Examination of Witnesses (Questions 60-79)
15 OCTOBER 2003
MR SIMON
WEBB CBE, DR
SARAH BEAVER
AND MR
PAUL JOHNSTON
Q60 Mr Crausby: Article III of the
draft Treaty envisages a group of states with "higher military
capability criteria" establishing "structured co-operation".
The Government were clearly opposed to structured co-operation
throughout the Convention on the future of Europe. Has there been
a re-think and how have the initial concerns been resolved?
Mr Webb: Article 40(6), I think
we are on.
Q61 Mr Howarth: Article III-213.
Mr Webb: Yes. There are actually
two linked parts.
Q62 Mr Howarth: Yes. There is I-40(6),
which sets up the general principle of a higher military capability.
Mr Webb: Exactly, and then there
is a more detailed exposition in Article III-213. I think it is
fair to say that we have been cautious about this area through
the Convention in part because inclusiveness is an important feature
for the UK. We have always tended to look for unanimity but a
general sense of inclusiveness has been a longstanding approach
here. We just think it brings the political dynamic of the EU's
involvement more effectively if you have that. So we tended to
look for inclusive solutions but being British pragmatists we
realised that as you get bigger and bigger you go to 25 and of
course there were shades of that in some of the earlier rounds,
Denmark's position for example, so it may not be quite as feasible
always to get unanimity or wide inclusiveness as you would really
like. You can then start to say, is one sure that one does not
want to haveif they are prepared to do ita group
of people who would be prepared to commit themselves to achieving
higher capabilities, which is some of what this talks about. Would
that not be a good thing? We are in favour of greater capabilities
so should we not be positive about that? What if you get a situation
in which your aspirations to do the sort of things we were talking
about earlier on are being frustrated by a few countries who do
not want to participate and are holding everybody else back? I
think to some extent you can see there is a tension there between
two or three important factors and the way I describe the current
state of this is that we are probably a little more open-minded
about seeing some of the tensions there. I think what you finally
get out of that isand I say this being a British officialit
all depends what you are talking about, does it not? We want to
see the detailed prescription. You will see there is a provision
for a protocol which lays it out and you can think of protocols
that would be inclusive and maybe mildly helpful on capability
that one perhaps should not be stingy about. You can think of
things which appear to take this provision and take it off in
directions one did not like where one would be very anxious. So
it rather depends on what the next level of detail down is like.
Since one is in a situation of a negotiation and so on one does
not want to take stark positions on everything when it is not
clear what is going to come out of it. I think another factor
here is that enhanced cooperation, of which this is a special
type, has been talked about in the Union, in the CFSP area for
a long time. In fact it was specifically prohibited by some of
the earlier documentation but it has been talked about in the
Union for many years. I think I am right in saying that although
it was finally authorised at Amsterdam very little has ever materialised.
It has been much talked about but not much has come of it and
I think probably one of the reasons why not much has come of it
is because of the sort of difficulties I have talked about. How
do you reconcile inclusiveness with practical effectiveness?
Q63 Mr Crausby: How do we ensure
that that sort of structured cooperation does not damage our relationship
between the EU and NATO? Does it not lead to a completely different
beast?
Mr Webb: Not necessarily. It could
just be an inclusive club that ups its capability, in which case
NATO should be pleased because most of the capability would then
be available to NATO. I think that again is in the "all depends"
category. We certainly would not allow it to do anything which
undermined NATO and you will see in the Government's White Paper
that we are very clear on that. That is the sort of first test
for us, to make sure it does not undermine NATO. I think it is
an area where one could see, as again somebody was saying earlier
on, transparency and reassurance about what is going on. It is
very important that one does not have an air of some mysterious
process which people might get anxious about. So I think we are
to some extent in process on what this might look like.
Q64 Chairman: In other words, we
might have lost this one? As David said, the Prime Minister said
no, we were going for it. If I might cite today's International
Herald Tribune, it said that: "The British officials
have said nothing ominous in this for Transatlantic relations
and the officials say they will not accept a Franco-German initiative
to create an operational planning headquarters. Fine for the moment.
Privately, the British asserted they reject the idea that those
in France and Germany would seek to manipulate the vanguard group
to assert a European defence identity both de-coupled from the
US and NATO and signalling an institutionalised separation between
the Transatlantic allies. `All the same,' said an American official,
`the British have yielded on a key issue.'"
Mr Webb: No, we have not, is the
answer.
Chairman: It did not say who it was.
"`From its previous resistance to structured cooperation
as superfluous and divisive,' he said, `the Blair government had
turned the concept into a fact.' This in turn created, according
to the official, the possibility of a defence group with a life
of its own, an agenda difficult to control and a political sub-text
since Britain intended the group to magnify its role as pacemaker
in European defence, of the Blair government having to come up
with initiatives to give the vanguard life and prominence."
