APPENDIX 15
Memorandum submitted by Scientists for
Labour (10 January 2003)
This document was published by the Ministry
of Defence on 9 Dec 2002, although much of its content had been
foreshadowed by the Defence Secretary (Geoff Hoon) in speeches
to the House of Commons, and also in a speech to the Foreign Policy
Centre on 12 November 2002.
The paper sets out the Government's strategic
thinking behind Missile Defences, and seeks not only to justify
US permission to upgrade the Fylingdales radar, but also suggests
embarking on a programme of such defences for the UK and for Europe.
The document invites debate, and these are the
considered views of Scientists for Labour (SfL), which is an organisation
open to members or supporters of the Labour Party who are interested
or involved in UK science and technology (http://www.scientists-for-labour.org.uk/)
SfL aims to improve the understanding both of science and of its
importance, within the Labour Party and nationally. It is also
involved in advising the parliamentary Labour Party on technical
issues affecting other areas of government policy, and regularly
lobbies government ministers on science policy issues.
The paragraph numbers referenced below (as §1)
refer to the numbering of the MoD document. For obvious reasons,
we focus on the scientific and technical issues that are raised.
Summary of Scientists for Labour Response
The MoD paper suggests that a UK ballistic missile
system could eventually, after many years of development, deter
the threat of ballistic missile attack on the UK and Europe from
"states of concern", and so enhance international stability
and security. It would not impact on threats from terrorist groups,
nor from major military powers. In our view, the outlook for defensive
and counter-defence missile technologies is such as to render
any such deterrence of "states of concern" as at best
nugatory, and a UK programme would tend to degrade international
security. The costs of a British system would be very high, and
the benefits negative.
The Ballistic Missile threat to the UK
We agree that whatever threat exists, it is
not from ballistic missiles of other major military powers (§2);
in any case, an effective shield against such mass missile attack
is unrealistic (§64), and is not the purpose of the present
US programme. We accept too that Fylingdales would be a specific
target only in such a mass attack. Nor is it likely that non-state
actors (ie terrorist groups) would favour use of ballistic missiles
as delivery vehicles (§33). Rather, the MoD paper identifies
potential sources of threat as being from "countries of concern"
(§9), a list that includes Iraq, Iran, North Korea and Libya,
and their possible motivation as an "an intent to impose
their will by threat of ballistic missile attack (on the UK)"
(§21). These countries do not yet have missiles of sufficient
range, but could acquire them within a number of years.
Certainly the proliferation of missile technology
is a matter of concern (§16), but of course there are legitimate
civil programmes, particularly satellite launchers, that share
much of the technology (§17).
Ballistic Missile Defences
§52 states (referring to recent US tests
in the Pacific, and specifically to that on 14 October.) "the
ability to hit the incoming missile with an interceptor has been
proved." This is far from the case, for the record of the
tests so far (there have been about 10, and each one costs about
$100 million) is very mixed. Indeed, the most recent one, conducted
on 12 December just a few days after publication of the MoD paper,
was a failure but received little publicity. Hence, to state (§49)
"A prototype Ground Based Interceptor has successfully intercepted,
on a number of occasions, a modified Minuteman ICBM launched more
than 7,500 km away" is at best a half-truth.
Furthermore, the key technical issue is the
conditions under which the test is conducted, in particular how
much information is given to the tracking radars and the command
and control system about the incoming missile, such as its launch
time, course, size, and crucially, whether it is equipped with
decoys or other penetration aids. Last May the Pentagon decided
that in future to classify this key information, so the significance
of the 14 October test interception is unclear. It will be remembered
that the record of the Pentagon's Ballistic Missile Defense Organisation
(BMDO) is not unblemished in this respect: The test denoted IFT-6
conducted on 14 July 2001 was claimed by the BMDO as a successful
in-flight destruction of a mock warhead; two weeks later, it emerged
that the warhead had been fitted with a radar beacon that allowed
it to be tracked—a totally artificial scenario.
