Supplementary memorandum submitted by
the Ministry of Defence (30 January 2003)
Geographical areas where there are difficulties
recruiting and reasons for those difficulties, picking up also
on whether there is any relationship with the presence or otherwise
of cadet forces.
There are problems in achieving targets in all
areas of the UK with quality being an issue as well as quantity.
This is nothing new; apart from the odd brief spell it has been
very hard to fully recruit the Army for the last 250 years. This
is unsurprising given that it can be a difficult and dangerous
job and for many is not perceived as an aspirational career. Specific
issues at present include the decline in the Army footprint and
the Army's need for more able individuals with better qualifications.
Traditionally, many recruits have come from the academically less
qualified. This issue is being addressed, but there remains a
perception amongst the general public that the Army is not a good
career for those with higher educational qualifications.
Additionally, the target market (16-24 year
olds) has decreased; this is compounded by low unemployment and
greater encouragement and opportunity for further education as
well as increasing social mobility and ease of travel, resulting
in a greater range of work opportunities. Modern lifestyles that
are not in tune with the demands of the Army are also a factor.
There are some specific regional issues of interest.
In Scotland, there has been a decline in overall numbers despite
the ratio of recruits to population being higher than the rest
of the UK. Scotland provided a considerable number of recruits
under the old Junior Entry schemes in the late 1980s and early
1990s. Although alternative Junior Entry routes into the Army,
such as the Army Foundation College and the School Leaver's Schemes,
have been introduced, these have failed to return Scottish enlistment
to earlier levels.
In London, the reduction of the Army footprint,
higher wages, greater social mobility, and no great recruiting
tradition have contributed to the difficulties. Similar effects
have been felt in all rural areas where the problem of increased
social mobility is a particular factor. This inevitably affects
all rural county regiments.
On the specific question of whether there is
a relationship between poorly performing areas and the presence
or otherwise of cadet forces, the evidence is inconclusive. However
it is undoubtedly true that there are not many cadet forces in
rural areas, and it is in rural areas that it is hardest to recruit.
At present only one army cadet in every eight joins the Army,
an issue which is being addressed.
RTR recruitment problems in Liverpool.
We believe this refers to 1 Royal Tank Regiment
(1 RTR). From an ATRA perspective, there are no major recruitment
problems associated with Liverpool. The output from the Liverpool
Armed Forces Careers Office is down 10% on last year's performance
which equates to approximately 20 fewer recruits, which is not
very significant overall and is commensurate with a slight downturn
in numbers recruited from throughout the North West region this
year. It has been a traditionally rich area for producing recruits
and it is also an area in which many of the battalions as well
as technical corps recruit.
The experiment in the use of the private sector
for recruiting in Scotland.
The Scottish Recruiting Trial involved the outsourcing
(to a civilian recruitment company) of specific aspects of the
Army recruiting operation in Scotland. The Army infrastructure
was to be used for traditional "outreach" purposes,
ie maintaining contact with schools and local organisations, whilst
the commercial company would be responsible for marketing activities
and for handling the responses to those initiatives. The aim of
the trial was "to test the hypothesis that a civilian recruitment
company would deliver lower recruitment costs and improved recruit
quality". The trial results failed to prove this hypothesis.
The civilian company had a number of difficulties,
which contributed to the failure of the trial. In the initial
trial period, the company admitted that attracting public interest
and commitment was an area not suited to commercial operations.
The co-lateral to this is that the Army has found that the surest
way to achieve public interest and commitment is through direct
Service contact; hence the use of Regimental Recruiting Teams
(RRTs). Another concern was a low pass rate at Recruit Selection
Centre (RSC). Correctly the company applied commercial pressures
to the operation with less time being spent on briefing, interviewing
and counselling; but this led to increased candidate failure at
RSC. The company eventually achieved high pass rates but only
by lengthening the process, thereby increasing costs.
