APPENDIX 20
Memorandum submitted by the University
of Surrey
PRESS NOTICE 40: AUTUMN PROGRAMME: THE FOOT
AND MOUTH OUTBREAK OF 2001: IMPACTS ON AND IMPLICATIONS FOR TOURISM
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
In response to the above press notice enclosed
please find a copy of a paper that was prepared by Professor David
Airey and Professor Richard Butler, of the University of Surrey,
and which we believe raises a number of issues relevant to the
deliberations of the Culture, Media and Sport Committee.
The paper was originally prepared for a conference
of the International Academy for the Study of Tourism held in
Macau in July 2001. Subsequently parts of it were considered at
a meeting of the Tourism Research Centre in Barcelona in May 2002.
It is destined for publication as part of a book in 2003.
Although it was substantially written toward
the end of the outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease we believe that
the comments related to the impacts on demand and on destinations
as well as the policy effects will have a direct relevance to
the work of the Committee. Also the four themes developed at the
end of the paper provide a theoretical framework for the consideration
of such events in tourism.
INTRODUCTION
The outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD)
in the United Kingdom which began in February, 2001, has had significant
impacts on many aspects of rural life, particularly agriculture
and tourism. The ramifications of the outbreak for tourism at
least are still manifesting themselves and likely to be doing
so for a considerable time to come. It has become clear in the
period since the disease was first diagnosed, that the impacts
on tourism are likely to be the most serious from an economic
viewpoint, although the social effects, as well as economic ones
on agriculture may, in fact, be more permanent.
This paper focuses on the effects and implications
of the outbreak on tourism in and to the United Kingdom. Because
of the absence of reliable and verifiable statistics on such a
recent event, this paper can provide only a review of currently
available information and what is essentially speculation on future
events and developments. The paper begins with an introduction
to the disease and the current outbreak. It then reviews the scale
and nature of tourism in the United Kingdom by way of context
to the subsequent discussion. Attention then shifts to the effects
of the outbreak on tourism demand in and to the United Kingdom,
on the image of the United Kingdom as a tourist destination, on
public awareness and policy responses to the outbreak, and finally
to impacts on tourism supply within the United Kingdom. There
is then discussion on four specific themes, the vulnerability
of tourism, the importance of image and perception, the awareness
and response to crises, and the level of accuracy of knowledge.
The last section concludes the paper with a discussion of potential
implications of the outbreak in the short and long term future.
FOOT AND
MOUTH DISEASE
Foot and Mouth Disease is a viral disease endemic
in several continents, and is highly contagious among vulnerable
species such as cattle, pigs, sheep and goats (DEFRA 2001). While
horses are resistant, other species such as deer, fox and hedgehogs,
and rodents such as rats are also affected, as are many other
animals not indigenous to the United Kingdom, but often found
in zoos and wildlife parks. Although it cannot be cured, the disease
is rarely fatal, and most adult stock recover within two to three
weeks, although they may carry the virus for up to two years.
The seven strains of the virus are distinct and exposure to one
does not give immunity to the others. The incubation period is
generally short, 3-5 days, although 2-21 days have been recorded.
Foot and Mouth is spread by direct and indirect contact with infected
animals, particularly within the first few days of infection,
and can be transmitted by air, by mechanical means, eg on vehicles
and people, and also from uncooked swill and frozen food. The
virulent nature of the disease, the speed of incubation and the
variety of methods of infection make containment of an outbreak
difficult, and this situation is complicated by modern farming
methods, in particular the frequent and considerable movement
of animals around the country.
Contrary to confused public opinion, there are
no implications for the human food chain, and restrictions imposed
on the sale of meat and dairy products is primarily for reasons
of animal health, not human safety, although there is little doubt
public confidence in related food products has been shaken (particularly
in Europe, following the outbreak of BSE some years earlier).
There has been only one recorded instance of a human contracting
Foot and Mouth in the United Kingdom, in 1967, and the human form
is short lived and very mild.
Foot and Mouth is not as rare in Europe as appears
to have been believed. In the United Kingdom there was a major
outbreak in 1967, and other outbreaks in 1922, 1923-24, and 1953.
There were only two years between that last date and 1967 when
at least one case was not recorded. Following the 1967 outbreak
and the introduction of more stringent elimination measures, only
one case, caused by windborne virus from France in 1981, has been
recorded in the United Kingdom (in the Isle of Wight). The last
significant outbreak in Europe was in 2000 in Greece. The recommended
procedures for eradicating outbreaks includes immediate slaughter
of infected animals and those animals in contact with them; rendering
(destroying) of carcasses, prohibiting movement of animals, establishing
quarantine zones for animals and people, disinfecting premises
and equipment, and burning articles which cannot be decontaminated.
Because of the virulence of the disease, rapid commencement of
such actions is essential to contain an outbreak. This means that
rapid confirmation of cases is also crucial, as the virus is produced
most rapidly in the first few days of infection.
At this point the cause of the 2001 outbreak
is still not certain, although the site of the first outbreak
was confirmed within a few days as a pig farm at Heddon-on-the-Wall
in Northumbria. It is thought that the infection came from pig
swill. The disease was confirmed on 20 February, having been reported
the previous day. By that time seven other farms already had been
infected, and sheep from infected farms had been sent to market
in Hexham and subsequently to Cumbria. Within a further four days
sheep had also gone to Carlisle, Devon, Dumfries, and Cheshire,
all before the first outbreak had been confirmed. Subsequent evidence
of an anecdotal nature has suggested that many of the movements
of sheep are unrecorded "around the edges of the various
livestock markets" (DEFRA 2001:1) which makes tracing dispersal
of flocks extremely difficult.
