APPENDIX 12
Memorandum submitted by Yorkshire CND
(9 Janaury 2003)
Yorkshire CND has been at the forefront of campaigns
against UK involvement in missile defence for several years and
has a direct interest in the issue, with two military bases in
the region planned for use in the US project, should it get the
go-ahead. The Ballistic Missile Early Warning station at Fylingdales
near Whitby and the spy-base and space monitoring station at Menwith
Hill near Harrogate are both touted for key roles in the system.
Fylingdales operates under the US "Masterplan
for tactical Warning and Attack" which lists the aims of
BMEWS as being to:
1. Support and aid the survival of strategic
military forces.
2. Provide an accurate basis for (US) national
command authority response decisions.
3. Enhance warfighting effectiveness of the
strategic nuclear forces.
As well as its Early Warning Function, Fylingdales
also forms part of the Space Surveillance Network (SSN), an intelligence
network that tracks and maintains a catalogue of space objects
(military and civilian satellites and space debris). Fylingdales
is therefore a significant command, control, communications and
intelligence installation. Information gathered by the radar installation
is fed directly to the North American Aerospace Defense Command
(NORAD) in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado. From there information
is passed to the National Command authorities and to Headquarters,
Strategic Air Command (SAC). In time of war, it would provide
the US President with information on what has and has not been
attacked, monitor trajectories of both surveillance satellites
and incoming ballistic missiles and allow prioritising and accurate
response and targeting on "enemy" satellites and ballistic
missiles.
| Preliminary MD architectures
| Initial configuration | Full configuration
|
| Planned deployment date | 2005-07
| 2011 |
| Number of interceptors deployed in Alaska |
100 | 125 |
Number of interceptors deployed in North
Dakota
| 0 | 125 |
| Upgraded early warning radars | Beale (Marysville, Calif)
Clear (Alaska)
Cape Cod (Massachusetts)
Fylingdales (England)
Thule (Greenland)
| Beale
Clear
Cape Cod
Fylingdales
Thule
South Korea
|
| X-band radars | Shemya (Alaska)
| Shemya
Clear
Fylingdales
Thule
Beale
Cape Cod
Grand Forks (N. Dakota)
Hawaii
South Korea
|
Satellite-based infrared sensors
in low-Earth orbit (SBIRS-Low)
| No | Yes |
For MD however, detection and warning are not enough. Accurate
tracking and discrimination between warheads, debris and decoys
is required. The "preliminary" architectures released
by the US Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) in March
1999 (see table above) describes the MD system as being deployed
in three phases. All three phases would use the current US early-warning
radars in California, Massachusetts and Alaska and at Thule and
Fylingdales, but they are not able to track targets accurately
enough to guide interceptors. The first phase therefore, involves
an Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR) program to give them this
capability. This would involve replacing existing computers, graphic
displays, communication equipment, and the radar receiver/exciter
for MD. New EWR software would allow the acquisition, tracking,
and classification of small objects near the horizon and this
data would be passed to other MD elements using improved communications
systems. This development will take place as a result of the request
made recently by the USA.
The upgraded early-warning radars will still be extremely
limited in their ability to discriminate real warheads from decoys
or to deal with other types of countermeasures. The system will
therefore also deploy new high resolution phased-array X-band
radars which use high frequencies (5.2-8.5 GHz) and advanced radar
signal processing technology to improve target resolution. Phase
1 would see an X-band radar at Shemya in the Aleutian Islands
(to cover missile launches from North Korea). Phase 2 would include
additional X-band radars at the current BMEWS sites (including
Fylingdales). Questions have been raised regarding the possible
danger to the health of people living close to these installations.
The BMDO insists that the microwave leakage from these high power
radars is safe—but others are not so sure and independent
investigations into possible health hazards need to be made. On
6 January 2003 Geoff Hoon stated in a press release that,
"Although the radar would have a different operating
pattern, the power and frequency output would not change, therefore
posing no risk to the health of people or livestock. The radio
emissions from the radar are many times lower than the safe limits
set by the relevant authorities and would remain so after the
upgrade."
