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4.3 pm

Mr. Andrew Robathan (Blaby): Like the hon. Member for Tynemouth (Mr. Campbell) and, I suspect, all contributors to our debate, I support the United Nations, although I often do so because it is the only

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show in town. I agree with much that the Minister said, and should like to talk about the effective use of taxpayers' money and how it is spent by the UN.

I have seen many UN operations around the world, both with the International Development Committee and in other capacities. Its staff drive large white 4x4s, they are on fairly large salaries and pensions, and their children's school fees are paid. They pay attention to their careers, have weekends off and usually occupy the best villas in town. I remember that in Sarajevo there were no vehicles on the streets in 1997 except UN 4x4s, and all the best villas around the city were occupied by UN personnel. However, I do not have a problem with that. If people are sent regularly to some ghastly spot they need to be well looked after.

Others have spoken of Bosnia, Srebrenica, Rwanda and the Congo, where conflict is now going on, but I should like to concentrate specifically on the effectiveness of UN aid, which is paid for to a large extent by UK taxpayers—I think that we are the fourth largest contributor—with regard to mine action. In July 1998, we passed into law the Ottawa convention; indeed, I was here at the time. Article 5 says:

"Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party."

Of course, the convention was very much a UN document. Those statements were made in 1998, and five years have already gone by. After the second world war and six years of war across the European continent, it took approximately five years to clear almost all the mines that had been laid in Europe. My point is that, as the Ottawa convention and what happened after the second world war show, mine clearance is a finite, short-term problem.

I should declare an unremunerated interest, as I am chairman of the trustees of an organisation called the HALO Trust, which is the largest humanitarian de-mining NGO in the world. It clears mines in Abkhazia, Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia and a host of other countries, and started its activities in Afghanistan in 1988. I use the HALO Trust as an example, but other NGOs could be cited, such as the Mines Action Group, which often work under the aegis of the UN. Since 1988, the HALO Trust has cleared well over 1.5 million land mines and pieces of unexploded ordnance worldwide. The income that it used for such clearing last year was $36 million, and it employs a total of 5,500 staff, of whom only 30 are expatriates—a ratio of about 1:200 expatriates to national staff. On that income, it is reckoned that the HALO Trust cleared approximately 30 per cent. of the mines lifted and cleared around the world last year.

The HALO Trust has been operating in Afghanistan since 1988, and throughout the conflict, apart from a couple of times when it had to stop operations under the Taliban. It has three expatriates there and 1,900 local staff, 1,500 of whom are down on their hands and knees clearing ground. In 2002, it lifted 75 per cent. of the mines cleared in Afghanistan. We had money from the United Nations in Afghanistan, but trying to get it out of the UN was like trying to get blood from a stone. The fact that the money was not forthcoming from the UN led to people being laid off. At the same time, when the

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UN distributes money to implementing partners, it takes a slice off the top for administration. That money is not for administration in New York, which is paid for by core funding, but the slice is up to 13 per cent.

I turn now to United Nations mine action. What is it? The United Nations Development Programme website states that mine action is an

"interagency consultative process, involving several other agencies, to develop a collective, comprehensive and coherent UN system policy on all those activities which aim to address the impact as a result of landmine contamination."

I hope that that is entirely clear. UNMAS, the United Nations Mines Action Service, describes itself on the UNDP website as

"a coordinator and facilitator at the field level."

I thought that mine action was about clearing mines. The same website states:

"UNDP works in mine action rather than demining . . . Mine action is a comprehensive term encompassing four main components: Mine awareness and risk reduction education; minefield mapping, marking and clearance; victims assistance and rehabilitation; and advocacy at the international level. . . . Secondary components are management and institutional arrangements."

I think that hon. Members can see what I am getting at, but I should like to give a final quote from the UNDP. It says:

"National ownership over mine action at country level is essential for short-term effectiveness and longer-term sustainability . . . National institutions need to be built from the ground up."

That is exactly what NGOs such as HALO do, so one has to ask who actually does it. The website also states:

"UNDP's primary collaborators do not encompass assistance to victims of a more medical nature. This aspect of victim assistance is better managed by UNICEF, WHO and others."

So UNMAS and UNDP do not blow up mines or deal with the after-effects of mines, so my question is, what exactly do they do?

