Examination of Witnesses (Questions 80-99)
15 OCTOBER 2003
MR SIMON
WEBB CBE, DR
SARAH BEAVER
AND MR
PAUL JOHNSTON
Q80 Rachel Squire: Do you expect
it to stay on the table?
Mr Webb: How could I possibly
speculate about the conclusions of this group?
Q81 Mr Howarth: Go on, have a go!
Mr Webb: Thank you for the kind
offer.
Q82 Rachel Squire: Okay. What about
then the British proposal for an EU cell within SHAPE? How has
that been received by other Member States? Does it have more support
than perhaps just from four Member States?
Mr Webb: Yes, it does. I think
it has been seen as a constructive contribution to the wider debate
and I think I am quite happy to say that significantly more than
four people have indicated that they support the idea. I do not
want to imply simply that some of the four have not also said
they think it is a good idea. I would not want to suggest there
was a competition on here.
Q83 Rachel Squire: There is some
hope yet then if certain of the original four are looking to compromise.
Talking of compromise, there have been reports of a compromise
proposal emerging involving a strengthened planning cell within
the EU's military staff at Cortenbergh and the Director General
for International Security Policy at the MoD told a Lords committee
last week that the UK saw some scope for expanding the capability
of the EU military staff to undertake strategic planning. Can
you clarify that for us?
Mr Webb: That was said by my deputy
associated with these two on either side and is of course true
but let me just fill it out a bit. Since the EU military staff
was set up a couple of years ago the world has progressed and
moved on and one of the features which is now reflected in our
own MoD organisation is a greater emphasis on forward strategic
planning than perhaps we used to do before. In fact we now have
a group which works on this full time and that is because you
see a range of things being talked about as future potential operations
and we are conscious that in order both to decide the sort of
things we might get engaged in and what our strategic level objectives
were. There is a very important distinction between strategic
and operational. What end state we would be after, what sort of
overall effect we would be trying to achieve within a broader
political and military context, that kind of thing. So to the
extent that we have thickened out our own organisation in this
direction I think there is a case for doing somewhat more in the
EUMS. We talked a little earlier and we got into the question
of civil/military transition. If you are going to do that better
and you are going to have maybe a more task force approach in
drawing these functions together there is an argument for strengthening
those functions there too. You could make an argument for some
other multi-nationalising of arrangements. So those are some areas
in which I could see an argument to be made for the strengthening
of functions. Whether that means extra people of course is a completely
fresh point because I am known, I think, as the suppressor of
increases in the size of headquarters. In fact in NATO I feel
myself as a shrinker of headquarters.
Q84 Mr Roy: You are known for much
more than that!
Mr Webb: So I do not think it
necessarily means more bodies overall but I think the functions
could be thickened out. But that finishes at the point at which
a strategic planning directive is sent to the operational headquarters
saying, "We might be interested in an operation of this kind.
You, operational headquarters"—of which of course SHAPE
is usually first choice—"go and produce a plan against
that operation." Then of course later on you might get an
executive order for decisions. So it is a very important distinction
here between strategic planning, which is all about the overall
end state that you get to, the overall objectives, and operational
planning, which is about how you organise the means to achieve
the end. That is an important distinction. So we are trying to
indicate a little flexibility where we can see it justified but
not to confuse strategic and operational planning or the command
of forces with goes with operational planning. We have not got
to a conclusion on this. These are again just the sort of things
we are throwing around.
Q85 Rachel Squire: Thank you for
that. I have come to the conclusion that conclusions take a long
time to reach, particularly when we come to dealing with our allies.
Moving on, I think one thing we all agree is that there should
be, as part of any military alliance, a mutual defence obligation.
This has been a key area for us as MPs, whether the Government
is prepared to see any sort of mutual defence obligation remain
in the final constitutional treaty for the EU. What is your view
on that?
