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Mr. MacShane: It is 0.8 per cent.
Mr. Viggers: The Minister corrects me, but let us call the modest percentage 1 per cent. for simplicity. That is less important than Germany's input, which was 1.9 per cent. when I last looked. The Minister may have a different figure. [Interruption.] He indicates a lower figure. Germany, with a heavy GDP, does not make much of a contribution to defence when compared with many others.
There is not only an overall quantitive weakness but a failure to co-ordinate defence procurement. Different nations often insist on their own aircraft, tanks, guns, uniforms and boots. If the head of an airline insisted on having his own aircraft, he would be certified and fired without delay, whereas the heads of different air forces—notably in France—insist on having their own aircraft. We have co-operative ventures but we do not come together to procure one type of equipment.
That was the position until 9/11, but since then there has been a massive boost to the United States defence effort. The United States spends approximately as much on defence as the next 11 largest countries put together. Its increase in defence spending is the equivalent of much of the European initiative overall. The United States is therefore in a class of its own.
Article 5 was invoked, not, as was expected, by a European country against possible aggression but in respect of the attack on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon. The United States therefore effectively invoked article 5 of the Washington treaty, which led to the European NATO countries deploying airborne warning aircraft over the United States and support of the US by Europe.
The invocation of article 5 was not what we historically expected—a triumphant proof that NATO is an operative coalition. In the context of Afghanistan and Iraq, it proved ultimately to be more a coalition of the willing than simply the operation of NATO. I therefore maintain that invoking article 5 after 9/11 did not result in boosting support for NATO.
Before an attack on Iraq, Turkey invoked the NATO treaty and asked for support against a possible missile attack. The refusal of France and others put NATO under considerable stress. So NATO has been in some difficulty, and this all comes when NATO is being expanded: the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are to be admitted, together with Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania. That will be helpful in strengthening and broadening the alliance.
The admission of those—in military terms—comparatively modest countries is justified, bearing in mind the fact that although we have thought of NATO as a military alliance, it is, of course, also political. One might once have asked, "What is the point of admitting Estonia to NATO? What can it do to support the defence of the other NATO countries?" However, that
is not really the right question. The question is what Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and all the other nations can do to strengthen the political alliance that is NATO.Also, those countries will be given the reassurance of NATO membership. They still feel that they are under the shadow of the former Soviet Union and now of Russia, and might feel that they can benefit from the safeguard—the spiritual and mental support—that they get from being members of NATO. That is important in terms of NATO's expansion. NATO is alive and well, but we need to work on the alliance.
Meanwhile, there are the European Union initiatives to consider. Let us never forget, although it is quite easy to do so, that France withdrew from the integrated military structure. It deliberately put itself in a situation whereby it cannot take part in the normal command and co-ordination efforts of NATO. It makes a point of not being part of the integrated military structure, and that significantly weakens NATO and significantly weakens the contribution that France can make to it.
I thought it regrettable that the Government and our Prime Minister chose the country that is not involved in the integrated military structure to be the subject of the St. Malo initiative in 1998. The intended Franco-British co-operation, and the strengthening of the European institutions for defence and of the European security and defence policy, which has led to a proposal that there should be a separate headquarters and command structure for a European force's identity, have not been very successful.
The Secretary of State talked with some pride of an initiative for having 60,000 troops available on a sustainable basis, but he ducked and weaved when I asked how many troops would be needed to maintain 60,000 on a sustainable basis. Of course, we all know that the answer is three times 60,000, because there must be one unit in preparation, one in operation, and one in stand-down and retraining. That is before one takes account of the fact that troops are often unfit for military service—some 10,000 are currently unfit—quite apart from all the other problems of training and so on. We would need 180,000 troops, but the Secretary of State did not give the answer that he knew as well as I did: we are nowhere near providing 180,000 troops on a sustainable basis, and we are dreaming if we think we can.
There is a tendency in Europe to talk about European co-operation and, having talked about it and agreed yet another new European initiative, everyone goes home feeling that they have done something good—people feel fitter for it all. That is rather like a man going to a shop and buying an exercise bicycle or a pair of dumb-bells, and going home feeling that he has done something to improve his health. He has not done anything of the sort. The fact is that these European initiatives are all talk and not much action. They are like, as they say in Texas, someone with a big hat and no cattle. To follow the analogy through, there is a danger that Europe is deteriorating because we are not taking defence as seriously as the Americans are. I have heard it said that Europe, or the European Union, is deteriorating into a great, fat, lazy Switzerland.
We cannot go on like this. There are severe dangers in pursuing the European defence initiative. I want to make two points that have not been made yet today. In
making the first, I speak as a member of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, of which several of those present now are also members. We co-operate and participate in the assembly's debates, and learn a great deal from listening to colleagues from other countries. I listen to Americans who say that if there were a credible European defence identity, the United States would not feel the need to become involved in areas such as Kosovo.I remember a conversation with an American senator, who said, "I do not think we would have been able to carry Congress with us if there had been a European defence identity. Congress would not have felt the need to be involved. It would have said, 'Kosovo is a European issue: let the Europeans work it out'."
As I said when I was talking about the allied contributions to the common defence of the United States, the US has many obligations apart from those in Europe. If there is a credible European identity in defence terms, it will not wish to be involved. I am confident of that, and I think it is a serious hazard.
The second hazard is this. If the US is not involved in a European venture and we in Europe do become involved, if and when the involvement becomes difficult—if more military power is needed than we originally anticipated; if the small involvement in an attempt to keep the peace turns sour, and our troops come under immense pressure and attack—we say to the US, "We are very sorry, but we had a European initiative which has gone wrong and we now need your support", the US will be even less likely to involve itself.
Dr. Julian Lewis : May I add a further refinement to my hon. Friend's point? Even if a so-called crisis management operation went wrong and escalated, and we as Europeans had to appeal to the Americans to come in—and even if they did come in—by then the war would already be under way. If they had been involved from the outset under the NATO structures, the war might have been avoided through deterrence, and the fighting might not have broken out in the first place.
Mr. Viggers: That is a good point. The sheer weight of NATO's power might deter a potential aggressor. The whole point of deterrence is that there is no need to become involved, because the initiators have been deterred. If an approach is made with much less force and in a rather timid manner, the fighting could well escalate. It is the sheer weight of the American war machine that enables America to assist in the maintenance of peace around the world.
Let me say in parenthesis that we should continue always to pay tribute to the Americans. Theirs is in many ways a rather insular country, and only 7 per cent. of them have passports. It has taken real determination and a real moral sense of purpose for America to involve itself in world events as it has.
The EU and NATO are not coterminous. With military involvement through the EU we would, as it were, gain an ally in Ireland and lose an ally in Turkey, which is NATO's strongest member in the crucial area of eastern Europe and western Asia. NATO is better shaped to assist the maintaining of peace in dangerous areas than is the EU. I should add that some of our allies have an agenda that is inconsistent with NATO and,
indeed, hostile to NATO interests. We would not paint a complete picture if we did not point out that there are European interests that are anti-American. They would like to see a greater American initiative, and to aggrandise their own countries at NATO's expense.All the difficulty that we have been discussing has arisen because our Prime Minister has a penchant for telling people what he thinks they want to hear. What he says in Europe is different from what he says in the United States. That is why, along with many others, the ambassador to NATO, Nick Burns, has expressed serious concern about the manner in which the European defence initiative is proceeding. He is anxious for us to play our part, and remain staunch allies of NATO. If we do not reiterate our support, there is a risk that the United States will place more emphasis on other parts of the world.
The debate has drawn attention to an important issue, and I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition on the motion.
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