Select Committee on Constitutional Affairs Fourth Report


Appendix 2

Memorandum by Chris Randall and Robert Thomas, Specialist Advisers to the Committee

Comments on the Late Memorandum Submitted by the Department for Constitutional Affairs on the Government's proposed changes to publicly funded immigration and asylum work

Introduction

On Friday 24th October 2003, the Department for Constitutional Affairs (DCA) and Legal Services Commission (LSC) submitted a memorandum to the Committee, which contains important new material on the subject of the Committee's current enquiry into legal aid in immigration matters. It is surprising to see such a radical shift in the DCA/LSC proposals following on so quickly from their evidence to the Committee. If these matters were under consideration at the time, it is difficult to understand why were they not put before the Committee for examination, and made available for comment upon by other witnesses.

On the same day, the Home Secretary announced that 15,000 principle asylum applicants whose cases pre-dated the Human Rights Act coming into force in October 2000 would be granted permission to stay in the UK. A significant proportion of these cases will have had some or all of their appeals outstanding. This will have a significant effect on the appeal backlog and therefore the legal aid budget. It is surprising to see that this not flagged up in the DCA's projections as to cost.

The new memorandum

The most important new material divides into two parts:

i.  A proposed amendment to the 'hard cap approach' set out in the consultation (paras 18-20); and

ii.  A threat to remove legal help from initial decision-making in asylum cases (paras 21-24).

There is also some ground-clearing in relation to other issues which we will address first, following the paragraphs of the new memorandum.

Para 13 Unique file number

The proposal here still does not seem to deal with the client who seeks advice about whether to make an application, and decides not to do so—there is therefore never an application to the Home Office, and no Home Office reference is ever generated. Nor does it deal with entry clearance applications, where a lot of work is done before the file reaches the Home Office (and the unique number is generated). The fact that some payments are linked with Home Office decisions does not deal with these particular problems either.

Para 15 Statistics

The statistics are noted. However, it remains the case that in 20- 25% of Home Office refusals, the Home Office decision is overturned. This does not inspire confidence in an area where decisions are of such import to clients. The reliance on the new DL/HL figures is a little disingenuous—just because the Home Office have decided that a 12% tranche of cases no longer qualify for subsidiary protection does not change the nature of those cases from meritorious to unmeritorious. Also there may yet be a knock-on effect on appeals from the DL/HL provisions, which it is too early to identify, given the recentness of the policy change.

Para 16 Interviews

This comment still does not address the fact that it is the Home Office's own protocol which restricts the role of representatives at interview. It does not address how interviews would change in the absence of representatives. It is also important to bear in mind that with the proposed widening of the non-suspensive appeal jurisdiction many applicants will not have an in-country appeal to put right matters which have gone awry at interview. A poor interview, unchecked by the representative, will be followed closely by removal, and a useless appeal exercised from the country of origin.

At the moment no time is allowed to a representative to make representations after an interview if the interview was preceded (as, at the moment it normally is) by the submission of a Self Completed Statement of Evidence Form. At the very least, the Home Office should, where attendance at interview is excluded, be required to re-instate the possibility of making representations for a short period after the interview.

At para 19 (ii) it is suggested that attendance will be allowed at the various fast-track establishments. While this is to be welcomed in itself, the logic for this is not clear. After all, the current failure rate of appeals at Harmondsworth is 294 out of 300. Representation at interview did not change much there, it seems. It is arguable that it is in the more borderline cases—which generally are not Harmondsworth material—that representation at interview is more important.

For non-suspensive appeals, for the reasons set out above, there is a good argument as to why representation at interview should be allowed. But, assuming they are to be expanded in number, why is it only to be allowed at non-suspensive appeals at Oakington?

Para 18 An Alternative Approach

i.  It appears that disbursements will no longer be subject to a cap per se. This is to be welcomed.

ii.  The introduction of a 'soft cap' for profit costs is also to be welcomed, so far as it goes. The next and crucial question is—how soft is that cap to be? Para 19 (ii) suggests that extensions may be granted by the LSC:-

'In genuine and complex cases where there is a real prospect of success'

This phrase raises a number of questions:

iii.  Interpreters—the requirement for suppliers to use only externally accredited interpreters is to be welcomed—however this will add considerably to the disbursement bill. It should be confirmed by the Home Office that their own interpreters will be of the same standard. In the absence (as posited) of both a representative and independent interpreter at interview, the need for well-qualified Home Office interpreters becomes even more important. If the Home Office interpreter does not do a proper job, there will be no-one from the applicants side who will know.

iv.  The taking in-house of Controlled Legal Representation decisions by the LSC is not unexpected. The fact that any appeal against a refusal by the LSC to fund a case will be a paper appeal only is very worrying. The LSC will need to be able to demonstrate its independence in these circumstances. We may see a growth of a satellite Judicial Review industry challenging the LSCs decisions to refuse to fund appeals.

