Examination of Witnesses(Questions 1-19)
WEDNESDAY 27 NOVEMBER 2002
RT HON
MR GEOFF
HOON MP, AIR
MARSHAL ROB
WRIGHT AFC AND
MR EDWARD
OAKDEN
Chairman
1. Welcome, Secretary of State. Would you like
to make an opening statement?
(Mr Hoon) I would. Can I first introduce
Air Marshal Rob Wright and Edward Oakden, who are joining me today.
I apologise to the Committee if I have delayed your start. We
had a special Cabinet meeting this morning to discuss the Chancellor's
pre-Budget statement, which no doubt colleagues will be able to
hear for themselves later today. The Prague Summit was a historic
two days for NATO. Together with enlargement, major changes were
agreed that will give NATO the equipment it needs to meet the
new threats of the 21st century. There is obviously a great deal
of work still to do but once implemented, those changes will mean
a leaner, more functional command structure; more highly deployable
forces with new capabilities; and a wide-ranging programme of
modernisation aimed at increasing efficiency and reducing bureaucracy
at NATO headquarters. We believe that this will give NATO the
ability to conduct operations and to rapidly deploy highly capable
forces wherever they are needed. The new capabilities package—the
Prague Capabilities Commitment—has the potential to deliver
real improvement across the range of capabilities, especially
in identified, key shortfall areas. Our responsibility now is
to ensure that that package is implemented. The Prague Capabilities
Commitment gives Europeans and Canadians a good opportunity to
start narrowing the growing capability gap with the United States.
We will also be looking to newly invited members to contribute,
perhaps through the provision of key niche capabilities, although
it is fair to say that some countries are already doing that.
The new NATO Response Force will enable the Alliance to deploy
a joint force quickly to wherever it is needed. It will significantly
enhance the Alliance's interoperability, act as a focus for capability
improvement, and be a further stimulus to completing the reform
of NATO's command and force structures. It is also an opportunity
for European allies to demonstrate to the United States that they
are serious about NATO having the forces and capabilities to act
swiftly, right across the spectrum of missions and in the face
of any threat. A root and branch review of the command structure
will provide the streamlined framework within which new capabilities
and the NRF will be deployed. The agreement announced at Prague
will mean a revised, streamlined command structure which will
be more flexible and responsive, and based on functional and deployable
need. NATO has further strengthened European security through
enlargement, bringing in more like-minded nations that have demonstrated
their willingness to stand by the NATO allies, whether it involves
defending against international terrorism or participating in
NATO operations. All these countries have made good progress but
still have more to do over the next 18 months to prepare themselves
fully for Alliance membership. The United Kingdom will continue
to help them. The need for collective defence has never been greater
and the new members will make an important contribution. NATO's
future success will depend not only on its own military capabilities
and structures, but also on its ability to work closely with as
many partners as it can. Hence NATO's decision to enhance its
partnerships with the countries to NATO's east and south, with
a strong emphasis on refocusing partnership to tackle new threats.
We recognise that the only way to defeat asymmetric threats like
international terrorism is by operating on a united front with
as many like-minded countries as possible, whether they are already
NATO members or not. NATO's greatly improved relationship with
Russia, for example, demonstrates this very clearly. Changes to
NATO's capabilities, roles and structures need to dovetail with
the European Security and Defence Policy. I firmly believe that
what is good for NATO is also good for the European Union, and
vice versa. These are complementary, not competing organisations
because they are both aimed at improving European military capabilities.
Finally, I should return to the recognised need for serious internal
adaptation to maintain the efficiency and effectiveness of NATO.
Prague has delivered a substantial package of reform which we
now need to see through. In short therefore the scale of the changes
agreed at the Prague Summit clearly demonstrates the health and
vitality of NATO. Implementation will now be the challenge, with
the next Summit only a matter of 18 months away. By then it will
be crucial that the commitments made at Prague are delivering
real results.
2. Thank you. We visited all of the serious
applicant countries a few months ago, and the MoD's response to
our report was unusually complementary. Our views were almost
congruent on everything we had said with the Ministry of Defence's
own view. Can you tell us the extent to which you believe NATO
to be militarily stronger as a result of the seven new states
who will be joining. Perhaps you can then tell us whether you
think NATO is stronger in other areas, politically perhaps, as
a result of Prague.
