Background to this inquiry
6. In February 2002 the Committee visited Washington
DC, two months after the US gave formal notice (on 13 December
2001) of its intention to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty, which would otherwise prevent the US developing
its 'Missile Defence' programme. [6]
While there we received a comprehensive briefing from General
Kadish and his colleagues at the Missile Defence Agency. We also
discussed missile defence with members of the Administration,
including in the Pentagon, and others. We returned convinced that
the US Government was committed to pursuing an active development
programme of missile defence technologies that would otherwise
have been constrained by the ABM Treaty, with a view to deployment
within a few years. It was also clear that that programme would
require at some point an upgrade to the Ballistic Missile Early
Warning System radar at RAF Fylingdales in North Yorkshire, and
that the US Government would need to seek the agreement of our
Government to make that upgrade. We discuss the reasons for this
upgrade in more detail below.
7. On our return from Washington, we explored the
position of the UK Government in two evidence sessions, first
with MoD officials[7] on
27 February[8] and then
with the Secretary of State on 20 March 2002.[9]
8. Over the following months the US continued with
a series of tests, a number of which were successful. In June
at the expiry of the required notice period, it abrogated the
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty which prohibited the deployment
by Russia or the United States of any missile defence system of
the scale to which the US was now committed. Internationally the
proliferation of ballistic missile technologies became a matter
of increasing concern. The pressure on Iraq to permit the return
of the UN weapons inspectors was on grounds of Iraq's continuing
efforts to develop longer range missiles as well as its pursuit
of weapons of mass destruction. Despite a missile testing moratorium,
there were no signs of North Korea terminating its ballistic missile
programme, and it continued to demonstrate a willingness "to
sell complete ballistic missile systems to anyone who has the
hard currency and is prepared to buy them".[10]
India and Pakistan each tested ballistic missiles.
9. On 17 October 2002 in a debate in the House of
Commons the Secretary of State announced that he had commissioned
some detailed analytical work on the implications of missile defence
and its relationship with other elements of a comprehensive strategy
against the ballistic missile threat.[11]
He added that the Government would welcome parliamentary and public
discussion of the issues involved. On 9 December the outcome of
that analytical work was published as a 'public discussion paper'
on missile defence. The US request for the upgrade at RAF Fylingdales
was received just 8 days later, on 17 December. And as we have
noted, the Secretary of State announced on 15 January 2003 that
his preliminary conclusion was to agree to the request, and we
have subsequently learned from the MoD that it wishes to make
its formal decision before the end of this month.
10. In effect the Government has made it difficult
to have any meaningful public or parliamentary debate over whether
the UK should agree to the US request. In announcing its preliminary
conclusion less than a month after the receipt of the request,
and only a little more than a month after publishing its discussion
paper, it has dismissed rather than responded to, or in any other
way addressed, the concerns and arguments of those who oppose
the upgrade. The first part of this period took in the Christmas
recess, and the House was only given an opportunity to discuss
missile defence following the Secretary of State's statement of
15 December 2002 and in the Defence in the World debate on 22
January 2003. Unsurprisingly, that latter debate was dominated
by issues relating to a possible conflict in Iraq. We cannot agree
with the Secretary of State's assertion that there were "three
months of vigorous debate" after his brief statement of last
October.[12]
11. We can identify no compelling external factors
which might have obliged the Government to announce its decision
so soon. Mr Hoon told us on 15 January that "I am anxious
to complete this process reasonably quickly", but also that
"the timing of any response ... is not driven by any specific
deadline"[13] and
that the " [upgrade] work would begin probably towards the
end of this year and take in the order of some two years to complete".[14]
On 21 January, our Chairman asked the Prime Minister (who was
giving evidence to the Liaison Committee) whether he knew why
a deadline of 31 January had been imposed on us, and whether perhaps
it related to his visit to the United States at the end of the
month. The Prime Minister's response was that he did not know
the reason, but he would find out.[15]
We set out our views on the arguments about the Fylingdales upgrade
in more detail below, but first we emphasise that we deplore
the manner in which the public debate on the issue of the upgrade
has been handled by the Ministry of Defence. It has shown no respect
for either the views of those affected locally by the decision
or for the arguments of those opposed to the upgrade in principle.
Despite the Secretary of State's unequivocal statement that he
wanted the decision to be informed by public and parliamentary
discussion, he has acted in a way that has effectively prevented
such discussions. And he has offered no good reason for doing
so.
The Committee's future plans
12. Beyond the decision on RAF Fylingdales, however,
there is a need for a broader debate on missile defence. This
debate needs to address the range of threats presented by ballistic
missiles, both now and in the future. It needs to consider to
what extent these threats can no longer be adequately guarded
against by the range of international agreements, deterrence,
and passive defensive measures on which we have so far relied,
and to assess the extent to which active missile defence is a
complement to or a substitute for other forms of defence against
ballistic missiles. Missile defence systems are expensive and
so far are largely unproven, so the debate must include whether
the potential benefits to the UK (and to our deployed forces overseas)
are sufficient to justify the levels of expenditure which would
be required and, in a world of limited resources, whether the
money should be spent on missile defence rather than on other
areas of defence and security, or indeed other areas of public
expenditure more generally. Since missile defence depends on technologies
which are still being developed and since it is directed against
an emerging and uncertain threat, these judgements will require
us to look some considerable way ahead. The debate must also consider
what other benefits might be derived from any UK involvement in
missile defence programmes, including those from industrial participation
in any collaborative projects.
13. These issues are broadly those which we announced
that we would address in the second stage of our inquiries into
missile defence. Therefore, as well as following up some of the
issues related to the Fylingdales decision which we have not had
time to address in this report, we plan to continue our inquiries
into missile defence along the lines set out in our press notice
of 10 January.
14. In this report, we confine ourselves to the rationale
for and implications of acceding to the US request to upgrade
Fylingdales. First, however, we set the context within which that
decision needs to be considered, in terms of the evolving threats
that early warning and missile defence programmes are intended
to counter.
1 Defence Committee Press Release 3/2002-03 Back
2
Defence Committees Press Release 4/2002-03 Back
3
Mr Nick Witney, Director General, International Security Policy;
and Mr Paul Taylor, Director of Strategic Technologies Back
4
HC Deb 15 January 2003, col 697 Back
5
Q 239 Back
6
In this report we differentiate 'Missile Defence', the specific
US programme, from 'missile defence' the generic defence capability. Back
7
Mr Brian Hawtin, then Director-General International Security
Policy; Commodore Marcus Fitzgerald OBE RN, Director Nuclear
Policy; Mr Paul Roper, then Director Strategic Technologies;
and Mr Andy Helliwell, Assistant Director of Nuclear Policy for
Missile Defence Back
8
QQ 1-128 Back
9
QQ 129-238 Back
10
Q 245 Back
11
HC Deb, 17 October 2002, col 504 Back
12
HC Deb, 22 January 2003, col 328 Back
13
Q 241 Back
14
Q 260 Back
15
HC 334-i, Q 78 Back