Further developments—para 21-24

This material causes us grave concern.

The Home Office are the initial decision-makers in immigration cases, and the respondent to any appeals. There is a clear political imperative in reducing the volume of applicant numbers. Government has made this clear. A high refusal rate, sustained on appeal, will, arguably, assist in the Government in achieving this political end not least via a deterrent effect on future applicants. The Home Office therefore have an interest in applicants failing at appeal. Given the added concerns about rising costs, they also have an interest in cases failing as early as possible, and in appeals regimes with limited, or no effective, appeals.

In that context, one would hope to see the organization which funds applicants representation, doing so at arms length from the Home Office. This appears to be less and less the case. One might also think that Government might be in favour of retaining legal aid for initial applications, in order for lawyers to assist the Home Office in coming to the right decision at an early stage. Regrettably that is not the case, and these proposals make that abundantly clear.

There is a shared budget for asylum and immigration, the SAF. Suppliers already have concerns, expressed in this consultation process, about the LSC's commitment to quality, given its volte-face from earlier guidance for immigration cases. Now it is suggested that the current determination process may be further changed to maximize 'effectiveness, efficiency and economy' (para 22). It is of concern, in passing, that fairness and justice are not mentioned here. It is further stated that 'Officials' (from which department we do not know) will examine the role that legal aid plays in achieving high quality decision-making. It is suggested that improved Home Office decision-making will allow for a reduction of Legal Help.

This raises a number of fundamental issues.

Home Office administration and the quality of its decision-making was widely and rightly attacked in the consultation responses. It is hard to emphasize how far in practice Home Office procedures would have to improve to reach a standard where they could command such confidence that LH to applicants could be cut, even if it were in principle thought to be a good idea. But in fact the principle clearly points in the other direction. This is for a number of reasons:-

i.  The powers of the Home Office are already very substantial. To reduce LH at the initial stage, in such a contentious, difficult, and important field would be quite wrong. The Council on Tribunals has already suggested, in the context of appeals that the balance has swung too far towards the executive. This proposal is to posit a giant leap further in that direction.

ii.  Good quality legal representation assists the Home Office in reaching the correct decision early on ['front-loading' or 'right first time']. This proposal seems to adopt the view that legal advice provides no help to decision-makers at all.

iii.  It should be recalled that a negative initial decision will lead more and more to an (ineffective) out of country appeal. Such applicants might never receive legal advice before their removal, under these proposals. There will be no opportunity for the unrepresented applicant to receive legal assistance to put right those matters which have gone wrong in their application, before they are once again in the country from which they fled.

There are no other areas of administrative decision-making concerning similarly important areas of peoples lives, where it is suggested that those about whom decisions are made who are impecunious, should have no legal assistance, because of the trustworthiness of the decision-maker. It should be emphasized that an asylum claim concerns matters of fundamental human rights, including the right to life, and that an incorrect decision could result in death or torture as well as a failure to adhere to international legal obligations.

Arguably the LSC should be playing a role of defending the position of the applicant against the encroaching powers of the executive. Unfortunately, it appears to be doing the opposite. The effect of the single budget appears to have been to co-opt the LSC into the executive, just at the time when applicants most needed it to stand firm against it.

It is of yet more concern that such fundamental changes could be introduced merely by regulation. The Committee has a particular responsibility in these circumstances to look at these matters further, whether in the context of this investigation, or a future one.

Para 24 suggests that lawyers will be involved in these developments as they progress 'to ensure they can deliver a good legal aid service to their clients' (para 24). This makes a welcome change to the complete, and telling, lack of involvement in the LSC's proposals considered by the Committee thus far. But it does appear to rather beg the question as to whether such a service could be delivered in those circumstances.

Chris Randall & Robert Thomas

Specialist Advisers to the Constitutional Affairs Committee

28 October 2003


 
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