APPENDIX 5
Memorandum submitted by Dr Stephen Pullinger,
Executive Director, International Security Information Service
(ISIS) [34](6
January 2003)
PART I: US PLANS
Rationale
1. The rationale for the pursuit of missile
defence by the US is to attempt to ensure that its strategic military
options are not curtailed through fear of an adversary's possible
use of ballistic missiles against US forces and territory. During
the Cold War the US felt unable to confront the Soviet Union directly
because of the US's vulnerability to devastating Soviet nuclear
attack. The US wishes to avoid being placed in a similar position
vis-a"-vis "rogue" states by removing US vulnerability
to ballistic missile attack.
Is there a capability?
2. A number of states that concern us already
possess short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and in seeking
to enhance their capabilities may develop long-range missiles
capable of reaching all of continental Europe and the US. [35]We
can debate how quickly they are likely to be able to do so and
their purpose in so doing. We can hope that they follow the example
of states such as Brazil and Argentina and abandon their programmes.
3. But, with the ready availability of imported
technology and expertise, and a continued investment in indigenous
capabilities these states, if sufficiently determined, will eventually
be able to develop longer-range missiles that can reach our territory.
They already have missiles that could be used against our forces
in theatre.
Is there intent?
4. Whilst one cannot entirely rule out the
unprovoked "out of the blue" ballistic missile strike,
its risk surely is minimal. The more realistic scenario in which
the use of ballistic missiles against the West might be considered
is in a situation where the possessor state is either already
engaged, or sees the imminent prospect of engagement, with Allied
forces.
5. The question some strategists now ask
is—would the Allies be prepared to eject Iraq from Kuwait
again if confronted with the prospect of enduring thousands of
civilian casualties as a result?
6. Most European governments, on the other
hand, seem less concerned with this question, probably because
they are not so inclined to envisage themselves being engaged
with a rogue state, and also because they have deeper faith in
the robustness of deterrence.
7. In the Gulf War Iraq was deterred from
using its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) because of the devastating
retaliation promised by the US. But at the same time, the Allies'
declared intent not to extend their war aims to include the toppling
of the Iraqi regime ensured that Saddam was never faced with the
type of "last resort" scenario in which he may have
had nothing to lose by using WMD.
Current concerns
8. The deployment of missile defence raises
a number of issues regarding its possible impact on strategic
stability and, hence, upon UK national security interests. Here,
I want to consider five such issues.
1. MD and MAD
9. Mutual Assured Destruction provided a
degree of stability between the two superpowers during the Cold
War. Both sides accepted MAD because they each recognised that
defence against nuclear-armed ballistic missiles was undesirable
on two grounds.
10. First, because it was potentially destabilising—if
either side were ever to believe that it could destroy sufficient
of its opponent's offensive capability that it could then shoot
down any residual retaliatory capability it might be tempted to
launch a pre-emptive strike.
11. Second, because it was ultimately futile—the
offence would always overcome the defence and the consequence
of such offensive use would be mutual obliteration.
12. Hence, whilst offensive arsenals rose
inexorably and unnecessarily (the degree of "overkill"
was absurdly excessive), only eventually being reined in effectively
by START, at least the two sides did not waste substantial resources
building vast arsenals of defensive missiles as well—these
being severely restricted under the ABM Treaty.
13. Both sides have developed and deployed
theatre missile defences (TMD). These are not and have never been
restricted by treaty, indeed the US and Russia defined what constitutes
a theatre, as opposed to a strategic, missile defence system in
a protocol to the ABM treaty, agreed in 1997.
14. Strategic missile defences—indeed,
nuclear-armed missile defences—were permissible under the
terms of the ABM Treaty, and they were constrained purely so as
not to challenge the concept of MAD.
15. The US does not want to enter into MAD
relationships with states of concern; it does not want to have
its coercive options towards such states curtailed; rather, it
wants to be able to confront them militarily and to prevail without
suffering significant casualties itself.
16. The US is clearly worried that it might
be deterred from pursuing its war aims as it would wish, or even
of getting involved in a conflict at all, if it faces an adversary
capable of landing a nuclear, chemical or biological warhead on
its territory.
17. But unless it is possible to develop
an infallible defence against that threat, then surely it remains
a threat that one would remain extremely wary of provoking. Is
it credible to believe that a US President would take the risk
of provoking a WMD attack upon US citizens on the basis that missile
defence would protect them?
