Select Committee on Defence Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 60-79)

15 OCTOBER 2003

MR SIMON WEBB CBE, DR SARAH BEAVER AND MR PAUL JOHNSTON

  Q60  Mr Crausby: Article III of the draft Treaty envisages a group of states with "higher military capability criteria" establishing "structured co-operation". The Government were clearly opposed to structured co-operation throughout the Convention on the future of Europe. Has there been a re-think and how have the initial concerns been resolved?

  Mr Webb: Article 40(6), I think we are on.

  Q61  Mr Howarth: Article III-213.

  Mr Webb: Yes. There are actually two linked parts.

  Q62  Mr Howarth: Yes. There is I-40(6), which sets up the general principle of a higher military capability.

  Mr Webb: Exactly, and then there is a more detailed exposition in Article III-213. I think it is fair to say that we have been cautious about this area through the Convention in part because inclusiveness is an important feature for the UK. We have always tended to look for unanimity but a general sense of inclusiveness has been a longstanding approach here. We just think it brings the political dynamic of the EU's involvement more effectively if you have that. So we tended to look for inclusive solutions but being British pragmatists we realised that as you get bigger and bigger you go to 25 and of course there were shades of that in some of the earlier rounds, Denmark's position for example, so it may not be quite as feasible always to get unanimity or wide inclusiveness as you would really like. You can then start to say, is one sure that one does not want to have—if they are prepared to do it—a group of people who would be prepared to commit themselves to achieving higher capabilities, which is some of what this talks about. Would that not be a good thing? We are in favour of greater capabilities so should we not be positive about that? What if you get a situation in which your aspirations to do the sort of things we were talking about earlier on are being frustrated by a few countries who do not want to participate and are holding everybody else back? I think to some extent you can see there is a tension there between two or three important factors and the way I describe the current state of this is that we are probably a little more open-minded about seeing some of the tensions there. I think what you finally get out of that is—and I say this being a British official—it all depends what you are talking about, does it not? We want to see the detailed prescription. You will see there is a provision for a protocol which lays it out and you can think of protocols that would be inclusive and maybe mildly helpful on capability that one perhaps should not be stingy about. You can think of things which appear to take this provision and take it off in directions one did not like where one would be very anxious. So it rather depends on what the next level of detail down is like. Since one is in a situation of a negotiation and so on one does not want to take stark positions on everything when it is not clear what is going to come out of it. I think another factor here is that enhanced cooperation, of which this is a special type, has been talked about in the Union, in the CFSP area for a long time. In fact it was specifically prohibited by some of the earlier documentation but it has been talked about in the Union for many years. I think I am right in saying that although it was finally authorised at Amsterdam very little has ever materialised. It has been much talked about but not much has come of it and I think probably one of the reasons why not much has come of it is because of the sort of difficulties I have talked about. How do   you reconcile inclusiveness with practical effectiveness?

  Q63  Mr Crausby: How do we ensure that that sort of structured cooperation does not damage our relationship between the EU and NATO? Does it not lead to a completely different beast?

  Mr Webb: Not necessarily. It could just be an inclusive club that ups its capability, in which case NATO should be pleased because most of the capability would then be available to NATO. I think that again is in the "all depends" category. We certainly would not allow it to do anything which undermined NATO and you will see in the Government's White Paper that we are very clear on that. That is the sort of first test for us, to make sure it does not undermine NATO. I think it is an area where one could see, as again somebody was saying earlier on, transparency and reassurance about what is going on. It is very important that one does not have an air of some mysterious process which people might get anxious about. So I think we are to some extent in process on what this might look like.

  Q64  Chairman: In other words, we might have lost this one? As David said, the Prime Minister said no, we were going for it. If I might cite today's International Herald Tribune, it said that: "The British officials have said nothing ominous in this for Transatlantic relations and the officials say they will not accept a Franco-German initiative to create an operational planning headquarters. Fine for the moment. Privately, the British asserted they reject the idea that those in France and Germany would seek to manipulate the vanguard group to assert a European defence identity both de-coupled from the US and NATO and signalling an institutionalised separation between the Transatlantic allies. `All the same,' said an American official, `the British have yielded on a key issue.'"

  Mr Webb: No, we have not, is the answer.

  Chairman: It did not say who it was. "`From its previous resistance to structured cooperation as superfluous and divisive,' he said, `the Blair government had turned the concept into a fact.' This in turn created, according to the official, the possibility of a defence group with a life of its own, an agenda difficult to control and a political sub-text since Britain intended the group to magnify its role as pacemaker in European defence, of the Blair government having to come up with initiatives to give the vanguard life and prominence." That may be wrong but that in essence appears to be saying that we started off as tough as Hell, we were not going down this road and now it appears that we are. So that is another one on the debit side of the ledger. Please reassure me that the Herald Tribune is as wrong as The Guardian appears to be most of the time.