In fact the only test of the radiation levels around Fylingdales
of which the results were made public was made by the Nuclear-Free
Local Authorities—a relevant authority—and contrary
to the statement made by Hoon, it found that radiation levels
were barely under the limit recommended by the ICNIRP (International
Commission for Non-ionising Radiation Protection)—for more
information on this see Appendix A). It is imperative that any
information held by any government body about the radiation levels
around Fylingdales be made public without delay and that, should
any upgrade take place, a new test take place, with results published.
The development of US missile defence has been clouded in
secrecy throughout its life and this may also be so for the possible
location of an X-band radar in the UK. It has recently been suggested
that an X-band radar could be located on ships at sea rather than
land-based. It is vital that the public be informed whether there
are plans to use any site in the UK for an X-band radar. It is
reasonable to believe that, whilst sea-based X-bands may be developed,
the US is likely to want a permanent station in key locations
across the globe, and one of these is likely to be the UK. Current
plans suggest that the huge radar would be built at the Fylingdales
site—within a national park. An X-band radar would almost
certainly increase radiation levels beyond the limits recommended
by the ICNIRP (see Appendix B) and a full investigation in to
this must take place before any go-ahead is given for an X-band
radar in the UK. Should it prove to exceed levels recommended
by the ICNIRP then the UK must not give permission for its location
on UK soil.
MENWITH HILL
The other US MD component in Yorkshire is at Menwith Hill,
which is probably better known for its use of a system called
ECHELON to systematically intercept fax, email and telephone messages
and search for key words. In 1966 the National Security Agency
(NSA) took Menwith Hill over and the interception of satellite
communications began as early as 1974. At this time the first
of the satellite communications dishes were installed—there
are now nearly 30.
In 1997 the Government announced that Menwith Hill was due to
become the European Ground Relay Station for the Space Based Infra
Red System (SBIRS) which has two components—SBIRS-High and
SBIRS-Low. General Howell M. Estes III (then Commander in Chief,
North American Aerospace Defense Command and US Space Command
and Air Force Space Command, Commander) said in a speech urging
the US Congress to "help fulfil the promise of space"
that: "These systems will significantly improve our ability
to provide much more precise launch and impact point of theater
missiles to forces in a theater of operations. They are key to
our ability to cue systems that we'll use for active defense as
part of both theater and national missile defense."
SBIRS-High will replace the early warning satellite system
known as the Defense Support Program (DSP) to detect the boost
stage of a ballistic missile after launch and provide initial
trajectory information. The SBIRS-Low system is to detect and
track cold missiles much later in their trajectory. Both would
be used for MD. However, Professor Ted Postol of MIT has expressed
grave doubts that SBIRS-Low will ever work, and SBIRS-High will
be used to detect ballistic missile launches even in the absence
of MD. If the US wants to use data relayed through Menwith Hill
for MD, they would need to ask for UK consent. The public has
a right to know if such a request has been made. It is possible
however, that, as Menwith Hill's SBIRS system is already up and
running for other purposes, no such request will be made. It is
vital that the public are informed as to whether Menwith Hill
will be used for Missile Defence, whether the UK government has
had any official or unofficial talks about the use of the base
for the system and whether, if any components were to be used,
permission would indeed be sought from the UK government.
A TARGET?
Whilst the likelihood of an attack on the UK in order to
disarm the missile defence system may be small the use of Menwith
Hill and Fylingdales for the system can only work to increase
awareness of the stations to opponents of the US and its allies.
Should a state wish to launch a missile attack on the US it may
wish to increase its chances of success by disabling missile defence.
Furthermore, should the US be perceived to be using the system
to aid first strikes against states then again, its disabling
would be beneficial to those states. The MoD has argued that a
rogue state or terrorist network is unlikely to have precise enough
missile technology to be able to successfully strike either base.
In the MoD press release of 6 January, Hoon is quoted as saying
"For the foreseeable future, the countries of concern
are unlikely to have the capability to target specific places
or installations."
However this does not take in to account the most likely
form of attack on either base—striking from within the UK
with a powerful weapon. Whilst the risk may be small it is irresponsible
to ignore it completely.