The 2001 outbreak was much larger and much more
widespread than the last major one in 1967 and involved a much
greater number of animals being slaughtered. The 1967 outbreak
was spatially limited to west central England, with no cases in
Scotland, Ireland or the south of England, whereas the current
outbreak involves the majority of the counties in England and
Wales and the Scottish Borders, with only parts of eastern and
southern England still remaining clear. Essex and Kent are outliers
in the south-east. Four cases have been recorded in Northern Ireland,
and a very few outside the UK. Major concentrations have occurred
in Cumbria/Dumfries and Galloway, Devon, and most recently, Yorkshire.
By July 2001, over 1,800 cases had been recorded and over three
million animals destroyed, compared to just over 1,400 cases in
total in 1967, and Appendix A lists overall costs and animals
destroyed (DEFRA 2001).
UK TOURISM
UK tourism has been marked by four key trends
over the past two decades. First there has been a rapid and consistent
growth in numbers of UK residents travelling abroad. As shown
in Table 1, this sector of tourism has grown from 17.5 million
visits in 1980 to 53.8 million in 1999, a growth of more than
200 per cent. A key factor behind this has been the development
of attractive and affordable offerings by the international tourist
industry, especially the large tour operators, to destinations
offering sun, sea and sand. The second trend has been the more
steady growth of international visitors to the UK which has more
than doubled over the period but which has had weaker growth in
the last few years. Here the attractions of the UK in the form
of cultural and city destinations as well as shopping, English
language and the countryside are meeting competition from a range
of other destinations in an increasingly global tourism marketplace.
Third, demand for UK domestic holidays of four or more nights
has been on a long-term decline with international competition
taking the trade from the traditional British tourist destinations,
typically at the seaside. Finally, domestic short holidays, visits
to friends and relatives, as well as business travel, have been
generally buoyant, although when combined with domestic long holidays,
the overall picture for domestic tourism is effectively static.
Table 1
UK TOURISM
| | 1980
| 1985 | 1990
| 1995 | 1999
|
| Million visits |
| Domestic (holidays 4 plus nights) | 36.5
| 37.0 | 32.5
| na | 27.0(1)
|
| Domestic (total) | 146.0
| 144.0 | 110.0(2)
| 121.0 | 146.1
|
| Incoming | 12.5
| 14.4 | 18.0
| 23.5 | 25.4
|
| Outgoing | 17.5
| 21.6 | 31.1
| 41.3 | 53.8
|
Notes (1) 1998
(2) estimated
Sources: International Passenger Survey, British National
Travel Survey, UK Tourism Survey, British Home Tourism Survey
This brief outline provides an important context for some
of the key issues facing UK tourism prior to the arrival of Foot
and Mouth Disease (FMD). In brief there have been fairly long-standing
elements of concern about the overall competitiveness of the tourism
sector in the UK in an increasingly global world. As an indicator
of this the UK Government has launched a number of studies and
initiatives designed to meet the challenges of competition (see
for example DNH, 1995 and DCMS, 1999). The unease about the overall
position of UK tourism was particularly compounded during Autumn
2000 and Spring 2001. The strength of the pound sterling against
the European currencies played a part in this but, perhaps more
importantly, a number of events, which were reported internationally
were anticipated to have a particularly negative effect on tourism.
These included a major accident on the rail network, a short-lived
but severe fuel crisis, torrential rain and flooding and ongoing
concern about BSE or Mad Cow Disease. Against this background
the emergence of FMD, and the associated publicity of the actions
designed to control and eradicate it, can be seen as the latest
problem for a sector that was already experiencing difficulties.
IMPACTS OF
FOOT AND
MOUTH DISEASE
Impacts on demand
It is always difficult to disentangle the effects of any
individual event on tourism demand, even more so when the event
is recent. As already explained, the 2001 outbreak of FMD arrived
at a time when the UK tourism industry was already experiencing
and anticipating problems. The difficulties of identifying effects
are also compounded by the multi-sector nature of the tourist
industry, by its regional distribution and the regional spread
of the disease and by the fact that the disease has been operating
over a period of time. As far as the multi-sector nature of the
industry is concerned, it is clear that while some sectors experienced
problems others have remained buoyant. The extremes of this are
that most of the outgoing tourism businesses have been experiencing
high or higher demand, which in turn is part of a long-term trend,
while other sectors such as farm tourism have suffered a collapse
of demand.
Similarly, some parts of the country have been very badly
affected, particularly Cumbria where the outbreak has been very
fierce, while in others the effects have been very limited. For
example the coastal resorts of the south of England reported high
demand from visitors, mainly domestic, over the Easter and Spring
holiday periods. Anecdotal evidence is also provided of holiday
visitors who by-passed Cumbria, to head for Scotland for the hill-walking
adding perhaps an additional 200 miles with associated expenditure
to their journey. Over time, the movements in demand fall into
two clear periods associated particularly with reaction and response
of the Government and the media to the problem. Initially, visitors
were encouraged to avoid the countryside. This, as well as the
media images of burning carcasses, served to depress both UK and
international demand. Later, following the realisation that the
collapse in demand for tourism was having an economic effect on
the countryside just as great as that created by the FMD itself,
the Government changed its approach and sought to encourage visitors
back to rural areas. This was met with some success in many areas.