18. Does anyone seriously propose that a
missile defence will remove that risk? Because unless it removes
the risk entirely, surely it will make little or no difference
to a President's calculations in pursuing a conflict against a
rogue state armed with WMD.
19. In other words, of course it is preferable
to be able to shoot down a proportion of attacking nuclear warheads
than none at all. However, as the consequence of even a single
warhead landing on a city is so catastrophic, one's ability to
mitigate an attack is of far less relevance than the overwhelming
imperative of preventing the attack in the first place.
2. Demonisation of "States of Concern"
20. The second issue relates to states of
concern. Three considerations arise here:
21. First, there are suspicions that proponents
of missile defence have exaggerated new threats in order to justify
investment in their expensive new programmes. This is not to deny
the existence of states that give cause for concern, or to dismiss
the problem of missile proliferation and acquisition, but one
can see why it may be in some people's interests to inflate the
immediacy and extent of the threat.
22. Second, there is a danger that in loosely
banding together a group of states and labelling them "states
of concern"—or components of an "axis of evil"—,
one subsequently fails to differentiate between them. It would
be wrong to equate Iraq with Iran or North Korea, for example.
Whereas Iraq is an uncompromising dictatorship, Iran is a state
wherein the forces of political reform have a chance of prevailing
over those of ideological fanaticism. North Korea, although itself
an authoritarian perhaps still with dangerous nuclear ambitions,
has also recently indicated a willingness to seek rapprochement
with the South.
23. When dealing with these states it is
important to recognise that there are a variety of policy instruments
available that can be applied to help address our concerns. Diplomacy,
economic sanctions, arms control and deterrence may be more appropriate
mechanisms for meeting the challenge posed by these states, and
ones that should not be forgotten in the enthusiasm for missile
defence.
24. Third, that the demonisation of particular
states becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. We should beware pushing
states into corners from which they cannot escape. We should not
be quick to isolate states before exploring the possibility that
diplomatic engagement might serve our purpose better. At present,
for instance, whereas isolation for Iraq has merit, for North
Korea and Iran it could prove counter-productive in terms of trying
to allay our proliferation concerns.
3. Will Missile Defence provoke an arms race?
25. The deployment of new strategic missile
defences could impinge upon the concept of mutual assured destruction
(MAD) by raising Russian and Chinese concerns about their ability
to continue to be able to inflict unacceptable damage upon the
US—their yardstick for credible deterrence.
26. But this need not necessarily be the
case. For instance if the missile defences are configured to target
specific states rather than to have a generic capability against
all missiles from whatever source, the Russians and Chinese need
have no concern.
27. Conceivably, even if they have a generic
capability ie a capability that could be employed against a ballistic
missile from whatever source (such as ground-based interceptors
in the US), they could still be configured in ways that do not
overly antagonise Russia and China. Here we need to consider each
country separately.
28. Even under current proposals Russia
is only talking about reducing its strategic warheads to around
1,700—more than enough to penetrate the type of limited
missile defence envisaged by the US. Hence, Russia should be sufficiently
reassured about the continuing viability of its deterrent.
29. As no US President could be sure about
being able to prevent devastating nuclear retaliation even if
he had first launched a pre-emptive nuclear first strike against
Russia he would surely never launch such an attack.
30. China is more problematic in this context.
Even a limited missile defence is likely to raise Chinese concerns
because they currently deploy only about two dozen, non-MIRVed,
inter-continental ballistic missiles. [36]
31. A pre-emptive strike against China could,
in theory, eliminate a sufficient proportion of its offensive
strategic capability that any residual missiles could be "mopped
up"—even by a limited missile defence.
32. Again though, it is inconceivable that
any US President would gamble on such a risk. Moreover, China
is already embarked upon an extensive modernisation programme
for its strategic nuclear forces, including the deployment of
multiple warhead missiles (MIRVing), the development of penetration
aids and the replacement of liquid-fuel missiles with the solid-fuel
variety.
33. Each of these enhancements will improve
China's ability to overcome any US missile defence. These enhancements
will take several years before they enter operational service,
but so would any significant missile defence system to deploy.
34. China's reaction to new missile defences
sited in the US might involve an acceleration of the nuclear modernisation
programme upon which China is already embarked. As China is the
least transparent of the acknowledged nuclear powers in terms
of its offensive deployments it will be difficult to gauge whether
or not missile defences have made any difference to the size of
China's nuclear arsenal. It is fair to assume, however, that US
missile defences will not induce China to slow its nuclear expansion.
