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Mr. Gray: My hon. Friend correctly said that the Secretary of State's speech sounded—through the general gabble—like a softening-up exercise for Treasury cuts to come in a future White Paper. Does my hon. Friend agree that the Secretary of State's body language while delivering his speech indicated that he was confident that he would not be the one to implement the cuts?
Mr. Jenkin: Let us concentrate on defence policy today, although I understand what my hon. Friend says.
Admiral Boyce also said that military advice to the Prime Minister would be to avoid a "discretionary operation"—a war in which Britain was not under direct attack—for at least a year unless there was a "pretty compelling reason". He said:
- "If you asked us to go into a large-scale operation in 2004, we couldn't do it without serious pain. We must allow ourselves time to draw breath."
I shall not dwell on equipment because that will be addressed in next week's proposed debate, but there is a real squeeze on the equipment programme that was laid out in the SDR. The carriers, which were the centrepiece of the review, are shrinking in size almost daily. Less than a year ago, the Secretary of State announced that the carriers would be 60,000-tonne ships. We understand that the two new large carriers are likely to be medium-sized. How long will it be before they become through-deck cruisers—the euphemism for small carriers that was acceptable to the Treasury in the 1970s under the then Labour Government?
Given the age of existing fighter vehicles, the Government must get a move on. If the carriers are smaller, there will be fewer joint strike fighters. There are constant rumours about cuts to the Eurofighter Typhoon programme.
The multi-role armoured vehicle has been cut. That followed the demise of TRACER, for understandable reasons. We are promised a new armoured vehicle that is to be in service by 2009, but the Government are only at the concept stage. That is a very short time frame to produce an entirely new armoured vehicle that is capable of carrying a 120 mm gun.
The underlying picture is clear. The Government's defence ambitions are not matched by the resources that they are prepared to commit to defence. We are expecting a new White Paper on defence. The speculation is that it holds new cuts, and the Secretary of State did everything to feed that expectation in order to ameliorate the impact when it arrives. In June he spoke about moves towards a
- "balanced structure of light, medium and heavy forces, together with a greater emphasis on enabling capabilities"—
Though the armed forces have been substantially transformed since the end of the cold war, they still need to become lighter, more deployable and more flexible and interoperable with our key allies. What we are likely to see in the White Paper is a fanfare heralding apparently new, but mainly old and delayed, capabilities that have long been in the pipeline, many of which were ordered under the last Conservative Government. That emphasises the theme hidden in the Secretary of State's talk of effects-based warfare and flexibility, whereas the real agenda is cuts. All the indications are that the Secretary of State faces another bruising battle with the Chancellor, who himself faces a funding crisis in the public finances entirely of his own making.
The Secretary of State warns of
- "a different requirement over time for main battle tanks",
The Sea Harrier is already going, depriving the fleet of one of the world's most capable air defence fighters. I remind the Secretary of State that when the Spitfire was withdrawn from service, which he mentioned during his remarks, we had another aircraft, the Meteor, in service to replace it. There was not a six-year gap between the Spitfire and its replacement, as there is between the fleet defence aircraft, the Sea Harrier, being withdrawn from service and the introduction of the joint strike fighter.
We also hear that the size of the Army may be scaled back yet again, with fewer infantry because the Government are unwilling or unable to meet the reduced manning requirements. Nobody but new Labour believes that less means more, yet that is what we are asked to believe.
Despite talk about so-called improvements in the enabling capabilities, there are worrying signs that Defence Logistics Organisation staff may be cut back. In particular, the Government have been forced to reveal what they call "implications" for service personnel at the DLO, as the Minister of State told my hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Mr. Howarth) in a written answer on 18 September. The word "implications" must have a larger and more pregnant meaning. Of course, it is a cryptic clue meaning more cuts.
Savings have already been made from reorganisation of the Defence Logistics, in the guise of efficiency. We are all in favour of efficiency, but it can be rather overused as an excuse. As the Select Committee has already pointed out, so-called efficiency savings are mainly generated from cuts in levels of stocks, which will have contributed to the problems encountered during the rapid deployment to, and sustainability in, Iraq. This problem, like the procurement problem and the manning and retention problem, goes to the heart of the Government's defence policy.
There is insufficient resource to match the Government's defence commitments. Despite indications at the time of the SDR that 2.5 per cent. of gross domestic product should be reserved for defence in perpetuity, the figure has fallen consistently. We are now at around 2.3 per cent. of GDP, heading for 2.2 per cent.
at the end of the plan period, compared with, for example, the US Government's 3.4 per cent. of GDP, rising to 3.8 per cent. over their equivalent plan period. The operating capability gap, of which the Secretary of State sometimes speaks eloquently, is getting wider and wider.In training, we have a dual problem. Not only is overstretch of regular forces disrupting individual and unit training, but problems have been caused by the lack of resources in the training system. In July, a report by the Ministry of Defence's directorate of operational capability found that armed forces training bases were operating
- "at the limit of, or beyond, capacity"
- "is running at risk and continues to be fragile".
The current pressures on the armed forces mean that reserve forces are being intensively used, the Territorial Army in particular. In operations in Iraq, thousands of reservists were used to support the regulars. On 20 June, some time after the end of the conflict, almost 4,000 TA members were involved in Operation Telic. Two Members of the House and two members of the staff of the House have been called up to serve. The extent and duration of current commitments has been problematic for many in the TA, as they try to balance work and service commitments, but imagine how they feel to arrive in Iraq and be told that they are not to take part in security tasks, but are to be employed more like navvies in the reconstruction.
In the debate on 12 June, my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Norfolk (Mr. Simpson) warned that
- "many members of our territorial armed forces will think of leaving. Some have already told me that they intend to do so."—[Official Report, 12 June 2003; Vol. 406, c. 879.]
The House should be reminded that that target was already the result of an 18,000 cut in TA numbers in the SDR, a cut that the Secretary of State has admitted was a mistake, as we warned the Government at the time. The TA now also has an increased role at home, assisting with home security incidents as part of the civil contingency reaction force. How is it meant to fulfil this role, when it is so under- recruited at home, and when so many members allocated to those tasks are also committed abroad?
I asked earlier whether the Government have a defence policy, and whether they are prepared to commit the necessary resources to sustain it. The final
question is whether the Government intend to have a sovereign independent defence and security policy in future. The implication of their support for the European security and defence policy, leading ultimately to the EU constitution, is that they do not.As I mentioned earlier, the Queen's Speech last year reiterated NATO's
- "continuing role as the cornerstone of Britain's national security."
- "our alliance with NATO has to be the superior alliance in terms of defence".
- "It is highly unlikely that the United Kingdom would be engaged in large-scale combat operations without the United States, a judgment born of past experience, shared interest and our assessment of strategic trends."
The Government have betrayed the assurances that the Prime Minister personally gave President Bush on these matters at their first meeting in February 2001. When President Bush emerged from the meeting to face the cameras, he was asked about the European security and defence policy. He said:
- "He"—
- "also assured me that the European defense would no way undermine NATO. He also assured me that there would be a joint command, that planning would take place within NATO, and that should all NATO not wish to go on a mission, that would then serve as a catalyst for the defense forces"—
- "moving on their own."
All that was meant to have been resolved in the EU-NATO agreement known as Berlin plus, which was concluded just a few months ago after four hard years of negotiation. It gives the EU assured access to NATO military planning under the command of the NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, who is always a European military officer.
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