End-use monitoring
116. End use is perhaps the most important factor
that the Government takes into account when deciding whether to
grant a licence. The Government needs to reassure itself that
the equipment is likely to be sent to the stated user and not
elsewhere, that the stated user is likely to keep the equipment,
not to pass it on, and that the stated user is likely to employ
the equipment responsibly. The Government "believes that
the surest way to prevent UK arms ending up in the wrong hands
is to examine export licences applications carefully at the pre
licensing stage and to refuse an export licence when there is
an unacceptable risk of diversion or misuse". We agree. We
also believe, however, that the Government should adopt a targeted
system of end-use monitoring to verify the proper use of goods
after they have been exported.
117. Saferworld, in its memorandum, makes a case
for a system of end-use monitoring which is "prioritised
to those countries and for those transfers that are in most danger
of diversion or misuse, through a targeted use of limited resources
against a matrix of likely risk factors, as is the case in the
US".[143]
As Saferworld explains:
Since 1990, the US has had in place a systematic
end use pre export screening and post export monitoring programme
for commercial sales of controlled items. The Blue Lantern programme,
administered by the Department of State, uses a system of 20 specific
criteria or red flags (for example the requested equipment does
not match the known requirements or inventory of the foreign end
user) and reporting by embassies, intelligence and law enforcement
agencies to highlight risks of diversion.[144]
We do not necessarily believe that the Blue Lantern
Programme can or should be imported wholesale into the United
Kingdom; but it does show that other countries operate targeted
systems of end-use monitoring, and apparently believe them to
be useful.
118. In our last Report, we recommended that "the
Government should consider the production of clear guidelines
for, and clarification of, the circumstances under which end use
monitoring should be undertaken".[145]
The Government told us in response that "we do not consider
that it is either practical or useful to monitor the end use of
all military goods exported from the UK over their lifetime with
the end user, particularly where we have already satisfied ourselves
of the end user's integrity before issuing a licence".[146]
This is to miss the point: we have never asked the Government
to monitor the end use of all military goods, but rather
to monitor in a targeted way the use of a small fraction of military
exports.
119. In its response to our last Report, the Government
also told us a little about the steps that it takes to monitor
exports after they have been delivered:
Last year the Government examined its procedures
on end-user verification and end-use monitoring. We assured ourselves
that licensing officials systematically consider whether there
is a need for Posts to carry out checks on end-users when considering
Export Licence Applications (ELAs), and also consider whether
follow-up monitoring would add value to our efforts to minimise
the risk of diversion. We also ensured that procedures are in
place to encourage best practice in this area of risk assessment,
including taking into account or seeking information on these
issues from civil society. In addition, our Posts overseas have
standing instructions to watch out for and report on any misuse
of UK-origin defence equipment in the countries that they cover,
and to feed that information into the export licensing process.
One of the results of this exercise was the refinement of internal
guidance on the practicalities of end-use checks and end-use monitoring.
[147]
120. While this tells us something about the procedures
that the Government follows, it also suggests a rather haphazard
approach to end-use monitoring. If civil society reports misuse
of equipment, then news of it may get back to the British Government.
Posts overseas may have standing instructions to watch out for
misuse of UK-origin equipment, but a standing instruction suggests
that it is not normal to ask posts to investigate how specific
equipment is used.
121. When we asked the Foreign Secretary under what
circumstances overseas posts are asked to carry out end-use monitoring,
he told us "when we get information about this", which
also suggests a reactive rather than a proactive response.[148]
Mr Dowse seemed to give a different answer:
There are specific circumstances. In some circumstances
it is not unknown for a particular condition to be put onto a
licence as to the circumstances in which the item can be used,
and in those circumstances—I know they are fairly specialised—we
do try to do what we can to ensure that the conditions are met.[149]
But this was again contradicted by more recent evidence,
in which the Government writes that "there are no defined
specific circumstances when end-use monitoring takes place".[150]
122. We have discovered, however, that "guidance
is issued to overseas posts and to the desk officers who consider
approval of the licence application. This guidance sets out circumstances
in which end-use monitoring should be considered".[151]
Even if there are no defined specific circumstances in which end
use monitoring takes place, it seems that there are perhaps defined
specific circumstances in which it is considered. We recommend
that the Government provide us, in confidence if necessary, with
a copy of the guidance issued to overseas posts and desk officers
on the circumstances in which end-use monitoring should be considered.
It may be that this guidance is evidence of precisely the sort
of policy that we are asking the Government to implement.
