistics, computers and signals, as well as engineers and, in particular, specialists in chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence. Those are all areas in which it would be helpful to have larger forces, and they could well be provided by reserve forces. The reaction forces will be a good start, but there is much more that the reserves should be tasked to do, and I hope that future Government policy will take account of that.
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