Defence and Security in the UK
9. In December 2001 we published a Report on the
Threat from Terrorism, which sought to characterise the threat
faced by the United Kingdom, its interests and the world more
widely following the events of 11 September 2001.[10]
Early in 2002 we followed up this work, as we had promised to
do, by initiating an inquiry into Defence and Security in the
UK, with the aim of monitoring how the Government, and other responsible
agencies and organisations, had been taking forward and implementing
their responses to those terrible attacks. We concluded in our
Report, published in July 2002, that, although the United Kingdom
was to some extent better placed to respond to the threat from
terrorism than it had been before 11 September 2001, there had
nonetheless been inadequate central co-ordination and direction,
and no proper and comprehensive examination of how the UK would
manage the consequences of a disaster on the scale of 11 September.
In many areas the Government had confused activity with achievement.
We pointed to the need for a strong central authority to lay down
clear criteria for the work of individual government departments
and to co-ordinate the efforts of other agencies.[11]
10. The Government's response to our Report was relatively
positive, particularly in the light of the criticisms that we
had levelled. The response described our Report as "an important
contribution to the continuing effort to strengthen the UK's defence
and security against the terrorist threat" and accepted a
number of our recommendations.[12]
We received a positive response to our concerns about the vulnerability
of communications systems to be used in an emergency.[13]
As is often the case with select committee reports, some of our
recommendations which the Government did not accept in its response
have also since been acted on to some degree. For example, although
the Government rejected our recommendations that the Civil Contingencies
Secretariat (CCS) should take on a more dynamic role as central
government's onestop shop for emergency planning issues,
the appointments of Sir David Omand as Security and Intelligence
Co-ordinator and of Susan Scholefield as new head of the CCS are
hopeful signs that the Government intends to raise the Secretariat's
profile and strengthen its relationships with local agencies.
11. We are pursuing our recommendations on the use
of the Reserve Forces in home defence and of military support
for civilian emergency operations in our inquiry into the New
Chapter of the SDR. We followed up our comments in the Report
on Quick Reaction Alert Aircraft with a visit to RAF Marham in
November 2002. We have a continuing interest in seeing civil contingencies
legislation brought before Parliament soon. Our Chairman wrote
to Lord Macdonald of Tradeston in November, expressing our disappointment
that there was no mention of a civil contingencies bill in the
Queen's Speech, and restating the continuing and urgent need for
such legislation. We will continue to press for its early introduction
and hope to have the opportunity to scrutinise such legislation
in draft.
12. Our inquiry into Defence and Security in the
UK was on a much larger scale than those usually carried out by
the Defence Committee, and it ranged well outside the usual purview
of the Ministry of Defence. We were grateful for the consent and
co-operation of those select committees on whose territory we
were trespassing. We held in total twelve formal evidence sessions,
and held numerous informal meetings, either where we lacked the
time and opportunity to take formal evidence, or where the subject
matter was too sensitive for formal evidence to be proceeded with.
We also carried out visits within the United Kingdom, to the Atomic
Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston, to HM Naval Base Clyde,
Rosyth Dockyard and the Scottish Executive, and to RAF Coningsby.
The witnesses at our final evidence session were three ministers
from three different Government Departments: an unprecedented
occurrence, to the best of our knowledge. Our Report was by far
the most substantial produced by us during the current Parliament.
Missile Defence
13. We held two evidence sessions on the subject
of Missile Defence in February and March 2002, the first with
officials from the MoD, the second with the Secretary of State.[14]
These sessions were prompted in part by our concern that the Government
was failing to initiate a public debate on the virtues or otherwise
of a missile defence system at a time when, as it was being widely
speculated, the US authorities were likely to request the use
of British facilities for just such a system. We had visited Washington
in February 2002, and had clearly seen the determination of the
US Administration to press ahead with its missile defence development
programmes. During our evidence session with the Secretary of
State on 20 March, we tried, without success, to persuade him
that it was time to encourage a public debate on the issues surrounding
missile defence in the UK, including how we should respond to
the inevitable request from the USA to use British bases for their
programme. This was particularly urgent in our view in the context
of having been told in the USA that the upgrading of RAF Fylingdales
would have to begin in 2003 if the US Administration was to meet
its interim missile defence capability for 2004-08. The Secretary
of State stuck to the line that in the absence of a specific request
from the Americans, there was in effect nothing to talk about.
It was not our most constructive session.
14. However, in December the MoD published a discussion
paper, which explored whether the UK itself had a need for missile
defence as well as how we might respond to any US request to use
our facilities. And later in the same month the Secretary of State
announced in a written statement to the House that a request had
been received.[15] We
are therefore now returning to the issues, as we announced in
a press notice of 18 December. We believe that the MoD was wrong
to let the best part of a year go by without engaging with this
very important and very sensitive subject. There is a risk now
that the debate will suffer from being rushed and also that positions
will have become more entrenched.
1 As approved by the Liaison Committee on 20 June 2002,
pursuant to the Resolution of the House of Commons of 14 May 2002
on Modernisation of the House of Commons. Back
2 Once
published, these will be available online at the parliamentary
website, www.parliament.uk Back
3 Third
Report from the Committee, Session 2001-02, Ministry of Defence
Reviews of Armed Forces' Pension and Compensation Arrangements
(HC 666), Summary. Back
4 Fifth
Special Report from the Committee, Session 2001-02 (HC 1115). Back
5 HC
188-i (2002-03). Back
6 eg.
Seventh Report from the Committee, Session 1999-2000, Gulf
Veterans' Illnesses (HC 125). Back
7 Seventh
Report from the Committee, Session 2001-02, The Future of NATO
(HC 914). Back
8 Eighth
Special Report from the Committee, Session 2001-02 (HC 1231). Back
9 HC
1232-i and -ii (2001-02). Back
10 Second
Report from the Committee, Session 2001-02, The Threat from
Terrorism (HC 348). Back
11 Sixth
Report from the Committee, Session 2001-02, Defence and Security
in the UK (HC 518), Summary. Back
12 Seventh
Special Report from the Committee, Session 2001-02 (HC 1230),
paragraph 1. Back
13 HC
1230 (2001-02), paragraph 38. Back
14 HC
644-i and -ii (2001-02). Back
15 HC
Deb, 17 December 2002, Col. 45-46WS. Back
