House of Commons - Defence - Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence

Select Committee on Defence Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence

APPENDIX 2

Memorandum submitted by the Church of England Board for Social Responsibility (22 December 2002)

INTRODUCTION

1. The terms of reference of the Church of England Board for Social Responsibility require it "to co-ordinate the thought and action of the Church in matters affecting the life of all in society". The Board reports to the Archbishops' Council and, through it, to the General Synod.

2. The Board warmly welcomes the decision by the House of Commons Defence Committee to launch an inquiry into missile defence. The Board recognises that this decision reflects the fact that the Ministry of Defence has now received a request from the United States of America's Department of Defense for the upgrading of early warning radar facilities in the UK for use in a possible defence system, which might in due course be extended to cover the United Kingdom. The Board is equally encouraged by the Secretary of State for Defence's decision to press for an informed public debate on the issues raised by missile defence. The following submission does not seek to argue the case either for or against missile defence rather it explores those ethical issues, which the Board believes will need to be resolved before any final decision is taken as to the desirability of such a defensive system.

THE US 2002 BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE PROGRAMME

3. In December 2001 the US gave formal notice of its withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, as the terms of that treaty allowed. On 14 June 2002 the treaty became null and void. The US administration believed that the ABM Treaty, far from being the essential underpinning of strategic arms control, was quite inappropriate given the fact that Russia no longer posed the greatest danger. The US administration saw that danger as lying in the possession, by irresponsible rogue states such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) wedded to ballistic missiles of ever increasing range and accuracy. Against this threat, it was argued, containment was plainly not watertight, and a steady relationship of deterrence, as it was understood between the US and Russia, could not be relied upon. [1]The need was to provide an effective defence against the comparatively small number of longer-range missiles that such countries could muster. This governed the new approach in several important ways.

Scope

4. The scope of the new exercise is far wider than was ever previously attempted. "The fundamental goal of the planned Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system is to defend the forces and territories of the United States, its allies and friends as soon as possible." [2]These were not idle words. Within weeks of scrapping the ABM Treaty a Pentagon team visited London, Oslo, Copenhagen, Berlin and Prague. Another delegation visited Warsaw, Budapest, Rome and Paris. This diplomatic offensive culminated in a high level briefing in Brussels on 18 July 2002. There has been a mixed response to this initiative. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have been the most receptive, while Turkey has asked for a low-level BMD shield before any attack takes place against Iraq. In contrast, President Putin described the demise of the ABM Treaty a "mistake", adding however that it would not stand in the way of Russian collaboration with the US on strategic arms control and other matters. [3]

5. Managing the diplomatic fallout from the US's decision to pull out of the AMB Treaty has been eased in part by the prospect of future economic dividends. In June 2002 it was announced that Boeing was to team with EADS, (the largest European aerospace company and second only to Boeing) to create "end-to-end products for global missile defence". Significantly, Lockheed Martin has struck a deal with Russia's Khruchev's State Research and Production Centre (their principal space launch institute) for the same purpose. The US's Missile Defence Agency (MDA) has also exchanged visits with Ukraine, and India is actively investigating the question of a missile shield, in conjunction with Israel, Russia and the USA. The United Arab Emirates have proposed a missile shield for the Persian Gulf and are pursuing this with US officials. Australian defence firms are in active discussions with Boeing, while Japan is already in collaborative research with the US on sea-based missile defence. [4]The US hopes all these countries will want to contribute to a system providing global protection. The US has been quick to emphasise that it is not looking for "significantly large amounts of funding support for the programme." [5]Instead they have stressed they are seeking agreements to deploy systems on partners' territory and above all "political buy-in" from allies in Europe and also Asia.

6. While the technical contribution the US's allies can make is small, they will be concerned to see the fine print of any proposed agreement. Who is going to be protected? Can the US's allies be sure that in exchange for any contribution they may make (in terms of technology and forward basing) they shall be included in the area to be defended rather than simply contributing to the defence of the continental United States—as was previously the case? Or will allies be expected to develop their own regional systems within the overall American concept? If so what confidence is there that sufficient political cohesion exists (eg within the European Union) to underpin such a regional system? How can allies be sure that the developments to which they are contributing will ever see the light of day? "Who is going to hold the keys for this system? Who will be able to use, and under what conditions, the computer generated images and intelligence? What are the guarantees for sharing?" [6]Others have questioned how technology will be transferred and what industrial benefits the allies will reap. Given the way America has treated foreign industrial partners in the past these misgivings are more than justified. But it seems clear that the US seriously intends to include as many allies and friends as possible within their protective system and that these allies are meant to include Russia.