ELSEWHERE IN
THE UK
US statements and the UK MoD document "Missile Defence:
A public discussion paper" both suggest that plans for a
US missile defence system include locating interceptor missiles
in North-West Europe. There are great concerns that this implies
locating them in the UK. Again, one potential site for these missiles
is close to Fylingdales and/or at other US bases in the UK. Such
a move could only increase the likelihood of the UK, particularly
Yorkshire, becoming a target. The MoD must make public any discussions
that have taken place about the possible location of interceptor
missiles in the UK. They must also ensure that any past, present
or future discussions about the use of any other UK bases or US
bases sited in the UK for missile defence be made public.
US PLANS
US plans for a missile defence system go well beyond those
being publicly discussed by the MoD at present. Whilst early stages
of development of the system require no more than a software upgrade
at Fylingdales, no change to Menwith Hill and no siting of missiles
on UK soil, plans for later stages are quite different. As has
been stated publicly by the missile defence agency and its sibling
organisations and predecessors, including US Space Command, missile
defence will eventually require the use of X-band radars, air-borne
lasers, space-based lasers and missile interceptors located across
the globe.
The Select Committee will doubtless be aware of US Space
Command's document "Vision for 2020" which clarifies
the plans for missile defence.
Whilst current plans for phase one of missile defence are
modest compared to those of the original star wars system proposed
by President Reagan, one must not be fooled in to thinking that
this is as far as current US plans go. The system will develop
in to a space-based system, with weapons in space (breaking the
Outer Space Treaty). Missile defence is not a tool on its own
but part of a larger plan to achieve what the US calls "full
spectrum dominance"—the dominance of land, sea, air,
space and information. By providing space weapons, new air-borne
weapons, missile interceptors and advanced missile tracking technology,
missile defence is a big step towards this dominance.
That this US dream is some way from fruition is not an excuse
for not considering it now. Once the UK gives the go-ahead to
missile defence it will become increasingly difficult to reject
further developments. The UK will become increasingly tied to
US foreign and military policy and will be a key a player in the
progress of US "full spectrum dominance". The long-term
implications of this system must be taken in to account fully
by the select committee and the Government.
ARMS RACE
In the public discussion paper published by the MoD recently,
it is stated that concerns that missile defence will cause an
arms race are ill-founded. It is pointed out that
"Many feared that US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty in June 2002 (after the six months' notice allowed
under the treaty) would cause global instability, damage international
relationships and create and arms race. But this has not happened."
This is a naive assessment of a complicated situation. Few
people predicting an arms race as a consequence of missile defence
or the death of the ABM treaty would expect it to take place within
six months. The argument is a more subtle one than that. The perception
of missile defence by some states (as well as individuals) is
that it will allow the United States to fight wars more efficiently
and effectively. By giving them the ability to defend against
limited missile attack, they will have the ability to launch a
first strike on a country with less concern about a successful
retaliatory attack. The concern is that this will allow them to
go war more often, or at least make them feel they are able to
do so when it suits their individual foreign policy objectives.
Whether or not they will do so is irrelevant to this concern.
It is the very perception of this threat that may lead to a gradual
increase in the arsenals of countries that recognise it. The response
of these countries would be unlikely to be an intensive increase
in missile arsenals over a short period, as this would provoke
instability. However, the instability already created by missile
defence means that these states will gradually increase their
arsenals over time. It may be a matter of months but more likely
a matter of years. As these states increase their arsenals, other
states that feel threatened either by the instability created
by the perceived threat of missile defence or by the states that
are reacting to the perception, will then increase their own arsenals
to attempt to redress the subsequent military imbalance. The result
is an arms race less obvious and slower than that of the cold
war, but an arms race nonetheless.
The discussion paper released by the MoD suggests that missile
defence may actually help to reduce weapons of mass destruction
as states will not spend the time and resources developing weapons
that a shield can defend against. As has been seen countless times
throughout history, as bigger shields are produced, so are bigger
swords. No state would allow itself to fall in to position of
impotence. If its current arsenal of weapons is rendered redundant
by a new system, it will develop newer or more numerous weapons
that can overcome the new system. By creating a shield one only
provokes the development of more powerful weapons to pierce that
shield.