A few indicators can serve to illustrate the seriousness
as well as the patchiness of the apparent influence on demand:
— The effects of FMD on domestic tourism will reduce
annual expenditure of domestic tourists by £1.5 billion and
of same-day visitors by £3.6 billion (Christel DeHaan Tourism
and Travel Research Institute, 2001).
— FMD has reduced international tourist receipts
by £2.3 billion annually or by 19 per cent from expected
levels in 2001. Reductions are largest in the UK's largest source
market, the United States, where visitor expenditures have fallen
by 26 per cent compared with the level that they would have reached
without FMD (Christel DeHaan Tourism and Travel Research Institute,
2001).
— Total expenditures by tourists and day visitors
in the UK will fall by £7.5 billion (Christel DeHaan Tourism
and Travel Research Institute).
— The damage to tourist firms will be highest in
Cumbria, Scotland and Wales (Christel DeHaan Tourism and Travel
Research Institute).
— In one of the worst affected regions, in the first
month of the crisis, March, the Lake District suffered a 75 per
cent decline in bookings compared with the previous year (CMSC,
2001).
Impacts on the UK as a tourism destination
As shown by the figures above, the UK is a major tourist
destination at the international level and has a very large domestic
tourism market. In general the appeal of the UK to foreign tourists
is tied closely to heritage, combined with ties to families and
friends, urban short breaks and special events. London is the
principal attraction and the major gateway for air arrivals. Thus
the focus of much of the international tourism is urban, and visits
to rural areas tend to be focused on specific attractions, such
as Shakespearean heritage at Stratford, Stonehenge, and literary
heritage links in the Lake District and Yorkshire. Some rural
areas such as the Cotswolds also attract significant numbers of
foreign visitors, but widespread travel throughout the countryside,
especially in England and Wales by foreign visitors is small compared
to the numbers remaining in urban centres. In contrast, domestic
tourism and leisure related trips focus very heavily on rural
areas. More than 100 million trips are made to "the countryside"
in the UK annually (Countryside Commission Annual Report 1998).
Many of these are short distance trips, mostly not involving an
overnight stay, but still involving considerable expenditure on
and use of rural tourism and recreation facilities and services.
As noted elsewhere in the paper, the effects of the outbreak are
not identical on all aspects of tourism. However, with respect
to the image of the UK as a tourism destination, the effects were
consistent and entirely negative.
The attraction of urban areas noted above notwithstanding,
much of the overall appeal and tourist image of the UK is related
to rural imagery. The rural landscape of the UK, particularly
the mixed farming landscape of England, the "green and pleasant
land" of Shakespeare, has been immortalised in paintings
by such as Constable, poetry by Wordsworth, literature by numerous
contemporary and past authors, and in the visual media by films
and television series too numerous to list. The public tourist
perception of the UK in part is of a rural idyll and anything
which shakes that image has the potential to do great harm to
the tourism industry, even if the image is not entirely correct
nor experienced by the majority of foreign visitors. It has been
argued that "most significantly of all (influences) in terms
of reinforcement or maintenance of rurality is tourism" (Butler
and Hall 1998: 116).
The negative scenarios were reinforced by regular items in
the news media on the outbreak itself, and by related events that
gained additional coverage. One example will suffice to illustrate
this. Airline passengers from the United Kingdom to several countries
are still required to walk over a disinfected mat, ostensibly
to disinfect footwear (in some cases ignoring footwear in baggage).
This alone reinforces the image in that country that the UK is
infected and travel there may be a problem. When Prince Charles
visited Canada in April 2001, there was global coverage of His
Royal Highness descending from the plane at Ottawa and duly walking
over a red carpet soaked in disinfectant. His itinerary was changed
to avoid him visiting farms in western Canada, again dramatising
that people coming from the UK were potential carriers and by
implication, that visiting the UK involved some risk, thus negatively
affecting the UK as a tourist destination.
A number of overseas governments reacted to the outbreak
by focusing attention and some restrictions on visitors from Britain.
Publicity material was produced warning of the dangers of FMD
to the home country, the importation of foodstuffs was banned
or restricted and material not previously publicised began to
appear (Hall, 2001), again drawing attention directly to the outbreak
and indirectly impacting on the attractiveness of the UK as a
destination. Other governments sought to take advantage of the
situation by advertising the availability of their countries with
no or minimal influence from FMD, thus increasing pressure on
the UK industry. The likely permanence of these developments is
discussed in the final section of the paper.
Impacts and policy effects
As already suggested, the reaction of the Government to the
outbreak of FMD, as far as tourism is concerned, can be divided
into two clear stages. In the first, there was almost a "knee
jerk" reaction to control the spread of FMD by discouraging
all visits to the countryside. This was in line with the policy
of massively restricting movements of livestock. Measures included
advice to avoid contact with farms, to avoid walking in areas
where there were livestock and to avoid making unnecessary visits
to rural areas. Footpaths and other rights of way in the countryside
were closed in virtually all parts of the country and major land
owners including the National Trust and the Forestry Commission
cut off public access to much of their land. In other words, large
parts of the British countryside were put off limits to visitors.
This by itself made headline news around the world. As already
noted, this action, coupled with media images of slaughtered and
incinerated animals, as well as the Government's decision to delay
elections had the effect of creating an image of a country and
countryside in crisis with dramatic effects on tourism demand.