The level of commitment by the current US administration
(§38) to BMD was not shared by its predecessor, in part because
of the technical deficiencies that we refer to here. We leave
comment on the political enthusiasm that is now to be found, and
also the impact of BMD on global security and stability, to colleagues
with expertise in International Relations.
The role of a UK BMD system
This Chapter (§65-70) is entitled Deterrence.
§69 looks at a scenario in which a regime contemplates "the
use of ballistic missiles against the UK (whether in a desperate
attempt to cling to power, or to prevent allied intervention in
a regional conflict) would then face not only the near certainty
of an overwhelming response, but also the probability that the
attack would fail altogether."
We comment that herein lies the fundamental
flaw of BMD in this context of dealing with a potential unbalanced
(in more senses than one) aggressor: the asymmetry between defence
and offence. For the defences to be useful, there has to be confidence
that they are 100% watertight (which is admitted in §58),
because the incoming missiles may well be nuclear-tipped or carrying
other Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Necessarily, it would
be an untried system. On the other hand, will an irrational aggressor
in extremis really care whether the majority of his dozen missiles
get through to their targets, or—if the BMD system were
to work well—only one or two succeed? Will he really credit
the "probability that the attack would fail altogether."
?
Countermeasures
Since the beginnings of anti-missile defences,
counter-measure technologies have been developed (eg the British
Chevaline project). There is a substantial literature on decoys
and other penetration aids, and their likely costs and efficacy.
In general, the conclusion is that the design of these countermeasures
is not particularly challenging to a team that has extensive missile
experience, and nor do they add hugely to the cost.
The MoD paper (§14) conflates the two distinct
issues of penetration counter-measures and warhead accuracy, and
seeks to dismiss them both as "costly and technically
complex" for most countries; that is true of the latter
aspect, but not the former. It is the straight-forward counter-measures,
not the difficult accuracy, that will be of interest to the rogue
aggressor. Indeed, in §19 it is pointed out that accuracy
is not a priority for these "states of concern".
Value for money
§84 rightly states that a UK BMD system
would be expensive. The US programme has a budget of $8.4 billion
and rising. Even if the UK "coat-tails" on the Americans,
it will still be extremely costly, and this is at a time when
NATO defence budgets are under other conventional pressures.
Alternative approaches to containing the ballistic
missile threat
We welcome the commitment (§36, §37)
to multilateral agreements designed to limit missile proliferation,
and the establishment of an International Code of Conduct. In
particular, a protocol for pre-launch notification for satellite-bearing
missiles should help greatly as a confidence-building measure.
As noted in §27, North Korea exports missiles and missile
technology extensively, and this "export industry is primarily
motivated by the need to acquire hard currency." North
Korea's total exports are about $700 million pa, so that there
is clearly scope—even if the political path is difficult
and long—for encouraging this impoverished country to direct
its technological skills and export trade at commercial satellite
launching, and to forgo the export of missiles.
International issues
We agree strongly that (§71) it is vital
that "Missile defence, does not itself contribute to missile
proliferation (by) other states." However, the statement
(§75) that "China, . . . has been pursuing her modernisation
programme for her nuclear forces for some years irrespective of
these (the US NMD) proposals. " would not by any means
be accepted universally. That modernisation is likely to trigger
further arms build-up, including missile proliferation, in the
Indian sub-continent (where the dangers of armed conflict are
very great indeed) and elsewhere in Asia. We go further than "The
maintenance of strategic stability is an important consideration"
(§71), and argue that UK policy should be to give it the
highest priority. Proliferation of missiles and of missile defence
systems both degrade stability. Consequently, a UK missile defence
programme would be both costly and against our best interests.
Scientists for Labour, January 2003
Eg "Countermeasures: A Technical Evaluation
of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned US National Missile
Defense System", A M Sessler et al, Union of Concerned Scientists
(April 2000), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/global—security/missile—defense/.
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