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Mr. Barnes: I think that Colombia is liable to be off the agenda as far as the commission is concerned. It does not mean that it has to be off the agenda as far as the Northern Ireland Office or the general political process is concerned. An interesting report on the financing of terrorism was produced by the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, and it raised questions about American involvement and FARC activity. The investigations by the police and other forces, and the NIO, will be able to continue, so that action can take place.
I asked the Secretary of State earlier about the relationship between clauses 2 and 3. It is possible that my point in that short intervention was not as clear as it should have been. Paragraph 3 of the agreement between the British and Irish Governments states:
- "Any incidents of non-compliance by any party will . . . be subject to either political exposure or, where appropriate, the process of law."
If the commission believes that it knows who is involved in a certain activity, and that that person should be exposed, that could be achieved by means of a statement to the House, which would be privileged. However, that could still affect future legal proceedings. Alternatively, the life of a person implicated in the serious paramilitary activity proscribed by the agreement could be put at risk, as a result of the activity of opposing paramilitary forces. Does that mean that we will not find out who is involved in paramilitary activity? If so, the Bill will be less effective than intended.
My final point has to do with on-the-runs. The material on the Bill placed in the Library by the Northern Ireland Office for this debate contains a document—"Proposals in Relation to On the Runs"—that was agreed in April 2003. It makes it clear that, in future, certain rules will apply to people who are on the run, and it seems that some sort of offer is being made to the paramilitary organisations. The offer is that, if on-the-runs play ball with the work of the commission and act according to the principles that it supports, they will get the clearance outlined in the document.
The document is the carrot and we are now discussing the stick. The problem is that people, when offered a carrot, will sometimes go after that incentive, in the hope that they can get round other limitations placed on them. Before any provisions are implemented in respect of on-the-runs and the conditions that they would have to observe, I want to ensure that people who are on the run from the on-the-runs, and their organisations, are free to return to Northern Ireland, if that is what they wish. The agreement between the two Governments refers to such exiles, if only by inference, and they must be provided for. That matter must be sorted out.
I generally favour the Bill. I recognise that we are moving the goalposts back in the hope that the game can be completed. However, there must come a point at which we say, "That's it." This is that point, and it must be reached without there being some way of wheedling matters so that those on the run can be got off the hook.
5.20 pm
Mr. David Trimble (Upper Bann): Let me comment on the closing words of the hon. Member for North-East Derbyshire (Mr. Barnes), without endorsing any form of amnesty, because we have always opposed any provision with regard to on-the-runs. I pay tribute to the hon. Gentleman's work over the years in highlighting
the plight of those who have been forced to leave as a result of paramilitary intimidation. They have become exiles from Northern Ireland and can return only at risk to themselves. His significant contribution in bringing the focus to bear on that form of paramilitary abuse should be recognised. We would all agree entirely with what he said about exiles.The hon. Member for Newry and Armagh (Mr. Mallon) made a compelling contribution, particularly when he talked about the activities of paramilitarism and about how he understood the feelings that exist. I endorse a lot of what he said about that. He referred to the way in which some sectors of society almost glorify those who have been involved in violence, and he criticised in particular the broadcast media and the press. That brought into my mind a newspaper article published today, as did his mention of the planned celebration for those who escaped from the Maze prison many years ago. The Independent today carries a huge spread on that subject. I have not read the article by Mr. David McKittrick, and I do not prejudge it. I did not get as far as reading the article because the graphic at the top of the page was enough for me to throw the paper away. It superimposed on a photograph of the Maze prison small photographs of some escapers along with little notes about who they were and what their contributions had been.
The note on one escaper referred to his having been
- "at the forefront of the peace process".
The glorification of that gentleman in that newspaper illustrates precisely what the hon. Member for Newry and Armagh was saying. The attitude among some politicians and members of the media has made achieving completion of the peace process more difficult. The whole process is predicated on giving to those involved in violence in the past the opportunity to move towards peaceful democratic politics. That process is impeded or delayed while some people tolerate, or even encourage, the glorification of paramilitary activities and paramilitarism. Any commentator, politician, newspaper or television programme that engages in that behaviour is helping to undermine the process in which we have all been engaged.
We will broadly endorse the Bill, but it should not, in many respects, be before us at all. If successive Secretaries of State had done their job properly over the past four or five years and if the Government had done their job and kept their pledges, it would not be necessary for us examine such legislation. In that respect, there is much merit in what the hon. Member for Grantham and Stamford (Mr. Davies) said.
My colleagues and I started to argue in the spring and summer last year for the creation of some sort of arrangement to monitor ceasefires, simply because successive Secretaries of State had failed to do so. After the agreement, we had the unedifying spectacle of continuing paramilitary activity and of Secretaries of State failing to identify it as such and brushing it under
the carpet—one Secretary of State used the phrase "internal housekeeping" about murder. If it had not been for that approach, we would not have had some of the difficulties that have arisen in the past four or five years and it would not have been necessary for us to consider this measure.One of the objects of this exercise—it is sad that this has to be the case—is to make it difficult for Ministers to turn a blind eye. Those people who have taken on responsibility in the independent monitoring commission should clearly understand that. Their job is not to support the Government; by scrutinising paramilitary activity and reporting on it clearly and accurately, their job is to ensure that the Government do not fail to carry out their functions in these matters.