A multi-layered system

7. The proposed BMD "system of systems" is to be genuinely "multi-layered". This is a complex notion. It means the ability to attack a long-range missile at all stages of its flight: ie the boost, midcourse and terminal phases. If this can be done it obviously increases the probability of successful interception against any given missile and so against the totality of an attack. Moreover attacks at the various phases provide different and complementary advantages. But there is another sense in which the new approach is multi-layered. The programme takes under its wing not only the classical anti-ICBM class (Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles) of weapons just discussed but also picks up what were previously known as Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) systems. [7]TMDs can be divided into two classes. Lower tier systems designed to defend areas only tens of kilometres across against missiles of up to about 1,000 kilometres range in their terminal phase. These can also be used to defend against bombers, cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Upper tier systems were designed to intercept those missiles with a range of several thousand kilometres in mid-course thus defending areas several hundreds of kilometres across. All such systems were compliant with the ABM Treaty (as amplified by a demarcation agreement in 1997) and are in a comparatively advanced state of development. TMDs are obviously important to the new BMD objective of defending American forces, their allies and their friends. Indeed a TMD system may suffice to provide a small country with appropriate anti missile defence. It may well also be that these various programmes will complement each other, not only by the interchange of technology, but also by exchanging information in the heat of battle.

Cost

8. The new BMD programme also differs radically from its predecessors in balance and financing. In 2000, 60% of all US spending on BMD went on Theatre Missile systems—especially on Lower Tier systems close to production—and only about 24% for National Missile Defence. This position has now been reversed. The BMD Budget for 2002 totals $7,709 million. Of this only $730 million, some 9.5%, goes to procurement, while Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation (RDT&E) absorbs some $6,970 million, ie over 90%. Of this total some 10% goes to the Boost Phase, 56% to the Midcourse Phase and 14% to the Terminal Phase systems. [8]What we see here is a gigantic, multi-billion dollar experimental project, entirely financed by the US. It is pursuing an evolutionary strategy as the technology emerges and provides for development, limited production and deployment of initial capabilities incrementally, as soon as they are ready. Although it is impossible to calculate the final cost of such a project, the Congressional Budget Office has estimated that if all programmes now under development became operational the cost would amount to $238 billion over 15-25 years. [9]It should be noted that this cost projection would be no more than 2.5% of the defence budget over the same period.

BMD—A CAUSE FOR CONCERN?

9. It is a curious paradox that liberal bien pensants, who were the first to condemn the policy of Mutual Assured Destruction when it served some useful purpose at the height of the Cold War, have recently been vociferous in its defence. It has now become fashionable in such liberal circles to claim that the ABM Treaty—whose whole point was to reinforce this system—has been an essential underpinning of strategic stability. While this has led people to search out supposed shortcomings in the US's BMD scheme, it can be seen that many of the earlier causes for concern fall away. [10]

Concerns allayed

10. First it was said that developing a BMD system was to approach the threat of ballistic missile assault on the US in the wrong way. The US National Intelligence Estimate has acknowledged that any state (let alone terrorist organisation) wishing to employ biological, chemical or nuclear weapons against the US would be far more likely to deliver them secretly by ship, truck or aircraft than by a ballistic missile. [11]The latter would probably be the most expensive and inaccurate means, besides leaving an unambiguous trail back to its country of origin. But equally to leave any mode of attack totally undefended against would, they say, be culpable.

11. What is considered to be at stake is the possible paralysis of the US (or any other nation) under an explicit threat of ballistic missile attack by a rogue state, possibly even a bluff. It is often said that if Saddam had possessed nuclear warheads for his SCUDs in 1990-91, he might still be in Kuwait and possibly commanding Saudi Arabia's oil. And America's present declared intention to unseat Saddam makes it all the more likely that he would use his missiles, having nothing more to lose. According to a recent report by the International Institute of Strategic Studies, if Iraq could acquire weapons grade fissile material from a foreign source it could probably produce nuclear warheads within a few months. The possibility of an Iraqi nuclear breakout is "a real risk that could dramatically and quickly shift the balance of power in the Middle East." [12]Suppose that Saddam Hussein were now to carry out a successful test of a nuclear warhead capable of being married to a SCUD missile. In the absence of a competent ABM system in that area it would radically complicate Allied planning, if, for example, Iraq was once again to threaten Kuwait.