  Q65  Mr Crausby: The FT said that there had been a deal done between France and Germany.

  Mr Webb: We have not taken a view on this subject in the IGC yet. This has not been discussed in the IGC so it is completely premature to suggest that we have taken a fixed view. I am just trying to talk through the issue. Chairman, you can get me into say "Yes," "No," but if I try and explain what I think are the pluses and minuses of the situation I hope that is helpful to understand it.

  Q66  Mr Howarth: There is clearly, as the headline described it in the Herald Tribune, a subtle shift going on, is there not, because when your colleagues came to give evidence last week to the House of Lords they said that the structured cooperation proposed should be approached with caution but they had potential possibilities and opportunities.

  Mr Webb: That is what I have just said.

  Q67  Mr Howarth: It looks from the outside as though we are mid-stream. moving from one position, which was no, but the Nice arrangements were flexible, to moving across and we are mid-stream and we are going to end up in a position where we have got to be in this to make it work.

  Mr Webb: Chairman, despite your commendable desire to get clarity on this, I have to come back to what I said right at the start, which is that we are in negotiation. There is a very big Treaty here covering a very wide range of areas. Defence is only one part of that Treaty and therefore the overall balance of where the UK ends up on the Treaty as a whole is a matter for senior ministers to decide. All I am trying to do is to give you some flavour, which I hope is helpful, of what I see as the arguments here but no position has been taken on this, no deal has been cut and I am just trying to set out how I see it. I come back to the point that it very much depends what it is you are talking about. There are certain types of structure. We were very clear and I have repeated that the Prime Minister's spokesman was very clear that the 29 April small group formulation we did not like. We thought it was not the right way to go. I am saying that it seems to be possible in a union of 25, maybe not immediately but over a period of many years—these treaties are supposed to last for a reasonable number of years—that other situations could crop up. I think what I finally said is that it all depends what is in the protocol. I think some of the protocols we would have very great reservations about, some of the protocols might seem acceptable.

  Q68  Mr Crausby: Regardless of whether we have changed our mind or not, how would you see it working in practice? The FT claims that there is an agreement, but whatever.

  Mr Webb: That is where I am stuck for a precedent, you see. One can make a drama out of this but as I say, people have been talking about this kind of enhanced cooperation for many years and I think I am right in saying, Paul, that there is not an instance of where one has occurred. I do not know is the answer to your question.

  Q69  Mr Crausby: Before we agree we should clear up some ideas about what it would mean. Would there be examples where it would involve the UK? Where might the UK not want to be involved in some instances? Could we be involved in some instances and not involved in others?

  Mr Webb: Again, you need to get to the protocol for the particular type of cooperation which was intended before you could really answer that. There will be some I would strongly recommend not getting involved in and I can think of some where one might.

  Chairman: Let us hope things are a bit clearer on the proposed EU headquarters.

  Q70  Mr Howarth: Can I say before I ask a specific question, you say everything depends on the protocol and I think you are right but this structured cooperation is quite clearly a key focal point in the Common Security and Defence Policy chapter of the Convention. You yourself said earlier that the EU is a law-based organisation. If we were to be part of this inner sanctum, because that is what we are talking about, how do you as officials at the MoD see what our obligations might be and in particular how do you think, if we were within this group, we would be affected by Article 15, which states: "Member States shall actively and unreservedly support the Union's common foreign security policy in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the acts adopted by the Union in this area. They shall refrain from action contrary to the Union's interest or likely to impair its effectiveness." This would be an integral component of the EU even though it would only contain a limited number of members. Can you give us any guidance on what thinking the MoD has been doing on the implications of our joining this group?

  Mr Webb: I do not think what you have just read out is actually new in terms of the Treaty.

  Q71  Mr Howarth: No, it is not new at all. I was just quoting from the draft Treaty itself.

  Mr Webb: That is in the existing Treaty.

  Mr Johnston: Article 11 of the Treaty of Nice.

  Q72  Mr Howarth: Okay, it has got an existing life and it is not new. But Article III-213 talks about Member States listed in the protocol which "fulfil higher military capability criteria" and wish to "enter into more binding commitments". I think "more binding commitments" is actually rather a key phrase. We then get into this business of what happens if this group which has these binding commitments then take a different view. How would we be constrained in the event that we joined this group? Would we be constrained in our freedom of movement if we wished to act differently from the other four members? Mr Jones says no. He is not my legal adviser but tell us if you have not done any work on this yet and that this is an area that would have to be explored or tell me that I am wrong in believing that Article 15 should not worry me. Not that I will be necessarily reassured by you.

