Examination of Witnesses (Questions 20-39)
THURSDAY 27 FEBRUARY 2003
DR BRYAN
WELLS, COLONEL
PHILIP ROUSE
AND MS
KATE SMITH
20. Could you hazard a guess as to why Russia
really is being difficult with Gudauta? I hear arguments from
a variety of sides. One is they simply do not want to give up
this facility for one reason or another. Therefore, they are using
what methodologies they wish in order to remain. How do you perceive
the Russian intentions on that air base?
(Ms Smith) We see it very much in the context of the
overall nexus of bilateral relations between Russia and Georgia.
There are a lot of outstanding problems between the two countries.
The issues of the bases have become wrapped up in all of those
issues and are seen as bargaining chips on both sides. That has
complicated the progress towards fulfilment of the commitments.
21. We must know what aircraft are there. I
would be amazed if satellite imagery is not able to tell at least
one of the participants of NATO and the OSCE exactly how many
and what type of aircraft are operating from Gudauta. I would
not expect you to comment on that but it does seem to me a pretty
implausible argument that they are using of security as the main
pretext for avoiding any inspections. Moving on to Moldova, what
can you do to avoid a ratification of the adaptation agreement
being held hostage by local differences between Russia and its
neighbours in Moldova?
(Dr Wells) I will start again by outlining what the
Istanbul commitments are. Russia made two commitments to Moldova
in the final Act at Istanbul. The first was to withdraw or destroy
Russian conventional armaments and treaty limited equipment by
December 2001. The destruction and withdrawal of the treaty limited
equipment was completed in November 2001 so that has been done,
but there remains a stockpile of ammunition and other equipment
at Colbasna in Transdniestr. The second commitment was to withdraw
all forces by the end of 2002. That deadline has passed and the
withdrawal has not been completed but Russia has now committed
to that withdrawal by the end of 2003.
22. What forces do they have there?
(Colonel Rouse) They have, I believe, slightly in
excess of 2,000 infantry guarding the stockpile of ammunition
and equipment.
23. Any heavy equipment?
(Colonel Rouse) No.
24. Any heavy military equipment?
(Colonel Rouse) Engineering type equipment but no
treaty limited equipment.
25. What is the government of Moldova saying
about this in terms of Transdniestr and where that fits in?
(Ms Smith) The Russian troops and ammunition that
remain in Transdniestr are one of the principal problems in the
relationship between Moldova and Russia on the whole issue of
Transdniestr and it is the Moldovan government's position that
Russia must withdraw them. At the OSCE summit in Porto in December
last year, the OSCE agreed to give Russia an extension to the
end of this year, which Russia agreed to subject to the right
conditions being there for them to complete the withdrawal.
26. Are you in a position to comment more politically,
to give us a perspective of the situation between Russia, Transdniestr
and Moldova? Can you explain more fully why it might affect what
we are talking about? Can you see any resolution of the problems?
What are we doing by way of trying to minimise the problems or
bring about some sort of solution?
(Ms Smith) I am not an expert on Moldova but I can
talk broadly about what the United Kingdom is doing. We have been
working very actively with the OSCE and the EU towards trying
to find a resolution to that problem, particularly on bringing
pressure to bear on the Transdniestrian leadership. I think today
the Justice and Home Affairs Council in the EU is due to sign
off travel restrictions on the Transdniestrian leadership. We
are taking forward the issue in a number of other contexts as
well.
27. Is there any anxiety that somebody might
use the issues that we have been talking about in Georgia, Abkhazia,
Moldova or Transdniestr to block anything that we have been talking
about? Will there be difficulties, not in ratification in this
country and passing legislation but in the OSCE? Have you had
any indications? The OSCE operates on a consensual basis where
anyone in Belarus or Moldova could play hard ball with this. Have
you had any indications of threats to delay the whole process?
(Ms Smith) Not that I am aware of. The fulfilment
of the Istanbul commitments is an issue in all states' parties
ratification processes but other than that I am not aware of anything.
Chairman: Obstreperous behaviour on the OSCE
will not necessarily be confined to the issue at hand. It could
be directed at any issue at hand.
Rachel Squire
28. We will come on to the detail of the Arms
Control Bill later but its main purpose seems to be to make the
changes in legislation needed to allow the UK to ratify the adaptation
agreement. When do you envisage the UK ratifying the agreement,
particularly given that so far only two other countries have done
so, Ukraine and Belarus? You need all 30 CFE signatories to put
it into force?
(Dr Wells) Yes. All 30 need to ratify the treaty before
it enters into force. There has been progress made over the last
three years since Istanbul in moving towards ratification. All
NATO allies are in compliance with the adapted limits and with
the Final Act of Istanbul. NATO has now agreed that Russia is
in compliance with the adapted flank limits and it is in the process
of verifying compliance of the other states parties to the adapted
limits and the Final Act. Essentially, the remaining issue is
the outstanding commitments to Moldova and Georgia that we have
already discussed. NATO has adopted a common position on this.
We are making alliance statements, for example, at the Prague
summit, on the importance of meeting those commitments to allow
all states parties to move swiftly to ratification. We are emphasising
that the adapted treaty is a good one for all states parties.