Unrest over the US proposals remains high and vocal. Whilst
the US is attempting to placate Russia by involving them in the
system, they are still wary of the programme and concerned that
it will have negative implications for their own foreign policy,
sovereignty and power. Interfax reported on 18 December that Russia's
foreign minister Igor Ivanov said:
"Such steps must not hurt Russia's security interests,
or the interests of other countries . . . Such a move must also
not prompt a new arms race."
China, which is not likely to be offered any involvement
in the system, is equally uneasy. Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu
Jianchao is quoted by the Guardian on 19 December as saying
that missile defence:
"should not undermine the security and stability of
the world. . . We worry about the possible negative impact on
regional stability of a missile-defense system. We hope the relevant
parties will act prudently. . . Only through the good co-operation
of the international community can we effectively solve the threat
posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, . .
The missile-defense system should not undermine the security and
stability of the world. Neither should it undermine global and
regional security."
The idea that the system is no longer of concern internationally
is false, and the idea that many states are not concerned about
the prospect of a subsequent arms race is equally incorrect.
SPACE
The United States and the United Kingdom are both signatories
of the Outer Space Treaty, which forbids siting weapons in space
or fighting wars in space. However, missile defence, in its later
stages, is likely to require the use of space-based weaponry.
As the US Space Command document "Vision for 2020" states,
space command would have a
". . . greatly expanded role as an active warfighter
in the years ahead as the combatant command responsible for national
missile defence . . .".
Whether in fact it would indeed be the US Space Command,
the Missile Defence Agency or another US body that takes on this
role, it is clear that such a role will be a major aim for the
US. Previous Chiefs of the US Space Command have spoken of fighting
wars in, through and from space. The link is not hard to make.
Missile defence will play a key role in providing warfighting
capabilities to the US. Its role is not one of defence but of
offence. Rhetoric like this will provoke an increase in the numbers
of WMD in other countries. Again, whilst the MoD discussion paper
argues that the "current territorial missile defence proposals
are much more limited" than the Reagan plans, long-term proposals
are even more ambitious and destabilising. It is worth repeating
that, once the UK becomes involved in the system, a way out will
become increasingly difficult to find. The go-ahead to these current
proposals is a giant step towards the US achievement of their
ultimate proposals.
As Canada's Foreign Minister Bill Graham was quoted as saying
on 18 December in the Globe and Mail newspaper, missile defence
would be a
"bad mistake. . . The big red line we all have is
the weaponisation of outer space, which I believe would be immoral,
illegal and a bad mistake. . . There are voices in Washington
that are calling for that and we are strongly urging them this
would be an extremely unfortunate development for peace. . . The
fact of the matter is they will have established the principle
(of space weapons) and they can't guarantee they'll have the technological
superiority 25 years from now and that's going to be a problem
for everybody."
SAYING NO
As Jean-Philippe Racicot, strategic affairs researcher at
the University of Quebec at Montreal is quoted as saying in the
same Canadian article, while Canada may oppose the initiative
politically, militarily it might not have much choice but to support
the action.
"In 12 to 24 months the Americans are going to ask
us: are you in or not? And at that point, if Canada says no, it
will be marginalized. . . So despite the official protests, we're
not going to have any choice but to go along."
Louis Balthazar, interim head of the same university's strategic
studies department continued,
"Canada is so closely tied to the United States, it
would be difficult to bypass this project."
The UK is, if anything, more closely tied to the US than
Canada. With its reliance on the US to maintain its Trident nuclear
submarines, its ties to US information gathered from Menwith Hill
and through other means, the UK has become dangerously reliant
on the US for its defence. Agreeing to the use of UK facilities
or land for missile defence would take us far deeper in to this
chasm of reliance and make it vastly more difficult to escape.
If the UK is to give the go-ahead for missile defence it should
do so not only because the security of the nation and NATO allies
would be increased, but because the stability of the entire international
spectrum would be maintained or enhanced. Either way, a decision
by the UK government should be based more on the benefits to the
people of the UK than on the ties to the US. The two are not necessarily
inextricably linked.
CONCLUSION
It is important to remember that current public plans for
missile defence do not tell the whole story. Whilst a software
upgrade at Fylingdales is all that is necessary at present, the
full plans for missile defence are far greater and the implications
far more destabilising. It is a path that is hard to turn back
on once the journey has been started.
