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Dr. Julian Lewis (New Forest, East): We would have no argument with the strengthening of European capabilities within NATO if the structure for the control and command of those capabilities remained within NATO. However, if a command structure existed outside NATO, but drew on the same troops, ships and aircraft that are at NATO's disposal, what would happen if NATO needed those troops, ships and aircraft and if there was a divergence between the two sets of commands being given to the same set of capabilities?
Mr. Hoon: I regret that the hon. Gentleman, like other Members on his Front Bench, is hypnotised by the European Union. Of course there is a command structure outside NATO: it exists in national headquarters. It has always existed, and that is precisely what the word "autonomous" refers to. There is not, and never has been, anything to prevent European nations—or, indeed, any other nations—from operating together militarily in an alliance or coalition to achieve a military objective. That is essentially what we are talking about here. Nothing has changed as a result of these agreements. The capabilities exist already. To return to the earlier part of the hon. Gentleman's question, we certainly want European capabilities to be improved within NATO, but we want them improved outside it as well. Simply being transfixed by the phrase "European Union" and, if the hon. Gentleman will forgive me for saying it, frothing at the mouth every time the phrase is used, is not an acceptable or sensible way of conducting the debate.
We have a position in which the pre-eminence of NATO for the more demanding global crisis management operations is recognised. It is necessary only to look at the range and scale of operations in which NATO is involved—in the Balkans, in Afghanistan and in support of Poland's efforts in Iraq—to see the remarkable array of skills and expertise that have been developed with other nations. The agreed EU position, reflected in the presidency report on the ESDP that was endorsed by the Nice European Council, is that NATO remains the basis for the collective defence of its members. The report emphasised specifically that the ESDP was about conducting crisis management tasks. That seemed to us an appropriate and complementary division of labour between the EU and NATO. In effect, the EU acts militarily only where NATO as a whole is not engaged.
Mr. Jenkin: There is a crucial distinction, which the Government keep making, even though the right hon. Gentleman resisted when I intervened on him during our previous debate on this subject: NATO will be confined to issues of defence while matters of security and crisis management will be taken over by the European Union. What does he think that NATO is in the modern security situation? It is a crisis management
organisation. What has it been doing in the Balkans? What is it doing in Afghanistan? It does crisis management. Why do we need two crisis management headquarters and two crisis management capabilities? The only reason for having a EU crisis management capability separate from NATO is so that it can shut the door on our north American allies.
Mr. Hoon: I will give the hon. Gentleman an illustration of what I am talking about in a second, but it is important that he recognises that the world cannot fit into this neat analysis—for or against the European Union and for or against the involvement of European nations in particular operations. What we are talking about is improving the overall capability of European nations, both within NATO and outside it, and I will give him an example to deal with his point in a moment.
The practical arrangements between the EU and NATO are embodied in the Berlin-plus agreement, concluded in March 2003. It sets out the support that NATO would provide to the ESDP in terms of assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities, the presumption of availability to the EU of NATO capabilities and common assets, and a range of European command options for EU-led operations, including developing the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe's role in relation to European responsibilities.
It was on the basis of Berlin-plus that the EU was able to launch its first military operation, taking over the stabilisation role from NATO in Macedonia, with supreme headquarters allied powers Europe—SHAPE—as the operational headquarters and DSACEUR as the operation commander. The UK supported that mission. Are the Conservatives now against it?
The EU's second military operation, in Bunia this summer, is another example of where the ESDP can be used effectively. The operation, which followed an upsurge in violence in the north-east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, stabilised the situation and assisted in the deployment of reinforcements for the UN peacekeeping force there. The House will be aware of the valuable contribution that the UK has made to that important mission. Are the Conservatives against that operation? The hon. Member for North Essex may not like the fact that the mission was conducted autonomously.
At the start of the ESDP, at the Cologne European Council in 1999, we agreed that ESDP operations would be conducted either with recourse to NATO assets or using national assets. NATO has had little experience of such small-scale operation in Africa. Various European national headquarters, in contrast, have a wealth of just that sort of experience. That is why we agreed with the approach taken in Bunia and why we supported it.
In that context, as my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary stated in the House on 20 October:
- "There is a hierarchy in military planning. It is not formally established in treaty but it has been followed and we want it to continue to be followed: NATO first, then the Berlin-plus arrangements . . . making use of NATO assets, and thirdly, wholly autonomous operations."—[Official Report, 20 October 2003; Vol. 411, c. 383.]
Mr. Hoon: The hon. Gentleman, with the benefit of considerable experience, regularly reminds the House of the importance of not overstretching our armed forces—I am sure that he would extend that to the armed forces of other countries as well—so it must be of some assistance both to NATO members and other European nations that organisations other than simply a NATO command headquarters are capable of carrying out such operations because, undoubtedly, that will have the effect of spreading the burden. As he rightly points out, modern nations in the present global security environment have a problem in taking on their share of responsibility, so I would have thought that, consistent with the points that he has wisely made to the House on many occasions, he would agree with my argument.
Mr. Keetch: I wish to return to the hierarchy described earlier that applies when the EU may take a role that NATO does not want to take. Liberal Democrat Members have often said that NATO should have a formal right of first refusal. NATO should have a formal ability to consider an operation, and if it did not want to undertake it for whatever reason, the EU system would click in. Does the right hon. Gentleman believe that such a formal right exists at the moment? If he believes that it does not exist, it might be helpful for other hon. Members to understand the arrangement if such a formal right of first refusal did exist.
Mr. Hoon: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that intervention. Clearly, there is no such formal right and I have indicated that there is no such specific treaty provision, but there are regular, detailed exchanges and conversations, particularly between Heads of State and Government in contemplation of military action, and certainly between Defence Ministers, trying to establish both the scale of any required operation and the most appropriate way to carry that through. All that takes place well before formal meetings involving NATO Ministers, EU Ministers or, indeed, a coalition of the willing, depending on which is appropriate.
I turn now to the capabilities. The Government firmly believe that the European countries need to strengthen their military capabilities. We are pursuing that both in NATO and, indeed, through the EU. The United Kingdom's work in NATO contributed to the agreement, at the Prague summit last year, on the Prague capabilities commitment, which is beginning to produce results. Multinational groups have been established to run programmes that address the critical capability shortfalls and recognise future capability requirements. The NATO response force—the tip of NATO's spearhead of high-readiness forces—is another resounding success for Prague. It was inaugurated just over a week ago, with an initial operating capacity. Although not yet the full package, it is 12 months ahead of schedule.
Similarly, under the Helsinki headline goal, EU member states aim to be able to deploy within 60 days, and sustain for at least one year, some 50,000 to 60,000 troops on crisis management operations. The EU now has operational capability across the full range of the Petersberg tasks, limited and constrained by recognised shortfalls. EU member states must now take action to address those shortfalls by more effective defence spending on the capabilities that enable member states to deploy their forces rapidly. That is being taken forward by EU member states in the European capabilities action plan.
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