In the second period, which started toward the end of March,
and followed significant lobbying by the tourism interests as
well as other parts of the rural community, the policy response
shifted fairly radically with measures to offset the problems
for tourism in the country at large. There was some confusion
here in that restriction of access remained fairly widespread
in the countryside while at the same time visitors, especially
from overseas, were being reassured that the UK was still a good
place to visit. The confusion became even more pronounced later
in the period when Government Ministers were personally encouraging
domestic visitors to the countryside itself at the same time as
many of the restrictions were still in force.
Table 2
COMPARISON OF AGRICULTURE WITH TOURISM IN THE UK
| | Agriculture
| Tourism |
| Contribution to employment | 1.5%
| 7% |
| Foreign exchange earnings | £8.4bn
| £12.5bn |
| Contribution to GDP | 1%
| 4% |
| Contribution to tax revenues | £88m
| £1.5bn |
| Revenue growth 1996-99 | -21%
| +26% |
Source: ETC (2001)
The rough comparison between the relative economic importance
of tourism and agriculture in the UK given in Table 2 provides
a source for understanding the policy shift as well as the confusion.
In brief, tourism is too important economically, in comparison
to agriculture, for the Government to sacrifice it. Yet at the
same time, with its historical importance and the long-standing
link between land-ownership and political power, the agricultural
lobby is particularly strong. Against this background it is understandable
that the Government's initial reaction was to turn attention to
agriculture but when economic realities became clear, to seek
at least to mollify the tourism interests.
Sharpley and Craven (forthcoming) have identified three broad
categories in the policy responses pursued by the Government in
this second period. The first was to attract visitors to the UK
in general as well as to the countryside, the second was to improve
accessibility in the countryside, especially in relation to public
footpaths and the third was to support tourism businesses affected
by the crisis.
On the face of it the summary of the measures provided in
Table 3 suggest a fairly comprehensive package which was introduced
relatively speedily. However, what this fails to highlight is
the scale of this support compared with perceived needs or perhaps
more importantly compared to that provided to the agriculture
sector. Some indication of the perceived needs can be seen from
the English Tourism Council's (ETC) request for £35.5 million
against the £3.8 million provided. Against the agriculture
sector which is estimated to receive £898 million (DEFRA)
from the public purse in compensation for slaughter alone the
support is relatively insignificant.
Table 3
MEASURES TO SUPPORT TOURISM
ATTRACT VISITORS
— Additional funding for British Tourist Authority
(£14.2 million) for overseas promotion and for English Tourism
Council (£3.8 million) for support for domestic tourism.
Scottish Parliament voted £12.7 million to VisitScotland
and Wales Tourist Board received £1 million. (BTA and ETC
had bid for £22 million and £35.5 million respectively.
— Government launched a public information campaign
involving overseas and domestic Ministerial visits (including
a visit by the Deputy Prime Minister) as well as a high profile
"World Travel Leaders Summit" that involved a senior
member of the Royal Family.
— Telephone hotlines and website established by
the tourist boards.
IMPROVE ACCESSIBILITY
— The Government worked with the national bodies
to encourage the opening of footpaths in areas unaffected by the
disease.
SUPPORT FOR
BUSINESS
— Moratorium agreed on various tax payments (VAT,
PAYE and NI and UBR) with deferment agreed on an individual basis
and interest not charged on deferred payments.
— Government funded 95 per cent UBR hardship relief
for three months to affected businesses in Wales of up to £50,000
rateable value and in England and Scotland of up to £12,000
rateable value.
— Extended loans of up to £250,000 but at a
premium of 1.5 per cent interest through Small Firms Loan Guarantee
Scheme.
— A £50 million Rural Business Recovery Programme
to enable Regional Development Agencies to assist small tourism
and other businesses in England.
— A Rural Skills Action package which gives advice
to those temporarily or permanently laid off, with 10 Job Centres
acting as one-stop-shops offering a single way into benefits,
training and other services.
Sources: Sharpley and Craven (forthcoming), British Hospitality
Association (2001)
The public policy issues for tourism from this experience are
both encouraging and discouraging. On the positive side, the British
Government clearly, and fairly speedily recognised the importance
of tourism and for some of the time, particularly in relation
to the opening of footpaths, it was clear that tourism was gaining
ground over the agriculture lobby. In part of course, this is
because the agriculture lobby itself, with a proportion of its
income dependent on farm stays and other forms of rural tourism,
had some equivocation as to the desirability of opening up the
countryside. On the more gloomy side, it is clear that public
thinking is still a long way from identifying tourism as a key
activity in the same way as agriculture, or to put it another
way, the historical power base of agriculture, dating from a time
when the country and its leaders depended on agriculture, is still
very much in place. One interesting change in government structures,
announced following the General Election of early June, was that
government responsibility for agriculture was to be moved from
the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (which has now
been abolished) to a new Ministry, the Department for Environment,
Food and Rural Affairs. This places agriculture into a wider government
context, which may be less sharply protectionist of the commercial
interests of farmers.
Impacts on Tourism Supply
The effects of the outbreak on the supply of tourism facilities
and services is difficult to assess quantitatively. The most serious
effect was through the closure of large parts of the countryside
to visitation, through footpaths being formally closed to prevent
the spread of the infection and because of other facilities being
closed and events being cancelled to avoid transference of the
disease. Initially at least, very little of the accommodation
supply was closed or unavailable, unless it was located within
a quarantined area. As the disease spread, facilities such as
youth hostels in rural areas were closed in increasing numbers.