35. China's nuclear modernisation programme
could ignite a regional nuclear arms race if India feels itself
falling behind its Asian rival. Any decisions by India to enhance
its nuclear capability would surely spark a response from Pakistan.
In those circumstances, with suspicions increasing with regard
to North Korea's nuclear capability, Japan might feel it has to
re-assess its nuclear abstinence.
36. To what degree missile defence could
be held responsible for this train of events, again, depends on
the type of missile defence deployed and one's assessment of what
would have happened in its absence.
37. China's main objection to missile defence
centres around Taiwan. If missile defence were to offer protection
to Taiwan from Chinese medium-range ballistic missiles, whilst
also making the US invulnerable to Chinese ICBMs, China fears
that its leverage over its former territory will have been neutralised.
38. Any decision by the US to afford such
protection to Taiwan, therefore, would be extremely provocative
to China. China neither wants Taiwan to be protected by any new
US MD system nor to receive its own Theatre MD systems from the
US.
39. Proponents contend that missile defence
will deter rogue states from proceeding with ballistic missile
programmes or of embarking on them in the first place. Hence,
they conclude that missile defence is a positive factor vis-a"-vis
missile arms racing.
40. Others say that as missile defence is
extremely unlikely to prove infallible the incentive for rogue
states to demonstrate that fact will be stronger than any rational
cost-benefit analysis of missile penetration rates.
4. Launch on warning
41. Concerns about the accidental or unauthorised
use of a long-range ballistic missile have been heightened since
the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and the worrying
state of Russia's command and control infrastructure in the context
of economic hardship and low morale in the armed forces.
42. Russia continues to rely on a "launch
on warning" policy, whereby it is prepared to launch a retaliatory
strike before the attacking missiles actually land. This adds
to the chance of accidental launch. It is difficult to make informed
judgements about the level of this risk but it would be unwise
to disregard it entirely.
43. If Russia were to perceive that new
US missile defences were a threat to the credibility of Russia's
nuclear deterrent—by offering the prospect of being able
to "mop up" any retaliatory strike following a US first
strike—then Russia would keep its nuclear weapons on hair
trigger alert.
44. China's strategic nuclear weapons modernisation
programme will involve moving from liquid-fuel to solid-fuel missiles.
This would enable China to adopt a launch on warning strategy,
which given its much smaller arsenal, it may feel compelled to
adopt.
45. If we want the Russians and Chinese
to move away from "launch on warning" doctrines the
US needs to provide them with credible reassurances that it is
not seeking a first strike capability (even though we may judge
such fears to be groundless).
5. Danger of Unilateralism
46. Russia has responded in measured tones
to the announcement of a US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, and
one must hope that it continues to act with restraint. But, if
Putin's policy fails to win any US concessions to Russian security
concerns there may come a time when the political mood in Russia
swings against him.
47. Fearful of a "protected" Taiwan,
China might even be tempted to act militarily against its former
territory before the missile defence umbrella descends upon it.
48. With China actually increasing its nuclear
arsenal and the continuation of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear
programmes, the prospects for a fissile material cut-off treaty
would recede even further. Any attempt by the US to weaponise
Outer Space as part of its missile defence plans are bound to
meet with the strongest resistance, given that no one else will
be able to match its deployments, whilst many will feel vulnerable
to US military force projection.
TECHNICAL AND
FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS
49. The technical challenge of shooting
down ballistic missiles remains a formidable one and being able
to demonstrate that a highly complex system of satellites, radars,
battle management stations and interceptors will work cost-effectively
is an even greater challenge. Any missile defence system will
have to prove itself technically worthy of the enormous investment
planned.
50. Essentially, missile defence against
intercontinental ballistic missiles can be attempted at three
stages of the attacking missile's flight—during the boost-phase,
mid-course or terminal phase.
51. One of the main challenges for mid-course
interceptors is to be able to distinguish between real warheads
and decoys that the incoming missile may deploy to confuse the
defences.
52. Essentially, the ground-based interceptors
are trying to hit an object six feet long and eighteen inches
wide, travelling at 15,000 miles per hour ie something the size
of an artillery shell but travelling 10 times faster, probably
whilst surrounded by decoys behaving in identical fashion.
