Examination of Witnesses(Questions 280-299)
RT HON
GEOFFREY HOON
MP, MR NICK
WITNEY AND
MR PAUL
TAYLOR
WEDNESDAY 15 JANUARY 2003
280. Have you had any discussions about whether
the United States would expect a financial contribution for stepping
under their umbrella?
(Mr Hoon) Sorry, I misheard that.
281. Have you had any discussions about whether
the United States would expect any financial contribution for
stepping under that defensive umbrella?
(Mr Hoon) As I indicated earlier, part of the request
from the United States indicated a willingness to provide coverage
under a developed missile defence system to the United Kingdom,
subject obviously to financial and other implications, and that
is part of the specific request that the United States have made
and that is why, again, it does not seem sensible at this stage
to commit the United Kingdom to something which clearly a future
government, for example, might not be able to afford. That is
part of the decision that a future government will have to take
when and if the time comes that such a system is sufficiently
mature and successful and the threat is sufficiently great for
us to judge it necessary to participate in it.
282. Thank you. How important is the upgrading
of Fylingdales to America? For instance, do they need to simultaneously
upgrade both Fylingdales and Thule?
(Mr Hoon) My assumption is yes, otherwise they would
not have made this request.
283. What would the consequences of a negative
response in terms of our relationship with America be?
(Mr Hoon) I think that is a factor that any UK government
must take account. We have as close as is possible military and
other relationships with the United States. I indicated that the
key test, though, remained what benefit was likely to flow to
the United Kingdom and indeed to members of the NATO alliance.
That still seems to me to be the right way to approach this issue.
284. Can we say no to this now and yet still
hope to be part of a system of radars and interceptors based elsewhere
in Europe?
(Mr Hoon) That is why I have approached it in the
way that I have. It seems to me inherently unlikely that we could
say no at this stage and then in years to come, assuming more
than an emerging threat but a real threat to the United Kingdom,
then to be able to say, "Sorry, we got that wrong earlier
and we would like now to join in rather belatedly." Giving
us this option for the future is the whole point of taking this
decision in the way that we are proposing to do now.
Chairman
285. I do not suppose the special relationship
would survive for very long if we declined their request.
(Mr Hoon) I believe that it would have a negative
impact on our relationship with the United States, but I want
to assure the Committee that the overwhelming reason is the reason
that I have set out more than once now, which is the consideration
of the United Kingdom's security interests and our relationship
to the United States is obviously a vital part of that security
interest.
Mr Hancock
286. I am interested in developing that idea
because in response to Patrick's earlier question when he asked
about the cost that the United Kingdom might have to bear, you
said that one of the benefits was this enhancement was not only
of our security but that of our NATO allies in Europe. That is
only enhanced if there is an interceptor available. I had the
idea that I would look in the Pentagon's budget on missile defence.
It is amazing what you find because there is money for the upgrading
of the radar but there is no suggestion of a non-continental US
interceptor priced into their budget, so who will pay for the
increased security benefits we will get if at the end of the day
they cannot afford it?
(Mr Hoon) Let me just deal with the point about security
enhancement. I do not think I entirely agree with you that there
is no benefit from upgrading the radar. If you are a relatively
poor country and, for whatever reason, you judge it worthwhile
to develop intercontinental ballistic missile systems you must
presumably intend at some stage that it is worthwhile using those
systems rather than spending the money, for example, on feeding
your own people or providing a higher standard of living to them.
An indication by the United States and a contribution from the
United Kingdom that we intend to develop defensive systems in
order to protect our people against such an emerging threat might
well lead such a country to think that perhaps it is not at all
sensible to go down that particular route. There is a sense in
which the mere fact that we are contemplating these developments
might have a deterrent effect on other countries contemplating
such proliferation. I do not think necessarily that the enhancement
is not of significance in security terms in its own right, but
I do accept that ultimately, if there is to be such a system and
it is to have what I might describe as provable effect, it would
have to be a complete system and that complete system would obviously
involve interceptors based somewhere in order to protect the United
Kingdom. That is a judgment, as I indicated earlier, that a future
United Kingdom government would have to take in the light of the
prevailing financial and security circumstances at the time. I
cannot assume anything at this stage other than that would be
a matter for the United Kingdom government at the time to finance.
It seems to me that that would be the only proper assumption to
make at this stage.
287. You are saying a lot of good, positive
things about why we should agree to this request. Are there any
negatives that you have looked at within the Ministry of Defence
associated with agreeing with this request?
(Mr Hoon) None that is convincing.
288. Internal ones or external ones?
(Mr Hoon) I am perfectly happy for other people to
do the job of criticising the decisions I take. I do not see any
particular reason why I should do it for them.
289. If it is such a good thing and you cannot
come up with a single negative—
(Mr Hoon) I did not say that.
290. Is there a negative factor that you can
come up with?
(Mr Hoon) Of course I could but I am not going to
because I do not find them persuasive. My job is to exercise my
judgment on these questions in the best interests, as I see it,
of the security of the people of the United Kingdom. That does
not involve finding fault with the decisions that I reach, at
least not publicly.
291. We have to reserve judgment on some of
those.
(Mr Hoon) That may be your job; it is certainly not
mine.
292. Why would we bother with a debate if there
are only good things that could possibly come out of this? Why
are you fluffing and not just saying, "Yes, let's get on
with it" if you cannot think of a single negative thing?
You have sold it hook, line and sinker to everyone else. Why the
need for a debate?
(Mr Hoon) I indicated that I can think of objections.
I am simply not prepared to articulate them publicly. It is not
my job to do so. I realise Mr Hancock is a member of a political
party that is capable of holding a whole series of diverse and
inconsistent positions simultaneously, but—
293. You have taken most of them on board, Secretary
of State. When the new, upgraded radar is in place, will all of
the information supplied by that radar system be instantly available
to the United Kingdom government or will it be filtered through
the United States security system?
(Mr Hoon) That information is available to United
Kingdom personnel. On my visit to RAF Fylingdales, there was one
single, attached US officer present at the base.
Chairman
294. There was a major in the briefing.
(Mr Hoon) But this is an RAF base. It is a UK base
and the information is secured, compiled and interpreted by RAF
personnel.
Mr Hancock
295. You see that being the case in the future?
(Mr Hoon) That will continue to be the case.
296. After the upgrade is in place?
(Mr Hoon) Yes.
297. Under British control, all of it?
(Mr Hoon) Yes.
Chairman
298. When I went, I thought that there would
be the sound of American accents everywhere one went. It was quite
a relief to find it was one person.
(Mr Witney) It is one uniformed liaison officer.
Syd Rapson
299. How much of the Fylingdales work will be
resourced from UK industry?
(Mr Hoon) That I do not know the answer to, but I
know a man who does.
(Mr Witney) I do not know the answer definitively,
but I suspect unfortunately not much because in contradistinction
to the big upgrade that occurred a decade ago where a lot of construction
work and so on was involved we are talking here about hardware
and software modifications fundamentally to a US designed radar.
We have not got into that detail yet. I suspect that there will
not be a huge amount of work coming to the UK industry out of
this particular upgrade.
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