APPENDIX 17
Memorandum submitted by British Resorts
Association
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 The British Resorts Association is a
local authority association with a UK remit and a membership of
60 authorities, nine tourist boards and 15 commercial organisations.
We act in the manner of a trade association for local authority-sponsored
tourism interests. The organisation is funded by membership subscriptions
and modest commercial activity.
1.2 Despite misconceptions linked to its
name, the Association is not exclusively in the business of supporting
traditional resort destinations. We do include a number of built
coastal resorts, but most, if not all, count rural hinterland
and coastline as a major part of their offer. A significant number
of our members are rural coastal destinations, while an important,
but much smaller group, are made up of inland rural and built
destinations.
1.3 The common thread running through the
membership is an established tradition of hosting visitors in
significant numbers. Therefore, for better or worse, tourism has
become woven into the social and economic fabric of the local
community. As a consequence it's importance to that community
is recognised by much greater local authority involvement in tourism
related issues, and very often by hands on management of the locality
as a tourist destination.
1.4 Like the vast majority of the UK's tourism
industry our members' core market is the UK domestic visitor.
Despite the competition from overseas destination, or perhaps
more accurately, despite the competition from UK-based travel
operators, domestic tourism remains a huge business, generating
in the order of £59 billion a year or 80 per cent of the
total tourism spend in the UK.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 In attempting to answer the question
"what is the future for UK tourism after September 11",
we believe it is more important to examine the details of relatively
recent past. We have watched recent events with increasing alarm.
To our mind some very basic lessons from the Foot and Mouth Disease
(FMD) outbreak are in danger of being missed or misinterpreted.
2.2 The truly remarkable thing about last
year's events was their ability to raise political and public
awareness of the importance of tourism. FMD, in particular, was
able to do more in a matter of weeks than all the combined lobbying
of the industry undertaken over a period of many years.
2.3 For local government the absolute critical
factor was the sudden recognition of the vital role tourism plays
in underpinning the wider social and economic fabric of a host
community. In the case of FMD, this vital role became a key argument
for supporting tourism in rural areas. However, the same basic
argument that tourism underpins the fabric of communities has
long been made, and largely ignored, in relationship to communities
where tourism's role is much more self-evident, for example in
seaside, spa and historic resort towns.
2.4 As an organisation we saw 2001 as an
opportunity to consolidate understanding of this complex and diverse
industry and through more detailed understanding, gaining access
to the level and type of support needed to grow the UK domestic
market for the mutual benefit of the whole industry. What we actually
saw was a heightened awareness of the need for action and arguably
a drive for quick fixes, which may or may not be based on a detailed
understanding of the long-term needs of the industry as a whole.
3. FOOT AND
MOUTH DISEASE
3.1 FMD was primarily a rural issue, but
its wider tourism impacts were felt across the entire UK industry.
Clearly those impacts in established traditional rural destinations
like Cumbria and Devon, which were also FMD hotspots, were devastating.
Those impacts were also felt across all rural areas, creating
particular difficulty for business with direct connections to
animals or to land access. However, contrary to popular belief
the rest of the non-rural tourism industry did not benefit as
a consequence of FMD, or at least not in the terms that the benefit
is normally interpreted.
3.2 From the outset, FMD created a roller
coaster year and completely disrupted established domestic tourism
patterns. For example, tourism activity virtually closed down
in the early part of the year. An excellent but short-lived emergency
national marketing and PR campaign in England saved Easter. This
was followed by a lacklustre May, June and July which saw some
incredible weekend day trip peaks on sunny weekends, but very
few mid-week staying visitors. The year as a whole was then saved
by a better than average main school holiday period in which those
who were going to take a UK holiday did so, but away from FMD
hotspots. Yes there were benefits but those did not necessarily
compensate for the overall losses during the rest of the year.
3.3 The net effect was that UK domestic
tourism was on a par with 2000, the year of widespread spring
flooding, the wettest summer on record and an autumn of rail chaos.