(Mr Hoon) The obvious expansion of NATO's geographical
coverage provides greater security. One of the practical lessons
we learned during the Afghanistan operations was the need to have
more bases, more access, more support from even beyond existing
NATO members, therefore new members constantly enhance the security
of the Alliance in that very practical way. One of the benefits
of NATO membership that is perhaps too often overlooked—and
again, we saw in Afghanistan and continue to see as far as ISAF
is concerned- is better interoperability, learning together to
be able to co-operate in often very difficult situations, having
standardised equipment and a standardised approach. The more that
standardisation spreads across the Alliance and into the new member
states, there are clear benefits to the security of the Alliance.
In one significant respect—and I think this is a crucial
question for the Alliance—how does a very small country
joining the Alliance help protect the United kingdom? It is obvious
how the United Kingdom might protect a smaller joining nation,
but it is perhaps less obvious to people here how the reverse
might be the case. That is why the emphasis that I have mentioned
already on the development of specialised capabilities can add
enormously to our overall range of capabilities. Perhaps historically
we rather tended to concentrate on providing or attempting to
provide a full range of capabilities. Instead, now the emphasis
is very strongly on specialisation, on even a smaller nation being
able to provide a niche capability that actually, in terms of
multinational deployment, may be absolutely vital, and may well
be an area of capability that even a country as powerful and with
as comprehensive a range of military capabilities as the United
States might well welcome in terms of a particular deployment.
In those ways NATO is strengthened by the expansion that we have
just seen.
3. When we visited the seven countries, we found
very prominent within each of the defence ministries very competent
and quite influential personnel from your own Department doing
a wide range of tasks, and all were lauded by the people they
were working together with. Now, after Prague, they have a difficult
task, a lot of demands placed upon them. Are we going to pull
the plug out of this assistance? Will it be maintained at the
present level? Will it be increased? Who pays for their being
seconded to defence ministries? If defence diplomacy is to work,
and it is, then I hope you will tell us very positively, Secretary
of State, that this excellent piece of British assistance to these
countries will be maintained and hopefully, if necessary, increased.
(Mr Hoon) I am certainly very grateful for your observations
and for those of the Committee, because it is something that I
am proud of. I think it is something that demonstrates the excellence
of the work done in the Ministry of Defence, because the reason
why our people are so welcome in a number of different countries
is that, of course, they reflect the very considerable abilities
that we have in the Ministry of Defence to develop policy and
to execute that policy—and this is very often something
that is particularly interesting to countries about to join NATO—as
well as how to organise the department in a way that makes sense.
I very strongly believe that the Ministry of Defence is the most
joined-up of government departments, having both the makers of
policy and the executors of policy working alongside. Indeed,
very often it is extremely difficult to distinguish whether those
people are from a military or a Civil Service background, and
I think that is enormously to the credit and strength of the Ministry
of Defence. Therefore, when individuals go to other countries,
part of what we are looking for is for them to have the ability
to influence and develop the policy or the structure and organisation
of a ministry of defence at the very highest level, and that seems
to be the case, largely because, my counterparts, other ministers,
permanent secretaries, chiefs of staff, recognise that what they
are getting from the United Kingdom is something that is so important
and so useful that they do not want to see it wasted at lower
levels in their administration. So I assure you that we will continue
to support this. We have already had requests for more support.
I think, generally speaking, the problem I face is trying to satisfy
the demand for such people in a number of different countries.
I assure you and I assure the Committee that we shall go on providing
that assistance so long as we can afford it and so long as we
have the individuals and, of course, the wish on the part of the
host nations to continue this work.
4. Can you drop us a note in due course about
the continuation on an individual basis, as you have been telling
us: Latvia, Person X, contract expires X date, to be replaced
by X, who is paying the salary, etc? This is one of the finest
external activities the Ministry of Defence is doing.
