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Mr. John Taylor (Solihull): Is the right hon. Gentleman acquainted with the words that the Minister of State, Northern Ireland Office, the right hon. Member for Liverpool, Wavertree (Jane Kennedy) uttered in Committee on 9 September, when she provided a litany of the steps to be taken by republican terrorists before an election can be considered?
Mr. Trimble: Indeed, I am aware of those steps, and the right hon. Lady gave a full and detailed description of what is involved in relation to the ending of paramilitary activity in her contribution in Committee last week. The hon. Gentleman will recall that, in addition, I referred to the need for decisive action to be taken in relation to decommissioning and for clear indications about future conduct because action in the here and now is, of course, extremely valuable, but we also need to find out where things will rest in the future.
I was referring to the damaging effect if the uncertainty is prolonged into the winter and the spring. A simple point underlies all this, and it was also touched on by the hon. Member for Grantham and Stamford. Suspension punishes everyone for the misdeeds of a few. Suspension took the Northern Ireland Assembly and all its Members out of operation because paramilitaries linked to a few had been engaged in unacceptable activity. It is in itself unacceptable that all the institutions should be suspended, consequently depriving Northern Ireland's electorate of the opportunity of democratic representation in the Assembly, because a handful of people have behaved badly.
It may be that the Government, for whatever reason, were not prepared to take the necessary action in October. It may be that the Bill will give them the power to take that action in the future, but the legislation will bite only after the resumption of the Assembly. At present, the Assembly is suspended and the offices are vacated, and the penalties in the Bill will have no effect this side of resumption. Of course, without progress from paramilitaries, do we get resumption? So the legislation will have no impact until we are the other side of the resumption of the Assembly, the re-formation of the Executive and, of course, the elections, which should have taken place. There is a significant question that the Government need to address: what happens if we do not see sufficient acts of completion from republicans? We cannot be expected to remain excluded indefinitely from the Assembly and the Executive because of the fault of others? If the Government find that they have been unable to make progress come 15 November, the Government—the Secretary of State, the Prime Minister or whoever—will have to come to the Dispatch Box and give hon. Members and, through us, the people of Northern Ireland, a clear explanation of what the future holds, rather than simply relying on hope and saying, "Well, we'll keep on trying", even after 13
months of trying time and again. If that is what the Secretary of State says, the general assumption will be that we are going back into deep cold storage and direct rule for years, perhaps decades. There is a danger of drift, and the Government must know that they ought not to allow that drift to occur and that, during the next few months, they will have to find answers to the questions that I have put.This legislation is essentially intended for a post-devolution situation, and it is needed because of the lack of confidence that exists. Let us assume that we had a statement from P. O'Neill announcing the disbandment of the IRA, for which many Unionists have called. If such a statement were made, how would we know whether it had happened? The IRA is a secret army—an underground organisation. There are some indications in terms of activities, but how can we tell whether an underground army has disbanded? A huge element of trust is involved in that, and in view of what has happened over the last several years, that trust is in short supply. The need is for the monitoring commission not just to monitor activity but to attribute responsibility, for it to give the people of Northern Ireland a guarantee that, if an organisation says that it has disbanded, that it has ceased activity and that there will not be any activity in the future, someone independent of the Northern Ireland Office or the Secretary of State will blow the whistle if it turns out that that claimed disbandment did not occur and that a secret element within the private army continues to exist and be active. That is why it is important.
The reserve power for the Secretary of State to act is also important not just because in the practical circumstances of the last five years an exclusion motion was never carried in the Assembly, but to provide a reassurance to the people of Northern Ireland if, as a consequence of an election, it appears that an exclusion motion might never be carried in the future in the Assembly under the existing rules. The reserve power is therefore important for the future, and I will return in a moment to the question of the reserve power for the Secretary of State as currently defined.
Nothing in this world is without difficulty or free from problems. It has been suggested that there are some fundamental problems with this legislation, particularly with regard to preserving sovereignty. At the strict legal level, there is no problem with sovereignty, because the agreement to create the monitoring arrangement is very clear. In its last couple of sentences, it talks about what might happen in the event of continuing paramilitary activity, and includes the phrases,
- "it would be a matter for the British Government . . . to resolve the matter . . . The British Government would envisage amending the Northern Ireland Act . . . to enable a variety of responses".