12. Secondly, it used to be said that a BMD system was unworkable: either because the overall control was too complex; or that such weapons could always be defeated by countermeasures much more cheaply and easily than they could be equipped to overcome them. In the light of recent successful tests this judgement seems too sweeping. Certainly there continue to be well-informed criticisms that the MDA's test regime is insufficiently rigorous and demanding, and not all BMD segments will work as intended. [13]Indeed the whole point of an RDT&E programme is to sort them out. It seems equally certain, given the resources, skills and motivation accorded to them, that some at least will be successful.

13. Thirdly, it used to be said that abrogating the ABM Treaty, let alone fielding operational BMD systems against ICBMs, would wreck all chances of keeping Russia on side with the West. Abrogating from the ABM Treaty was seen as the death of arms control. Neither of these predictions has come true. President Putin, for his part, has taken these developments with equanimity, as described above. The Moscow Treaty of May 2002, read in the light of the US Nuclear Posture Review, may seem a feeble measure of arms control, but it does mandate substantial reductions in strategic nuclear warheads, down to a figure of 1,700 to 2,500 for each party by the end of 2012. [14]

14. Finally, an argument used to be made against participation by the UK in the Clintonite NMD (National Missile Defence) system. It was argued that allowing the upgrading of the Fylingdales radar, let alone the addition of a much more obtrusive X-band system, could bring ballistic retribution upon North Yorkshire. This argument, not a particularly noble one at best, fails completely if the UK is able to benefit from the protection offered by the proposed system. The Ministry of Defence estimates the costs of upgrading Fylingdales as between £5-10 billion. [15]Even at the upper figure, which is comparable to the acquisition cost of Trident, it might still be a good bargain. Instead of making Fylingdales a liability it would become an asset to the defence of the UK. However, this cost needs to be balanced against the low ballistic missile threat to the UK and a defence budget, which is already under intense pressure. It remains very unlikely that the British government, as opposed to industry, will put up much money in the near future.

Outstanding concerns

15. There remain, however, substantial concerns. By far the most serious of these is the view that BMD, in American eyes, is less an end in itself than a stepping-stone to the arming and domination of space with offensive weaponry. This issue, which cries out for an arms control solution, raises questions which go far beyond the subject of this briefing. [16]

16. A second cause for concern is the escalation of costs. It could lead either to the under-funding of programmes, of which there are already signs, or their cancellation—as in the Navy Area element of terminal defence in the 2002 budget. [17]Alternatively it could lead to more and more resources being poured into the programme as it evolves. The latter scenario is more likely, perhaps, in view of the powerful industrial interests involved and their close links with the present US administration.

17. A third cause for concern would arise if Russia became disaffected. Some Kremlin hawks might indeed welcome this, as might their counterparts in the Pentagon. There have been reports that President Putin's increasing cordiality towards the west has been causing resentment in Russia, partly because it damages Russia's amour propre, partly out of disillusionment at the apparent failure of the western economic model. Although, it seems that neither the abrogation of the ABM Treaty, the imminent inclusion of the Baltic States into NATO or western censure of Russian repression in Chechnya is likely to imminently sour relations significantly, there remain persistent disagreements between Russia and the US. These include the US's plans to invade Iraq and its failure to curb Israel. Allied to these are the US's objections at Russia supplying nuclear fissile material to Iran, and the potential for disagreement over the routing of oil pipelines from the Caspian. It would be disastrous if Russia felt goaded to pull out of the BMD collaborative system and once again became a nuclear adversary of the west.