The hon. Member for Newry and Armagh regretted the fact that instead of doing the job ourselves we are once again turning to someone outside, and I sympathise entirely with him. When the suggestion was made last summer, ensuring that this scrutiny was done properly was in the forefront of my mind—getting the right people to ensure that the Secretary of State did not dodge the column. Indeed, hon. Members may be interested to know that one of the first suggestions that I made—if not the very first—when we were thinking of a single ceasefire monitor was the distinguished Spanish judge Baltasar Garzon, whose achievements in a wide range of fields are extremely well known. Indeed, his achievements with regard to ETA are significant, as are those in outing the dirty war committed by the socialist Government of Spain.
David Burnside: One of the great contributions of that Spanish gentleman resulted in the proscription of Batasuna—the front organisation of ETA, which I do not believe will be debated later this evening.
Mr. Trimble: If my hon. Friend looks at the dates, he will notice that that happened after I had identified Baltasar Garzon as a first-class person for this job, so I am not surprised at what he describes.
In an intervention, I referred to the fact that as a result of the representations of my party and others, we made some progress in persuading the Government of the desirability of moving down this road—establishing some oversight of ceasefires. A statement was made to the House on 25 July last year. Unfortunately, that statement was not emphatic enough in its commitment and it did not give any sense that there would be a radical change in the Government's approach. That was a great disappointment to us.
The day after the statement, a colleague contacted the Government to say that as a result of the way the issue had been fumbled in the House, we could expect a violent summer and a political crisis in the autumn, which is precisely what happened. As hon. Members will remember, last summer was certainly the worst for violence and public disorder that we have had in the Belfast region since long before the ceasefires. That was no accident, and it could largely be attributed to the Government sending the wrong signals last summer.
The crisis came in the autumn, with what we call Stormontgate, although it was slightly different from what I had anticipated. Stormontgate was in fact part of the same operation that led to the Castlereagh raid.
There were two manifestations, but both arose from a widespread intelligence gathering operation conducted by the mainstream IRA. To ensure that I do not prejudice future legal proceedings, I shall not mention the person in the IRA who was responsible for directing both Castlereagh and Stormontgate—[Interruption.] We should not have sedentary interruptions on that point.As a result of the crisis, we had suspension. If, in June or July last year, the Government had taken up the suggestions that I and other parties made in the spring and early summer and put in place some form of ceasefire monitor or sanctions, we might not have had suspension in 2002. These provisions come a long time after the event, to try to repair the damage done by the Government due to their mistakes in managing the process.
Since suspension, questions obviously arise about the circumstances in which there could be a return to devolution and to the Assembly and the Executive. The criteria have been spelt out by our party, embodied in a resolution of the Ulster Unionist council of September 2002. They were reflected in language used by the Prime Minister in his speech at the Belfast harbour office in October last year and, as was pointed out earlier, elements of them were reflected in comments about the ending of paramilitary activity made by the Minister of State to a Standing Committee last Tuesday.
The ending of paramilitary activity has repeatedly been defined. Hon. Members should bear it in mind that the time scale, too, has been defined. The relevant paragraph—paragraph 13—of the joint declaration refers to the "immediate" ending of paramilitary activity. The time scale embodied in the word "immediate" is fairly clear.
Decommissioning is also required; it has not been forgotten. Again, careful perusal of the documentation makes that clear. Actions are needed that effectively carry us towards completion. It must be clear that the process is moving to a conclusion, according to the definitions that have been offered.
It is necessary not only for paramilitary activity to end but for a clear indication as to the future status, role and structure of the organisation currently referred to as the Irish Republican Army. We need to know that the cessation of paramilitary activity and decommissioning are more than here-and-now events. We need to know what is intended and what is likely to happen in the future.
Those things have not yet happened, although we know that considerable efforts were made in March and April to obtain adequate responses on those matters and that the republican movement failed to make adequate responses. Hopes have been expressed by several hon. Members that we can make progress, that we can get the Assembly back, reform the Executive and hold the elections that would be necessary for that. However, to do so, the underlying problems of paramilitary activity must be resolved.
A mere glance at the calendar shows us that, if we are to move to elections in the autumn, it will be necessary for the republican movement to take those steps during the next few weeks. I am not in a position to define how much time there is, but it is important to note that time is limited and that action must occur quickly. We cannot
have the sort of spun-out, long-delayed process that we have had in the past. Things need to move very quickly indeed. I hope that they do, because to go through another winter with the political process in uncertainty and with the institutions continuing to be suspended would be deeply damaging.
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