(Mr Hoon) I strongly agree with that, and I do want
to emphasize that there will be no lessening in our enthusiasm
for this simply because these seven nations have been admitted.
But clearly we deal with this on an ad hoc basis. It first of
all depends on the country in question wanting to continue the
relationship, and we encourage that wherever we can. It also depends
on us having individuals who are available and suitable for the
particular task in question. One of the things that we have seen
as countries have changed their organisational structure is that
they perhaps then want someone who is a specialist in terms of
financial accounting, so instead of looking at the big picture
of how a department operates, they will be concerned specifically
with how you ensure budgetary control, how you make sure that
the money that is available is reaching where it needs to go.
What we find is this is a developing process, and we are providing
different skills as countries become more sophisticated.
Mr Roy
5. The Summit declaration and the Prime Minister
alluded to the fact that we may not have seen the end of the enlargement
process, and 18 months down the line we could be looking at further
enlargement, maybe Albania and Macedonia. What are your thoughts
with regard to whether NATO should keep enlarging, keep growing
bigger and bigger, and if it does, will it not become weak round
the edges the more you bring in weaker countries? Is there a territorial
concept to NATO with further enlargement? Would that change the
whole remit of the organisation?
(Mr Hoon) I think those are very good questions, and
I think they go to the heart of NATO and what it does, and those
are things that we do have to face up to. Certainly we see the
prospect for further enlargement. One of the things that I did
whilst I was in Prague was to have meetings with my counterparts
from both Albania and Macedonia specifically to emphasize that
we did not regard this as an end to the process of enlargement,
that we wanted to see continuing reform there to allow both of
those countries to become members in due course. That really is
our position. We do see the benefits of enlargement. We do see
the importance of the partnership arrangements that I have described
perhaps maturing into membership in the way that the Membership
Action Plans have worked for those who have recently been offered
the prospect of membership. But I think we do then have to reconcile
the issues that you have set out, which is on the one hand, if
NATO continues to expand and becomes ever larger, does that potentially
threaten its coherence as a military alliance? I think there is
a tension here that we have got to face up to. NATO is a special
military alliance, and it should have particular military capabilities.
We do not want to see it simply turning into yet another international
organisation. We have plenty of opportunities of debating international
matters with our partners in the international community; we do
not need NATO to assume that form. We want to preserve its military
qualities and characteristics, and although no-one has sought
precisely to define geographical limitations, it would seem to
me that we might be guilty of breaching the Trades Descriptions
Act if we went too far beyond the North Atlantic area in terms
of our responsibilities. So I am not going to precisely define
it, but I think it is something that perhaps we will know when
we see it.
Mr Jones
6. The other day Eduard Shevardnadze in Georgia
was saying that he thought joining NATO might be an aim in the
future. Although you say there are not geographical borders being
drawn up yet, would you see, for example, the possibility of states
like Georgia coming into NATO?
(Mr Hoon) I do not think it is right at this stage
to make commentaries on individual countries in that way, but
I certainly see no reason why we should not have a broad definition
of what is Europe, and moreover why we should be seeking to exclude
countries who have had very good partnership arrangements with
NATO already. So I certainly would not rule that out.
Mr Hancock
7. Secretary of State, what do you now think
is more relevant to the prospects for getting the capability gap
improved at this time than we have had previously?
(Mr Hoon) I think that is a good question, because
I asked that question myself at a meeting of defence ministers
in Prague in the sense that everyone was enthusiastic about the
DCI and its prospects for improving NATO's capabilities at the
time that was agreed—I think it was at the Washington Summit—yet
it has not delivered as much as we might have wanted. It has delivered
some capability improvements but certainly not all of them. I
think we have learned lessons though from the DCI in terms of
shaping the Prague Capabilities Commitment, not least that it
is not as comprehensive. Instead of trying to provide the 57 varieties—I
think it is actually 59 varieties—of capability improvements,
we are concentrating on a smaller number, a smaller, more important
area of capability improvement. Equally, we are making individual
states much more responsible for the commitments that they enter
into. So it should not be as possible as perhaps it was for individual
states to take a step back when asked to volunteer for particular
improvements. But in the end—and this is what I said to
my fellow defence ministers—it will depend not simply on
defence ministers being willing to see capability improvements;
it will be something that has to engage the whole of government.
