Examination of Witnesses(Questions 80-99)
WEDNESDAY 27 NOVEMBER 2002
RT HON
MR GEOFF
HOON MP, AIR
MARSHAL ROB
WRIGHT AFC AND
MR EDWARD
OAKDEN
80. On that specific question that I put to
you, at Prague did other NATO members indicate that they were
themselves keen—as I understand Italy might be and possibly
the Netherlands—to join with the United States in committing
funds to participate in the programme of developing the technology
to deal with missile attack?
(Mr Hoon) There was no specific discussion about the
commitment of funds. Clearly, that is a matter for individual
nations to decide. I think I mentioned in the Statement that I
made to the House that there has been a briefing by the United
States of NATO allies in recent months about the US thinking in
this area. That has clearly stimulated a debate here and in other
countries. It is too soon to say what other countries will decide.
It is important that the United Kingdom engages in that debate
and reaches some early conclusions.
Mr Crausby
81. Moving on to organisational reform, the
Prague summit declaration gives details of an agreement to streamline
NATO's military command arrangements. What stage did those decisions
reach? What details remain to be resolved and what interest has
the British Government in the outcome of those deliberations?
(Mr Hoon) You are talking about the NATO command structure
and the NATO reform. There was quite significant work at a fairly
advanced stage. We have now produced a generic outline of what
NATO needs for its overall headquarters structure. The acronym
used is MMR—Minimum Military Requirement—which means
that we have surplus headquarters at present and we shall reduce
that to a requirement, the detail of which I shall not go into
now. It was agreed by Heads of State and over the next six months
that will be drawn up, the geography will be applied and the structure
will be developed. There is a considerable reduction in overall
size of our current structure, which is very much statically orientated.
Another significant factor is the development of our two strategic
commands, SACLANT and SACEUR, into two commands one of which will
be responsible for transformation linking transatlantically to
the US and will take forward future capabilities and developments
as a CJTF[5]strategic
headquarters. The other headquarters, currently known as SACEUR,
will look after all operations and so on. There is quite a clear
definition of responsibility and a clear link between the two
to take forward NATO's overall capabilities. That is a very significant
change in the way in which we have been doing things since the
last change in 1991.
Syd Rapson
82. On the two strategic headquarters—one,
the strategic command, which clearly will be based in America
and one, the ops command, will be in Belgium—how will they
be able to co-ordinate and work together when they seem to be
two separate strategic commands?
(Air Marshal Wright) It is fairly early days in terms
of the detail. Transformation command will be responsible for
all joint doctrine, concepts and education and the operations
command will be responsible for the exercising of capabilities.
In all those areas there will be a supporting relationship. The
Defence Planning Element, which will be in Europe, will be linked
very closely. SACEUR clearly has the need to identify the capabilities
that are needed in the near term and the transformation command
can link to that in partnership, looking at the future capabilities,
say, beyond eight years. Training is an area where you will see
great linkage. Under transformation command, for example, will
be a joint lessons-learned analysis centre. It is very important,
as the UK has learned, to draw out lessons learned to apply them
to new exercises and to apply them to new capabilities. For example,
the transformation command will analyse an exercise that the operational
command is running. It will play the lessons learned back to the
operations command to implement in the shorter term and play them
back to transformation command for the longer term. Equally, transformation
command may come to the operations commander and say, "We
need to run an experimentation exercise on capabilities".
These are early days, but it is very much a partnership and a
much clearer delegation of responsibilities and an avoidance of
duplication.
83. I appreciate that. I shall watch how it
evolves, but it is early days. When you talk about geographic
commands, that is a sensitive area, as we know when we went to
Europe and spoke to NATO. Are Norway and Portugal likely to lose
their involvement in this? Will they be compensated? Because they
have command structures geographically in their countries they
feel that they are part of the team, but they will probably be
the two losers. Will there be any compensation?