18. Related to this danger is the possibility of go-it-alone BMD policies on the part of friends and allies. Japan, Taiwan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are already acquiring limited BMD systems intended for the protection of national territory. In Europe, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Italy and Greece all have TMD programmes; Spain and Turkey are considering the matter and NATO as a whole is conducting a feasibility study. It would be unfortunate if the US's allies opted out of collaborative programmes with the USA, but suspicion and mistrust does exist as to the US's intentions. As an American defence consultant explained: "We have been at this [missile defence co-operation] for 20 years, cajoling and talking to bring in others but we don't treat them well when they come in." [18]When the Pentagon cancelled the Navy Area element of terminal defence in December 2001 it failed to notify their German and Dutch partners; they read about it in the newspapers. Though Germany and Italy have been paying 45% of the cost of MEADS, the US has for years refused to share the underlying technology, insisting that they buy "black boxes" from American suppliers. [19]The Japanese, who were in active collaboration with the US on the Navy Theatre Wide system have had to re-think their position after the scope of this programme was unilaterally transformed by the US into a system with rather wider goals. The Americans clearly believe they can devise a workable BMD system without allied participation. If they let this attitude dominate their relations with partners then the "fundamental goal" of the planned BMD system, "to defend the forces and territories of the United States, its allies and friends as soon as possible" will go by the board.

WHAT FUTURE ARMS CONTROL?

19. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons, in its report into British-US relations published in December 2001, recommended that the Government should seek to ensure, if either party to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty were to withdraw, that the United States and Russia should establish "an alternative mutually satisfactory and legally binding agreement on the development of missile defence systems, which might include other states." If read as meaning some alternative arms control arrangement, this now looks rather dated. The aims of any new agreement might be defined as to ensure that:

— any system be as inclusive as possible;

— the concept of shared protection must be underpinned by a clear notion of strategic stability;

— no participant should feel threatened by any other;

— there be no impediment to further nuclear build-down;

— technical collaboration be maximised;

— costs be properly controlled and fairly shared; and

— arrangements for cancellation of projects be thought out and agreed in advance.

20. What, if anything, remains of value in the old ABM Treaty approach and what, if anything, should be salvaged from the Treaty? First, forswearing the "defence of territory" is obviously inapplicable since this is the whole point of the new system. Second, some commentators have suggested that the limitation of 100 on numbers of interceptors allowed to each side be maintained. [20]The logic is elusive however. The ABM Treaty addressed the requirement to defend very small areas (the national capital or a missile site) against attack by possibly a very large number (hundreds) of warheads. The present requirement is to protect the whole of a nation's territory against attack by a very small number of missiles, originating from one or more widely separated points of origin. Moreover, the respective systems (of the US and Russia) will be designed to support each other, not in rivalry. It will be necessary to allow the number of interceptors located in the various partners' territory to emerge by agreement as the logic of development requires. Third, ABM radars were restricted in numbers and in technical performance and could only be located on the national periphery, facing outwards. This restriction no longer applies. Fourth, under the Treaty no component of a BMD system could be sea-, air-, space-, or mobile-land-based. Self-evidently if the new system is to go forward it may involve all these modes of basing.

21. The above analysis suggests that rather than resurrecting some part of the ABM Treaty it is necessary to begin again from scratch. The aim should be to apply not just the narrow requirements of the ABM Treaty but the whole non-proliferation regime, in recognition that the ABM Treaty was only one aspect of efforts to build as stable a security environment as possible where weapons of mass destruction exist. Here we could really begin to build a possible framework for dealing with the issue of missile defence and the threat from ballistic missiles. It could be a summary of what works and what doesn't and the basis for a concept of missile defence within a framework for strategic stability. This could link missile defence to further warhead reductions, to nuclear safety concerns, and other non-proliferation issues. This might serve to take the good from arms control stability and transparency and link it into a process for guiding/restraining the US's inevitable development and deployment. In addition, it could bring or "buy in" Chinese, Russian and other regional concerns. It might even help develop a framework for bringing in rogue states.

A NEW APPROACH

22. Rather than looking at this problem from an arms control perspective it might be better to view it in terms of collaborative development based on the pursuit of common security. A mutually satisfactory and legally binding agreement on the development of missile defence systems, which might include other states, is the ideal recipe for successful collaboration. It seems likely to meet many, if not most, of the objectives just proposed.

23. The first aim, of inclusiveness, is being energetically pursued by the US government. However mixed their motives may be, this aim must be whole-heartedly endorsed. Recently proposed non-proliferation plans by Russia and Germany emphasise the need for a multilateral assessment of WMD threats. The lack of any co-operative threat assessment as the basis for evaluating various competing technical solutions is a glaring gap at present.