That may be wrong but that in essence appears to be saying that
we started off as tough as Hell, we were not going down this road
and now it appears that we are. So that is another one on the
debit side of the ledger. Please reassure me that the Herald
Tribune is as wrong as The Guardian appears to be most
of the time.
Q65 Mr Crausby: The FT said that
there had been a deal done between France and Germany.
Mr Webb: We have not taken a view
on this subject in the IGC yet. This has not been discussed in
the IGC so it is completely premature to suggest that we have
taken a fixed view. I am just trying to talk through the issue.
Chairman, you can get me into say "Yes," "No,"
but if I try and explain what I think are the pluses and minuses
of the situation I hope that is helpful to understand it.
Q66 Mr Howarth: There is clearly,
as the headline described it in the Herald Tribune, a subtle
shift going on, is there not, because when your colleagues came
to give evidence last week to the House of Lords they said that
the structured cooperation proposed should be approached with
caution but they had potential possibilities and opportunities.
Mr Webb: That is what I have just
said.
Q67 Mr Howarth: It looks from the
outside as though we are mid-stream. moving from one position,
which was no, but the Nice arrangements were flexible, to moving
across and we are mid-stream and we are going to end up in a position
where we have got to be in this to make it work.
Mr Webb: Chairman, despite your
commendable desire to get clarity on this, I have to come back
to what I said right at the start, which is that we are in negotiation.
There is a very big Treaty here covering a very wide range of
areas. Defence is only one part of that Treaty and therefore the
overall balance of where the UK ends up on the Treaty as a whole
is a matter for senior ministers to decide. All I am trying to
do is to give you some flavour, which I hope is helpful, of what
I see as the arguments here but no position has been taken on
this, no deal has been cut and I am just trying to set out how
I see it. I come back to the point that it very much depends what
it is you are talking about. There are certain types of structure.
We were very clear and I have repeated that the Prime Minister's
spokesman was very clear that the 29 April small group formulation
we did not like. We thought it was not the right way to go. I
am saying that it seems to be possible in a union of 25, maybe
not immediately but over a period of many yearsthese treaties
are supposed to last for a reasonable number of yearsthat
other situations could crop up. I think what I finally said is
that it all depends what is in the protocol. I think some of the
protocols we would have very great reservations about, some of
the protocols might seem acceptable.
Q68 Mr Crausby: Regardless of whether
we have changed our mind or not, how would you see it working
in practice? The FT claims that there is an agreement, but whatever.
Mr Webb: That is where I am stuck
for a precedent, you see. One can make a drama out of this but
as I say, people have been talking about this kind of enhanced
cooperation for many years and I think I am right in saying, Paul,
that there is not an instance of where one has occurred. I do
not know is the answer to your question.
Q69 Mr Crausby: Before we agree we
should clear up some ideas about what it would mean. Would there
be examples where it would involve the UK? Where might the UK
not want to be involved in some instances? Could we be involved
in some instances and not involved in others?
Mr Webb: Again, you need to get
to the protocol for the particular type of cooperation which was
intended before you could really answer that. There will be some
I would strongly recommend not getting involved in and I can think
of some where one might.
Chairman: Let us hope things are a bit
clearer on the proposed EU headquarters.
Q70 Mr Howarth: Can I say before
I ask a specific question, you say everything depends on the protocol
and I think you are right but this structured cooperation is quite
clearly a key focal point in the Common Security and Defence Policy
chapter of the Convention. You yourself said earlier that the
EU is a law-based organisation. If we were to be part of this
inner sanctum, because that is what we are talking about, how
do you as officials at the MoD see what our obligations might
be and in particular how do you think, if we were within this
group, we would be affected by Article 15, which states: "Member
States shall actively and unreservedly support the Union's common
foreign security policy in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity
and shall comply with the acts adopted by the Union in this area.
They shall refrain from action contrary to the Union's interest
or likely to impair its effectiveness." This would be an
integral component of the EU even though it would only contain
a limited number of members. Can you give us any guidance on what
thinking the MoD has been doing on the implications of our joining
this group?
Mr Webb: I do not think what you
have just read out is actually new in terms of the Treaty.
Q71 Mr Howarth: No, it is not new
at all. I was just quoting from the draft Treaty itself.
Mr Webb: That is in the existing
Treaty.
Mr Johnston: Article 11 of the
Treaty of Nice.
Q72 Mr Howarth: Okay, it has got
an existing life and it is not new. But Article III-213 talks
about Member States listed in the protocol which "fulfil
higher military capability criteria" and wish to "enter
into more binding commitments". I think "more binding
commitments" is actually rather a key phrase. We then get
into this business of what happens if this group which has these
binding commitments then take a different view. How would we be
constrained in the event that we joined this group? Would we be
constrained in our freedom of movement if we wished to act differently
from the other four members? Mr Jones says no. He is not my legal
adviser but tell us if you have not done any work on this yet
and that this is an area that would have to be explored or tell
me that I am wrong in believing that Article 15 should not worry
me. Not that I will be necessarily reassured by you.