Most hotels, guest houses and bed and breakfast establishments
have remained open throughout the epidemic, although many have
received very little trade and have had to reduce staff and some
facilities. At the height of the epidemic the vast majority of
nature reserves, gardens and historic properties in rural areas
were closed. By mid April, 2001 some of the major zoos and wildlife
parks were closed and others had some species removed from view,
although a majority of privately run stately homes were open and
the major theme parks remained open throughout the epidemic.
The cancellation of events, particularly where these were
of international importance or of international newsworthiness
(including the UK local elections) further publicised the outbreak
and the limitations it imposed on activities and travel in the
UK. Where these events were particularly rural in nature, such
as fairs, equestrian events, festivals, and country shows, the
rural image was further denigrated. The Cheltenham Gold Cup racing
event was cancelled, and the Republic of Ireland Government requested
horse owners not to send racehorses to events in the United Kingdom,
not because horses themselves are vulnerable to the disease but
because of the risk of the disease being carried on a host. The
TT motorcycle racing event on the Isle of Man (scheduled in late
May/early June) was cancelled for the first time in peace time
in its 94 year history because of the disease free status of the
island and the risk of introduction of the disease. Crofts Dog
Show was postponed from March to May, with implications for a
considerable number of European owners, particularly in view of
recent changes made to quarantine laws in the UK which would have
resulted in larger numbers of foreign entries than previously.
A number of county agricultural shows and festivals were cancelled,
although most other major horse racing events such as the Grand
National, the Epsom Derby and Royal Ascot were held. Even at these
events there were media pictures of celebrities walking over disinfectant
soaked straw, continuing the negative coverage. Football games
in general were not affected, major league and cup competitions
and European participation continued unaffected, but the Six Nations
Rugby Union competition was postponed until the autumn for completion
at the request of the Irish Rugby Union to avoid large numbers
of spectators crossing to the Republic and to Northern Ireland
(there being only one case in the Republic and four in Northern
Ireland).
Thus while the reduction in supply was small in the overall
context of that available, the cancellation or postponement of
some high visibility events and the initial general impression
that the countryside was closed undoubtedly created an image that
much less was available than was actually the case. As discussed
elsewhere, the changes in policy and guidance from the Government
further confused the situation and uncertainty and lack of clarity
of information still remains. Regional and local bodies made various
efforts to convince potential visitors that it was appropriate
and safe to visit much of the countryside, including newspaper
advertisements, posters and television coverage, but the efforts
often suffered from lack of co-ordination and even presented conflicting
messages.
THEMES
Fragility and Vulnerability of Tourism to Exogenous Forces
Much of the tourism literature is concerned with the impacts
of tourism upon economies, environments and communities (Mathieson
and Wall, 1982), rather than on the impact on tourism of exogenous
forces. Increasing attention is being paid to the effect on tourism
of negative events such as terrorism and natural disasters, although
only limited literature has appeared in academic publications.
There has been little exploration of the effects of something
such as an outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease on tourism and thus
a conceptual framework or context for such a study is absent.
It is not proposed to provide such a context here, but to note
that there are similarities in the effect of the event, the treatment
of the event in the media, and the response of various agencies
to the event and its coverage to other situations.
In the UK context perhaps the closest comparison can be made
with the impacts of oil spills on tourism, in particular, the
grounding and sinking of the "Braer" off the coast of
Shetland in 1993, with the subsequent spillage of 85,000 tons
of crude oil (more than in the Exxon Valdez incident in Alaska).
The event drew immediate and excessive media coverage, over 500
media representatives arriving on scene within a week of the event
and global coverage of storms, a wrecked ship, dead birds, oil
slicks and depressed and affected individuals, along with forecasts
of environmental and economic catastrophe (Butler 1996). Central
public sector response was vague, uncertain, contradictory and
confusing, although in that case local authority response was
generally hailed as exceptional and highly effective. In the event,
the threatened catastrophe did not materialise, certainly because
of natural events and not human actions. However, tourism to Shetland
was affected, with immediate cancellations and an overall decline
of some 10 per cent in numbers over the previous year. Subsequently,
however, tourism has recovered to pre-event levels (Mullay 1994).
This was accomplished because of promotion, almost all by the
local sectors, and favourable, though very limited, media coverage.
Some clear messages emerge from this and other events in
the context of tourism. First is that tourism is highly vulnerable
to such exogenous forces and cannot be shielded effectively from
their effects in most cases. Second, such effects are likely to
be more serious for tourism where the environment is a key element
in its attractiveness, as was the case in Shetland and is the
case of the image of tourism in the UK. Third, central government
cannot be relied on automatically to respond quickly, efficiently
and appropriately, especially if the event is not national or
not perceived as of national importance. There is no doubt the
speed and nature of the response to the FMD outbreak was conditioned
by the importance given to agriculture and the influence of the
former Ministry (MAFF) and because it was anticipated that it
could be a national problem. Fourth, and it remains to be seen
if this is the case for the FMD outbreak, compensation for anticipated
losses, eg tourist non-arrivals, is hard to obtain, compared to
compensation for proven losses, eg slaughtered animals. Where
intangible losses are involved, for example, loss of image, the
difficulty in obtaining compensation is even greater, both from
the private (insurance) and public sector. Fifth, and perhaps
most depressingly, there is often little which is or can be done
to prevent a re-occurrence of the event in the future, with similar,
if not even more severe effects.