24. The second aim can best be pursued through a culture of transparency throughout the enterprise. Transparency is particularly important between the US and Russia and it should not be too difficult to achieve at the government-to-government level. It is often overlooked that in the last 30 years the two states have concluded no less than six treaties aimed at reducing the dangers of misunderstanding when objects are launched into space, setting up risk reduction centres and requiring advance notice of impending launches on either side. [21]In 1996 the two nations set up a programme of regular Theatre Missile Defence Exercises (TMDEX) to build trust and confidence in the area of ballistic missile defence. The fourth command post exercise in this series took place in the US Joint National Integration Centre in Colorado Springs from 22 January to 4 February 2002, and it was attended by 40 Russian officers. More such exercises are planned, the next possibly in Moscow. [22]But there are disturbing signs that the MDA intends to classify some test results in the NMD series, arguing that to give information about targets and countermeasures would be to assist potential enemies. The truth may be that the Agency wants to defuse criticism of the lack of rigour in the test programme or, more sinisterly, to obfuscate the development goals of individual programmes and dilute congressional oversight of budgets and spending. [23]Whatever the cause, the fullest exchange of information on programme objectives and progress will be crucial to maintaining confidence between partners that none is seeking an edge over any other. The examples of high-handed dealings just quoted point the need for particular attention to this point.

25. The aim of ensuring no impediment to further nuclear build down should not prove difficult so far as the US, France, UK and Russia are concerned. Under the Moscow Treaty, Russia and the US are allowed from 2,500 to 1,700 strategic missiles of a type to be decided by them. The target date is 2012. Both Russia and the US understand that a force of this size, even in the doomsday event of a disabling "first strike" by the other side, could not be seriously threatened by the very limited BMD provided for in the new American programme. And Comprehensive Threat Reduction programmes might be emphasised as part of the deal to get involved in missile defence.

26. China is in a different position. There is no sign of her wishing to join the American system, which she bitterly opposes. She has good reason because a BMD aimed at defeating an attack by a small number of ballistic missiles emanating from, say, North Korea, might well be effective against the very limited Chinese arsenal of strategic missiles. Even a Boost Phase System aimed specifically at North Korea could be switched to China at almost no notice. According to the US Central Intelligence Agency, China now has only about 20 ICBMs but is expected to have 75 to 100 by 2015, most of them aimed at the US. [24]While it is an open question whether the Chinese would have built up their forces in any case; it is clear the American BMD programme will have done nothing to dissuade them. Matters might be even more serious if India comes in with the Americans, since the Chinese strategic force is principally aimed at matching the former. It is hard to see what can be done about this other than the broadest possible approach to regional stability in South Asia, treating the Taiwan problem with delicacy and eventually making China herself an ally. The key for US policy is to ensure that Sino-US relations are defined by economic rather than military issues. Supplying TMD to Taiwan might tip the balance the wrong way, but this subject lies far outside the scope of this report.

27. In all these areas the devil lies in the details of the collaborative deals that will be struck. Many who have sought to drink at the well of technology transfer have come away with seriously upset stomachs. The Memorandum of Understanding on SDI (Strategic Defence Initiative) collaboration in the 1980s left a lingering sour taste. Chancellor Schroder has said that this time there must be no "black boxing" of technology. Work and cost sharing agreements are always the source of intense bargaining. People want to see fair shares—a juste retour—on their work. But if carried to extremes giving each partner their fair share of the work can lead to a project costing more than single-nation projects would have done, not only overall but to individual participants. And international projects are famously difficult to cancel, even when obviously failing, because getting agreement of all the partners at the same time is often impossible.

28. The US MDA has said that it will be guided by four principles. First, it will develop capabilities on a bi-lateral basis founded on the needs of each partner country and the contribution that it can make. Second, it will allow for different levels of participation for each country, including government-to-government and industry-to-industry arrangements or both. Third, it will not predicate foreign inclusion on direct monetary investment. Rather it could be based on contributions in kind like materiel or basing rights. Finally the participation of industry will be based on a best-value basis.