The United Kingdom Tourism Statistics on which these broad comparisons
are based are designed to give a relatively accurate national
overview down to regional level. Below this figures in England
are not universally available and where they are available, they
are not necessarily gathered in the same way, or necessarily in
a manner designed to show trends. In short it is difficult to
evidence the actual detailed impact on individual destinations.
However, it is possible to say with confidence that wherever there
are peaks and troughs and where established tourism patterns are
disrupted there will be the odd winner and a host of losers. This
rule of thumb applies across destinations, but it applies more
particularly within the diverse array, of mainly small businesses,
which combine to create each individual destination. Large numbers
of tourism businesses did not go bust. But what is more important
is what else they did not do. For example they did not invest
in improvements, and many did not market themselves as well as
they ought to have done for 2001. These and a host of other lost
opportunities have combined to put much of the industry back by
a year or more and as yet there is no real sign of a return to
a positive environment of reinvestment.
3.4 Quite rightly action is being taken
to address the short-term impacts of FMD on rural tourism. Without
assistance this otherwise viable industry's long term future could
be seriously damaged by what was, hopefully, a one off event.
Given the potential damage to the wider social and economic fabric
this would bring, it is money well spent. It does, however, raise
a number of concerns for us:
3.4.1 Once the short-term damage is repaired
should rural tourism continue to receive more favourable support
than other sectors? We would argue for similar support for all
sectors or a broadening of the support over time so that it benefits
all sectors.
3.4.2 If tourism's role in underpinning
the social and economic fabric of communities is worthy of recognition
and support in rural communities, why is it not regarded with
equal importance elsewhere? In particular, why is it not gaining
the level of recognition in traditional built resort destinations,
where social and economic imbalances have been allowed to develop
to a point at which they undermine the very tourism product on
which that the resort's social and economic fabric is built?
4. SEPTEMBER
11
4.1 The impacts of September 11 were largely
on the inbound international market. September 11 did dissuade
many UK travellers from flying abroad and there were therefore
some benefits for the UK domestic market. Regrettably, in terms
of traditional built and rural domestic destinations, much of
that reluctance took place during the autumn and spring shoulder
months. By the start of the main 2002 season the reluctance to
fly was already diminishing, spurred on by the UK outbound travel
industry's need to discount their current supply of distressed
stock and to generate forward bookings for summer by discounting
where necessary.
4.2 For the domestic industry an optimistic
start to the 2002 year with an excellent Easter was followed by
a slow pre-summer school holiday period. Again the short, sharp
summer school holiday period proved to be better than expected
based on the year's earlier performance. On this occasion it was
factors like the World Cup, the longer Queen's Jubilee Holiday,
Commonwealth Games, free admission to National Museums and yet
another unseasonably wet early summer, which had a far greater
impact than September 11.
4.3 There was, however, one area where September
11 did indirectly affect the domestic market this year. In response
to the loss of international trade some honey pot destinations,
and London in particular, have switched marketing resources to
target the domestic market. In the short term at least, any major
new national campaign selling individual areas or products will
invariably serve to divert some existing businesses, rather than
creating and then capitalising on additional business for the
domestic industry. This may appear a relatively simple and obvious
point but it contains within it lessons for any centrally supported
marketing campaign:
4.3.1 The aim must be to generate additional
business, either by encouraging UK residents to take more holidays
and take them at home, or by encouraging UK residents to convert
some of their current overseas holiday taking back to the UK.
4.3.2 Individual products, destinations,
regions etc can, and do, already market themselves. Their aim
is to alert potential customers within the marketplace to their
product and hopefully secure a sale. They are not in the business
of growing the overall market so that all others in the industry
can have a better chance of selling more products. National marketing
for England cannot be effectively achieved by the combined efforts
of its regions, nor solely by the efforts of private sector businesses.
4.3.3 The role of growing the overall product
for the mutual benefit of the industry is a national function.
By definition the message cannot be directly linked to particular
products, or particular areas. It is, therefore, highly unlikely
that such a diverse industry will see sufficient direct individuals
return to wish to fund the bulk of the high level marketing activity.
