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Mr. Blunt: On the operation in the Congo, what does the hon. Gentleman have to say about the EU setting up its own force there, separate from the UN? Surely it would have been better for the EU to act in support of

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the UN by joining the UN force, and by helping to provide Security Council resolutions to enable the force to act effectively.

Mr. Moore: My understanding—I stand to be corrected—was that the EU was approached to carry out its functions in that matter and that it does so under the auspices of the UN. [Interruption.] I am sure that if the hon. Gentleman speaks in the debate, he will explore that issue further.

One area that has not been touched on this afternoon, but where there is a glaring need for reform, is the number of outstanding Security Council resolutions that gather dust and which have been ignored or not been complied with. Surely a UN designed for the 21st century should have systems in place to ensure that, in future, the terms of Security Council resolutions are not allowed to gather dust. In that respect, the Secretary-General should undertake an annual resolutions review to determine which obligations are outstanding and what action needs to be taken to comply with them.

The Iraq conflict threw the international order into chaos because it challenged the existing notions of sovereignty and what is or is not legal under the charter. There is a legitimate debate about this area, some of which has been rehearsed here this afternoon; there is no need to repeat the finer points.

Earlier today—as the hon. Member for South-West Devon said—the Foreign Secretary highlighted the need to reform the charter to take account of failing and rogue states. There are echoes here of the Prime Minister who, in his much-quoted keynote speech in Chicago on 22 April 1999, said that the


In September of that year, the Secretary-General—in his address to the General Assembly—noted that


If we are to make progress in this area, there must be a clear framework for intervention, defined and qualified by formal criteria and principles. It is important to remember that humanitarian intervention could in itself serve as a deterrent to future conflicts. It is also important that those criteria and principles are understood in the wider UN.

We believe that a framework of humanitarian intervention should also recognise that the objective of any intervention should be a better state of peace. The UN and its members must be prepared to commit not only to peace enforcement, but to the provision of substantial economic resources in the long term once stability has been restored.

Hugh Robertson: I agree with the hon. Gentleman about the basis for humanitarian intervention, but unless the criteria are tightly tied down, we can get Mogadishu-type situations; indeed, UN forces in Bosnia encountered similar problems. Unless the two parties involved in the country concerned want to resolve the conflict, it is extremely difficult for the UN force to do it for them. If the UN tries to do that, those delivering humanitarian aid get sucked into the conflict, becoming targets and a part of the problem.

Mr. Moore: The hon. Gentleman makes an entirely fair point. Clearly we need to ensure that the parties to

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a conflict make every effort to end it, and ensure that they are committed to peace. I cannot help but feel that, in so doing, the UN would be a great deal more credible if it had a set of guiding principles and criteria on the basis of which it was prepared to commit an intervention force to a particular country or region. That is what we lack at the moment, and that is where much of the pain and grief of the past year has come from.

There must be a better way of planning for the aftermath of conflicts and the reconstruction efforts that flow from them. The unseemly diplomatic battles after the end of the formal conflict in Iraq should not be forgotten. Even yet, the situation is far from clear.

The International Criminal Court has become a major tool of the international community in advancing the rule of international law in general and international humanitarian law in particular. Britain's role in bringing the court into being deserves praise, but it is sad to note that the British Government appear at the same time to be undermining the cohesion of the European Union on the issue and assisting in the bilateral article 98 immunity agreements that the US is keen to introduce with many countries. There will be looming difficulties in coming months as the US and the EU clash over their approach to the court in their relations with third countries. Hopefully, the Minister will be able to make the British stance clear in that regard.

The Government wrote in 2000:


I hope that the Minister can stand by that commitment today.

Peacekeeping has long been recognised as one of the key areas of UN activity, producing successes and, sadly, also many failures. There is a well-recognised need to develop the UN's capacity for peacekeeping, and we support the creation of an early-warning intelligence-gathering unit. A capability for the rapid establishment of operational headquarters in the field should also be developed. That would allow for better co-ordination of UN peacekeeping missions in the early stages of an operation, especially between UN headquarters and those in the field. Once deployed, UN peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandate professionally and successfully. That means that UN military units must be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission mandate. Rules of engagement need to be sufficiently robust, so that UN contingents are not forced to cede the initiative to hostile elements. No longer must UN blue helmets stand by while the most serious crimes against humanity are being committed.

