| Previous Section | Index | Home Page |
Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston): I suppose that I am also guilty of jumping up every time that I hear the word "Europe".
In the context of capabilities, I hope that my right hon. Friend will say a bit more, first, about co-operation between NATO and the EU—not least about the expressed concerns of the United States about our agreeing to precise terms of the Convention on the
Future of Europe—and, secondly, about developing capability so that the European reaction force and a NATO reaction force will draw on the same resources.
Mr. Hoon: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for making that point. In the past 10 days, I have had a meeting of Defence Ministers in NATO and a meeting of Defence Ministers in the EU. There was absolute agreement among Ministers at both meetings not only about the importance of the relationship between NATO and the EU, but the importance of developing capabilities—whether for use by NATO as an alliance or for use in autonomous operations by the EU, or indeed for use by individual nations. My hon. Friend and I absolutely agree about that important relationship, on which the Government will continue to focus.
Mr. Crispin Blunt (Reigate): Will the Secretary of State say something about the Government's attitude to our European partners beginning, in effect, to start to merge their armed forces to provide greater flexibility for their rather limited budgets? What will be our attitude if they start to merge their armed forces so that they have some form of single executive direction?
Mr. Hoon: Our emphasis has always been on improving our European partners' military capabilities. The way in which they do so is obviously a matter for them, but I have emphasised today the importance of interoperability. If certain countries chose to pool their resources—for example, to produce a capability that would not otherwise be available—that would be a wholly sensible approach that we would welcome, although, clearly, it would depend on the capability being useful and available. I do not advocate merging forces for the sake of it, but if two countries can join together to fill a capability gap—the process that we considered as part of the Helsinki headline goal target—that would not otherwise be filled, that seems a very sensible and welcome approach.
We need armed forces that are capable of doing their job in that new environment, rather than those that might look impressive in what I might describe as Soviet-style parades. There are those, such as the hon. Member for North Essex (Mr. Jenkin), who count quite a lot and might see themselves as the new "Bernard" Brezhnev, counting tanks and missile launchers as they rumble past. The reality is that our forces will need the ability to reconfigure forces and equipment rapidly to deliver critical effect at the right moment. That is what will determine success.
We are now able to bring force to bear with ever-greater precision, from a wide variety of platforms, to attack and reduce the combat power of an adversary. The astonishing speed with which we can increasingly operate can destabilise an adversary and achieve decisive effect, causing the enemy to give up even though many of its military forces may still remain—what we call effects-based operations, which focus on undermining an opponent's ability to exercise effective command and control of its forces, rather than simply on battlefield attrition. Effects-based operations are not new—just as asymmetric warfare pre-dated the events of 11 September 2001—but a process is being developed
that provides a better understanding of what effects we might be able to achieve and how best we might achieve them.
Patrick Mercer (Newark): I take the right hon. Gentleman's point about Mr. Brezhnev's bean-counting approach and I welcome his comments about radical thinking and not wishing to fight the last war again, but everything he has said involves conventional forces, expeditionary warfare and engaging enemies on the battlefield: not once has he talked about homeland defence and the integration of armed forces and civil forces that will be so necessary in asymmetric warfare.
Mr. Hoon: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for raising that issue. I do not overlook that important aspect of defence policy. We dealt with it in some detail in the new chapter, and we have continued to develop it in the work that flows from the new chapter, especially in respect of augmenting our reserve forces to allow a rapid response internationally and domestically. I entirely agree that, in the new environment following the end of the Soviet Union's threat to the United Kingdom, we must pay significant attention to the threats to the United Kingdom, perhaps in a way that had not been thought necessary in a previous generation. We certainly take such things fully into account.
People are at the heart of effects-based operations. The continuing trend towards expeditionary and multinational deployments will have an enormous impact on the skills required of service personnel in the coming years and on the way in which we train them to apply those skills to the tactical situations in which they operate.
Experience tells us that, for many military assets, such as deployed headquarters and logistical support, conducting several smaller scale operations is more demanding than one or two larger operations. Frequent and often concurrent medium and small-scale operations have been the exact pattern since the strategic defence review, with a new operation arising on average about once a year. While we must therefore retain the capacity to undertake the most demanding large-scale operations as part of a coalition, it has become clear that we need to structure our forces with a focus on the more frequent demands of concurrent medium and small-scale operations.
The operational burden is not falling evenly across the range of capabilities. The recent pattern of operations, and of those that we foresee in the future, place extra strain on certain of our forces—the elements that act as multipliers of combat power by enabling more rapid manoeuvre, more rapid deployment, better intelligence and target acquisition, greater accuracy and, therefore, the ability to undertake operations more quickly and at lower cost in life and matériel. We must therefore look hard at whether we have enough of those kinds of forces
The size and shape of each of the services will need to evolve to optimise joint operations and provide greater flexibility and capability to project power. In the case of the Army, experience demonstrates that our current light forces cannot provide the combat power required by some of the more demanding operations in which rapid deployment is needed, so we must move from the
current mix of light and heavy forces, representing the two extremes of deployability and combat power, to a more graduated and balanced structure of light, medium and heavy forces together with a greater emphasis on enabling capabilities such as logistics, engineers and intelligence. That will lead inevitably to a different requirement over time for main battle tanks, other heavy armoured fighting vehicles and heavy artillery, offset by a new requirement for more medium-weight forces based on the future rapid effects system family of vehicles.We are currently engaged in the Royal Navy's largest shipbuilding programme for many years. With two new aircraft carriers, Type 45 destroyers, Astute class submarines, new amphibious shipping and Royal Fleet Auxiliary support vessels, we are optimising the fleet for joint operations. Some of our older vessels contribute less well to the pattern of operations that we envisage, and some adjustments are likely to be needed.
With the introduction of Typhoon, the Royal Air Force will enjoy a significant margin of advantage in air warfare over any potential opponent for the foreseeable future. The emphasis of air power will shift from dedicated air defence aircraft such as the Tornado F3 to multi-role platforms equipped with precision-guided weapons and enhanced sensors.
On a wider front, enhancing the armed forces' ability to respond to change means changing the way in which we support them, which will place a premium at all levels on flexibility, innovation and improved systems and processes.
We are engaged in a process of essential change that will lead to the introduction of new technologies and practices into the armed forces. That has always been an essential part of our long-term planning. As in the past, it also means that, inevitably, the new capabilities replace old ones. Those who suggest that this significant modernisation and adaptation of our armed forces is somehow a cuts exercise to score political points are at best mischievous and at worst risk damaging the morale of our servicemen and women.
We have a responsibility to provide our people with the equipment to carry out the tasks that we currently ask of them. The Spitfire played a crucial role in winning the battle of Britain, but as the jet age opened it was obsolete by 1950. The same is true today of many of the technologies and practices that were designed to meet the threats of the cold war. When we dispense with unnecessary capabilities, it is because they no longer meet the requirements of our modern armed forces.
Mr. James Gray (North Wiltshire): The Secretary of State accuses some of his detractors of making political capital out of suggesting that some of the things that he has described, many of which we endorse entirely, are driven by Treasury cuts. Will he therefore be happy to give us an absolute assurance that, five years from now, under his Government, our forces will be of the same strength and defence spending will be at the same level or at higher levels than today?
| Next Section
| Index | Home Page |