Missile Defence:
— threatens to provoke a new arms race;
— will lead to the weaponisation and militarisation
of space;
— is provoking concern and anger amongst key states
including China, Russia and Canada;
— may pose a threat to UK bases;
— may lead to the siting of interceptor missiles
in the UK;
— will allow the US to achieve "full spectrum
dominance" and so perceive themselves more able to fight
wars without threat of retaliation;
— may increase radiation levels in the North York
Moors national park and surrounding villages; and
— will tie the UK ever more tightly to US foreign
and military policy.
The UK government must take the brave step of rejecting use
of Fylingdales, Menwith Hill and any other part of the UK for
any component of the missile defence system. Instead they should
take genuine multi-lateral steps towards nuclear and conventional
disarmament and peace and confront the root causes of inequality
and unrest, and urge the US to do the same. Creating new levels
of warfighting technology is not a step towards peace or security.
Annex A
EMR concerns associated with existing and proposed
development at RAF Fylingdales
HEALTH EFFECTS
The replacement of the familiar BMEWS "golf balls"
with a large Phased Array Radar at the Fylingdales site, that
commenced operation in 1993, led the Nuclear Free Local Authorities
to conduct a ground-based EMR survey of the surrounding area[50]
This survey was an extension of earlier work in the summer of
1991 and used 23 measurement sites, including moorland paths and
tracks, roadside locations and habitations. The survey found maximum
field values of about 10Vm-1 with typical values around 5Vm-1.
The report concluded:
— "At no point in the area accessed by the
survey is the field strength due to RAF Fylingdales' transmission
higher than that recommended in the current UK guidelines for
protection against biological hazard from non-ionizing radiation;
— "In the northerly locations, the new phased
array radar has not significantly changed the time averaged levels
of field to which walkers and residents are exposed;
— "South of the transmitter, the levels
to which walkers and residents are exposed are now ten times that
which they were before the pyramid upgrade became operational;
— "The threat to vehicles using the A169
from interference to their electronic control systems has been
reduced though not eliminated."
INTERNATIONAL SAFETY
STANDARDS: THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION
ON NON-IONIZING
RADIATION PROTECTION
(ICNIRP)
Exposure limits for Radio Frequency (RF) fields are developed
by international bodies such as the ICNIRP. The ICNIRP is a non-governmental
organization formally recognised by the World Health Organisation
and has drafted guidelines to protect against RF health effects.
They state that:
"Environmental RF levels from radars, in areas normally
accessible to the general public, are normally at least 1,000
times below the limits for continuous public exposure allowed
by the ICNIRP guidelines." [51]
At frequencies in the range 300 MHz to several GHz, there
is significant local, non-uniform absorption by the human body—the
recommended maximum field levels are shown in the following table
(where f is the radar frequency in MHz).
Reference levels for general public exposure to time-varying
electric and magnetic fields (unperturbed root mean square values)
Frequency
range | E-field
strength
(V m-1)
| H-field
strength
(A m-1)
| B-field
((T) | Equivalent
power wave
density
(W m-2)
|
| 10-400 MHz | 28 | 0.073
| 0.092 | 2 |
| 400-2000 MHz | 1.375f1/2 |
0.037f1/2 | 0.046f1/2Nntf/200 |
|
| 2-300 GHz | 61 | 0.16
| 0.20 | 10 |
A comparison between the survey results and the table above
indicates that the 5-10Vm-1 EMR levels recorded around RAF Fylingdales
(operating in the frequency at 420-450 MHz) were in fact quite
close to the ICNIRP reference levels (28-29Vm-1) and not ".
. .1,000 times below the limits for continuous exposure".
Also, a number of factors significantly alter human exposure
to RF generated by radar systems, often by a factor of at least
100:
— Radar systems send electromagnetic waves in pulses
and not continuously. This makes the peak pulse power emitted
much higher than the measured average or root mean square power.
— Radars are directional and the RF energy they
generate is contained in narrow beams. RF levels away from the
main beam fall off rapidly. In most cases, these levels are thousands
of times lower than in the main beam.
— Early warning radars are continuously changing
the direction of their beam.
ARE INTERNATIONAL
SAFETY STANDARDS
RELIABLE?