53. The challenge for boost-phase defence
is slightly different. As these systems target the booster rocket
of the missile itself rather than the warhead, and in the earliest
stages of its launch, boost-phase defence does not need to deal
with decoys and dummy warheads.
54. On the other hand, a potential drawback
to boost-phase systems is that they would need to be heavily reliant
on automation because in order to hit a missile in its boost phase
you have only about three or four minutes to detect, identify,
decide, launch, track and intercept that missile. Once it completes
the boost phase and accelerates ahead of the interceptor, you
cannot "catch it up".
55. This increases the risk of system failure,
including the prospect of firing by mistake, perhaps launching
at something other than a ballistic missile. One could even envisage
rogue states seeking deliberately to induce such an error. A mistaken
launch could raise tension in peacetime and provide the spark
that ignites an already tense situation.
56. In addition, targeting the booster rocket
risks the possibility of not destroying the missile completely,
but allowing its payload to continue some distance, perhaps exploding
or spreading radioactive material, chemicals or biological agents
on a neighbouring "friendly" state.
57. Missile defence could face other challenges
too. For instance, a nuclear weapon detonated in space would create
an electromagnetic pulse that would distort radio communications,
disable ground- and space-based radars, and blind interceptors'
infra-red sensors for about half an hour. Whilst the defences
were blinded, this would allow an opportunity for attacking missiles
to get through
58. Testing of ground-launched mid-course
interceptors is at a relatively early stage. The technology needs
to prove itself to a far greater degree and in much more realistic
testing situations than have so far been attempted. The testing
of all boost-phase defences has not even begun.
59. Yet the Bush Administration now intends
to deploy a small number of interceptors by 2004, before all its
components have been properly tested, arguing that the system's
shortcomings would be outweighed by its symbolic value. The danger
of this "scarecrow" rationale is that a reckless development
timetable would create conditions for dangerous system malfunctions
that could lead to major accidents.
60. The deployment of any system should
not be considered until it has proved itself to be a cost-effective
one, following a rigorous, extensive, and credible testing programme,
the results of which should be assessed objectively. There should
be no rush to deploy a system, particularly an unproven and ineffective
one.
DOING IT
RGHT
61. As the US proceeds with missile defence
it would maximise its chances of winning wider international support
if it were:
— configured as a system that offered
protection to all states rather than just to a few;
— specifically to target only the
particular state or states of concern;
— not configured to significantly
undermine the military capabilities of other states.
62. What might an acceptable missile defence
architecture look like that would satisfy those criteria?
63. Mid-course and terminal phase missile
defences are most likely to involve the deployment of land- or
sea-based interceptors in or near the territory or region to be
protected.
64. Boost-phase missile defences might be
interceptors deployed on land or aboard ships adjacent to the
particular rogue state, or possibly lasers on aircraft, ships
or satellites in space.
MID-COURSE
AND TERMINAL
DEFENCES
65. One advantage of mid-course and terminal
defences is that because they would not be deployed around a particular
state they would be non-discriminatory. Unlike boost-phase defences,
interceptors for mid-course and terminal defence would be invulnerable
to attack: based in underground silos as opposed to vessels at
sea or aircraft on patrol (although forward-based sensors would
be more exposed).
66. The major drawback is that if deployed
in the US they would offer virtually no protection to any ally
(other than for those in the Western hemisphere), and if deployed
in Europe they would invoke significant additional financial,
and quite possibly political, cost.
67. Another disadvantage is their "catch-all"
ability to counter the missiles of non-rogues, specifically Russia
and China, who fear the neutering of their nuclear deterrents.
68. China's much smaller arsenal of inter-continental
ballistic missiles makes any missile defence deployment unwelcome
to it at present. However, China's ongoing nuclear modernization
programme should help reduce those concerns as weaponry with enhanced
missile defence penetration capabilities is introduced.
BOOST-PHASE
DEFENCES
69. One of the attractions of sea- and air-based
boost-phase defences (BPD) is that they could offer protection
to every potential target of missile attack, including Russia
and China. Their launch platforms are mobile, thereby allowing
the specific targeting of rogue states and the flexibility to
enable system withdrawal or re-deployment.
70. This discriminatory deployment capacity
helps to avoid upsetting other states, fearful of losing the potency
of their own ballistic missiles. BPD systems can and should be
limited geographically and technically—configured only against
the particular rogue state.
