LIST OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(i) On 17 December 2002, the US Government
requested an upgrade of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System
station at RAF Fylingdales, to allow it to be used for missile
defence purposes. We deplore the manner in which the public debate
on that issue of the upgrade has been handled by the Ministry
of Defence. It has shown no respect for either the views of those
affected locally by the decision or for the arguments of those
opposed to the upgrade in principle (paragraph 11).
(ii) We believe that it is incumbent on
the MoD to publish as much of the detail of the request as it
is able to. For example, more information could be published on
the timescale for the upgrade and for its incorporation into the
US missile defence system and how the system would be able to
track missiles. Such additional information should also address
radiation emissions and other local concerns (paragraph 41).
(iii) We see no reason to believe that agreeing
to this upgrade will lead inevitably to further development or
deployment at Fylingdales itself, or indeed elsewhere in the UK.
But that agreement to the US request does represent at least a
step or two down the path towards active participation in Missile
Defence (paragraph 54).
(iv) We do not believe that the opponents
of missile defence strengthen their case by resorting to allegations
about hidden US motives. The United States of America is one of
the UK's closest allies. We share many of the same values, both
political and ethical. We prefer to judge American intentions
on the basis of their official statements about the purpose of
its Missile Defence programme. We do not assume that there must
be some more or less sinister ulterior motive behind their request
to upgrade Fylingdales (paragraph 57).
(v) We very much welcome the MoD's approach
of putting its case to the planning authorities in a form that
could be made public. Those who will need persuading that the
local impact of the upgrade will not be significant extend beyond
the planning authorities. It would seem that many of the concerns
raised by various groups spring from a misplaced apprehension
that the UK will inevitably field the full panoply of the Missile
Defence system, and an exaggerated view of health hazards that
might be caused by the proposed upgrade. But the MoD has not done
as much as it could to present the full facts and explain carefully
how such misgivings are misplaced. The MoD must now grasp this
opportunity to clarify Fylingdales' role and its environmental
impact (paragraph 66).
(vi) If the UK wishes to keep its options
open on a possible missile defence for the UK. It clearly is in
our interests to respond positively to the present request. Furthermore,
we do not believe that the UK, or the Fylingdales area, would
face any material additional risks from the upgrade, in terms
either of health risks from radiation or an increased likelihood
of potential attackers identifying Fylingdales as a target (paragraph
71). Nor do we believe that arguments that missile defence may
cause international instability provide compelling grounds for
rejecting the US request (paragraph 59).
(vii) We conclude that the United Kingdom
Government should agree to the US Government's request for the
proposed upgrade to the facilities at RAF Fylingdales for missile
defence purposes (paragraph 72).
| 