Mr Webb: There are two and a half
places where this crops us. For those of you who have read Mr
Witney's evidence, he talked about a half too. There is in Article
40 what you might call a reformulation of previous language which
goes right back I think to Maastricht pretty well and various
evolutions about Common Security and Defence Policy including
the progressive framing of Common Union Defence Policy and I think
that the last situation at Nice talked about this and when it
has been reformulated but whichever way you pick the reformulation
it does say that no decision is being taken now to create common
defence and that is for some future decision. It is clear about
that. The language has been reformulated. So I do not think that
that gives rise actually to any fresh issues for us. There is
a clause 40(7) which also talks about mutual defence and says
that until we get to the decision yet to be taken, which I just
talked about, countries might come to the aid and assistance of
other countries which are the victim of armed aggression on their
territory. There is also something called the mutual assistance
clause, which is 40(2), which is supported by Article III-231
in chapter 8, which talks about "Should a Member State fall
victim to a terrorist attack or natural or man-made disaster other
Members shall assist it at the request of its political authorities"
and it is made clear elsewhere in the language that could include
military means. We have had no problem at all about the idea of
mutual assistance, sometimes known as the solidarity clause. We
have accepted formulation along those lines early in the 1990s
and it is common sense stuff. When you ask ministers about this
they say it is unconscionable that if a country in the EU suffered
from some terrorist attack that we would not make available our
armed forces to go and help them. So that is fine. 40(7), as you
can see from the way it is formulated, it is not entirely clear
what it means. You could think of formulations where it was fine
and you could think of formulations which would worry you, particularly
if it appeared to be getting into any sort of difficulty in relation
to NATO and the Government's White Paper makes clear our general
disposition on that. So I think the answer is that 40(7) could
be all right but it is not quite clear exactly what it means and
there is a question about whether one should make it clear or
whether it will come out. That is something that we are not happy
with.
Q86 Rachel Squire: I think I have
ended up more confused given what you have just said to me. Let
me put it clearly. Those of us who are members of NATO have always
seen that NATO's role is a mutual defence obligation that in the
event of an attack on any NATO ally the other NATO members would
immediately offer their assistance.
Mr Webb: Yes. Well, offer assistance.
Q87 Rachel Squire: When we get into
the discussion and the wording of these various clauses there
has been concern that some members of the EU wish under this European
Security Defence Policy, Common Security and Defence Policy, to
have that same strong collective defence commitment that we have
within NATO. As we all know, there have been some specific arguments
about giving assistance to a member of NATO from certain EU countries
earlier this year in respect of possible action as a result of
Iraq. What we had understood was that the British Government was
making it clear that it did not see any EU defence capability
taking on that level of defence capability of another Member State.
What you have just said seems to be making that much woolier.
Mr Webb: You have articulated
it, if I may say so, better than I did the first time around.
I think you have said exactly what is the Government's position,
which is that collective defence is a matter for NATO and as the
White Paper says, we will not accept any arrangements which undermined
NATO's role in collective defence. I was merely trying to point
out that elsewhere in the Treaty there is a different, separate
provision which is sometimes called the solidarity clause, sometimes
called mutual assistance, which is about dealing with the consequence
of an attack. So it is not about defending you against an attack
and sending your armed forces to beat off an enemy, it is about
the fact that an attack has occurred. This is relevant in the
terrorist context where some awful terrorist incident has occurred.
There is no enemy to defeat immediately to hand but there is a
great humanitarian problem that a country is facing. So we have
acknowledged that we are happy to see resources, including the
resource of the armed forces to help in that latter category under
EU arrangements. We are not happy to see any encroachment on NATO's
role on collective defence of territory. The question then is
quite where does this clause 40(7) sit and I think it is difficult
because it is not clear whether it is really some variation on
mutual assistance or whether it actually encroaches into the area
of collective defence. My instinct would be to make sure that
we are clear it does not encroach on collective defence.
Q88 Chairman: I am sorry, I cannot
contain my enthusiasm. You are very reassuring but I look at this
document and it says, "if one of the Member States participating
in such cooperation is the victim of armed aggression on its territory,
the other participating States shall give it aid and assistance
by all the means in their power, military and other, in accordance
with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter". That seems
pretty strong to me. This seems stronger than NATO. It renders
NATO almost superfluous. They will say, "No, we're doing
it because the European Union has committed us."