71. Sea-based systems require the rogue
state to be adjacent to international or friendly waters, whereas
air-launched systems would have to rely on nearby friendly airbases,
permission of neighbouring states to use their airspace, and (possibly)
constant re-fuelling capabilities. Both air- and sea-based systems
would be vulnerable to attack, thereby requiring protection by
other assets.
72. Ground-based BPD, if deployed in underground
silos, would be less vulnerable than air- and sea-based BPD but
would require the permission of adjacent states to construct and
would not enjoy the desired flexibility enjoyed by mobile launch
platforms.
73. Space-based BPD offers the prospect
of global coverage of any ballistic missile launch and, therefore,
protection to all. On the other hand, they would render everyone's
ballistic missiles vulnerable, which might prove problematic.
Especially if implemented on a unilateral basis the deployment
of space-based missile defences could provoke dangerously unpredictable
responses.
74. Even if boost-phase defences work well
the US is also likely to want to deploy mid-course and terminal
phase defences on or adjacent to its own territory as part of
a layered defence against rogue state missiles and to cope with
accidental or unauthorised use of ballistic missiles by Russia
and China.
CONCLUSION
75. Theatre missile defences, and some strategic
missile defences are already with us. The questions now are:
— how much further investment should
we pour into developing and expanding defences against long-range
ballistic missiles?
— how should we apply such defences
in ways that both meet our concerns about the ballistic missile
threat, whilst not undermining strategic stability?
76. The answer to the first question depends
partly upon our threat assessment of ballistic missile proliferation
and partly on the technical performance of missile defence systems
as they are tested and developed. The US is already convinced
of the threat. The Bush Administration wishes to proceed apace
with missile defence.
77. The answer to the second question would
seem to require any missile defence system to offer protection
to everyone rather than just to the US, whilst not challenging
the credibility of the Russian and Chinese nuclear deterrents.
Proceeding on this basis will help to maintain NATO cohesion and
should make it easier for others, including Russia and China,
to accept its deployment.
78. By way of illustration, this would probably
applying some restraints on the number of ground-based interceptors
in the US, and all space-based systems would need to be prohibited.
79. Sea-, air- and possibly ground-based
boost-phase systems configured specifically against particular
states of concern would appear to fulfil these criteria in one
sense, but in terms of their heavy reliance on automated response
could prove highly destabilising.
80. What we should avoid is a premature
rush to deploy unproven systems, and to do so in ways that are
insensitive to the genuine concerns of Russia and China. We need
these countries inside the non-proliferation regime helping to
strengthen it, not as spoilers undermining it from the outside.
81. Failing a decision to cancel the programme
altogether, Russia and China want the US to impose limits on missile
defence. The US is not prepared to accede to this, at least whilst
it is conducting development programmes in a variety of system
modalities. At some stage further down the line, if MD is genuinely
not aimed at Russia and China, the US may need to provide more
concrete guarantees to that effect than it is willing to do at
present.
82. Preparing to find ways of defending
oneself against the offensive weaponry of potential foes has been
an imperative of the military throughout history. Politicians
are duty-bound to offer protection to their people from attack.
Ballistic missiles armed with nuclear, biological or chemical
warheads could cause millions of casualties within a few minutes
of being launched.
83. In principle, notwithstanding the accepted
caveats, it is hard to argue against those who say that if it
proves technologically feasible to deploy cost-effective systems
that can intercept and destroy such missiles before they reach
their targets then why would we not pursue that possibility?
84. But if we do pursue that objective it
is best to appreciate that missile defence will provide only an
imperfect defence against just one particular element of the threat
posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
85. Moreover, the application of missile
defence should be pursued in ways that neither upset strategic
or regional stability, nor undermine our wider counter-proliferation
efforts, nor distort our defence policy overall.
PART II: UK INTERESTS
PRESERVE UK DETERRENT
CREDIBILITY
86. Given the small size of its own nuclear
forces and a need to continue to be able to deter the Soviet Union,
Britain has always been in favour of restrictions being placed
on strategic missile defences. Even today, the Ministry of Defence
would not want to see a resurgent adversarial Russia, willing
and able to expand its own missile defences to challenge the credibility
of Britain's deterrent.