Given the diverse nature and the typical size of the business
involved, national marketing is effectively about providing a
core service that the industry is incapable of providing for itself.
4.3.4 The National Boards of Wales, Scotland
and Northern Ireland currently conduct very effective high level
conceptual marketing and PR campaigns selling the idea of holidaying
in their areas to the English. This is the model that England
should adopt to sell itself to the English and to the rest of
Britain.
4.4 In terms of the international market,
September 11 was a huge blow to an international tourism market
already struggling from the effects of FMD. Some commentators
would also point out that FMD was a body blow to a market already
depressed by an economic downturn in the USA and suffering from
bad publicity related to rail crashes, wet summers and flooding
among other things. In terms of the current market we will not
be the only one to point out that September 11 as such is no longer
the issue and certainly not in the key US market-place, where
doubtless fear of an impending war or ill defined terrorist threats
to European cities will have taken over.
4.5 The Gulf War depressed overseas travel
from the US for several years after its end. Our current difficulties
continue and will not be resolved for several years after international
events themselves are resolved. In this situation it is vital
that BTA continue to be resourced adequately enough to maintain
our market profile, regardless of actual inbound performances
achieved.
5. GOVERNMENT'S
SUPPORTING ROLE
5.1 Government already has a role in supporting
tourism, particularly at Local Government level, where it is difficult
to escape the fact that everything they do or do not do has a
direct impact on tourism. The key lesson of FMD is that tourism
underpins the social and economic fabric of communities. Therefore,
failure to intervene wisely, and in all timely manner will have
much wider social and economic impacts. Ultimately these will
have to be addressed by government, albeit perhaps under some
other departmental heading and, in all probability, at much greater
total cost to the public purse.
5.2 The role within Central Government is
to maintain a watching brief on all the activities of government
and ensure that tourism's interests are properly represented in
key departmental areas. This is obvious and arguably it is already
what DCMS tries to achieve. The key question is does this supporting
role go beyond promoting and supporting tourism within government
to a role in promoting and supporting tourism in the public domain?
5.3 We would argue that there is an essential
role to play, particularly in facilitating the promotion of the
concept of England as a desirable destination, thus increasing
the susceptibility of the British market to the array of product
and destination marketing messages already put in place, at the
various appropriate levels, by the industry. By its nature this
conceptual messaging can only be fairly and equitably co-ordinated
centrally and largely at public expense. The industry is simply
too fragmented and diverse to realistically expect it to fund
a neutral mutually beneficial campaign. No one appears to have
much difficulty accepting that there is a role marketing Britain
abroad or that that role should fall to a well-resourced central
tourist board (BTA). It appears to be patently obvious that the
role exists and that no reasonable alternative delivery mechanism
exists. The same could be said about marketing England, but arguably
there is a financially driven reluctance to come to a similar
conclusion regarding the funding and delivery mechanisms.
5.4 We also recognise that tourism is a
powerful social and economic tool. Therefore government should
maintain some form of influence upon its development. There are
a whole host of quality, employment, health, environmental and
associated areas where central strategic and policy direction
would be of benefit to the industry and to government at all levels.
Traditionally this function has been delivered by a central, arm's
length body. We can see absolutely no reason to suggest that in
future it should not continue to be co-ordinated by a central
national body, which remains at arm's length to government. Possible
alternatives, for example a committee of regional interest or
central Government Department control, are simply unworkable or
unacceptable as a means of managing England's overall tourism
interests.
6. ENGLISH TOURISM
COUNCIL (ETC)
6.1 We understand that the future of ETC
is under review and that various options have formally or informally
been made known. We are also aware that Ministers have announced
a preference to create a private sector led marketing body in
England.
6.2 This organisation had considerable experience
working with the English Tourist Board (ETB) and played a vocal
role in the debate leading up to the creation of ETC. While ETB
had a marketing and PR role, the marketing role had no resources
allocated to it throughout much of the 1990s. This, above all
else, led to widespread, but ill-defined, criticism of ETB as
an effective National Tourist Board. The incoming Government noted
the dissatisfaction and, not unreasonably, interpreted it to mean
that the industry would not object to ETB's demise and a redistribution
of funds to Regional level. The industry did object and a major
rearguard action was mounted, resulting in the retention of a
national strategic body but regrettably, a body with no marketing
or wider PR function. At that time cynical commentators predicted
that without a marketing function ETC's role would be questioned
again on exactly the same basis within five years. The really
cynical suggested that this was the intended game plan.