  Mr Webb: Let me ask Paul to comment on it because it goes to the sort of wider foreign policy context of which Article 15 and 11 of the old Treaty are really a broader CFSP kind of point. But to answer your question, we have thought about whether there are possible formulations of 40(6). We have tried to think about circumstances in which it might work and circumstances in which we would be very anxious about it as part of trying to take this overall view. But it is still quite difficult to get traction on what proposition there might be in front of us. Paul, do you want to say anything general on this?

  Mr Johnston: Yes, just to say in terms of the general position that the language you quoted as existing Treaty language about CFSP, it does not affect in any way the fact that decisions are taken on an inter-governmental basis by unanimity in the ESDP field. The Nice permanent arrangements say that the commitment of national resources for ESDP (e.g. deploying troops for operations) is a sovereign decision for the nation states concerned and that remains completely the position and there has been no dissent from that principle or debate about that tenet of ESDP in the Convention or in the IGC. The question of what the more binding commitments would mean is one that would need to be addressed in the protocol if the EU at 25 decided that they wanted to have structured cooperation. As Mr Webb said, we have not had the first formal discussions of defence in the IGC. The idea that is attractive to us, as Mr Webb noted, is the idea of commitments which lever up capabilities and encourage those Member States who want to participate more intensively in capability development to do more. But it is clear from the discussions of ESDP which have taken place in various EU fora over the last few months that people believe that structured cooperation is not an issue which was really thoroughly debated out in the Convention and will need to be debated out in the IGC and these are just some of the issues.

  Q73  Mr Howarth: But something has made the Government move its position from being wholly opposed to this concept to recognising it. I am sure that it was not the agreement of the French and the Germans to come and support the United States and the United Nations on Iraq. I am sure there was no squalid little deal there.

  Mr Webb: Let us be clear, I have not indicated any change in the Government's position. I am merely articulating some of the arguments that go behind the current debate.

  Q74  Mr Howarth: It would appear that others, not yourself, Mr Webb, have said to the House of Lords that there were potential possibilities and opportunities. That was not the language of Nice. Can I put this particular point to you because I think it will certainly help us as we are trying to get to grips with this. How would structured cooperation within the framework of the EU be different from defence cooperation between Member States outside the framework of the EU, in other words would structured cooperation envisaged by Article III-213 exclude the possibility of Member States getting together outside that arrangement and if it does not what is the added value in being in the structured cooperation if we could just get together with one another on an ad hoc basis without the binding commitment?

  Mr Webb: To get you into the relationship with the coalition is a winning idea, which is a point we talked about before, which is that in some ways obviously you would rather have wide inclusion but it happens that in some circumstances that is not possible and it is still better to be able to act in a coalition of the willing than not to be able to act at all. There are things like, for instance, the initial ISAF deployment to Afghanistan, which I think almost everybody would agree was a good idea, which was actually a coalition of the willing outside the structure of any of these particular organisations. So to that extent that is a fair point. On the other hand, you could make the point that in the world of rapid deployments and in more risky and difficult situations some preparation and organisation and familiarisation and something which would imply some pre-planning is a good thing.

  Q75  Mr Howarth: Called NATO?

  Mr Webb: Yes. NATO can also find itself in the position of being unable to act at 19 or 18.

  Q76  Mr Jones: Could I clarify one thing because obviously I would not want Mr Howarth to go away with the impression that somehow he is getting away scot-free with this. Could I just reinforce this point, that the actual decision whether or not the nation state actually commits troops is actually down to that government and this in no way is going to be a situation whereby Britain or any other country will be told by Europe or be forced to commit troops?

  Mr Webb: Thank you for that. Exactly. The command of forces remains a national decision so to that extent there is always that limiting constraint over everything we have been talking about. Thank you for the opportunity to put that.

  Q77  Mr Howarth: I am sorry, Mr Webb, until we know what the binding commitments are. You said that yourself. We do not know what the protocol is and we do not know what the binding commitments are.

  Mr Webb: We would not sign up to a binding commitment which eroded that.

  Q78  Mr Jones: Can I ask this then. Is it the position of the British Government that decisions over deployment of troops or forces is the sovereignty of the actual government and they will not sign anything which actually allows it to be subject to any body such as this European body or any other body?

  Mr Webb: Yes.

  Mr Johnston: I can quote the agreement on this which everyone signed up to at the Nice European Council: "The commitment of national resources to Member States to such operations will be based on their sovereign decisions." That remains our position.

  Q79  Rachel Squire: Thinking of nation states and the decisions they take, Mr Webb, can I see if we can get a little clarity on just where we are now with the proposal that France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg made on 29 April, that there should be an autonomous EU headquarters at Tervuren near Brussels. The first question, is that still on the table?

  Mr Webb: Yes. I have not seen it taken off the table by those four.


 
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