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Mr. Keetch: How does the hon. Gentleman judge paragraph 127 of today's report? It states:


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Is it not acceptable for the JIC to believe that invading Iraq could possibly spread terrorist weapons? Admittedly, the Prime Minister took a view, but in disregarding ours the hon. Gentleman should note that some members, at least, of the JIC accept it.

Dr. Lewis: The hon. Gentleman makes a fair point, which would be convincing if he were saying that the question is clear cut and there is never a countervailing argument. But according to his view, because we are afraid that there is a risk that something may get worse if we try to deal with it, we must not do so. I particularly resent the way in which the JIC, an intelligence organisation, has been made into a political football in the context of this military campaign. In my view—I speak now not as a politician, but as someone who studied JIC and joint planning staff documents professionally, during the academic phase of my life—the old system was better. The intelligence people would make their assessments and submit them to their political masters, and the political masters would sign off their own assessments and not seek to shelter behind their professional advisers. I am not going to get into the game of second-guessing the JIC. Its role is to give the Government information, and the Government must take responsibility for the policies developed on the basis of it.

Bob Russell: I am sure that the hon. Gentleman does not want to mislead everybody. Does he accept that the view taken by the Liberal Democrats—many members of his own party and of the Labour party also took it—was that action against Iraq should take place only with the full support of the United Nations?

Dr. Lewis: The view of the Opposition and of the Government was that this country faced a serious threat. I, for one, never took the view that the United Nations was some sort of world Government, without whose imprimatur we could not act to defend ourselves if we judged it necessary. The Prime Minister did not take that view and he was right not to do so. We have not delegated the defence of this country to the United Nations, and heaven help us if ever we do. When the Prime Minister said that he might have lost his job and tearfully informed his family of the great risk that he was taking, I have to say that I began to lose a little sympathy with him, because, with the support that he knew he had from the official Opposition—doing what loyal Oppositions always do in such circumstances in times of national crisis—he knew that he could count on us. His job was not really in danger.

How wretched it is that, by unnecessarily exaggerating and manipulating intelligence, the Prime Minister has discredited himself, his Government and, most important of all, the prospect of taking similar action in similar circumstances in future. Suppose that Iran reliably proves to be in an advanced state of development of nuclear weapons. Suppose that Korea goes from bad to worse in respect of the threatening noises that it is making about the nuclear weapons that it already possesses. Who now will believe the Government when they say that we have to act?

I am going to touch briefly on the Intelligence and Security Committee report. I have only two things to say about it. The ISC has done itself, in my opinion, no

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favours with the report—and that will be seen to be the case when people look back on it in the fullness of time. I am most interested in the two annexes to the report, which I will briefly mention. The second annexe is interesting because it contradicts the report of the Foreign Affairs Committee at each and every turn. It is interesting to see what happens when two bunches of senior politicians try to cover the same ground and each pretends to be authoritative.

What interested me most throughout the post-Iraq campaign post mortem has been less the first than the second dossier. That was the one that was plagiarised and was, depending on whether one counts the cover sheet, 18 or 19 pages long. It is briefly referred to in the ISC report. That report quotes the Prime Minister as having stated on 3 February 2003:


Curiously, paragraph 133 of the report states:


Furthermore, paragraph 22 of the second annexe states:


and the next word is in italics

—"containing further intelligence."

The trouble is that, having checked Hansard for that day, I can say that the Prime Minister did not describe it as "containing" further intelligence. Had he done so, it would not have misled the House. He described it as further intelligence.

We can see from the first annexe that the intelligence document that the Secret Intelligence Service supplied, on which part of the report was based, was only five pages long, whereas the final report was 18 or 19 pages long. It has to be said that, as far as the second dodgy dossier was concerned, the ISC has engaged in a whitewash of what was actually presented to the House in a misleading way by the Prime Minister.

On the brighter side, it is extraordinary that so little has happened by way of terrorism in the UK so far. There are several reasons for that. The first is that there has been no significant support for al-Qaeda among the UK's 1.5 million Muslims. The second is the unsung successes of the security and intelligence services when they are allowed by politicians to get on with their jobs. Let us not forget the special branch officer, Stephen Oake, who was stabbed to death in January in the aftermath of the discovery of the ricin terror cell. Thirdly, there is the determination of the US and the UK to take the fight to the enemy in Afghanistan and to remove regimes with the potential to produce weapons of mass destruction, whether that threat is imminent or not.

Defence is indivisible; the country that adopts a purely reactive strategy will suffer. The front line in the defence of the United Kingdom is not at the gates of Downing street, nor is it on the concrete blocks in

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Grosvenor square and Parliament square. The front line is with our forces in the failed states and the rogue states. It is in the shadows with the secret intelligence services and our security services, in which our Muslim citizens have an important part to play. It is in the spirit of the British people—especially those who live and work near prestige targets—who will never give in to the threat of terrorism in the UK.