6.3 Government seeks radical reform. Restructuring
ETC to include a properly funded England marketing and PR function
would, in our view, be radical. It is not simply recreating ETB,
since ETB did not really have a properly funded marketing role
and it also carried with it other historic baggage, which was
not taken forward into ETC. A restructured ETC with a marketing
and PR function would be an entirely new body to either ETB or
to ETC. It is also a body that many in the industry would support
but few would suggest on the grounds that it is an option DCMS
could not countenance. We are not convinced that the assumption
is true, and even if it is it should not be allowed to stand in
the way of attempts to achieve the best possible solution.
6.4 There is a requirement for an effective
arm's length strategic body, a role ETC already carries out to
good effect, within limitations. One of its major limitations
is that it has no means by which to influence the implementation
of the strategies it is charged to develop and promote. That means
lies mainly with effective high level marketing and PR activity.
6.5 To our minds there is little or no point
in having two bodies looking after what are essentially two sides
of the same coin. We see no prospect of the strategic function
being carried out effectively by a private sector lead body. We
also question to whom such a private sector-led marketing body
will be answerable. Presumably it will answer to the industry
and not to government or to such bodies as government entrust
the development of tourism strategy. If ETC needs a marketing
function to deliver strategy effectively, then a marketing body
almost certainly needs strategic direction in order to market
effectively. Surely a single body based on the well-tried and
proven National Tourist Board model is the most practical solution.
6.6 We note that Scotland, Wales and Northern
Ireland with a much smaller tourism product and much smaller populations
have no difficulty in accepting the need for National Tourist
Boards, nor do they balk at the thought of giving them well-resourced
national domestic marketing roles.
7. BRITISH TOURIST
AUTHORITY
7.1 We have nothing but praise for the efforts
of BTA. We also commend government for increasing BTA's core funding
over recent years and for its agreement to support emergency campaigns
following in the wake of September 11.
7.2 BTA is the correct mechanism to co-ordinate
and deliver the marketing of Britain as a tourist destination
abroad. We are aware that devolution has led to discussions about
separate marketing efforts. If this means sometimes selling Scotland
as a distinct product in an existing BTA office (as we understand
may already be the case) then we have no objection. If it means
Scotland giving additional funds to create a new BTA offices where
BTA cannot afford to be, then there would also be no objection.
If, however, it means Scotland setting up Scotland offices in
competition to, or at the expense of, BTA offices then we would
be deeply unhappy.
7.3 Marketing the UK abroad is an expensive
and complex process and the current BTA arrangements are highly
cost effective, making BTA's modest funds go a long way. We do
not believe that efficiency should be lost to meet the potentially
ascetic needs of devolution.
8. QUALITY AND
PRODUCTIVITY
8.1 Recent attempts to promote quality and
productivity in England have not been as successful and certainly
not as quick as perhaps government would have liked to see. DCMS
has tasked ETC with the development of strategies to meet either
industry desires or government policy objectives. Working with
small groups of industry representative strategies are developed,
refined, published and launched with an accompanying PR fanfare.
The delivery has then largely been left to Regional Tourist Boards
and industry bodies to take forward as they see fit. The Regional
Board, where it has been appropriate to do so, have rolled out
strategies by distributing material and holding industry briefings.
Ultimately the strategies stand or fall by the degree of enthusiasm
they are received by the industry. Not surprisingly, perhaps,
policies which offer obvious advantages are warmly embraced and
more difficult policies are abandoned by individual businesses.
8.2 Occasionally individual Regional Tourist
Boards are able to give incentives to participate in a particular
strategy, usually by subsidising the cost. Developing relationships
with RDAs may improve this route but not necessarily on a consistent
national basis. The practice of giving incentives is widely used
by the National Boards of Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland
where resources more accurately reflect the importance of tourism.