123. It is true that end-use monitoring after an
export has occurred is not the most effective way of preventing
the misuse of equipment. It can, however, inform future licensing
decisions, and decisions on whether to allow the export of spare
parts. A recipient of defence exports is also perhaps more likely
to use these exports responsibly if he knows that this use may
be monitored.
124. The Government has provided us in confidence
with information on a few instances of end-use monitoring that
have been carried out by British posts overseas. It points out
that "there is no database of end-use monitoring and so it
is impossible to say in how many countries end-use monitoring
occurred in 2001". It also claims that "most end-use
monitoring shows that UK arms exports are not being misused, and
as such this goes unreported".[152]
125. In every case but one that the Government has
been able to identify, end-use monitoring has investigated whether
the use of equipment supplied from the UK has been consistent
with international human rights standards. This suggests that
end-use monitoring, in so far as it takes place, is largely incorporated
into the responsibility of diplomatic posts for general human
rights monitoring. While this is clearly an important consideration,
posts overseas should also be used to ensure not only that military
equipment is being used as intended, but also that it is being
used by those who were intended to use it. We recommend that
one of the central purposes of end-use monitoring should be to
ensure that the Government is made aware when military goods exported
from the United Kingdom have been diverted to unintended third
parties.
Open licensing
126. Our predecessor Committees examined suspicions
that the Government was using open licensing (OIELs) in an increasing
range of circumstances as an alternative to single licences (SIELs)—which
are inherently more transparent and a stricter form of regulation.[153]
The Government denied that any policy shift had occurred,[154]
and the Committees concluded that the statistics did not suggest
any evidence of such a change.[155]
In its reply, the Government stated that it "welcomes the
Committee's assessment that there is no evidence of a change in
policy on the use of OIELs and reiterates its repudiation of such
allegations".[156]
127. Although the number of OIELs issued in 2001
showed a slight increase on the previous year, both in real terms,
and as a percentage of all licences issued, this was not statistically
significant enough to indicate any change in policy.[157]
However, evidence to us from a major group representing British
defence exporters has cast doubt on the Government's claims that
there has been no change in policy on the use of OIELs. The British
Defence Manufacturers' Export Licensing Group has:
welcomed the efforts at improved efficiency that
the Government has made in recent years to reduce the bureaucratic
burden associated with export controls, both on itself and Industry,
whilst in no way undermining the effectiveness of the UK's export
control system, mainly through increasing the scope of open licensing.[158]
128. We conclude that it is curious that industry
recognises that there has been an increase in the scope of open
licensing, given that the Government has consistently denied that
this is the case.
118 Ev 3, Q 9 Back
119
Cm 5629, p 1 Back
120
Ev 3, Q 10 Back
121
Cm 5629, p 1 Back
122
Ev 48 Back
123
Ev 3, Q 7 Back
124
2001 Annual Report, pp 369-370 Back
125
See also HC (1999-2000) 225, para 75 Back
126
2001 Annual Report, p 371 Back
127
Ev 30. The Al Hussein project was formed within the Disposal Services
Agency of the MoD to facilitate the transfer of surplus Challenger
I Main Battle tanks, together with a support package of equipment,
to the Jordanian armed forces. Back
128
Ev 30 Back
129
Cm 4872, p 9 Back
130
Except for gifts which appear in the UN Arms Register Back
131
Letter from the Minister of State for the Armed Forces to Llew
Smith MP, dated 15 January 2003 Back
132
Ev 12, Q 71 Back
133
Ibid, Q 72 Back
134
Ev 9, Q 44 Back
135
Ev 49. Back
136
Ev 9, Q 43 Back
137
HC (2001-02) 718, para 133 Back
138
HC Deb 26 September 2002, Col 309-310W Back
139
HC Deb 26 September 2002, Col 310W Back
140
Ev 37 Back
141
Cm 5629, p 10 Back
142
HC Deb 26 September 2002, Col 311W Back
143
Ev 41 Back
144
Ev 45 Back
145
HC (2001-02) 718, para 97 Back
146
Cm 5629, p 8 Back
147
Cm 5629, p 7 Back
148
Ev 8, Q 39 Back
149
Ibid Back
150
Ev 49 Back
151
Ibid Back
152
Ibid Back
153
HC (2001-02) 718, paras 99-101 Back
154
Ibid, para 100 Back
155
Ibid, para 101 Back
156
Cm 5629, p 8 Back
157
1998: 566 OIELs, 9869 SIELs (5.73%); 1999: 449 OIELs, 8967 SIELs
(5.01%); 2000: 419 OIELs, 8371 SIELs (5.01%); 2001: 511 OIELs,
8105 SIELs (6.30%). Back
158
HC (2002-2003) 620, Ev 33 Back
