Examination of Witnesses(Questions 40-59)
WEDNESDAY 27 NOVEMBER 2002
RT HON
MR GEOFF
HOON MP, AIR
MARSHAL ROB
WRIGHT AFC AND
MR EDWARD
OAKDEN
40. How does it differ from the previous NATO
response forces, the ACE [3]Mobile
Force and the ARRC[4]?
(Mr Hoon) This is the force that would
be deployed to do the job and much more than the framework support
structure that you are describing. These would be forces that
would deploy into a theatre, into a crisis, and if necessary they
would fight.
41. Will they replace the ACE Mobile Force and
the ARRC?
(Mr Hoon) No. The idea is that they will be the front
end, if you like; they will be the force that will be available
to carry out the actual task on the ground. It is about readiness,
about deployability, and about sustaining them at the sharp end.
42. Is it planned that they will draw on the
same assets as the ARRC and the ACE Mobile Force?
(Mr Hoon) No.
(Air Marshal Wright) The ACE Mobile Force was very
much a legacy organisation, a multi-national organisation, designed
to put a footprint on the ground. With all the work that we have
done on the NATO force structure—the deployable, flexible,
out-of-area concept—we decided that in relation to the headquarters
about which I spoke earlier—ARRC is one, but there are eight—nations
would put forward to be developed as key mobile headquarters.
As I said earlier, ARRC is a template for the way in which we
shall operate. It will be one of the Command and Control elements
that will control the Response Force. The Response Force is a
vehicle for many things, not only capabilities. If one looks at
the panoply of what NATO is doing—the command structure
and the task force—with one of those land headquarters—ARRC
is one—controlling the land, the NATO Response Force will
fit within that, as will the air and maritime elements. It is
a total picture, and the whole thing is deployable and capable
at the top end of the spectrum if required, and critically at
very short notice.
43. They will be like a 15-hour assault brigade?
(Air Marshal Wright) Indeed.
(Mr Hoon) I think the analogy of our own spearhead
approach is the right one: having forces maintained at very high
readiness, able to move very quickly.
44. Has any decision been taken yet about what
the force will comprise, what contribution the UK will make and
what contribution other nations will make?
(Mr Hoon) We are still working on that. It is the
point that James was making earlier—he has gone now—that
we want other countries also to be in a position to maintain forces
at that level of readiness. That is a very different approach
from the one that generally is adopted. The whole concept of having
a force available at short notice, with all the logistic support
that is required, is something that we want to see other countries
being able to do as well as ourselves.
45. Did you have people sidling up to you saying,
"We would like to join you on this one", or was there
a sense of a degree of reluctance?
(Mr Hoon) No, I think there is a recognition in other
countries that this is something that they have not necessarily
tried before and that they will have to reorganise to achieve
it. It is exactly the point that I was making earlier about changing
concepts. If in the past, your concept was that you were required
to place large numbers of infantry personnel into a particular
place, but in a relatively relaxed timescale: you organised the
forces in a way to do that. This is a wholly different concept,
and, as we have found, a very challenging one. From the perspective
of the UK it is important that we do not assume too much responsibility
in the first place because we want others to develop a similar
kind of capability.
Mr Hancock
46. It will be difficult for many of those countries
to deliver any elements of those kinds of forces at all. Most
of them have conscript armies which train for fairly short periods
of time and they will not be available for that kind of deployment.
(Mr Hoon) Even if countries have conscript armies,
they have professional elements alongside them. I accept that
there is an issue in those countries that have conscript armies
about how much time, effort and resources they devote to conscription
as opposed to their professional forces, but they all have very
effective professional forces as well.
47. They are not very large elements.
(Mr Hoon) I disagree with you. I think if you check
the numbers you will find that they have significant professional
forces as well. France has only recently abandoned conscription
and no one suggests that France does not have a highly professional
and some very sharp-end forces that would readily satisfy the
terms of the NATO Response Force. Conscription is a bit of a red
herring. There are problems with conscription but I do not think
that it stops the development of these kinds of professional forces.
48. Did you sense that there was an agreement
among the members of the Alliance as to the purpose or usefulness
of this force, or did you sense that different countries had different
views?
(Mr Hoon) On the contrary, I would say that there
was very great enthusiasm. There is a recognition that it is precisely
the kind of force required to deal with the kinds of threats that
we face today. It is fair to say that the deployment to Sierra
Leone, for example, was widely admired by our European partners
as being something that they themselves would have liked to be
able to do but at that stage, at any rate, probably could not.
49. Are you confident that the timetable will
be met?
(Mr Hoon) Yes, I am. This is quite a modest-sized
force. James' question was about spending better rather than spending
more, about making sure that you embrace the concept and organise
the forces to be able to deliver.
50. The reality is that we are better placed
than any other country to do this because we are already independently
structured to deliver such a force, so the burden will fall upon
us. The question will arise that if there are two operations,
one involving this new NATO force and one involving the EU Rapid
Reaction Force, and we have commitments to both, which will take
priority?
(Mr Hoon) I have made it clear already that because
we are already organised in this way with significant elements
of our Armed Forces, it is important to give other countries the
opportunity to develop the same kind of approach. I had already
answered the question before you asked it.
51. I think there is a clear message and we
welcome that. What relationship do you envisage between this new
NATO force and the EU reaction force?
(Mr Hoon) There is a long answer which is that it
is about improving military capabilities. The United Kingdom is
wholly relaxed about whether that is done in the context of the
EU or NATO, providing at the end of the day we get better capabilities.