Peacekeeping has become central to the United Nations and is perhaps the most important yardstick by which its performance is measured nowadays. The funding of peacekeeping therefore needs to be placed on a firmer basis. In short, we firmly believe that the doctrine of peacekeeping, which evolved in the 1950s in the context of interstate conflict, is no longer valid for the intra-state conflicts of the 21st century. Many of those conflicts throw into sharp focus the millennium

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development goals, and through emergency aid and long-term assistance the UN does much of its most valuable work. It is, as one commentator put it, a


We need to ensure that it is fit to do that job.

We firmly believe that a review and strengthening of UN finances are long overdue. The scope of UN responsibilities and the hopes invested in the organisation are immense, but the budget for the core functions is just $1.25 billion a year. That is significantly less than Birmingham's annual budget for 2000–01, and about 4 per cent. of New York city's annual budget. UN resources are simply not commensurate with its global tasks. Non-payment of dues should not be tolerated, and we must hope that the Government will support efforts to get back-payments brought up to date.

Before concluding, I want to pay tribute to Britain's own major contribution to the United Nations. The Liberal Democrats believe that for many generations, Britain has lived up to its position as a founding member and permanent member of the Security Council. Although we have at times profoundly disagreed with the UK Government's approach to key issues such as Iraq, we recognise that Britain's role in the UN has none the less always been a strong one. Indeed, the diplomats based there are some of the finest to be found.

The UN has no right, divine or otherwise, to exist. It must be relevant to the principles that underpin it, and fit to achieve the objectives that we set it. We still need an international body that is devoted to peace and security on one hand, and to development and emergency assistance on the other. The principles therefore remain valid—indeed, perhaps more than ever. But no one can deny that the UN's organisational and political structures need wholesale reform. We should support the efforts of Kofi Annan and the president of the General Assembly—and, indeed, of this Government—with enthusiasm, or, as the hon. Member for Bristol, West put it, in a way that inspires. Through that, we can hope to produce an institution fit for the 21st century.

3.24 pm

Alan Howarth (Newport, East): The United Nations has changed in the years since 1945. Its membership has greatly increased, the Security Council was enlarged in the mid-1960s, and the Counter-Terrorism Committee was set up recently, after 11 September. As the Government's Command Paper notes, the UN has responded to the great changes of decolonisation and the end of the cold war, and the new challenges of HIV/AIDS, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and civil conflict.

The UN's mission, affirmed in 1945 so eloquently, movingly and indeed succinctly in the preamble to the

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charter, remains valid: to maintain peace, to advance human rights, to uphold international law and


At the millennium Assembly in 2000, Heads of State and of Government reaffirmed those principles, while defining their priorities for the new century:


As the Secretary-General has said in his report of 9 September 2002:


Of course, the UN has its contemporary successes. Large amounts of aid are delivered, increasingly in partnership with non-governmental organisations and the private sector. Relatively unpublicised good work has been carried forward in the reconstruction of Sierra Leone, for example. The world is a very much better place in innumerable ways because of the presence and activities of the UN and its agencies.

The world, however, while pinning many hopes on the UN, is all too conscious of its deficiencies. How could it have happened that the UN, while claiming to defend Bosnia, effectively abandoned it, tacitly co-operating, it has been seriously argued, with Serbian ethnic cleansing? On one occasion, Serbs were even reported as wearing blue berets provided by UN troops. How could it be that at least 800,000 people, out of an original population of 7.5 million, were massacred in Rwanda, with the warnings of the UN commander in Rwanda and his pleas for more soldiers and matériel seemingly dismissed in New York?

Can the UN truly claim to have been doing all that it could to end the continuing conflict that has cost 2 million lives in the eastern Congo? We know of the miseries of Liberia. We know that the Taliban's abuses of human rights and the failure of Government in Afghanistan were neglected, while al-Qaeda used the haven of that failed state to build its capacity. We know that great areas of the world have become poorer now than they were 10 years ago. We know that for years on end, the UN has failed to enforce its own resolutions, which have been routinely breached by Iraq and by Israel. We can see now the results of the failure to plan adequately for post-war reconstruction in Iraq—a responsibility, however, that is as much the international community's as the UN's. One can make that distinction in this context. We have seen the culpable failure of security that permitted the tragic terrorist bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad on 19 August, and the consequent evacuation of the UN's international personnel from Iraq.