Importance of Image and Perception
In exploring the relationship between tourism and FMD it
is difficult to separate reality from image and perception. Clearly
the slaughter and disposal of up to three million animals or up
to seven per cent of the nation's livestock herd represent a fairly
dramatic event and this has a number of "real" effects
on tourism, both immediate and long lasting. The reality of pyres
for burning the slaughtered livestock in the Lake District and
elsewhere obviously has a strong deterrent effect on visitors.
In the same way, and possibly of far more importance in the long
term, the potential changes in agriculture and associated land
management practices may have a real effect on the nature and
attractiveness of the English landscape. In essence the English
countryside, which is one of the country's key attractions, is
a direct result of human intervention primarily though agricultural
practices developed over centuries. If these change as a result
of collapse in agriculture then the landscape changes. In this
sense Middleton (2001) has likened agriculture to the horse that
is responsible for pulling the tourism cart. If the horse is weakened
then the cart cannot proceed. In a very real way this focuses
on the crucial relationship between tourism and the countryside
and in the end a long term benefit of this crisis may be a better
appreciation of this link.
Beyond this, many of the more immediate effects of tourism
are more to do with the image and perception of the disease and
its effects rather than the reality. In reality only a very small
proportion of the country has been seriously affected by the disease
itself and for the overwhelming majority of the residents of the
UK their only awareness of the disease has been through the media
and by the existence of closed country footpaths for a brief period.
Yet for all this, the images are very vivid and, as in so much
of tourism, they become the reality, especially for those making
decisions about where to take their vacations. At the most simple
level the image of burning carcasses in the UK acts as a powerful
message that this is not a country to visit this year. When this
is linked with some of the other problems noted earlier of rail
accidents, or BSE or Mad Cow Disease (which has no links with
FMD) then the message becomes even more powerful and the need
for effective news management becomes even more urgent. The reality
of FMD is that it has been prevalent in many different parts of
the world for a long time, Africa, Latin America and SE Asia.
As the New Zealand Biosecurity Minister commented in May "Even
when the Foot and Mouth outbreak is confirmed as eradicated in
Britain it is still widespread in a lot of places a lot closer
to New Zealand than Britain". Yet even this did not stop
the US National Center for Infectious Diseases in its March update
on FMD from focusing solely on the UK. (CDC, 2001).
Of course some of the particular difficulties for the UK
from FMD lie with the image and nature of the UK itself as a tourist
destination. For many domestic and international visitors the
attraction of the UK lies in its landscape and rural areas. Hence
anything that detracts from this does damage to the tourist image
as a whole. In other words the effects of FMD are magnified though
the rural image of the destination and clearly, for the international
visitor this appears to infect other types of tourism as well.
The same outbreak in a destination that is noted for beach tourism
would most likely make its impact felt in a very different and
lesser way.
Awareness and Response
The lack of awareness of the likely impacts on tourism and
thus the appropriateness of the response to the outbreak are fairly
apparent and have been noted earlier. Whether the nature of the
response to the outbreak was appropriate will be debated for some
time to come. The central government has argued that it had little
choice but to follow a policy of immediate slaughter of infected
animals and those within three kilometres of confirmed cases and
create exclusion zones, and that vaccination was not a feasible
option. From the tourism point of view, there is little doubt
that mass vaccination and much more limited slaughter, perhaps
of only confirmed cases, would have been likely to have had much
more limited negative publicity and less serious effects. One
can argue that because tourism is worth more than agriculture
in economic terms, prime consideration should have been given
to determining what response would have had the least negative
effects on tourism, rather than what was perceived best for the
agricultural export market. Such arguments are irrelevant now,
and run in the face of what was conventional politics and wisdom
at the time of the outbreak, that agricultural interests were
paramount with respect to agricultural issues and the outbreak
was seen as an agricultural issue. Response was therefore left
initially with the ministry responsible (MAFF), which had no mandate
with respect to tourism and appears to have had little understanding
of the role or importance of tourism in the rural economy. The
Cabinet, through subsequent government policy appears to have
accepted this situation initially.
Once it became clear that it may not have been the best response,
and the scale of the impact on tourism and associated businesses
was realised, counteracting measures were taken. While the basic
policy for dealing with the disease was not changed (rightly or
wrongly), senior government ministers, including the Prime Minister,
who eventually took personal charge of the response, appeared
in the media encouraging the public to visit the countryside,
and doing so themselves. This response is continuing, with the
Prime Minister apparently going to spend a part of his summer
holidays in the UK to set an example of appropriate behaviour
and support for UK tourism. Despite these subsequent responses,
the overall result has been a classic case of the issue-response
cycle in respect of media coverage and public and private sector
behaviour. Immediate and extensive negative imagery set the tone
and the nature of the event, and subsequent efforts, at least
in the short term, have proved ineffective in counteracting this
situation. It is likely that only a cessation of media coverage
will reverse the situation and there are indications that this
is now happening as new cases are only a few a day and few carcasses
remain visible in the countryside.