A recent report on the Physiological and Environmental
Effects of Non-ionising Electromagnetic Radiation for the
European Parliament[52]
states:
"What distinguishes technologically produced electromagnetic
fields from (the majority of) those of natural origin is their
much higher degree of coherence. This means that their frequencies
are particularly well-defined, a feature that facilitates the
discernment of such fields by living organisms, including ourselves.
This greatly increases their biological potency, and "opens
the door" to the possibility of frequency-specific, non-thermal
influences of various kinds, against which existing Safety Guidelines—such
as those issued by the International Commission for Non-ionising
Radiation Protection (ICNIRP)—afford no protection. For
these Guidelines are based solely on consideration of the ability
of radio frequency (RF) and microwave radiation to heat tissue,
and of extremely low frequency (ELF) magnetic fields to induce
circulating electric currents in the interior of the body, both
of which are known to be deleterious to health, if excessive."
The report points out that the frequency-specific sensitivity
of living organisms to ultra-low intensity microwave radiation
was discovered over 30 years ago in Russia and there the exposure
guidelines are approximately 100 times more stringent than those
of ICNIRP. It also notes that some symptoms have been reported
in epidemiological studies involving humans, animals and plant
life connected with a radar operating at 154-162MHz, with a pulse
repetition frequency of 24.4Hz—at a location where the intensity
of the emitted radiation is comparable to that typically found
at 150m from a base-station. Additional reported effects include[53]:
— Depressed nocturnal melatonin levels in cattle[54].
— Less developed memory and attention span (as well
as decreased endurance of their neuromuscular apparatus) of children
living within a 20 km radius of the radar, subject to a maximum
exposure of 0.00039 W m-2.
— A six-fold increase in chromosome damage in cows
exposed to a likely maximum intensity of 0.001 W m-2.
(The cited field intensities are estimated from information
on the electric field intensity as a function of distance from
the radar installation[55]).
In April 2001 the US Air Force agreed to conduct "time-domain
measurements" on a similar radar installation (known as PAVE
PAWS—Phased Array Warning System) at Cape Cod in the United
States. Local residents there have been concerned about the radar
because the area has some of the highest rates of cancer in the
state. From 1993 to 1997, nine of the Cape's 15 towns had breast
cancer rates at least 15% higher than the rest of the state. [56]
Richard Albanese, an Air Force scientist for more than 31
years, and others are worried that the Cape Cod radar's phased
wave fronts affect human tissue in ways that are not yet understood.
In a presentation given in February 2002 at the start of a series
of experiments to measure the PAVE PAWS radar, Albanese said he
has conducted animal testing that showed animals suffering harm
when exposed to phased array radar at levels 1,000 below the current
electrical health standards. [57]
The Fylingdales PAR operates by emitting a series of pulses
and additional, perhaps more serious, problems may arise at frequencies
around 17 Hz. As mentioned in the above European Parliament report,
this lies in the range of beta brain-wave activity and is close
the frequency of a flashing visible light that can provoke seizures
in people with photosensitive epilepsy. It is also the modulation
frequency at which ". . .there is a maximum in the expression
of calcium ions from brain cells when they are irradiated with
amplitude modulated, low intensity RF radiation over a wide range
of carrier frequencies" and ". . .any interference .
. .could well undermine the integrity of the whole nervous system,
although the extent to which this actually occurs is, at present
uncertain, owing to a lack of the necessary research."
The pulse repetition frequency of the radar is understood
to be 27 pulses per second[58].
This was the documented frequency of the previous system and it
is not known whether there are any similar effects at or around
this frequency that need to be examined closely.
Annex B
Effects of X-band radar
The final configuration of NMD will require the deployment
of high resolution phased-array X-band radars (XBRs) which use
high frequencies (5.2-8.5 GHz) and advanced radar signal processing
technology to improve target resolution and discrimination. These
systems emit a series of electromagnetic pulses over a 50
field of view in azimuth and elevation, and can be rotated to
track targets from any direction.
The initial NMD configuration includes an XBR at Shemya in
the Aleutian Islands (to cover missile launches from North Korea).
The final NMD configuration is expected to include additional
XBRs at the current BMEWS sites, and this including Fylingdales.