The website continues:

"There are situations where a mine clearance operation is needed quickly to defuse a potential humanitarian catastrophe. In these . . . situations . . . a wide range of actors"—

here it gives a list, including the HALO Trust—

"may be better placed to respond to the need. UNDP should avoid becoming involved in these emergency situations, except to provide full logistical support to our partners. UNDP's primary interest is in building national structures able to successfully clear mines into the long term."

We might term that last task "capacity building", but the Ottawa convention mentions a period of 10 years, and experience has shown that unless someone lays more mines, they are a finite problem. The role of UNMAS therefore includes facilitating, co-ordinating, management and capacity building. It involves people in headquarters, not people clearing mines.

UNMAS has 13 expatriates in Kabul in Afghanistan. What exactly are they doing? One of UNMAS's roles is co-ordination, and we agree that everybody needs co-ordination, but it can be achieved nationally by Government, even in a country that is being rebuilt, assuming that no corruption is involved. In Angola, which I visited recently with the hon. Member for Putney (Mr. Colman), co-ordination was achieved between the NGOs and they did not need an

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overarching body. HALO took responsibility for clearing one province and the Mines Advisory Group took responsibility for another. Co-ordination can be achieved with a lighter touch.

UNMAS does not need 13 expatriates in Kabul. The UNDP agrees, as we can see from its statement to the mine action support group meeting on 9 October about Sri Lanka:

"Due to the fact that parts of Sri Lankan territory still are under the control of non-state actors"—

that means terrorists—

"there is no central mine action coordination centre yet . . . Despite the lack of a central mine action coordination, the cooperation of both the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE"—

that is the Tamil Tigers, if memory serves—

"with UNDP and NGO's is satisfactory and provides overall compatibility of mine action policies."

So co-ordination can be achieved, according to the UNDP, without the UNDP's assistance.

Anyone who has examined the costs and the funding of the United Nations will know that it is opaque and confused—to put it mildly. We funded more than 5 per cent. of the UN's activities last year and are the fourth largest contributor. The UN website for mine action says that $206 million is spent on that activity alone. It says that the organisation plans to have 8,000 de-miners. It does not have them yet, and I would like to know where they will be based. HALO fields a de-miner for $6,300, so the UN—on its funding—should have more than 31,000. On its own figures, it spends $154 million on co-ordination and other headquarters functions. I put it to the Minister, and to his colleague the Secretary of State for International Development, that that is not why we give money for humanitarian work to the UNDP. That is not implementation: it is bureaucratic waffle under the heading of co-ordination.

Finally, I turn to the NGO perspective as expressed in the HALO Trust's annual report. Five of the largest mine clearance NGOs—Danish Church Aid, the Danish Demining Group, Handicap International France, Norwegian Peoples Aid and the HALO Trust—met as a group that was initially called the NGO Task Force. In August this year, they reformed into a group called the NGO Perspective on the Debris of War. The group agreed to the following statement:

"Victims and communities affected by the debris of war deserve better support than they are currently getting from the mine action community. The mine problem is finite, straightforward and relatively simple to solve. However, mine action processes are becoming over-complicated and, as a consequence, unjustifiably expensive.


We, five experienced NGO mine action operators, are concerned that under the current circumstances the obligations of the Ottawa Treaty cannot be met."

What are the implications of that? Although donor funding for mine clearance is increasing—we all welcome that—it appears that there may not be the corresponding drop in casualties. At some point, donors such as DFID will say, "What's the point? We're going to walk away from these escalating costs," and the clearance agencies will have to abandon numerous areas of mine clearance for mine-affected communities.

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HALO believes that donors, including the UK,

"should now review their funding priorities and decide what elements of 'Mine Action' really contribute to casualty reduction and the relief of poverty. The review should not be done by the established circle of mine action consultants who have advised on policies during the past 10 years—as they are likely to justify their previous advice. HALO is convinced that there are . . . hundreds of millions of dollars being spent that have little or nothing to do with casualty reduction or the relief of poverty. A whole 'Mine Action' industry"—

one might even say circus—

is feasting off international donor funding—an almost continual stream of conferences, consultants, publications, studios, re-writes, IT systems",

and so on. If we want Afghans, Cambodians and Angolans to live without a constant threat of landmines over the next few years, we need to switch funding from so-called "mine action", which is peripheral, to actual mine clearance.

I used the HALO Trust as an example, but other NGOs could be so used. UN mine action costs UK taxpayers and others a great deal of money, which should be better spent, but mine action is itself only one among many issues. I very much hope to hear the Minister say that the Government will hold the UN to account and will review the funding for mine action and other humanitarian work.

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