There are two areas, however, about which people might have concerns. One is with regard to the ground rules that we developed for the inter-party talks. In developing those ground rules, there was one important issue on which I and my colleagues were careful to insist: that while the inter-party talks included the British Government and the Irish Government, as well as the
political parties in Northern Ireland, strand 1 of those talks should be between the political parties in Northern Ireland and the British Government alone, and that the Irish Government should have no participation in strand 1. As originally drafted, the paper that appeared at the beginning of May appeared to breach that. I am glad that the international agreement, the draft of which has been published, makes it clear that the strand 1 issue has been resolved. Some people have queried whether that is so, and I have referred to article 6 of that draft agreement, which refers in (a) to whether people are committed to
- "non-violence and exclusively peaceful and democratic means"
- "failed to observe any other terms of the pledge of office",
The distinction can be illustrated by remembering what happened during the talks. During the talks, a number of violent incidents took place that were attributed to paramilitaries who were related to parties that were engaged in the process. Most of the talks took place in Belfast, but it will be recalled that there were two weeks out—one in London and one in Dublin. By coincidence, when we got to London, the entire week was taken up with the question of whether the Ulster Democratic party—which had links with the Ulster Defence Association, a paramilitary organisation—should be excluded from the talks because of violence committed by the UDA. When we got to Dublin, the whole time was taken up with the question of whether Sinn Fein should be excluded from the talks because of violent acts committed by the IRA.
How were those issues conducted and resolved? In both cases, exclusion occurred but the decision was taken jointly by the British and Irish Governments in exactly the manner to which article 6(1)(a) relates. The position in the agreement is precisely what happened during the talks. When we were in Lancaster house or Dublin castle and we were urging the Governments to exclude both the Ulster Democratic party and Sinn Fein, it was never suggested that there was any great breach of sovereignty there or that any fundamental principle was being violated. Those who are concerned about the matter should consider it in that context and see that it is entirely in accordance with the precedents established in the talks.
I have dealt with what is called the strand 1 issue, but there is another aspect of sovereignty that we must consider. I have referred to the reserve power for the Secretary of State; it is crucial that there is that reserve power. However, the hon. Member for Grantham and Stamford was right to say that the Bill, as published, fettered that power unduly because the power would arise only when there was first a determination or report
by the monitoring commission with a recommendation. If there were no report or recommendation, there would be no power for the Secretary of State. I agree entirely with the hon. Gentleman that that was too great a fetter on the Secretary of State's power and that a power conditioned in that way would not reassure the public.I hope that the independent monitoring commission will work. We do not know what the future holds and we do not know exactly how the IMC will operate. The hon. Member for Thurrock (Andrew Mackinlay) asked about the IMC's rules of procedure, its quorum and whether its decisions would be based on unanimity or a majority. We do not know the answers to those questions, and we do not know the pressures that may be brought to bear on the individuals concerned. I am generally content with the individuals concerned but we are moving into uncharted territory. It would be wrong to assume that everything will be all right and that we do not need to make sensible provision for unforeseen circumstances.
Because it is wise to make provision for unforeseen circumstances and for emergencies that might not occur, it is right for the Secretary of State to have a reserve power that he can actually use. Not making provision for such a power is not something that Governments usually do when they draft legislation. When drafting legislation, efforts are usually made to try to provide for contingencies. Friedman has referred to the law of unintended consequences and unanticipated events, and it is better to have a reserve provision that might at least cope with them than to proceed on the assumption that everything will be all right and that there will be no problems. Given the history of Northern Ireland over the past few years, it is wrong to proceed as though there will never be problems.
As originally drafted, the Bill was seriously defective. That was why my colleagues in another place tabled amendments, which have been tabled again for consideration today. If the amendments had been passed, they would have resolved the problem entirely. At one stage, we thought that they recommended themselves to the Liberal Democrats but when it came to the bit, they unfortunately went off on a venture of their own and drafted an amendment without thinking the matter through carefully. Their amendment was an endeavour to provide a reserve power but it was seriously defective. I endorse the comments made by the hon. Member for Grantham and Stamford about Lord Glentoran's work in the other place because he improved the Liberal Democrat amendment significantly, although it remains defective.
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