87. At present, current trends suggest that
Russia is moving in the opposite direction politically and is
too weak economically to break out beyond the former ABM Treaty
limits. Even if it did, the latent capacity of Britain's Trident
system to deploy additional warheads means that the MoD apparently
is confident that it could still overcome new defences.
PRESERVE GOOD
RELATIONS WITH
RUSSIA
88. Britain's main concerns about US plans
for missile defence are that they should not sour relations with
Russia sufficiently to damage European security and that they
should not undermine the arms control and non-proliferation regime.
89. Ministers have repeatedly expressed
their wish that the US and Russia manage to reach an accommodation
on missile defence. Hence, HMG was relieved that Russia's response
to the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty was measured and restrained.
MAINTAIN COMMON
FRONT AGAINST
PROLIFERATION
90. More widely, Britain does not want Russia
and China to become alienated from international efforts to control
the spread of weapons of mass destruction. HMG recognises the
extreme importance of drawing them closer to the international
control regime. It also continues to stress the other available
policy instruments for dealing with proliferation concerns—diplomacy,
sanctions, arms control and deterrence.
DANGERS OF
DECOUPLING
91. There are two potential problems related
to transatlantic de-coupling. First—relating to the possibility
of the US being protected by a MD system that offered little or
no protection to its European Allies. Second—relating to
European countries coming into range of the ballistic missile
capabilities of Middle Eastern states long before the Continental
US does.
92. How will this impact on the willingness
of Allies, including the UK, to participate in any new Gulf War-type
coalition, for example, when European populations are vulnerable
in ways that the US population is not?
PRESERVE TRANSATLANTIC
RELATIONS
93. Whatever the extent of HMG's misgivings
about US plans for MD they are certainly not appear to be sufficient
to suggest that Britain would refuse any US request to upgrade
its facilities at Fylingdales and Menwith Hill.
REDUCE RELIANCE
ON LAUNCH-ON-WARNING
DOCTRINES
94. Just as the UK's nuclear weapons are
now on a reduced notice to fire, so the British Government will
presumably want to draw Russia away from its nuclear doctrine
of launch-on-warning. This is another important reason why HMG
has a national security interest in trying to ensure that MD is
not proceeded with in a manner likely to heighten Russian insecurities
vis-a"-vis the survivability of its strategic nuclear forces.
KEEP OFFENSIVE
WEAPONS FALLING
IN NUMBER
95. It is in the UK's interests to see Russian
nuclear forces continue to be reduced and for those reductions
to be codified in a formal, legally-binding agreement. In conjunction
with the Co-operative Threat Reduction programme, this will be
a necessary means of ensuring the irreversibility of acts of nuclear
disarmament.
AN ACCEPTABLE
MD ARCHITECTURE
96. At some stage, if it has not done so
already, HMG should begin to identify the criteria that it would
want to apply to any US MD system, along the lines set out in
the section "Doing it right" above.
97. In which case, Britain might eventually
be expected to endorse a missile defence system that was truly
universal in the protection if offered, was targeted at specific
rogue states and was not destabilising in terms of regional or
global security. This would help prevent the potentially divisive
impact within NATO of a purely national missile defence system
protecting only the US, and reassure Russia and China.
DO NOT
ALLOW MISSILE
DEFENCE INVESTMENT
TO DISTORT
THE DEFENCE
BUDGET
98. MoD planners need to guard against preparing
to fight the next war in the ways that they want to fight it rather
than in the ways the potential enemy intends to fight it. Instead
of investing considerable resources in developing highly visible,
sophisticated weaponry our opponents may well choose to pursue
cheaper, relatively uncomplicated and clandestine methods of hurting
us.
99. The danger for MoD planners is that
if they make incorrect judgements about the nature of the threat,
our security effort may become dangerously distorted in the context
of limited defence budgets. There is a danger that an over-hyped
concentration on MD could divert attention from more real and
immediate threats. In which case, any UK expenditure on MD should
be weighed extremely carefully against the opportunity costs such
investment incurs.
34 The views expressed in this memorandum are those
of the author alone. Back
35
See "Foreign Ballistic Missile Developments and the
Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015", unclassified summary
of a National Intelligence Estimate, produced by the US National
Intelligence Council, 2002. Back
36
As proponents of ground-based interceptors seem to work on the
principle of four interceptors being launched to intercept each
warhead, a missile defence deployment of 100 interceptors would
be assigned to deal with 25 attacking warheads ie about the current
level of Chinese inter-continental capability. Back
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