(Mr Hoon) Perhaps I can emphasise that there were
no geographical decisions taken at Prague in that sense. The NATO
Military Authorities have been tasked to develop the issue of
geography and to report to the NATO spring ministerial meetings
in June of next year. The Air Marshal has set out the principles;
the question now is to translate those principles into geographical
practice, if I can put it that way. We have not arrived at that
stage yet.
84. Was it delayed because it is a sensitive
issue and you did not want to spoil Prague?
(Mr Hoon) It is a process of change and transition.
We are going from a significant number of relatively static headquarters
to something that is far more deployable and flexible. In a sense,
over the next period those countries that agree with you to this
extent are at risk of losing their static headquarters, and may
well want to put forward an argument as to why that may not be
the case, as to why it may be appropriate, for example, to have
a fixed headquarters in the southern part of NATO's territory
looking across at potential threats from the south. That is a
perfectly proper argument and one that we shall have to take on
board in considering how to apply those principles to the practicalities.
We should not lose sight of the fact—I hope that this is
wholly consistent with what I have said to the Committee all morning—that
NATO itself needs to transform. Too many of its physical structures
are still based on the kind of concept that we had in the Cold
War. Alongside the changes that nation states are making, we need
to look at how NATO itself is re-organised to reflect modern,
strategic threats.
85. What is the nature of the new mobile headquarters?
How will they be staffed? We understand that there is a shortage
of English speaking commanders for the mobile headquarters. Can
you go into detail on that?
(Mr Hoon) There is progress. I think we have dealt
with this already. From a single deployable headquarters, we have
four?
(Air Marshal Wright) We have six and we will eventually
have eight.
(Mr Hoon) There is a process by which each of the
deployable headquarters goes through a certification process,
to see whether it is capable. We have not quite got to the eight
yet, but there is very significant progress.
(Air Marshal Wright) There will be six at the end
of December. In terms of the English speaking aspect, all the
headquarters are multinational with at least ten nations or more
. They will all operate in English. Nations are deciding where
to put their main effort. You will see a preponderance of UK personnel
in some headquarters and fewer in others. All nations are doing
that. They are all fully manned, which is one of the certification
requirements, and they all have the right degree of multi nationality.
Syd Rapson: I am glad to hear it.
Patrick Mercer
86. Going back to NATO headquarters itself,
I gather that there is a package of measures being produced to
improve their effectiveness and efficiency. How have the powers
of the Secretary-General in relation to the internal operation
been changed at Prague?
(Mr Hoon) Again, that is an area where we want to
see change. We have supported very strongly George's efforts to
modernise the structures of bureaucracy internally. I was tempted
to respond to Gerald's earlier point about committees. We believe
that there are something like 400 odd committees in NATO and we
would like to see a significant reduction. As ever, we have to
reduce the right ones. That is work in progress.
Chairman
87. The MOD has an appalling labyrinth of committees.
(Mr Hoon) I could not accept that.
Chairman: Far more than 400, I venture to suggest.
Mr Howarth
88. I think you are being told how many.
(Mr Hoon) I was hoping for the answer, but it did
not come very quickly. The technology is not yet that responsive.
Patrick Mercer
89. What discussions have there been over the
future working practices of the NAC?
(Mr Hoon) That is a more practical way of putting
the same question that I had earlier about the impact of enlargement.
Those are issues that we are working on. I cannot say that there
are specific conclusions yet, but the issues are difficult because
clearly this is an Alliance of sovereign nations and anything
that impacts on any one country's sovereignty is of great significance.
It involves the potential deployment of their armed forces. We
need to be quite cautious about this. We need to ask the question:
how would we feel if in any way our sovereignty was breached.
I am sure that Gerald, James and maybe you, Patrick, would be
the first to complain if decisions were taken to deploy Britain's
Armed Forces without that being referred back to Parliament and
to a British government.
Mr Howarth
90. Quite right.
(Mr Hoon) You would just like other people to give
up their sovereignty but not us.
Patrick Mercer
91. We have heard about informal groupings of
key states holding pre-meeting meetings.
(Mr Hoon) Which informal groupings?
92. We have heard of informal gatherings at
the NAC; that there are pre-meeting meetings
(Mr Hoon) I do not think that I admitted to that,
as I recall.