Whilst we had heads of state and heads of government present at
Prague, it is important that they also maintain the commitments
that their government has entered into, and not leave it simply
to defence ministries to struggle, often with inadequate budgets,
in order to deliver those improvements.
8. If that is the case, why is it not apparent
that some targets have been set for these capabilities to be brought
up to scratch? No real interim stage benchmarks have been established,
I understand. Has the capability audit that was carried out on
the aspiring and existing NATO countries now been put into such
shape that it can be made available to this Committee, for example?
(Mr Hoon) Target dates have been established. The
difficulty in terms of benchmarking, if I have understood your
question correctly, is obviously that you either have the capability
or you do not, and clearly we have seen a number of countries
entering into specific commitments—we ourselves have done
so—and we want to see those delivered, but frankly, you
are either going to deliver that military capability or you are
not.
9. Where do you stand on putting these countries
behind the right marker to say, "If you do not deliver, we
will take some sort of action"? Is action to be taken against
them if they do not fulfil their commitments? What are you going
to do to make them put their money where their mouth is?
(Mr Hoon) I think that is central to the difficulty
which an international organisation like NATO has. If I may say
so ,with respect, we need to think through the implications of
that in terms of national sovereignty, for example, because in
the end this is an alliance of sovereign nations, and each nation
has its own difficulties to balance commitments in defence as
against domestic priorities. That is true of the United Kingdom,
and it is true of any other member of the Alliance. Ultimately,
it will depend on peer pressure, on other countries who are prepared
to make that extra spending and enter into those commitments being
able to persuade their fellow Alliance members that they should
do the same. I accept that this is the inherent weakness of any
international organisation made up of those kinds of sovereign
states. If you are suggesting that there should be some overriding
constitutional arrangements, then I think that would go far beyond
anything that sovereign nations today are prepared to enter into.
10. Will it not turn into a two-tier NATO? There
will be the NATO members who are there because it is a good political
club to belong to, and there will be the NATO members who can
actually deliver the punch when it is required. The thing that
worries me is that some of the people who only have the political
commitment will have the right to veto what the ones who will
have to deliver the punch will be able to do.
(Mr Hoon) That is why it is important to look at the
capability requirements in the round. One of the changes, as I
indicated earlier, that has occurred since the DCI is the recognition
that we need to make an overall assessment of what NATO needs
as an alliance as against perhaps the individual political priorities
of particular member states. But I think I made the point in relation
to Frank's question earlier that there are these kinds of tensions
as NATO expands and enlarges, but our policy and priority is to
keep NATO as an effective military alliance. If we fail to do
that, we will have failed in an important plank of our policy,
because NATO will then be more influenced by those who are not
perhaps prepared to make effective military contributions. All
I would say to you is that you should not underestimate the significance
of a political commitment to take action. I am less worried in
the context of your question by those countries who are at least
prepared to enter into the political commitment to take action,
even if they themselves are not as well equipped to do it. I obviously
would prefer that they were both politically prepared and militarily
prepared. Nevertheless, providing that there is no inertia in
the system, I think the political commitment is equally important.
11. Were you satisfied as our Secretary of State
and a significant player in the NATO family to the commitment
to increase capabilities of the three countries who were allowed
to join in the previous enlargement?
(Mr Hoon) Certainly one of them, Hungary, has publicly
conceded that they have not done as much as they might have done
in terms of delivering their commitments, but one of the frustrations
undoubtedly of multinational, international organisations is that
different countries have different economic cycles, they are able
to commit to different projects in different timescales, there
will be fortunately in democratic societies elections, different
parties coming to government with different policies. Trying to
coordinate all of those different steps in a coherent whole is
extraordinarily difficult, and I think actually we should concentrate
on how successful we have been in keeping the Alliance moving
in the direction that I have described rather than perhaps warning
of the problems. There clearly are problems, but they are not
insurmountable, and frankly, the success of the Alliance is that,
by and large, we have been able to overcome them.