A further factor was the company found it difficult
to cope with the weight of administration attending entry into
the Army. The number of unavoidable checks and clearances required
for Army entry generate a heavy administrative load, which added
to the company's costs.
Several lessons were learnt from the trial,
and have now been incorporated into the recruiting operation.
A revised Applicant Processing service, using selected and trained
civil servants, has been developed, as this was an area where
military input was not essential. A need for good quality, local
level information delivery on the Army as a career was identified
early in the trial. Fully trained mobile recruiters with the necessary
equipment are best placed to deliver this and their processing
duties are now undertaken by civil servants. These measures are
designed to reduce overall wastage by improving the quality of
input and by managing applicants with sensitivity and care so
as to reduce wastage during the process.
Detailed statistics on recruitment of Ethnic Minorities.
The following chart shows details of all Ethnic
Minorities (EM) enlisted in the period April to December 2002.
These are collated from internal ATRA figures and may not exactly
correspond with published EM statistics for the Armed Forces as
a whole, which are collated and published by the Defence Analytical
Services Agency (DASA):
| Regional Area |
| Cohorted
Countries (1)
| UK EM(2) | Commonwealth
"Freeflow" (3)
| Total EM |
| Scotland | | 53
| 8 | 10 | 71
|
| Northern Ireland | | 3
| 1 | 0 | 4 |
| N W England | | 8
| 18 | 8 | 34
|
| N E England | | 21
| 44 | 30 | 95
|
| Wales | | 2
| 9 | 2 | 13
|
| W Midlands | | 29
| 41 | 52 | 122
|
| E Midlands and E Anglia | |
26 | 28 | 34 |
88 |
| S W England | | 86
| 16 | 9 | 111
|
| S and S E England | | 231
| 20 | 20 | 271
|
| London | | 45
| 50 | 377 | 472
|
| TOTAL EM Enlistments | |
504 | 235 | 542
| 1,281 |
| TOTAL Enlistments | |
| | | 9,985
|
| EM Percentage of total Enlistments
| 5.0 % | 2.35 % | 5.43 %
| 12.83 % |
NOTES: (1) Cohorted
Countries: Those where we have sent Commonwealth Selection Teams
to select potential recruits prior to them coming to the UK for
final selection and training—Fiji, St Lucia and St Vincent
& the Grenadines.
(2) UK Citizens of EM origin.
(3) Commonwealth citizens who are recruited in the UK,
ie those who have travelled to the UK under their own steam and
who are enlisted through UK Recruiting Offices.
Additionally, it should be noted that there is an ongoing
re-survey exercise to align ethnic origin markers with the new
codes used in the 2001 National Census.
The reasons for current limits on the number of Gurkhas being
recruited.
The Department's plans ensure that all defence activity is
guided by clear and coherent priorities, which in turn establish
the requirement for infantry capability. The Gurkhas provide two
of the 40 infantry battalions in the British Army. The ethos of
the Gurkhas is based on their core role of providing infantry
soldiers and this is enshrined in the structure of the Brigade
of Gurkhas. In order to maintain the ethos of the Brigade the
proportion of infantry to other arms must remain balanced. Gurkhas
also provide specialist formed units of engineers, logisticians
and signallers. In recent years Gurkha units have made important
contributions to Peace Support Operations, including in East Timor,
Sierra Leone and the Balkans.
We recognise the part that the annual recruitment of Gurkhas
plays in the overall strength of the Army. The Committee will
be aware that towards the end of 1996 manning shortfalls in some
infantry battalions necessitated the formation, on a temporary
basis, of three Gurkha Reinforcement Companies. Encouragingly,
infantry numbers have increased during the past 12 months enabling
a Gurkha Reinforcement Company to be disbanded, with another to
follow in April this year and the final one in 2004. Despite the
reduced requirement for infantry reinforcements, we intend to
maintain Gurkha force levels at around 3,500 in order to create,
as announced last July (Official Report, 15 July 2002,
Column 23W), two permanent Gurkha sub-units—a Queen's Own
Gurkha Logistic Squadron and a Queen's Gurkha Signal Squadron.