93. I am not suggesting that you have, but that
has come to the Committee from other sources.
(Mr Hoon) I am sure that countries have the ability
to meet as and when necessary to discuss a whole range of things
that may or may not come before the NAC.
Mr Howarth
94. That is a very good barrister's answer.
(Mr Hoon) No, I ask the questions!
Patrick Mercer
95. There has been a strict limit to and in
fact no increase at all to NATO's administrative budget. We are
told zero growth. Is it likely to remain so or will there be some
rethinking on that?
(Mr Oakden) A settlement has just gone through but
it is a less than one per cent increase.
Chairman
96. Perhaps you could drop us a line on that?
(Mr Hoon) It is fair to say that the Secretary-General
has made his views on this well known to member states.
Syd Rapson
97. On Russia, we live in unusual times. The
Warsaw Pact countries are now part of NATO which must be satisfying
to some extent. They are all in with the exception of Russia and
NATO is now within 100 kilometres of St Peterburg. It is unusual.
The relationship between Russia and NATO is extremely good. I
think it is based upon a personal relationship between President
Putin, President Bush and our own Prime Minister who plays a significant
role in keeping this personal relationship going. At the Prague
summit there was talk of deepening and broadening the relationship
and co-operation with Russia. How is that to be done? My interpretation
may be wrong, because a personal relationship between the three
men cannot be the only thing, but it is the most important. How
can NATO encourage more intensity to the co-operation and deepening
which is satisfying and for which we are grateful?
(Mr Hoon) From our point of view, I think that can
be done by engaging in practical co-operation. One of the weaknesses
of previous arrangements was that they tended to be based on the
exchange of rather fine-sounding phrases, but they were not always
backed up by practical action. What we have seen since the NATO
Russia Council first met at the Rome summit in May is that we
have sought to concentrate on specific issues, looking at the
way in which we are engaged in peacekeeping, making assessments
together of terrorist threats, looking at the way in which our
forces may work together. Certainly from the UK's point of view,
I have had conversations with my Russian counterpart, and we want
to see something that is very practical. The co-operation between
the UK and Russia, particularly since 11 September, has been remarkable,
but at a very practical level, which is where I think the real
progress needs to be made.
98. Sensible progress is the way forward.
(Mr Hoon) Yes. Sitting around a table of 20, or 27
as it will be soon, I think the weakness was that there tended
to be rather theoretical discussions about co-operation. Since
May we have tried to have items on the table that allow us to
do something as a result of the discussions. That makes a real
difference.
Mr Jones
99. I want to turn to relations with the Ukraine.
The declaration from Prague was quite positive on the relationship
between NATO and the Ukraine. That was obviously against a backdrop
of the controversy around the sale of radar to Iraq. How do you
see relationships developing, especially when you have bellicose
noises coming out of Ukraine, quotes from the FT and Mr Kuchma's
spokesman who has made it quite clear that the unfounded allegations
should be cast aside and that Ukraine's national interests and
national status should be respected. To what extent is Kuchma
himself an obstacle to better NATO/Ukraine relations? How do you
see that going forward? I know we had an adept change of language
to get the seating plan right in Prague. How do you see it developing?
(Mr Hoon) I went to Ukraine immediately after the
NATO informal meeting in Warsaw. It is fair to say that we had
a fairly vigorous exchange about allegations concerning the sale
of radars to Iraq. I put the concerns fairly bluntly to the president
and indeed to my counterpart. It is fair to say that they offered
to co-operate in investigating the matter and efforts have been
made to pursue those investigations. You are right, it still means
that we are concerned about the evidence and it is a matter that
we continue to look at very carefully. It is perhaps indicative
of the kind of changes that are necessary in the Ukraine, so that
those kinds of allegations cannot arise again, and if they do
arise, they are investigated thoroughly and the government takes
appropriate action. That is part of a wider reform that is necessary
in Ukraine in order to allow us to feel more confident about their
progress towards eventual membership of NATO. That indeed is their
ambition.
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