Syd Rapson
12. You have mentioned in your opening statement
that the capabilities gap will narrow by specialisation and some
sort of niche capability. Could I press you on how the Prague
commitment would allow member states to have interoperability
between each member state and the US in particular, which is getting
increasingly difficult? It seems that interoperability works against
specialisation and niche capabilities. Could you clear that up
for us?
(Mr Hoon) I do not think it does, but I can see how
it might. The whole point of trying to identify shortfalls and
how an alliance like NATO resolves them is that they first of
all need to be coherent. We need to be able to bring together
the various capabilities in order that they can work successfully.
Some of the key gaps that we have identified are certainly in
the areas of communication, and secure communication in particular.
I have made the point before—I do not know if I have made
it to the Committee but certainly to the House—about my
concern about the United States in particular is investing in
new technology in a way that means that, whilst US forces are
internally interoperable, they are not necessarily so with their
partners and allies, and might not be on an active deployment.
That is why we put so much emphasis in the New Chapter work on
ensuring that we make a significant investment in this area of
digitising our armed forces. That is going to be a challenge for
the Alliance as a whole, but in terms of designing niche capabilities,
they will have to be designed in order to fit in with the overall
framework. That seems to me to be ultimately easier than leaving
a particular country to say "Actually, we would rather like
to develop this particular kind of capability, and we will spend
whatever money it takes," and then hope that that fits in
with the overall scheme of things. It will have to be a top-down
description of the framework, and member states will then have
to subscribe to certain standards in the way in which they satisfy
their commitments obligation. Again, you are right to point out
the potential difficulty, but actually the deployment in Afghanistan,
for example, demonstrated that common standards of training, common
specifications on equipment have allowed a significant level of
interoperability already, and we need to go on developing that.
13. Could I stress the strategic lift capability,
which I see in some danger as the German parliament failed to
ratify the A400M project? What is being done to ensure that that
is not scuppered by this unfortunate German lack of enthusiasm?
(Mr Hoon) I gave an answer to the question from Mike
about the kind of difficulties that arise in relation to these
multinational projects. Elections, changes of policy, changes
of economic circumstances are difficult enough within one country;
when they are multiplied across a number of countries, that inevitably
causes rifts. If I can say, Syd, that I am more confident about
A400M's future than I have been for some time, that we have been
given real undertakings by the German Government that they will
go ahead, and in those circumstances, I feel confident that that
strategic lift issue will be addressed.
14. They will still be driving this project
forward?
(Mr Hoon) They are absolutely committed to ensuring
that A400M is delivered, yes.
Chairman
15. Which do the RAF want: the A400M or the
C-17s?
(Mr Hoon) The RAF is very pleased, as am I, with the
C-17s, but equally are looking forward to the delivery of A400M.
Mr Jones
16. May I raise something in terms of the technology
gap? There has been a lot written about the potential technology
gap between the European defence industries and the US. Do you
think that NATO should have a role in trying to encourage more
specialisation between the various countries in Europe in terms
of trying to not plug that gap, but ensure that research goes
further in terms of ensuring that the European defence industry
can not just compete with the United States, but actually is not
wasting money in trying to compete with things that are produced
by the United States, and perhaps give some type of opportunity
to the United States defence industry to have a relationship with
certain defence companies or countries developing certain products
rather than trying to emulate what has happened in the United
States, which just from a budget point of view the European defence
industries are never going to be able to compete?
(Mr Hoon) That is something that I think all secretaries
of state, not only for defence, but also for trade and industry,
for example, would have to grapple with. All I can say is that
it is a perfectly proper observation. I am not going to specifically
be able to answer it, because I think it will depend on particular
circumstances. All I would invite you to consider—and it
follows on from the Chairman's question—is whether you would
apply that, for example, to heavy lift aircraft. Would you say
that because the C-17 was there, a very successful aircraft, being
produced specifically in the first place for the United States
Air Force, we should as European nations have abandoned our ability
to develop a heavy lift aircraft of our own? It is a perfectly
proper argument, but I am afraid the generality needs to be put
into a specific context. There will clearly be areas, where we
are unable to compete with US industry, where we do buy directly
from US suppliers. Equally, I think it is vitally important for
our own technological base and for our own manufacturing industry
that we also seek to identify those areas where we are capable
of competing. It is unlikely with large-scale projects that that
will be the United Kingdom on its own; it will have to be the
United Kingdom working with partners. Some of those industrial
partners may well be American; they may equally be European. But
I am not sure that there is a "one size fits all" answer
to your question, because I think you have to ask whether this
is an area where UK or Europe would want to abandon any effort
to develop capability, given that it is likely that the United
States will be able to supply that equipment. I think you have
to be pragmatic and look at those areas where we have some strengths
and we have some capability as against those where we do not.
