| Previous Section | Index | Home Page |
18 Sept 2003 : Column 948W—continued
Defence Exhibition
Dr. Cable: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the total cost of holding the Defence Systems and Equipment International exhibition in September was to (a) the Ministry of Defence, (b) the Department of Trade and Industry, (c) Trade Partners UK and (d) other government departments and agencies; and if he will make a statement. [129776]
Mr. Ingram: In reply to the hon. Member for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn) on 20 May 2003, Official Report, columns 677–78 W, I provided an estimate of the direct cost of the exhibition to the Ministry of Defence. The final cost remains to be established, but we do not expect it to exceed the estimated figure.
The Metropolitan police estimate a total of £1.48 million in additional pay and other costs associated with policing the event. British Transport Police estimate their cost of policing the event as £250,000. As above, the final cost remains to be established.
Neither the Department of Trade and Industry nor Trade Partners UK incurred costs.
Falkland Islands
Mr. Jenkin: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will list the incidents involving Argentinian military personnel and (a) British troops and (b) Falkland Islands residents in the past six years. [129906]
Mr. Ingram: The armed forces of the United Kingdom and Argentina participate in a range of joint activities as part of a bilateral defence relations programme. We are unaware of any significant incidents between Argentinian military personnel and our own armed forces or residents of the Falkland Islands.
Mr. Jenkin: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many (a) fisheries protection vessels and (b) maritime patrol aircraft have been operational in the Falkland Islands in each of the past six years. [129908]
Mr. Ingram: Fisheries Protection Vessels are provided by the Falklands Islands Government. In addition, the Falkland Islands Patrol Vessel is permanently stationed in the Falkland Islands, with the exception of short absences for visits and maintenance periods in South America. Maritime air patrol tasks are undertaken by assets permanently stationed in the Falkland Islands (currently a C-130 and a VC-10), and on various occasions over the past six years specialist maritime patrol aircraft have also been deployed to the Falkland Islands.
Mr. Jenkin: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the strength of (a) the Army, (b) the Royal Navy and (c) the Royal Air Force in the Falkland Islands has been in each of the last six years. [129910]
Mr. Ingram: Force level in the Falkland Islands for each of the past six years, broken down by service, are shown in the following table. All figures are rounded to the nearest 10, and, due to rounding methods used, totals may not equal the sum of the individual components.
18 Sept 2003 : Column 949W
| April 1997 | April 1998 | April 1999 | April 2000 | April 2001 | April 2002 | October 2002 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Naval Service | 260 | 100 | 50 | 270 | 40 | 40 | 40 |
| Army | 620 | 600 | 640 | 580 | 680 | 640 | 480 |
| RAF | 900 | 850 | 860 | 770 | 740 | 670 | 670 |
| Total | 1,790 | 1,550 | 1,550 | 1,620 | 1,460 | 1,350 | 1,200 |
Force Readiness
Mr. Jenkin: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what percentage of the (a) Army, (b) Naval service and (c) RAF units, required to be rapidly available, are at (i) very high, (ii) high and (iii) medium states of readiness. [125605]
Mr. Ingram: Data on forces at very high, high and medium states of readiness were collected in support of the Spending Review 2000 Public Service Agreement (PSA) target that by 2005 a minimum of 90 per cent. of rapidly available military units (described as those held at very high, high or medium readiness) should be at the required states of readiness. Information against this PSA target was last collected for the quarter ending 31 March 2003. Performance for that quarter was:
| Service | Proportion at very high, high and medium readiness (%) |
|---|---|
| Royal Navy and Royal Marines | 91 |
| Army | (31)29 |
| Royal Air Force | 91 |
(31) Army data excludes forces deployed in the Gulf or recovering from emergency fire-fighting activities as these were not rapidly available for alternative tasks.
In order to provide a more comprehensive view of military preparedness, performance against Spending Review 2002 PSA Target 3 is assessed on the basis of the readiness state of all forces. Details of the basis for the assessment are set out in the Technical Note to the 2002 PSA targets, available on the Department's website http://www.mod.uk. At the end of the first quarter of financial year 2003–04, the first time when performance was measured against Spending Review 2002 targets, 77 per cent. of force elements were assessed as meeting their readiness requirement with no critical weakness. These figures reflect the impact of both Operation FRESCO and Operation TELIC.
I am withholding more detailed information about the readiness of our armed forces under Exemption 1 the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information (1997).
Future Rapid Effects System
Mr. Gerald Howarth: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will incorporate TRACER technology in Future Rapid Effects System; and what assessment he has made of the possibility of incorporating TRACER technology in Future Rapid Effects System under an open international competition for Future Rapid Effects System development and manufacture. [130625]
Mr. Ingram: The Future Rapid Effect System project is currently in the Concept Phase. We are reviewing procurement options and no decision has yet been made on how to take the programme forward. It is too early
18 Sept 2003 : Column 950W
to state what technologies might be incorporated in the eventual solution but where possible we shall look to exploit past development activity.