One remains to be convinced that full and accurate awareness
of the scale, the role and the integrated nature of tourism, both
in rural and urban Britain has really been appreciated. It is
highly likely a similar response might be adopted if the outbreak
should flare up again. It could be argued that if tourism survives,
as it almost certainly will in most areas, then it will again
be treated as not needing specific attention, as having survived
such an impact, it will be able to survive anything. The newly
created ministry with responsibility for rural affairs (DEFRA)
did not gain the tourism mandate as some had argued in the media,
and this was almost certainly an appropriate decision. As opposing
views noted, tourism in the UK, particularly international tourism,
is not only or even primarily a rural activity and placing it
in a rural ministry would have been inappropriate. If there is
a good side or positive feature of the outbreak for tourism, it
can only be that it is now much better known and more appropriately
appreciated than it was, but how permanent such a shift in awareness
is remains to be seen.
Level and Accuracy of Knowledge
One of the starkest lessons from this outbreak of Foot and
Mouth Disease is how poor is the level and accuracy of knowledge
of events as and when they happen. At the macro level speculation
about the scale of the impact has varied from the British Hotels
Association that the hotel sector would lose £5 billion of
business this year to reports from a London-based consultancy
company suggesting that during the first month of the crisis in
March hotel occupancy actually increased (Travel Trade Gazette,
2001). This weakness in information will certainly have contributed
to the hesitant start made by the Government in March in its recognition
of the significance of FMD for tourism. The picture has been further
clouded by simple lack of understanding on the part of consumers.
For example there is anecdotal evidence that some potential tourists
were anxious that as a result of FMD the food in the UK was unsafe
to eat, that FMD was a form of BSE or that the countryside was
simply closed. Much of the official effort to address the crisis
has been dealing with this type of misunderstanding but even as
late as mid June, when FMD appeared to be firmly under control,
with only a handful of reported cases each day and much of the
countryside returned to normal, many consumers still had very
negative views of the situation. For example in a survey of English
Consumers (ETC, 2001a):
— 39 per cent agreed that "you could not enjoy
going to the countryside because you would see the destruction
and disposal of animals because of Foot and Mouth".
— 45 per cent agreed that "you cannot go for
walks in the countryside because most of the footpaths are closed".
— 55 per cent agreed that "people should keep
out of the countryside to avoid spreading Food and Mouth".
For an activity that rests on image for its success and survival
the proper control and communication of image is crucial for tourism.
The UK experience of FMD in 2001 is that control of the image
was lost. With this in mind, one of the most important lessons
from these events clearly is the need for speedy and accurate
information. At this level this is a task for government as well
as for industry.
CONCLUSIONS AND
IMPLICATIONS
One can never be sure what the full range of implications
of such an event as the one discussed here will be, particularly
when the event is not concluded. Two major implications have emerged
already. The first is related to the impact of the outbreak on
the image of, and hence demand for, Britain as a tourist destination.
We have raised the issue of image several times in this paper.
It is clear that while the Foot and Mouth outbreak has clear major
implications for and impacts on agriculture in the UK, the impacts
upon tourism, particularly international tourism are much less
direct and tied very specifically to questions of media coverage
and the image produced and publicised. While there were some direct
impacts on tourism, many of them such as footpath closures, impacted
much more on domestic rather than international visitors to the
countryside, yet the major impacts in terms of demand seem to
have been on international tourism. This has to be directly related
to the image of the UK that has been disseminated abroad.
The importance of image to the development and maintenance
of a tourist destination is well documented (Hunt 1975, Gartner
1993, 1997, Gunn 1988) even if the process of image formation
and the ways in which image influences destination-choice decision-making
are still unresolved. Buckley and Klemm (1993: 185) note that
"a favourable image is an essential requirement for any tourist
destination". Similarly it is clear that destinations, which
have or suffer from negative images will find it difficult to
attract tourists given the variety of choice of destinations available
now. Developing a positive image and overcoming a negative one
can be both time-consuming and expensive, and is never guaranteed
success. Gartner (1993) has identified several components in the
image formation process, including "autonomous" agents,
such as news reports, articles, and documentaries about places,
which, because of their autonomy or lack of bias to a viewpoint,
are generally seen as credible and thus have major impacts on
image development. He argues (1997) that because of the high credibility
and market penetration of such elements, this may be the only
agent capable of changing an area's image in a short period of
time.
In the case of the current Foot and Mouth outbreak, there
has been extensive national and international coverage of developments
in the UK for over four months, much of it in this autonomous
form, for example, news coverage on television and in newspapers,
press releases, and discussion pieces in magazines and journals.
It would be astonishing if such coverage had not had negative
effects upon the image of the UK and its countryside. Whether
these effects are long term or are of a short duration remains
to be seen. A recent television news report (ITN 2001) indicated
that overseas visitation to the UK in May was 11 per cent down
from the comparable figure for 2000, an improvement over the decline
of 21 per cent in the April figure. The lack of media attention
to the outbreak, the decline in slaughter of animals and in carcass
disposal, and the lack of "pathos" or human interest
stories have all served to remove images from the daily media.
Gartner (1997) suggests that although the autonomous change agent
may be significant in the short term, it may not change an image
permanently over the long term, a point made earlier by Boulding
(1956), who argued negative images had to be constant and prolonged
to lead to an entirely new image of a feature or place.