29. It is hard to fault these principles but more is needed. Much will hinge on the quality of the US leadership. In this respect it is encouraging that the US national industry team, led by Boeing, and Lockheed Martin, is drawing in talent from all the major firms. [25]Important European firms, apart from EADS, are also engaged. [26]Much would be gained by the use of a bulk export license, which would reduce the number of technical assistance agreements needed to consult allies on the project. Although the regulations allowing for bulk licences have been on the books since September 2000, the US State Department has only ever granted one such licence. However, it is reviewing a global project license for the Joint Strike Fighter, which might be used as a model. Additionally, it is looking for a set of standard terms and conditions to provide the basis for each of the US exporters and all foreign end-users to be involved in the co-operative programme. If the Pentagon is not yet thinking in these terms, now would be a good time to start. [27]

30. Some countries may have comparatively little to offer towards the programme, others can make a substantial contribution. The danger is that the US, by far the predominant partner in managerial, financial and technical terms, will use her weight to bully the others or impose unfair conditions on them. Anyone who has had military/technical/commercial dealings with the US has seen this process at work. In this instance the political stakes are far too high for shenanigans of this nature to be countenanced and it will need political involvement at the highest level to prevent this happening as the 20-year programme winds on. The aim must be to play up whatever know-how allies have to offer. Russia, for example is already a partner on an observation satellite that could play a part in cueing interceptors. [28]The British Ministry of Defence has said that it is keen to play a leading role in US plans, even though the long standing position is that no decision will be taken until Washington puts in a request for upgrading the radar at Fylingdales. Much more could be involved than this, however. A proposal is under discussion under which the new British Type 45 destroyers, six of which will come into service from 2007, could become part of the global network of early warning/interceptor vessels equipped with SMD missiles, radars and communications. [29]It is to be hoped that this will be given a fair wind.

BMD—AN ETHICAL POSTSCRIPT

31. There have always been grave objections, on ethical grounds, to a policy of deterring a massive and indiscriminate attack upon one's own country by threatening an equally massive and indiscriminate retaliatory assault upon one's attacker. To put the point crudely, two wrongs do not make a right. It will be said that just such a policy successfully prevented war for some decades between the United States and the Soviet Union, though the point can never be proven. But it is well attested that this system came close to breakdown at the time of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. And the potential instability of such a system, as between India and Pakistan is of great current concern. But over-riding these concerns about the vulnerability of a deterrent relationship is the blatant immorality of a city-busting policy, which is the inevitable counterpart of mutually assured retaliation. In principle, therefore, it must be better to address the threat of an attack upon oneself—from nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) weapons as from any other, by fending off such a blow rather than by reciprocating. It was not an irresponsible aim on the part of President Reagan to render ballistic missiles "impotent and obsolete". The objection to such a policy was then, and remains today, the utter impracticality of such a programme as between the United States and Russia. Hence the ABM Treaty, locking in as it were the doctrine of massive retaliation, could be defended on moral grounds as the lesser of many evils and as the foundation of arms reduction treaties between the two adversaries.

32. A new situation has arisen as a result of the possible acquisition of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, allied to ballistic missiles, by "rogue states". The number of missiles they will be likely to acquire in the foreseeable future is of the order of one or two dozen—which makes defence against them a far more practical proposition. There is also a sense in which such countries (Iraq in particular) can be regarded as undeterrable, because of the utter indifference of the rulers to the suffering of their own people. It is possible that if rogue rulers such as Saddam Hussein were threatened with their own removal they would have nothing to lose. In such cases, to the inherent moral ambiguity of a retaliatory policy is added the likelihood that it will not work anyway. And at the same time, due to technical advances and the comparatively modest size of the threat, defence has at last become potentially feasible. Moreover, since the US and Russia are no longer strategic adversaries but partners, the ABM Treaty has itself become obsolete. On ethical grounds this argument is hard to fault.

33. A number of serious misgivings remain. The notion has been widely canvassed, though not emphasised by the US administration, that the technologies developed for BMD systems will inevitably be applied offensively. Military satellites could be developed with the ability to launch projectiles or directed energy beams for strike purposes, whether defensive or offensive. This briefing paper has already discussed defensive uses, but in the offensive mode such weapons might well be used for the attack of targets on the ground. The combination of satellite-based "weapons from space", allied to the prospect of attack by laser weapons or electromagnetic pulse, evoke understandable fears. But these are not altogether rational. A convention already exists banning the development or use of lasers designed specifically for blinding.