17. Do you think NATO has a role in trying to
encourage various European partners to actually cooperate in developing
not heavy lift, but other areas?
(Mr Hoon) I think the idea of identifying those shortfalls
that we need to fill does lead to some assessment of who might
and how we might do that, because it may well be that the answer
is NATO may say to the United Kingdom, "Please supply this
particular capability." It may say to a group of nations
that they collectively should procure heavy lift aircraft, for
example. On the other hand, I think one of the things that NATO
can achieve that individual nations are not able to do on their
own is the kind of solution that AWACS provides, where those countries
like the UK that already have such aircraft are excluded, but
on a subscription basis even a country with a relatively modest
defence budget can participate in the development of that capability
by paying an annual cost. So I think that there are various ways
of resolving the problem, which again leads me to the pragmatic
end of the answer rather than anything. I think that gives you
a comprehensive solution to the problem.
Chairman
18. I know it is not strictly Prague, but we
do not get to see you all that often. Further to what Kevan said
and I said, I think most people, if not all, on this Committee
would be delighted if the A400M is adopted. Our only concern is
at what stage will you have to say we really need the process
to start cranking out aircraft, because the RAF cannot wait indefinitely?
We said in a report we produced six months ago that if the A400M
is not deliverable, maybe Plan B should be activated. Are we anywhere
near that, bearing in mind this increasing commitment we have
to out-of-area activities? How long can we carry on with delayed
C-130Js and leased C-17s? Are we anywhere near that crisis point
where we might say, as the Government has done in the past, "Enough
is enough"?
(Mr Hoon) We are certainly not near any crisis point.
I accept that I would need to make a judgement if I felt that
there was a real prospect of A400M not being delivered, but that
is not the position. In fact, as I said in answer to Syd's question
earlier, I am more confident now than perhaps I have been in the
very recent past that A400M will be constructed and will be delivered.
Mr Cran
19. Secretary of State, you said very properly
in your statement, and I quote, "We will also be looking
to newly invited members to contribute perhaps through providing
key niche capabilities." Would it be fair for the Committee
to deduce from that that it is your view that the capability shortfall
is a problem for most of the other countries rather than the United
Kingdom and perhaps one or two others?
(Mr Hoon) Even the United States does not have at
any given time all of the capabilities that it requires to do
the A-Z of military activity. I do not say that because they would
not be able ultimately to generate such capabilities; it is simply
that whenever there is a requirement for capabilities, it comes
with a time line, and it may well be that that particular capability
is doing something else, or it may not be available in sufficient
numbers given the needs of that particular operation. We have
discussed before that the United States made very detailed requests
of the United Kingdom in the aftermath of the events of 11 September
because it was familiar with the capabilities that we had on offer,
but frankly, we had capabilities that were—I will not say
lacking, but were short at the particular time as far as the Americans
were concerned. So I do not think this emphasis on niche capability
should be taken as suggesting that somehow any one country—the
United States gets closest to it—is necessarily in a position
to provide the full range these days, because military operations
are ever more demanding, they are relying on ever more sophisticated
technology. I think it will be increasingly the case in fact that
countries cannot provide the full range of what might potentially
be necessary given the wide range of possible operations, which
is why we concluded in the Strategic Defence Review that increasingly
operations will be multinational. That is the direction in which
we will go, but the advantage that the concept of specialisation
brings, as I said earlier, is that the smallest nation may well
be capable of making a vital contribution alongside the largest
one.
|
