APPENDIX
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO HCDC'S
FIRST REPORT OF SESSION 200203 ON MISSILE DEFENCE
1. The Government welcomes the Committee's Report
and its main conclusion that the United Kingdom Government should
agree to the US Government's request for the proposed upgrade
to the facilities at RAF Fylingdales for missile defence purposes.
It is convinced that it is in the best interests of the UK that
we retain options for the future development and possible acquisition
of missile defences, subject to further examination of the complex
issues involved. RAF Fylingdales will be an important element
in the US programme for both developmental and operational use,
and would be a key building block in any extended missile defence
that might give protection to the UK and Europe. By agreeing to
this upgrade, the Government believes it will ultimately enhance
the security of the UK and the NATO Alliance.
On 17 December 2002, the US Government requested
an upgrade of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System station
at RAF Fylingdales, to allow it to be used for missile defence
purposes. We deplore the manner in which the public debate on
that issue of the upgrade has been handled by the Ministry of
Defence. It has shown no respect for either the views of those
affected locally by the decision or for the arguments of those
opposed to the upgrade in principle.
2. The Government does not accept the suggestion
that the Ministry of Defence has shown no respect for the views
of opponents of the upgrade or those affected locally. The MOD
published a discussion paper on 9 December, to which it has received
a large number of responses. The Defence Secretary has attended
public meetings in North Yorkshire to hear local views, and officials
have maintained close contact with local planning authorities
to keep them informed of plans and to listen to their views. The
MOD also responds to large numbers of letters on the subject.
The Government has encouraged full and effective Parliamentary
and public discussion of the issues raised. There have been many
opportunities for MPs and members of the public to make their
views known, including through a MOD website and email address.
The Defence Secretary described work in the United States on missile
defence in the House on 17 October 2002 and made an oral Statement
on 15 January. There was further opportunity for Parliamentary
debate on 22 January. The MOD has assisted the Committee's present
inquiry, to which the Defence Secretary gave evidence in March
2002 and again in January 2003.
We believe that it is incumbent on the MOD to
publish as much of the detail of the request as it is able to.
For example, more information could be published on the timescale
for the upgrade and for its incorporation into the US missile
defence system and how the system would be able to track missiles.
Such additional information should also address radiation emissions
and other local concerns.
3. In evidence to the Committee and in other
fora, the MOD has indicated that it will provide a report to the
local planning authority giving details of the upgrade and its
timescale and providing information about radar emissions and
other environmental aspects. Although the essential details are
already clear to MOD, further site surveys and exchanges of information
with the US are necessary before the full details can be presented.
On the basis of current information, we expect that this evidence
will demonstrate that no formal process of planning consultation
is necessary. The MOD report will be in a form that the Authority
may make public if it so chooses.
We see no reason to believe that agreeing to this
upgrade will lead inevitably to further development or deployment
at Fylingdales itself, or indeed elsewhere in the UK. But that
agreement to the US request does represent at least a step or
two down the path towards active participation in Missile Defence.
4. The Government has been at pains to point
out that the upgrade of the radar at RAF Fylingdales does not
imply that any further development of this or any other site will
be undertaken. In evidence, it has explained, for instance, how
US plans for XBand radars are not settled, and are tending
towards a seabased deployment option indeed the US
is already building such a platform as part of its missile defence
test bed. The Government has also made clear that decisions on
deployment of missile defences to protect US friends and allies,
including ground based interceptors, are some way off. The upgrade
is a discrete proposition which does not commit the UK to any
deeper involvement in the deployment of missile defences, although
it gives the Government options to do so, should it decide on
that at a later date. Separately, the MOD intends to agree a new
technical Memorandum of Understanding with the United States,
which would give it full insight into the development of the US
missile defence programme and provide the opportunity for UK industry
to benefit from participation. But any UK acquisition of missile
defence would be subject to a separate decision, at the relevant
time. The Government will approach this issue in stages, considering
each step in the light of how both the threat and how the relevant
technologies evolve.
We do not believe that the opponents of missile
defence strengthen their case by resorting to allegations about
hidden US motives. The United States of America is one of the
UK's closest allies. We share many of the same values, both political
and ethical. We prefer to judge American intentions on the basis
of their official statements about the purpose of its missile
defence programme. We do not assume that there must be some more
or less sinister ulterior motive behind their request to upgrade
Fylingdales.
5. The Government agrees. Missile defences are
just that: defences. They threaten noone. This capability
would need to be used only if a ballistic missile has actually
been fired. Once such a missile is in the air, and threatening
a devastating impact, it is unthinkable that anyone could not
want to be in a position to shoot it down.
We very much welcome the MOD's approach of putting
its case to the planning authorities in a form that could be made
public. Those who will need persuading that the local impact of
the upgrade will not be significant extend beyond the planning
authorities. It would seem that many of the concerns raised by
various groups spring from a misplaced apprehension that the UK
will inevitably field the full panoply of the Missile Defence
system, and an exaggerated view of health hazards that might be
caused by the proposed upgrade. But the MOD has not done as much
as it could to present the full facts and explain carefully how
such misgivings are misplaced. The MOD must now grasp this opportunity
to clarify Fylingdales' role and its environmental impact.
6. As indicated in response to Recommendation
(ii), the MOD will provide a detailed report on the upgrade in
a form that could be made public. This will address the issue
of perceived health hazards, on which earlier material has already
been provided to the local planning authority and to the Committee.
The MOD will also continue to explain publicly the continuing
role of RAF Fylingdales and the Government's approach to future
decisions on missile defence relating to the UK. The Government's
efforts to promote local consultation and explanation were described
above [Recommendation (i)]; it considers that the whole process
has been conducted with particular openness.
If the UK wishes to keep its options open on a
possible missile defence for the UK, it is clearly in our interests
to respond positively to the present request. Furthermore, we
do not believe that the UK, or the Fylingdales area, would face
any material additional risks from the upgrade, in terms either
of health risks from radiation or an increased likelihood of potential
attackers identifying Fylingdales as a target. Nor do we believe
that arguments that missile defence may cause international instability
provide compelling grounds for rejecting the US request.
- The Government welcomes the Committee's conclusion
that the UK, including North Yorkshire, would not face any material
additional health or security risks arising from the upgrade.
The security interests of the United Kingdom are already closely
identified with those of the US and other NATO allies, and this
will not change regardless of decisions on missile defence. The
Government also believes that any increased threat to RAF Fylingdales
itself is negligible. For the foreseeable future, states of concern
are very unlikely to have the sophisticated capability or size
of arsenal to consider targeting specific points or military installations.
Long range missiles in their hands will essentially be weapons
of terror. On the issue of international stability, missile defence
is not intended to defend against responsible states with established
strategic forces. Its aim is to tackle limited threats from states
of concern with emergent missile capabilities, which seek to acquire
and threaten to use ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction
in contravention of widely accepted international norms. The proliferation
threat is not new; missile defence is a response to, not the cause
of, the problem.
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