Mr Webb: That is where you get
down to the language which, as I think I have said, is difficult.
If you think "victim" is in the sense of having suffered
an attack which is now over and you have got the consequences
of it to deal with obviously we would want to go and help them.
Q89 Mr Howarth: That is semantics.
Mr Webb: That is what I mean.
That is exactly why we are saying that it is difficult.
Q90 Chairman: But it is there, in
other words it has got to the stage that they are actually arguing
it. The fact that now we have to argue about a semantic—
Mr Webb: No, I am not trying to
defend it. I am just trying to explain why I do not think it is
clear and my instinct would be that one should try to get it clear
and it goes to the Government's overall position as set out in
the White Paper that we would want to make it clear that this
was not an encroachment on the collective defence role as set
out in NATO.
Q91 Chairman: Do not try, just veto
it. It is not a question of trying and failing. We appear to have
made concessions on almost everything else so far, going through
the list of questions.
Mr Webb: We have not made concessions
on anything yet, Chairman.
Q92 Chairman: Sorry, if you go through
the list of questions—I will not bore you with the details—almost
every area of questions we have asked we appear to have moved
from one position to a position of compromising—a structured
cooperation in the headquarters, we are seeing it rather differently,
mutual defence obligations, we are trying to clarify it, and we
have other things too. Looking at it pessimistically, we need
to sweat a little bit over the next few months otherwise those
people whom I have been saying are alarmist might come back to
us and I can just imagine the press release the French Foreign
Ministry is going to put out at the end of all this in which it
will be rather triumphal in that further steps have been taken
on a road, "NATO—we have not gone all the way yet but
we have made pretty substantial progress as a result of these
negotiations. We will be coming back in five years and we will
finish the job." That is the alarmist stuff that I have heard
and frankly, despite your best efforts, I am not in an incredibly
strong position to confirm that their views are nonsensical. This
is what I think this Committee in almost every case has got to
be reassured on.
Mr Webb: Chairman, I think you
should be reassured by the Government's White Paper, which makes
it very clear indeed that the Government will not accept an erosion
or an encroachment on the role of NATO. That is made very clear.
We are merely spending some time trying to help understand our
view of what these proposals mean and how we are approaching them
overall but we have not made any concessions at all. I am merely
trying to give you some exposure to the arguments. So if you want
me to just come and say, "The Government's White Paper has
nothing more to say," I think that would be, if I might suggest,
a less interesting afternoon for you than for us to try and help
with some of our limited expertise to illuminate what the issues
are. But I must just reiterate the Government's White Paper stands.
Nothing I have said this afternoon in any way changes that position
and the Government has made it clear that it has some very firm
positions which I think it will sustain however this negotiation
proceeds but it also has some areas where it has some flexibility
of mind and it has made that clear in its White Paper and all
I am trying to do is to help a little in the understanding of
where these positions are.
Q93 Mr Howarth: I am quite keen to
explore with you further just to see where the European Court
can intervene in what might otherwise be an arrangement which
we had all understood and agreed and where it might, as it has
done in so many other areas, reinterpret European treaties in
a communitarian fashion, not as British officials had believed
would be the case when they set out the position.
Mr Webb: That is an argument for
clarity, I agree.
Q94 Rachel Squire: Just on arguments
of clarity, given all that you have said how would you answer
the question, if the Government is so opposed to any encroachment
on that crucial role of NATO why is the proposal still there on
the agenda for negotiation given that we have all been assured
their position, as we understand it, is that this will not be
agreed except by unanimity?
Mr Webb: The Convention is the
Convention and it has representatives from government and of course
we were most ably represented but it is only the work of a group
of people making a proposal so you inevitably do not end up necessarily
with the complete perfect answer. That is why we have an intergovernmental
conference which has, as I say, yet to get to this area but it
was kicked off in Rome a couple of weeks ago and which is working
through these areas.
Q95 Rachel Squire: So it would be
optimistic if the first decision in the IGC will be to erase that
particular part of the draft constitutional treaty?