This move will ensure that the Army is able to deliver enhancements
envisaged under the Strategic Defence Review.
Statistics on the number of suicides among recruits.
Over the 21 years 1982-2002, a total of 14 soldiers undergoing
initial training have died within the categories of suicide and
open verdict. One further case awaits a coroner's hearing bringing
the overall total to 15. This figure should be viewed in the context
of the approximately 250,000 soldiers who have passed through
basic training in the Initial Training Organisation (ITO) during
that time. The net occurrence rate based on the average resident
figure appears to be about 10 per 100,000, which is close to the
"adjusted male whole population rate" in the relevant
age groups (16-19 for the majority of trainees). This suggests
that viewed within the significance limits of the very small sample
size, the ITO has not been a markedly dangerous environment. The
deaths can be subdivided as follows:
Firearms. Seven cases, of which six were on guard duty
(including four at Deepcut) and one was off duty in barracks.
This latter case may have occurred during the earliest stages
of training equating to the current Phase 1.
Other causes within barracks. Six cases, with hanging
as the predominant means.
Outside barracks. Two cases: one drug overdose, and
one hanging.
By verdict. Of the 15 cases; six were suicides/took
their own life, seven were open, one is awaiting a coroner's verdict
and one is unrecorded (a 16 year old who hanged himself in 1982).
The Committee also referred to a recent written Parliamentary
Answer, which referred to a target to reduce the per capita
cost of training a recruit. The following is provided to answer
specific questions on this:
The target referred to is one of five "headline"
targets which underpin the MoD's new, output-focused system for
driving and measuring efficiency. This system was described in
the information given by MoD to the Committee on 7 October 2002[14]
(in the response to Q5). Further detailed information on the "headline"
targets is given in MoD's Service Delivery Agreement and the supporting
Technical Note (copies available on www.mod.uk ).
Briefly, each is drawn from one of five high-level enabling
processes which support the delivery of military capability; and
between them they form the basis for measuring MoD's progress
against its value-for-money target to achieve average year-on-year
output efficiency gains of 2.5% between 2002-03 and 2005-06[15].
The target to reduce by an average of 6% the per capita
cost of training a successful military recruit to the agreed standard
is an aggregation of individual targets for the Royal Navy, Army
and Royal Air Force. It tracks the cost of the initial military
training of recruits from the point they first join the relevant
Service and start to draw down a salary, through to when they
leave the relevant training organisation[16]
and are posted, usually to one of the Front Line Commands. It
is important to note that the efficiency "gain" is not
necessarily synonymous with reduced cost. This particular target
is a "unit cost" measure and thus achievement can be
either through reduced cost, or increased output (ie training
more people for the same cost), or both.
The new efficiency system is still in the process of being
introduced and precise figures and profiles for the ATRA target
have not yet been agreed. It is, therefore, too early to give
definitive figures for progress against this four-year target.
A full report of progress against all the "headline"
targets will be published later in the year in MoD's Performance
Report for 2002-03.
How much use do you currently make of the private sector to
provide training? What scope is there for expanding this?
ATRA has three projects under which the private sector provides
training:
The Army Foundation College (AFC), Harrogate:
All general vocational education and IT skills training on
the course at the AFC is provided by the private sector as part
of a Foundation Modern Apprenticeship. This amounts to some 30%
and includes some support to initiative (ie development) training
as well. All other training focuses on basic military skills,
which cannot be transferred to the private sector.
Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (REME) Training Group
The private sector provides approximately 80-85% of training
contact time with Phase 2 and 3 trainees across REME Training
Group. Phase 1 trainees also receive academic training at the
Army Technical Foundation College as part of our existing contract.
There is only limited scope for expanding this.