Ahmed (1991) discussed ways of improving a destination's
negative image, including capitalising on the positive components,
organising familiarisation tours, and where possible, taking advantage
of negative features. The relevant authorities have undertaken
the first two procedures, albeit possibly belatedly in the first
case. The familiarisation tour of foreign dignitaries, involving
the Prime Minister, the Duke of Edinburgh and the Royal Residence
at Windsor seemed successful, although was almost immediately
undermined by a suspected case of human Foot and Mouth Disease
two days afterwards. The third approach is more difficult to envisage,
since there is little that people might want to see related to
the outbreak. Promoting quiet footpaths or lack of crowds, while
effective in destinations normally selling such attributes, is
more likely to remind people of why such areas are quiet in a
destination such as England.
It is almost inevitable that the only way to counteract the
effects of negative publicity is through an increase in positive
publicity and promotion. This is not as easy as may be thought,
as one has to ensure that promotion does not serve to remind potential
visitors of the negative event (a common problem following all
forms of disaster, for example, transportation accidents). Government
advertisements to date for the domestic market have tackled the
problem head on, ie, claiming boldly that "The Countryside
is Open". Whether such an approach will be effective for
the foreign market remains to be seen.
The second major implication for tourism in the UK relates
to both the general level of awareness of the importance of tourism
and in particular, government appreciation of the role and scale
of tourism in the UK and in rural areas especially. UK governments
at most levels generally have not paid much attention to tourism
over the past decades, never giving it full or sole ministerial
status, and appearing to hold the viewpoint that while it was
valuable, it was an area for the private sector and tourists would
always come to the UK. The grasp of its role in rural areas in
particular seemed very weak, the previous Ministry of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Food (MAFF) was very much the government decision
maker for rural areas. In this context tourism was under the Department
for Culture, Media and Sport which was seen as the more junior
partner. The report of that Department (CMSC 2001: xv) commented
that "public authorities failed initially to appreciate the
severity of the crisis in tourism" and went on to note that
even after several weeks the Government was still "not sure
of what the effect was going to be on the tourism industry"
(ibid). The about turn in policies noted earlier is further
evidence of the failure to realise at the beginning just how large
and how important tourism was to both the rural economy and way
of life, and to the UK economy and employment generally.
There is little doubt that this lesson has been learned to
some extent, although at considerable cost and probably still
with some unbelievers. As a columnist for The Times pointed
out, the fact that the Treasury was unable or unwilling to provide
20 million pounds for tourism promotion when MAFF was spending
more than that amount in killing uninfected animals each week,
suggested the lesson and appropriate priorities had still not
been learned (Jenkins, 2001: 19). It is doubtful that politicians
yet fully appreciate the important role of tourism in the UK rural
economy, despite this having been noted in a Rural White Paper
of 2000 (ETC/CA 2001). The situation is compounded by the point
made earlier, that it is domestic tourism (and leisure and recreation)
that makes the greatest use of the UK countryside in a direct
manner, but to international visitors, the UK countryside is a
key element in the attractiveness and image of the country as
a whole. A decline in overseas visitors might not be felt as directly
in rural areas as in urban settings, again highlighting the variable
nature of the scale and direction of the effects of the outbreak.
Any permanent change in agricultural and hence rural activities
as a result of the outbreak could have real impacts upon both
the appeal and direct use of the countryside for tourism. Further
declines in mixed farming and particularly in the disappearance
of livestock could negatively affect the appearance and accessibility
of the countryside for tourism and recreation. Over time, such
changes may also affect the image of the UK countryside and thus
the appeal to overseas visitors also. Farming in many parts of
the UK was in dire straits before FMD and its recovery rightly
needs to be a high priority. If tourism is not included in the
recovery plans and its current and potential importance in maintaining
the economic and social viability of rural communities not appreciated,
agricultural recovery and rural stability is unlikely to be achieved.
Thus there is much more to the second implication than simply
the belated recognition of the importance of tourism and the need
to assist its recovery and well-being.
Implications for specific features, events, and individual
facilities will emerge in due course. It is unlikely that major
events or features will disappear because of one poor or cancelled
year. The future is less certain for some facilities, particularly
small individual ones, that may have been of marginal viability
even in good tourist years. It would be naive to expect that all
will survive the reduction in tourist numbers. Whether they will
be replaced, and over what period cannot be determined at this
time.
The paper has attempted to draw out some interpretations
and conclusions from an event which is still continuing, and one
which was not seen at the start as having particular significance
for tourism by many of the parties initially involved. That perception
changed very rapidly as events unfolded and developments took
place. It is almost certain that some predictions will be unfounded
and new developments occur which were not foreseen, such is the
nature of tourism and forecasting. One thing that does appear
certain is that the FMD outbreak of 2001 will be regarded as a
tourism disaster just as much or more so than an agricultural
one.
KEY STATISTICS OF FOOT AND MOUTH
| | Statistics
|
| Compensation for animals slaughtered | £1,047,321,000
|
| Compensation for seized and destroyed items
| £29,187,000 |
| Cost of cleaning and disinfecting premises |
£254,588,000 |
| Cost of disposal and transportation of carcasses
| £170,770,000 |
| Veterinary costs | £15,152,000
|
| Direct cost to taxpayer | £2,059,000,000
|
| Total premises with animals slaughtered |
9,996 |
| Total animals slaughtered with F&D or on continuous properties
| 4,080,001 |
| Total slaughtered under welfare regulations or movement restrictions
| 2,573,317 |
| Other animals slaughtered | c2,000,000
|
| Total animals slaughtered | 8,653,318
|
Figures supplied by DEFRA, 2002.
4 October 2002
|