No one is a shrewder critic of the UN than its Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. In his report of 9 September 2002, building on the reforms begun in 1997, he set out a whole programme of reform. He advocated a more representative and open Security Council; changes in the procedures of the General Assembly and

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the Economic and Social Council; better prioritisation, abandonment of obsolete concerns and a sharper performance by the Secretariat; better co-ordination of UN agencies, committees and activities; a reformed budget process as a lever for further reforms; fewer meetings and less paper. In 2001–02 Kofi Annan noted—unbelievably—that 15,484 meetings were held and 5,879 reports issued. He also advocated fewer conferences and better follow-up in respect of those that are held; reform of the office and procedures of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights; better communications, and much else. I am glad that the Government are giving vigorous support to the Secretary-General's agenda.

As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has pointed out, however, the issue is less institutional than political. Without the will for reform among Governments and if agreement cannot be reached on how to deal with the difficult problems of international affairs, it is no good railing against the UN. Governments do not find it difficult to genuflect to the great abstractions and the broadly stated principles of the charter. What is hard, apparently, is to make generosity of vision a practical reality.

Kofi Annan rightly upbraided the General Assembly on 23 September this year:


He drew attention to terrorism in many countries; violence in the middle east and Africa; the threat of nuclear proliferation in the Korean peninsula; and, of course, the position in Iraq. He reminded the General Assembly of the consensus expressed three years ago in the millennium declaration, but said, as the hon. Member for Tweeddale, Ettrick and Lauderdale (Mr. Moore) reminded us,


He put it to the General Assembly:


He then announced a high-level panel to take a hard look at fundamental issues and at the structural changes that may be needed.

The panel's task of analysis and prescription is difficult and the diplomacy required for nations to reach agreement will be yet more so.

We are looking at a world in which there is no longer a balance of power and where the nature of the state and of threats to peace and security have been changing profoundly. Globalisation, communications technology, modern weaponry and migration all mean that borders and sovereignty—and therefore state identities—have different, perhaps less, meaning from what they used to have. States in which Governments have collapsed and poverty is desperate—failed states—may be incapable of undertaking the responsibilities that UN principles require of them.

Multinational corporations and financial markets, the arms trade, international organised crime and the drugs trade create and characterise global power structures that are very different from those of 1945. The crises of migration and water shortages require new

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thinking and new accommodations. The communications revolution, transmitting news and images instantly across the world, has profound implications for global politics. The rise of fanatical ideologies interacting with poverty and hopelessness, the absence of democracy and the risks of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction present the most dangerous pathology and the most pressing case for renewal of the UN.

It is far too dangerous to sleepwalk further into this new world of the 21st century. Countries are now tempted to claim a right of pre-emptive action in self-defence to take out the threat of terrorism equipped with WMD before an attack occurs. The Secretary-General rightly expresses deep concern about the proliferation of the unilateral use of force outside the bounds of article 51 of the charter. Equally rightly, as the Minister reminded us, Kofi Annan said that it is not enough to denounce unilateralism unless we face up squarely to the concerns that make some states feel so vulnerable, and he invited discussion on the criteria for early authorisation of coercive measures to address certain types of threat.

International law has always evolved—from the Pax Romana to the religious peace of Augsburg, from the treaties of Westphalia and Utrecht to the Congress of Vienna, from Versailles and the League of Nations to San Francisco and the peace of Paris in 1990—as jurists and statesmen have sought to reflect the interdependent development of strategy and constitutionalism, the new realities of insecurity and power.

In a sense, honourable and learned differences of opinion about the legitimacy of the coalition's intervention in Iraq are by the way. What matters is that the international community develops authoritative ways as a community to deal with the problems of today and tomorrow, which are different from those of 1945 or the 1980s. The alternative will be a capricious, mainly well-intended, but often blundering American hegemony seeking to police a Hobbesian international chaos.


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