When fully operational each system will include a radar mounted
on pedestal and associated control and maintenance facility, and
a power generation facility.
XBRs have an average power of 170 kW and an antenna area
of 123m2, which means a power aperture product of about 20 million,
though this usually incorporates a "thinned" array of
only 1/5 of the total possible number of aerial elements (around
81,000) decreasing the gain by a factor of 5. In this case more
energy goes into radar beam side lobes but does produce a narrower
beam and provides greater tracking accuracy.
Although the BMDO insists that the microwave leakage from
XBRs is not harmful[59],
recently questions have been raised regarding the possible danger
to the health of people living close by.
Potential effects
The XBR BMDO fact sheet[60]
states that "The exposure limits established by [the US
standard] ANSI/IEEE C95.1 1999 are used to ensure that public
health will not be impacted by EMR emitted from the XBR".
Two major exposure environments are defined: inside and outside
a controlled area of radius 150m where security personnel would
prevent any unauthorized access. It is claimed that outside the
controlled area EMR will be no higher than the power density levels
specified in ANSI/IEEE C95.1 1999. The BMDO provide the following
table:
Comparison of EMR exposures
| System | Distance
| Power Density
(W m-2) |
Power Density
(mW cm-2) |
| Microwave Oven | 5cm | 50
| 5 |
| X-Band Radar [at fence boundary] | 150m
| 25 | 2.5 |
| Walkie-Talkie | 10cm | 25
| 2.5 |
| Cellular phone | 1cm | 6
| 0.6 |
The BMDO continue:
"There is a possibility that EMR may effect television
reception out to a distance of 4 kilometers (about 2.5 miles)
from the XBR and that occasional static may occur in some radios
out to 7 kilometers (about 4.3 miles) from the XBR."
However, the projected power density level is higher than
that recommended by the ICNIRP guidelines for radars (10W m-2
at this frequency range—see table in Appendix A).
The BMDO also claim that wildlife will not be adversely affected.
Although there is a potential for higher levels of exposure to
birds flying through the main XBR beam, it is claimed that exposure
would only be for a short time and ". . . time-averaged
power densities would not raise body temperatures or cause adverse
biological effects".
However, this claim is not consistent with the European report
cited earlier.
50
"RAF Fylingdales EMR survey, second phase" by Tim Williams,
Elmec Services, 2 August, 1993. Back
51
WHO Fact Sheet No. 226, Junen 1999. Back
52
"The Physiological and Environmental Effects of Non-ionising
Electromagnetic Radiation", by G J Hyland, Private Treaty
No EP/IV/A/STOA/2000/07/03. Back
53
Science of the Total Environment; Issue No 180, 1996. Back
54
"Study of Health Effects of Short-wave Transmitter Station
at Schwarenburg", by E S Altpeter et al, University of Berne,
Inst for Social & Preventative Medicine, August, 1995. Back
55
"Measurement of the intensity of electromagnetic radiation
from the Skrunde radio location station, Latvia", by Y Kainins
et al, Science of the Total Environment 1996: 180: 51-56. Back
56
"Radar tower plan rekindles fears" by Richard Higgins.
The Boston Globe, 5 March 2001. Back
57
"Measured Responses" by Kevin Ddennahy, Cape Cod
Times, 28 February 2002. Back
58
Jane's Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems, Second Edition, page
62, 1991-1. Back
59
US DoD say (Press Release, 6 October 1999: NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENCE
DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT RELEASED): . . .Overall,
the expected environmental impacts resulting from potential NMD
deployment are minimal. Areas analysed in the DEIS include: potential
electromagnetic radiation effects to air space, biological resources,
and humans from operation of the X-Band Radar; construction and
operation impacts on vegetation, wildlife, threatened and endangered
species, wetlands and fisheries; health and safety issues to the
public associated with transportation and operation of the Ground-based
interceptor; potential impacts to geology and soils and water
resources; noise related impacts from both construction and operation;
increases in hazardous waste generation and air emissions; and
socioeconomic impacts and benefits resulting from both construction
and operation of the NMB system." Back
60
"X-band Radar Fact Sheet" from the BMDO-www.acq.osd.mit/bmdo/bmdolink/pdt/jn0019.pdf Back
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