It enhances transparency on a number of fronts so we hope that
all states parties can see the benefits in moving swiftly through
the meeting of the Istanbul commitments so that we can get this
treaty ratified and into force.
29. You sound as though you are making every
effort to dovetail the UK's timetable with that of other states.
It is not that we are streets ahead and everybody else is still
at the starting point.
(Dr Wells) Although no NATO ally has yet ratified
the treaty—you said that Ukraine and Belarus have indeed
ratified—in January of this year Poland and Germany told
us that they were considering ways of introducing legislation
so that they would be in a position to ratify swiftly once conditions
were met. That is very much the position that the UK is in.
30. Can you tell us what the attitude of the
United States is towards ratification?
(Ms Smith) The United States takes a very similar
position to ourselves, that ratification must be seen in the context
of consistency with the Istanbul commitments. That is the NATO
position to which we are all signed up.
31. That sounds like a very diplomatic answer.
The United States is somewhat choosy about which treaties it ratifies
and which it does not. The United States is not known for swift
ratification of treaties and agreements. I am asking for a little
more clarification on just what their attitude is.
(Dr Wells) The United States is a signatory of Istanbul.
It is a member of the NATO alliance which has agreed the statements
on the importance of meeting Istanbul commitments to allow swift
ratification. As with all other states parties, the United States
gets a good deal out of the adapted treaty: enhanced transparency
of troop deployments, of holdings of treaty limited equipment.
And I think it is worth remembering that there are no inspections
on the land of the United States.
Jim Knight
32. You would be confident that, at the point
at which we are ready to sign it, they would sign it?
(Dr Wells) I cannot deliver the United States for
you. I can merely say that they get a good deal out of it.
Chairman
33. The US Senate does not necessarily have
views that are coterminous with those of the US administration.
If they wish to play difficult they will play difficult and much
of this could be caught up in the post-Iraq crisis, as to whether
the US thinks the Russians have been behaving properly. This is
something which is a complicated factor. Is there any urgency?
If it goes on for two years, is anybody going to have any sleepless
nights over delaying ratification?
(Dr Wells) It is fair to say that whilst ratification
is still pending we have the current CFE treaty which does allow
inspections so we can continue to inspect and verify holdings
of treaty limited equipment. It is just that the adapted treaty
is better.
34. The treaty has been working well now for
12 years and relations are infinitely better now than they were
when it was signed originally. Whilst it is important for us to
ratify, no government needs to ratify at break neck speed. We
need to be careful to see if anybody is trying to exploit any
domestic, political difficulty they have, in which case it might
be more difficult. In terms of numbers, how many have to ratify
before it becomes operational?
(Dr Wells) It is all.
(Ms Smith) That means Moldova and Georgia also have
to ratify. There is not much point in others going ahead if they
are still reluctant because of the outstanding commitment issues.
Chairman: I am really glad the OSCE parliamentary
assembly allowed Belarus back into the assembly; otherwise Belarus
might have played dirty pool.
Rachel Squire
35. The reason we are going ahead and introducing
this Bill before others have ratified it is because we think the
adaptation agreement has real benefit?
(Dr Wells) Yes. Once we reach the judgment that the
Istanbul commitments have been met, we want to be in a position
to ratify as quickly as we can.
Chairman
36. On the question of NATO doing a deal amongst
itself, is there a public document? You did mention the agreements
and documents in Prague. Could we have a look at any documents
agreed within NATO about the pace and the content of any ratification
of this update?
(Dr Wells) We can certainly undertake to do that,
yes.
Chairman: If it is sensitive, we do have facilities
to keep those documents under close supervision.
Mr Cran
37. I wonder if I can come on now to the adaptation
agreement which may be signed in the light of this Bill at some
point in the future. The question arises in our minds as a Committee,
how Parliament fits into this particular process, because the
last time this occurred in February 2000 in relation to the 1999
adaptation agreement some device was cobbled together that allowed
us to consider the adaptation agreement. What would happen this
time, particularly if quite a period of time elapses between the
Bill and the signing of the adaptation agreement?
(Dr Wells) Clause Three of the Bill provides that
the substantive provisions of the Act will come into force on
such a date as the Secretary of State appoints by statutory instrument.
It is standard practice for commencement orders for Bills that
there will be no formal requirement for parliamentary proceedings
on that statutory instrument, but I recognise that if there is
a significant passage of time we would need to consider that.
Although it is a matter for the Committee, it would be open to
the Committee to call for further evidence at that point. It would
also be open to ministers, subject to pressures of the parliamentary
timetable, to make time for a debate when we have reached the
point when we want to move ahead and ratify. That would be a matter
for ministers and business managers at the time.
38. Those were very carefully chosen words.
Is there a clear commitment there that when an adaptation agreement
is going to be signed the House of Commons would be consulted
or that Parliament would be consulted?
(Dr Wells) The Secretary of State can appoint the
day of entry into force by statutory instrument and there is no
requirement for parliamentary proceedings.
Chairman: Unlike the European Union agreements.
Mr Cran
39. You did indicate that it would be open to
ministers to make the time available if they so chose?
(Dr Wells) It would be open and that would be a matter
for ministers and business managers at the time.
Mr Cran: So we have no commitment there, have
we?
Chairman: It is very much up to us. We
have interposed ourselves in the process on a number of occasions
and there is no reason we should not again.
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