34. A more likely prospect, in the near term, is the development of anti-satellite weapons (ASATs). These might be satellites carrying "kinetic kill vehicles", rockets, space mines or cannons. The Soviet Union and the US both tested ground- and air-based ASATs into the 1980s. The US Air Force has since experimented with ASAT concepts where projectiles are launched either from high-flying fighter aircraft or from satellites in space. Eventually the US intends to carry out a space "hit-to-kill" demonstration as proof-of-concept. This would be a very dangerous move. The commercial use of space plays a crucial part in all our lives: not only for map-making, clocks and navigation but for telephones, television, computers and banking. Active offensive anti-satellite platforms with "shooting" capabilities must clearly be a major focus for arms control efforts. "Not since the development of the atomic bomb has the United States had an equivalent opportunity and incentive to show leadership for restraint in the development of a new class of weapons, namely weapons in space." [30]The pragmatic argument for preserving the global commons of space from the mayhem resulting from a battle between satellites is so strong as to amount almost to a moral imperative.

35. The final misgiving arises from the overweening nature of some recent statements of US policy. "It is time to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength. We must build and maintain our defences beyond challenge." [31]If this aim were taken literally, bearing in mind the vast complexity and variety of potential threats, no limits could be set to America's quest of military power short of bankruptcy. There is need, in all such matters, for moderation and a proportionate balance between the dangers faced and the means available (most of them non-military) for confronting them. Security "beyond challenge" is not to be had on earth. To pour vast resources into one (arguably marginal) aspect of military defence is to court the sin of hubris. America's friends have an obligation to warn and counsel against this danger, as best they may.

CONCLUSION

36. Lest it be thought that this briefing paper gives too uncritical an endorsement of the new American BMD programme it must be readily acknowledged that there are other, possibly better and cheaper, means of tackling the underlying problem. In general terms the Missile Technology Control Regime has an important part to play and important proposals for improving it are on the table, not least from Russia. [32]These deserve to be taken seriously. The threat from individual "Axis-of-Evil" states can be addressed in many other ways: perhaps in Iraq by enforced disarmament; in North Korea by a mixture of offering incentives such as food, fuel oil and nuclear power, and intensive diplomatic pressure; in Iran by seeking general de«tente in the context of a more forceful Middle East regional policy and so forth. Preventive diplomacy addressing the underlying motives for WMD proliferation deserves to be given a much higher priority. [33]None of these can be guaranteed to work but nor can missile defences. This argues strongly in favour of a cocktail of measures: export controls, arms control and defence. It will be important to deploy all three in the best combination In some cases arms control and export controls might be the most reliable with missile defence as a backstop to discourage breakout. In other cases defence might be the best hedge against proliferation. Meanwhile the threat of ballistic missiles delivering gas, germs or nuclear warheads will not go away. While the BMD programme has such a pressure of wind in its sails, many commentators will argue there is more to be gained from joining the ship, and attempting in some small way to steer it, than carping from the sidelines—not least so long as the USA is footing most of the bill. This report, however, is intended to do no more than help unpack the issue of BMD and map the arguments both for and against such a system.

1 Speech of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, John E. McLaughlin at the 4th Annual Space and Missile Defence Conference, Huntsville, Al. 21 August 2002.www.cia.gov/cia/public-affairs/speeches/archives/2001/ddci-speech-08232001. Back

2 Fact Sheet, Ballistic Missile Defence Approach, www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/html/ Back

3 Michael Evans, The Times, 23rd July 2002-08-06. Back

4 News Review, 23rd July 2002, The Daily Jang, London, 1st July 2002, Aviation Week and Space Technology, 1st July 2002, Defence News, 25th February-3rd March 2002, and 13-19 May 2002. Back

5 David Martin, Deputy for Strategic Relations at the Missile Defence Administration, quoted by Andrew Chuter, Gopal Ratnam and Jason Sherman in "Missile Defence: the New Deal" Defence News 8-14 July 2002. Back

6 French Air Force General Richard Wolsztynski, as in Footnote 5. Back

7 Hugh Beach, "Theatre Missile Defence: Deployment Prospects and Impact on Europe" ISIS Briefings on Ballistic Missile Defence, No. 2, September 2000. Back

8 Fact Sheet, "Ballistic Missile Defence Fiscal Year 2002 Budget" www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/html Back

9 Richard Wolfe and Nancy Dunne, Financial Times 5 February 2002. Back

10 David Gee and Helen Hughes, "US Missile Defence: Ten reasons for Concern" for the Missile Defence Working Group, www.quaker.org.uk/peace/opsdocs/10%20pdfpdf Back

11 Walter Pincus, "Experts Rethink Threat" IHT 12 January 2002. Back

12 "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: a Net Assessment" The International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, 9 September 2002, p. 70. Back