Mr Webb: Let me ask Paul to comment
on it because it goes to the sort of wider foreign policy context
of which Article 15 and 11 of the old Treaty are really a broader
CFSP kind of point. But to answer your question, we have thought
about whether there are possible formulations of 40(6). We have
tried to think about circumstances in which it might work and
circumstances in which we would be very anxious about it as part
of trying to take this overall view. But it is still quite difficult
to get traction on what proposition there might be in front of
us. Paul, do you want to say anything general on this?
Mr Johnston: Yes, just to say
in terms of the general position that the language you quoted
as existing Treaty language about CFSP, it does not affect in
any way the fact that decisions are taken on an inter-governmental
basis by unanimity in the ESDP field. The Nice permanent arrangements
say that the commitment of national resources for ESDP (e.g. deploying
troops for operations) is a sovereign decision for the nation
states concerned and that remains completely the position and
there has been no dissent from that principle or debate about
that tenet of ESDP in the Convention or in the IGC. The question
of what the more binding commitments would mean is one that would
need to be addressed in the protocol if the EU at 25 decided that
they wanted to have structured cooperation. As Mr Webb said, we
have not had the first formal discussions of defence in the IGC.
The idea that is attractive to us, as Mr Webb noted, is the idea
of commitments which lever up capabilities and encourage those
Member States who want to participate more intensively in capability
development to do more. But it is clear from the discussions of
ESDP which have taken place in various EU fora over the last few
months that people believe that structured cooperation is not
an issue which was really thoroughly debated out in the Convention
and will need to be debated out in the IGC and these are just
some of the issues.
Q73 Mr Howarth: But something has
made the Government move its position from being wholly opposed
to this concept to recognising it. I am sure that it was not the
agreement of the French and the Germans to come and support the
United States and the United Nations on Iraq. I am sure there
was no squalid little deal there.
Mr Webb: Let us be clear, I have
not indicated any change in the Government's position. I am merely
articulating some of the arguments that go behind the current
debate.
Q74 Mr Howarth: It would appear that
others, not yourself, Mr Webb, have said to the House of Lords
that there were potential possibilities and opportunities. That
was not the language of Nice. Can I put this particular point
to you because I think it will certainly help us as we are trying
to get to grips with this. How would structured cooperation within
the framework of the EU be different from defence cooperation
between Member States outside the framework of the EU, in other
words would structured cooperation envisaged by Article III-213
exclude the possibility of Member States getting together outside
that arrangement and if it does not what is the added value in
being in the structured cooperation if we could just get together
with one another on an ad hoc basis without the binding commitment?
Mr Webb: To get you into the relationship
with the coalition is a winning idea, which is a point we talked
about before, which is that in some ways obviously you would rather
have wide inclusion but it happens that in some circumstances
that is not possible and it is still better to be able to act
in a coalition of the willing than not to be able to act at all.
There are things like, for instance, the initial ISAF deployment
to Afghanistan, which I think almost everybody would agree was
a good idea, which was actually a coalition of the willing outside
the structure of any of these particular organisations. So to
that extent that is a fair point. On the other hand, you could
make the point that in the world of rapid deployments and in more
risky and difficult situations some preparation and organisation
and familiarisation and something which would imply some pre-planning
is a good thing.
Q75 Mr Howarth: Called NATO?
Mr Webb: Yes. NATO can also find
itself in the position of being unable to act at 19 or 18.
Q76 Mr Jones: Could I clarify one
thing because obviously I would not want Mr Howarth to go away
with the impression that somehow he is getting away scot-free
with this. Could I just reinforce this point, that the actual
decision whether or not the nation state actually commits troops
is actually down to that government and this in no way is going
to be a situation whereby Britain or any other country will be
told by Europe or be forced to commit troops?
Mr Webb: Thank you for that. Exactly.
The command of forces remains a national decision so to that extent
there is always that limiting constraint over everything we have
been talking about. Thank you for the opportunity to put that.
Q77 Mr Howarth: I am sorry, Mr Webb,
until we know what the binding commitments are. You said that
yourself. We do not know what the protocol is and we do not know
what the binding commitments are.
Mr Webb: We would not sign up
to a binding commitment which eroded that.
Q78 Mr Jones: Can I ask this then.
Is it the position of the British Government that decisions over
deployment of troops or forces is the sovereignty of the actual
government and they will not sign anything which actually allows
it to be subject to any body such as this European body or any
other body?
Mr Webb: Yes.
Mr Johnston: I can quote the agreement
on this which everyone signed up to at the Nice European Council:
"The commitment of national resources to Member States to
such operations will be based on their sovereign decisions."
That remains our position.
Q79 Rachel Squire: Thinking of nation
states and the decisions they take, Mr Webb, can I see if we can
get a little clarity on just where we are now with the proposal
that France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg made on 29 April,
that there should be an autonomous EU headquarters at Tervuren
near Brussels. The first question, is that still on the table?
Mr Webb: Yes. I have not seen
it taken off the table by those four.
|