Armour Centre
At the Armour Centre the majority (in the region of 90-95%)
of Phase 2 training is carried out by the private sector as part
of the Facilities Management Contract and covers such areas as
driving and maintenance of Armoured Fighting Vehicles, Communications
and Gunnery training. The reverse is the case for Phase 3 training
which is predominantly taught by military instructors who are
considered best placed to carry out such training.
The present training requirement within the Facilities Management
Contract has been included as a core requirement of the Armoured
Vehicle Training Service Private Finance Initiative (PFI), which
is currently being prepared for Main Gate submission. The contractor
management of training may be increased as a result of the PFI
option.
In the longer term, do you expect ATRA to establish the sort
of "decider"/"provider" split that DLO is
pursuing?
The ATRA already has a process known as the Statement of
Training Requirement (SOTR), which is the Customer Supplier Agreement
between the ATRA and its customers (LAND Command/Defence Logistics
Organisation/RN/RAF and others). The Arms and Services Directors
act as customer Agent for their specific military discipline and
determine both the quantity and quality of training required in
output terms across the Short Term Plan. The ATRA then costs the
requirement and builds it into its budget submission.
At the moment the bidding process for the Public Private Partnership
for the Royal School of Military Engineers at Chatham is in its
final stages. What are the expected benefits of this PPP?
Is this an approach you expect to see extended to other parts
of the ATRA?
The expected benefits of this particular PPP include: more
cost-effective training; rationalisation of the Estate; the release
of military manpower to the frontline and improvements to the
infrastructure. This approach will be considered for other areas
of ATRA and for the rationalisation of specialist training under
the Defence Training Review. Potential projects, wholly within
the ATRA, are the Army Foundation Project and the Royal Military
Academy, Sandhurst.
In the last two years you have earned around £11 million
from "repayment customer", most of which (more than
£7 million) has been for training. Who are these repayment
customers and what training do you provide for them?
— Are you allowed to retain that income?
— Do you have a target to increase your income from
non-MoD sources?
— Bearing in mind incidents such as the Minley drowning
(of a member of Charlton FC's youth team) are you satisfied that
the ATRA is properly staffed, trained and equipped to handle the
liability issues that can so easily arise from this activity stream?
The majority of customers are Armed Forces personnel from
other countries. We have a long tradition of assisting to train
allies and Commonwealth countries. Increasingly, military training
is used to support Defence Diplomacy and to ensure a consistent
cross-Government (FCO and DfID) approach to countries where our
Government wishes to have influence. All countries must be approved
by MoD before they have access to training. Training is normally
for officers and covers most of the key areas such as infantry,
armour, engineers, artillery, communications, and mechanical and
electrical engineering. In addition, various specialist skills
are also taught. This includes bomb disposal, mine clearance and
other similar training that assists countries in dealing with
disasters.
The ATRA is permitted to retain this income.
Collectively, ATRA sets an annual target for Income Generation
(from all sources) for all its Operating Divisions, which is used
to make up ATRA's net budget. Once this target is achieved, any
additional income may be retained by the unit.
HQ ATRA has dedicated staff to assist all units engaged in
this type of activity. Comprehensive guidance notes have been
published and each activity undertaken must be supported by a
Project Information Datasheet (submitted to the HQ before progressing
the activity), which is designed to identify, manage and minimise
risk. Training is being developed by MoD and the Civil Service
College and the first course will be delivered In February 2003.
This whole area of activity is currently under review to identify
the required staffing levels and to ensure that procedures and
policy minimise liability and maximise benefit. Benefit must be
greater than income alone, and should include PR, recruiting,
greater public awareness and experience for ATRA instructors.
14
Under the HCDC Liaison Officers letter D/Parliamentary/21/40. Back
15
Including through a 20% output efficiency gain in the Defence
Logistics Organisation. Back
16
The Naval Recruiting & Training Agency, the Army Training
and Recruiting Agency, or the RAF Training Group Defence Agency. Back
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