HMS Sheffield
Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to his answers of 9 September 2003, ref 127274 and to the hon. Member for Hereford (Mr. Keetch) of 4 February 2003, Official Report, column 174W, on HMS Sheffield, what the reasons are for the difference between the cost of operating HMS Sheffield in 2001–02 and the cost of operating ships in the same class in the same year; and if he will make a statement. [130315]
Mr. Ingram: I refer the hon. Gentleman to the answer I gave on 4 February 2003, Official Report, column 174W. There was a misprint in Hansard and the figure for HMS Sheffield's annual operating costs should have read £35 million. The average annual operating costs for Batch 3 Type 22 Frigates I gave in my answer of 9 September 2003, ref 127274 was £11.9 million.
The apparent discrepancy arose because the cost for HMS Sheffield included an element for depreciation and cost of capital, but excluded annual maintenance, while the costs provided for Batch 3 Type 22 Frigates included maintenance but excluded depreciation and cost of capital.
When compared on a "like-for-like" basis, the average annual operating costs, based on direct costs charged to FY01-02, including costs for manpower, fuel, stores and other costs (such as port visits) were £8.1 million for HMS Sheffield and £8.3 million for Batch 3 Type 22 Frigates.
Iraq
Llew Smith: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the source was for the allegation at Paragraph 2, Page 19, of the dossier on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction of September 2002, that the Iraqi military were able to deploy chemical or biological weapons within 45 minutes of an order to do so; what attempts were made to verify the source of this information prior to deciding to include it in the dossier; on what date this information became available to British intelligence sources; whether details were passed on to the intelligence agencies of the United States and other allies for comment prior to publication; and whether protection has been offered or provided to the source since receipt of the information. [128519]
Mr. Rammell: I have been asked to reply.
As the ISC has reported, based on the evidence of the Chief of SIS, the source of the report was a senior military officer in a position to comment on the deployment of chemical and biological weapons. The
18 Sept 2003 : Column 951W
source was regarded as reliable. The report was issued on 30 August 2002. The dossier which included the information about the 45-minute claim was passed for comment to the US Government. It has been the practice of successive Governments not to comment on issues relating to the validation or protection of intelligence sources. The security and intelligence agencies are not within the scope of the Code of Practice to Government Information.
Llew Smith: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment he has made of the basis for the assertion made by the Director of the Joint US-UK Iraq Survey Team, that Saddam Hussein had given orders for his commanders to fire chemical shells at forces invading Iraq. [128806]
Mr. Ingram: It is not the Department's policy to comment on remarks allegedly made in a classified briefing to United States Congressional Committees. Coalition forces continue actively to pursue intelligence leads, documentation and individuals connected with Iraq's WMD programmes through the Iraq Survey Group.
Matthew Taylor: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) what total additional amount has been spent by his Department on operations in Iraq in each month since 1 January; [130282]
- (2) what the cost was of deployment of troops to Iraq's neighbouring countries in the build up to the invasion of Iraq; [130281]
(3) if he will estimate the total additional monthly cost of British operations in Iraq; [130280]
(4) if he will estimate the extra monthly cost of one member of personnel in the occupation force in Iraq. [130277]
Mr. Ingram: The Ministry of Defence identifies the costs of Operations in terms of the net additional costs it has incurred. The costs which the MOD would have incurred had the operation not been undertaken—expenditure on wages and salaries or on conducting training exercises, for example—are deducted from the total costs of the operation.
Calculating all the costs of military action will take some time since they will include the cost of ammunition, bombs and guided weapons consumed in excess of peacetime levels and the cost of repairing and replacing equipment destroyed and damaged. We do however estimate the cost of preparatory activities in 2002–03 at around £700 million, less than the £1 billion set aside at Spring Supplementary Estimates 2002–03. This estimate includes the procurement or modification of equipment, increased maintenance and stock consumption, civil sea and air charter and provision of infrastructure in-theatre. A figure for total costs in 2002–03 including the cost of operations up to 31 March 2003 will be published in the Ministry of Defence's Resource Accounts.
It is too early to estimate the costs likely to arise in 2003–04. Once these are known, additional funding will be sought in the normal way through Supplementary Estimates.
18 Sept 2003 : Column 952W
Accounting records and costs are not maintained on a daily basis while force levels have fluctuated considerably during 2003–04. As a result, to provide daily or per person average costs would be misleading.
Mr. Gardiner: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment his Department has made of how long it will take to clear unexploded ordnance in Iraq. [129863]
Mr. Ingram: The United Kingdom and other Coalition Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Organisation teams have been engaged in Explosive Ordnance Disposal tasks since before the end of the conflict in Iraq. To date, UK and other Coalition Explosive Ordnance Disposal Teams in the UK Area of Operation have completed over 1,500 tasks and destroyed over 500,000 individual munitions. Those munitions include not only those dropped or fired by Coalition Forces, but also many from the Iraq-Iran war as well as mines laid, ordnance fired or dropped, and stores of ammunition and other ordnance left by Iraqi military and paramilitary forces. It is not yet possible to say either what percentage of unexploded munitions have been cleared nor when all the work will be completed.
| Next Section | Index | Home Page |