There are also comparisons to be made, as I have said already,
at the sharp-end, war-fighting force. The Peterberg tasks are
not designed at that level of war-fighting capability, but I see
no reason why ultimately they should not be amended in that direction.
I see no reason why, when we are concerned with improving capabilities,
that that should not be something that the EU should embrace as
part of a continuing process to refine the Peterberg tasks and
to develop this kind of tighter, sharper capability.
52. If, as we hope, the EU reaction force draws
on NATO structures and NATO planning and systems and if the NATO
reaction force is called into operation at the same time, do you
foresee that being a problem and that that will impose strains
and difficulties on NATO?
(Mr Hoon) That is why it is important in developing
these kinds of forces that we do not simply have one of them.
The ambition in relation to capability improvement is that we
have a choice, and that we shall have more than one set of these
forces available to be able to do the job. That may be over ambitious—at
the moment many countries do not have even one—but we have
just discussed the example of deployable headquarters. I suspect
five years ago that you may have been asking why the UK was the
only country essentially that was making a substantial contribution
to a deployable headquarters and now we see other countries prepared
to do the same. Gradually the lessons have been learned and the
capabilities improved. We want that to happen.
53. In relation to the reports in today's newspapers
about this new Franco-German operation which is going to have
integrated command capability, where will that fit into the new
arrangements? Is that yet another force that is being created
in Europe? Does it fit in with the EU force? Is it additional
to it? What will it do in relation to the NATO force?
(Mr Hoon) I do not think that you should get too excited
about what is a submission by France and Germany to a committee
that is looking at the long-term reform of the treaties governing
the European Union. I have met M. Barnier on a couple of occasions
lately and I have submitted some ideas on behalf of the United
Kingdom. They are ideas about longer-term thinking. I am sure
that the Committee would want all countries to engage in that
kind of long-term thinking. Certainly the United Kingdom is engaged
in that. I would not get to excited at this stage about what are
ideas. I am sure that Mr Howarth is not afraid of ideas.
54. I am not afraid of ideas. The Daily Telegraph
says that the Foreign Office is alarmed. I am not sure that your
soothing reassurance to the Committee sits with that, but of course
the newspaper may conceivably be in the wrong. Are you not concerned
that the French and the Germans are separately talking about a
combined force, a Franco-German force with its own doctrines and
integrated command capability at the same time as the other discussions
are taking place. Is that not creating confusion?
(Mr Hoon) These are ideas and I do not think that
we should be afraid of ideas. This is a submission to a committee
that is looking at the treaties governing the European Union and
what they may look like over the next 30 years. I think that we
should encourage other countries to have ideas, because out of
the process one day we may achieve something practical. As I said,
the United Kingdom has submitted our thinking on future developments
in the European Union. I hope that my ideas are also received
with as much enthusiasm as the Daily Telegraph appears
to have received these contributions from France and Germany.
It is an important part of the process of developing policy. They
are ideas and no more than that at this stage.
Mr Jones
55. Secretary of State, I want to turn to terrorism.
One of the issues at Prague was the endorsement of the military
concept of defence against terrorism. When you came before the
Committee just after 11 September you emphasised the importance
of intelligence in terms of the war against terrorism. Do you
share the concerns of Donald Rumsfeld that the West feels that
spies from the Soviet era will penetrate institutions in the new
NATO member states and thus access to NATO countries' secrets?
Do you have concerns that some aspirant countries are possibly
not as trustworthy as others and to use the Chairman's phrase,
that you would not trust them with a copy of the Daily Telegraph?
(Mr Hoon) Clearly, I do not in any way underestimate
the importance of security. The security of what NATO does is
absolutely paramount. I know that the Committee has visited a
number of countries that are likely to join NATO in due course.
Their level of criticism about our engagement, for example, sometimes
with the Russian Federation is remarkable, because understandably
most of those countries are pretty suspicious of the Russian Federation,
given their own recent history. If you go to the Czech Republic,
you will not find wild enthusiasm for Russia because of what happened
in 1968. The same is true of the Baltic states. I think the idea
is a little far fetched, that citizens of those countries, who
have had relatively recent experience of the Soviet Union and
what it meant for their own people, are likely to become spies
on behalf of the Russian Federation. In my view that is just a
little unrealistic.
56. You disagree then?
(Mr Hoon) I am trying to be polite.
57. Yes?
(Mr Hoon) Yes.
58. In terms of the war against terrorism, one
of the roles identified was the idea of NATO assuming a role in
home defence. Can you explain exactly what that means? Is it around
Article 5, or is it something else that NATO could assist in homeland
defence of member states?
(Mr Hoon) The first thing to say about homeland defence,
as far as the United Kingdom is concerned, is that the role of
the Armed Forces is always in response to a request from the civilian
authorities. It seems to me that that principle should apply equally
to any request for, say, the use of our military forces in assisting
in the internal defence of any other member of the Alliance. Clearly,
in light of the appalling events of 11 September, it is not difficult
to envisage circumstances in which other countries may make such
a request particularly if there were devastation on a wide scale.
It is important to get the structures right. For me the structure
would be that there would have to be a request from the civilian
authorities for the use of military assets in the way in which
they are used in the United Kingdom in support of the civilian
power. We would need to keep that framework clear before engaging
in anything along those lines.
Patrick Mercer
59. I have three brief questions. On chemical
and biological warfare, the CBW initiatives were discussed at
Prague. What was the British contribution to that?
(Mr Hoon) We can now deploy two brigades with full
personnel protective equipment. Between now and 2005 we want to
see a significant improvement in our detection capabilities. We
are working on that.
3 Allied Command Europe. Back
4
ACE Rapid Reaction Corps. Back
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