5.25 pm

The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Mr. Adam Ingram): In opening the debate, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence highlighted the key areas of what is an undoubtedly broad subject, and we have had a good, intensive and wide-ranging debate. It is a pity that the hon. Member for North Essex (Mr. Jenkin) failed to rise to the occasion.

Yesterday morning, I was listening to "Yesterday in Parliament", which was reporting on Tuesday's debate, a debate called by the hon. Gentleman to hold the Government to account. Unfortunately, I could not be present for the debate; normally I would have been and, probably, I would have wound it up. I was keen to hear what had gone on. I was in the Ukraine at a joint exercise involving British, Ukrainian and Polish troops, an annual exercise that has been going for seven years.

The BBC had built up Tuesday's debate, suggesting that the Secretary of State was going to come under intense scrutiny. I was stunned when the BBC commentator said that that was not the case. In fact, he directly criticised the hon. Member for North Essex for failing to deliver the knockout punch, or even a punch at all. The commentator said that, for the Secretary of State for Defence, it was no more than a stroll in the park.

That is why I want to make this point to the hon. Gentleman about his speech. He personalised, as he has a tendency sometimes to do, at a time when we are dealing with big and complex issues. The repeat performance today ill serves the House, but is perhaps a true reflection on him; not one word did he utter about the subject matter.

The Secretary of State rightly praised the men and women of our armed forces and the contribution that they make in the United Kingdom and globally. They continue to provide a highly skilled and well-organised resource on which the civil authorities and the wider community can draw in times of crisis. I am grateful to all Members who recognised this today.

We must not confuse the role of the armed forces in the defence of the UK with the wider contribution that they can make in the UK. As the Secretary of State said, the days of defending our shores from invasion are long gone. We all understand the advantage of dealing with a potential threat before it reaches our shores. We should not assume that solutions are always military ones.

The right hon. Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Mr. Portillo) made a strong contribution. I did not agree with everything he said, but he highlighted two points with which I did agree. The first concerned the question of where the front line is; the hon. Member for New Forest, East (Dr. Lewis) made the same point in winding up for the Opposition. The front line is no longer here, but elsewhere.

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The other point that the right hon. Gentleman raised concerned the MOD itself—the nature of the Department, its unique flavour and ethos. He said that it is a privilege for Ministers to serve there, and I echo that. I have been at the Department for more than two years and I have learned that that is so. The right hon. Gentleman rested his case on the importance of that ethos and on the bonds of loyalty that exist. I can tell the House that those bonds of loyalty are still there. The Department has the utmost support from the Secretary of State, and that is returned. That applies in respect of all Ministers who serve there.

The right hon. Gentleman also referred to the Prime Minister commenting to the Indian Prime Minister in relation to the terrible atrocity that had occurred in that country that the issue was engaging with those who were posing the threat, who might be from a neighbouring country or countries. The right hon. Gentleman tried to draw a parallel with what has happened in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. I know that he understands the clear difference between the threat posed by domestic terrorism and that posed by international terrorism. The four years that I spent in Northern Ireland taught me that the way to resolve the threat posed by domestic terrorism is, first, to resolve never to be defeated or deflected by it and, second, always to look for the points of accommodation and agreement on the basis of which progress can be made. We would not be in the situation we are in today in Northern Ireland without the bravery and determination of the Prime Minister to take some big risks. We should ask the people of Northern Ireland whether the point that my right hon. Friend was making to the Prime Minister of India applies to Northern Ireland. It is now a different and better place, and it will get better still, because we dealt with the threat by understanding the roots of the problem and finding solutions.

We should not relax our stance on our security or resilience at home. Notwithstanding some of the contributions made to the debate, the Government have a robust counter-terrorism strategy in place, under the direction of the Home Secretary. Much progress has been made, much of it—understandably—not advertised. It may be what people call secret or confidential, but the very nature of our response means that it has to be kept on a very close hold. The more we expose what we seek to do to counter terrorism or terrorist threats, the more those who wish to take action learn from it. Other nations may develop their strategies differently, but we have had 30 years of dealing with domestic terrorism. That has stood us in good stead, but I am sure we all agree that if our approach needs to change, we in this country learn lessons and adapt quickly and constructively to meet any new threat.

I know that what we have in place is robust because I have the privilege of serving on some of the Committees that deal with the issues. I have seen our response evolve and develop after 11 September 2001. The real test is not so much who is in charge, but what the response is to a particular threat. We have not had to face some of the scenarios that could apply, but we are increasingly holding exercises, with a range of scenarios, to test the resilience of our capabilities.

Last weekend, of course, we saw the exercise in London. I was also recently the lead Minister on a major exercise in Norfolk with a nuclear incident scenario.

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Interestingly, the lead Department was the Ministry of Defence, not the Home Office. All the services answer, through the various response mechanisms that are laid down, to the one lead Minister. The idea is to ensure that the mechanisms are robust and respond coherently. We learn lessons from every one of those exercises, and there is no point holding them otherwise. We will have more exercises in the future, and we hope that they are only ever exercises that test the integrity and strength of our systems. I have confidence that all the services would respond—


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