Ultimately, it is not necessarily the industry to whom these strategies
need to be sold. For example, the fundamental problem with all
the accommodation schemes in England is that the public are largely
unaware of what they mean and do not actively seek them out. Therefore,
for many establishments there is no obvious market advantage in
joining, particularly as a not insignificant fee is usually involved.
8.3 As indicated previously an ETC with
a properly funded marketing and PR function could act to influence
key strategy areas, including quality and productivity.
9. OTHER ISSUES
9.1 The Association worked closely with
DCMS and ETC to develop the ETC resort regeneration paper, Sea
Changes. Its launch in February 2001 was to be the culmination
of efforts to gain recognition for the important role and fragile
state of many of Britain's seaside resorts. The high profile launch
of that report and the ever-growing awareness of resort issues,
both fell victim to FMD.
9.2 During the last year there have been
some major developments in certain resorts and much improved recognition
among some of the RDAs who will ultimately help deliver most of
the physical improvements. In considering the state of Britain's
tourism we would ask the Committee to consider reminding Government
of the importance of the resort sector and of the urgent need
to address a raft of social and economic imbalances, which have
clustered in many of them. The bulk of these imbalances have been
imported as an unintentional consequence of successive governments'
social policies. The nature and scale now is very often such that
only targeted government intervention is capable of resolving
the underlying issues.
9.3 The Association continues to seek to
gain clarity on the issue of measuring the local impact of tourism.
In England at least the means by which local government measures
tourism, if indeed they bother to do so, is mixed. DCMS did issue
guidance in 1998 but it offered broad advice not specific guidance
on what was needed to fulfil a specific purpose. Since 1998 the
introduction of Best Value, the creation of RDAs and the continued
activities of various government-sponsored funded bodies has seen
the demand for local value and volume figures grow out of all
recognition. Despite the growth in demand and despite repeated
calls from local government practitioners DCMS will not be pressed
to give specific advice. Nor does it seem likely that they will
at least define the minimum acceptable standards and requirements
of Government and government agencies for data so that others
can attempt to give more practical guidance on their behalf.
9.4 While tourism remains a non-statutory
and largely unfunded function of local government the requirement
to measure tourism on a regular basis will remain a mute one.
Most authorities recognise the need to measure activity in order
to manage it. Many, however, pay lip service to the accuracy and
effectiveness of the mechanism used because they know no one will
currently challenge it. When FMD struck and Government urgently
needed to understand the local value and volume of tourism, many
authorities in England had no way of doing so. Many of those that
did, had no way of monitoring changes due to FMD in real time.
9.5 It seems to us that if we wish Government
to take tourism seriously then we should at least measure it accurately
on a regular basis for management purposes. However, if Government
wish us to measure tourism consistently, it would not be unreasonable
for them to declare what, as a minimum, they expect from the data,
for example do we need to be able to measure and demonstrate trends
between years or even within each year? Such key questions currently
remain unanswered.
10. CONCLUSION
10.1 FMD and September 11 are the latest,
and perhaps greatest, in a long line of difficulties for the UK's
tourism industry. It is right and proper that the deepest wounds
are recognised and the short-term vulnerabilities in otherwise
viable sectors are addressed. But in addressing the immediate
difficulty it would be unwise to start restructuring National
supporting structures based largely on the experience of FMD and
September 11. UK tourism problems are deeply seated and in England
at least the key issue is the long term lack of National Tourist
Boards with a properly funded marketing and PR function. It may
be over simplistic, but if the problem is a lack of National Tourist
Boards with a properly funded marketing and PR function, then
surely the solution is simple: create just that.
10.2 We are grateful for the opportunity
to touch on a number of issues, which we see as important. We
are conscious that in attempting to cover a lot of ground in relatively
few pages many of the arguments presented lack the background
and detailed substance you may require in evidence. We would therefore
welcome the opportunity to present the detail and respond to any
questions during an oral evidence session.
3 October 2002
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