Mr Webb: I think I do know how
firmly British ministers stand behind the White Paper that they
have put out and I think it is very carefully balanced to indicate
the areas which are of very great importance to Britain but on
the other hand mostly outside those areas it indicates other areas
where we are prepared to hear further argument.
Q96 Rachel Squire: What is the UK's
position on other countries in the EU indicating that they might
want to sign up to it even if they allowed Britain and others
not to?
Mr Webb: I think the Treaty has
got to be agreed unanimously, there is no way out of that. The
Treaty must be agreed unanimously. You can have derogations, you
can have stand asides, as Denmark has done on certain aspects
of ESDP, you can have derogations of the kind that Britain has
entered on a number of occasions to do with social chapters and
so on, but in terms of agreeing the Treaty as a whole, particularly
in central areas like this, I think unanimity is essential.
Q97 Rachel Squire: Can I just quickly
ask about one final area that I have always found a bit contradictory
and I have discussed in some depth with my colleagues who have
been on the Western European Union and that is that actually Article
4 of the 1948 Brussels Treaty contained a collective defence commitment
and we have lived with that in existence for the last fifty years.
Some would argue that we agreed to that EU collective defence
assistance a long time ago. What is the Government's line on that
one?
Mr Webb: We do not accept this
line of argument because the NATO treaty followed the WEU Treaty
and, if you like, absorbed it. Although the WEU Treaty was never
revoked, we were also very clear as the WEU in part of it being
evolved into ESDP. The WEU commitment was always discharged through
NATO. I heard this argument but it is wrong.
Chairman: Well, the circumstances were
different. Europe was totally incapable of any defence in 1948
and there could have been few if the French had any aspirations
in that direction, so the argument that it was not activated then
does not cut much ice today where the political aspirations are
rather different.
Q98 Mr Jones: On the other point,
unlike some I have got to say that some of us do not look over
to Europe as though there are these people queuing up to take
over the defence of this country. Would Mr Webb also agree that
although a lot has been said about the Treaty, that it is mostly
in tablets of stone, there is actually a Hell of a lot of negotiation
to take place still and things will change over the next twelve
months as it actually develops?
Mr Webb: I think that is so. It
is very important not to miss the fact that there is a great deal
about this Treaty in the round that really aligns closely to British
interests and our ambitions so it is wrong to suggest that there
is something threatening and unpleasant about the whole thing
and there will be arguments no doubt made that one should buy
the package rather than pick it to pieces and that if you start
picking one piece to pieces you may find that other bits that
you like get eroded. So there is all that, but all that just says
it is in negotiation.
Q99 Mr Jones: Just on the European
Armaments, Research and Military Capability Agency, in the draft
it talks about proposed multilateral projects, while in the British
Food for Thought it talks about joint commands, things like airlift
and other things. How do you actually see this working in practice
in terms of, firstly, can you explain whether there is a difference
there and secondly, if we are talking about joint commands what
would be the position vis-a-vis the recent intervention in Iraq
where Spain, for example, was committed but France was not if
you had a joint command in, for example, heavy lift or any other
area of joint operations? Would that mean that the other partner
would have a veto over the use of that capacity?
Mr Webb: No, not necessarily.
Our first priority has been for multinational projects of the
kind that you are familiar with and which can, particularly with
a range of smaller countries in Europe, be an efficient way of
bulking something up to make a sensible project. So that is certainly
part of it. On joint commands, there are proposals from time to
time for pooling actual operational assets. For example, that
happened, as you know, in NATO where there is a sort of AWACS
force with which we have an association and that can also be quite
an efficient military tool, particularly if you are in the world
of rapid reaction, because it means you can efficiently organise
a rotation between the countries so you always have something
available. So I do not think one should set one's mind wholly
against that, but the level at which those joint command arrangements
take place is always negotiable and invariably there is some sort
of national veto, which means that finally you have the right
to say, "No, this is not available to this joint command.
We need it for national purposes." It does not tend to apply
so much to Britain because we have most of our own capabilities
but I do not discourage others from doing it.
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